OPINION
Opinion By
This is аn appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment affirming the Texas Workforce Commission’s decision to deny Joseph A. Murray unemployment benefits. Murray raises six issues generally contending the TWC’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and he was denied due process of law before his termination. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude thе summary judgment was proper. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.
Joseph Murray was employed as a resource operations analyst by Comm South Companies. Comm South used a progressive disciplinary system to address absences and tardiness. On January 31, 2002, Murray signed an employee warning notice acknowledging and agreeing with the company’s statement that he had acсumulated a fourth tardiness violation on January 16, 2002 and a fifth violation on January 18. Murray also acknowledged that he had read and understood Comm South’s warning that “any further tardy [sic] could lead tо further disciplinary action and/or termination.”
On February 21, Comm South issued Murray another warning notice regarding a tardiness violation on February 14. Murray again signed the notice agreeing with the company’s statement that he had been tardy and that he had been informed that any further violations could lead to disciplinary action or termination. Rather than discipline or terminatе Murray after his sixth violation, however, Murray’s supervisor recommended that Murray change his work schedule to allow him “some cushion” in the time by which he was to report to work. Murray wrote on the warning notice that he had adjusted his morning schedule to allow him to arrive at work promptly.
On March 8, 2002, Murray was late returning from lunch. According to an affidavit signed by Brenda Gillard, the administrative services manager for Comm South, this incident exceeded the number of tardiness violations permitted under the company’s disciplinary system. As a result, Murray was discharged from his employment with Comm South.
Murrаy applied for unemployment benefits, but his request was denied by the Texas Workforce Commission. In its written decision, the TWC stated that it found
The TWC and Comm South filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing the TWC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The defendants submitted summary judgment evidence including the signed warning notices, Murray’s monthly attendance record, and Gillard’s affidavit testimony. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Murray brought this appeal.
II.
A TWC decision regarding benefit payments carries a presumption of validity.
See Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt,
In his first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues on appeal, Murray contends there is no substantial evidence to support the TWC’s decision that he was not entitled to receive unemployment benefits because thеre is no evidence that he violated the company’s attendance policy or committed misconduct.
See
Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 207.044 (West 2006). “Misconduct” is defined by the Texas Unemployment Comрensation Act to include the “violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees.”
See id.
§ 201.012. An attendance policy is a policy “adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees.”
See Lairson v. Texas Emp’t Comm’n,
Murray argues the evidence does not support a finding that he violated Comm South’s attendance policy because, according to Murray, the attendance policy allowed for twelve instances of tardiness in a twelve-month period and he did not exceed that number. Comm South concedes that its original attendance policy allowed for twelve instances of tardiness. The company submitted evidence, however, showing that it amended the policy to reduce the allowable number of tardiness violations to five. Comm South аlso submitted evidence showing that Murray acknowledged receiving the amendments over one year before he was fired. The form Murray signed on February 22, 2001 specifically states that he had received, read, and understood Comm South’s then effective attendance policy. In addition, the evidence shows that Murray signed warning notices following his fifth and sixth tardiness violations stating thаt he understood that any further violations of the attendance policy could lead to his termination. This evidence is sufficient to
Murray further argues that his tardiness did not affect his job performance and, therefore, cannot be considered misconduct. The statutory definition of “misconduct” requires only that the employee violate a rule or policy adoрted to ensure orderly work or safety. There is no requirement that the employer show the violation negatively affected the employee’s work.
See
Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 201.012. We decline tо expand the definition of “misconduct” beyond the plain wording of the statute.
See Haas v. Texas Emp’t Comm'n
In addition, Murray contends his violation of the attendance policy should not be considered misconduct because the policy is unreasonable.
See Lairson,
Finally, Murray contends the evidence is insufficient because “some of the key documents submitted by the employer aren’t signed or missing (sic) and the time sheet with the alleged tardy has the time hand written.” Murray does not identify what “key documents” are missing. The only unsigned document he identifies is his Monthly Attendance Record for the month of January. The Monthly Attendance Record was signеd by a representative of Comm South but not by Murray. Although Murray did not sign the attendance record, he does not dispute the two tardiness violations noted on the form. Furthermore, these are the same tardiness violations Murray acknowledged when he signed the employee warning notice on January 31, 2002.
The time sheet reflecting Murray’s final tardiness violation has Murray’s signature at the bottom. Although the violation is detailed in a handwritten notation that specifies the time Murray left for lunch and the time he returned, the printed portion of the sheet states that he took morе than his allotted time for lunch. Additionally, Murray does not deny that this tardiness violation occurred. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the TWC’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. We resolve Murray’s first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues against him.
In his second issue, Murray contends he was denied due process of law because Comm South failed to administer properly its own attendance policy and .terminated him without proper notice. In making this argument, Murray again relies on his assertion that the company’s attendance policy allowed twelve incidents of tardiness in a twelve-month period. As stated above, Comm South produced evidence that its policy was amended to reduce the allowable incidents of tardiness to no more than five. Comm South also produced evidence that Murray was aware of this change, that he was warned twice after his fifth tardiness violation of the possibility that he would be terminated if hе incurred any further violations, and that the company allowed him to change his schedule in an attempt to help him avoid further violations. Murray makes no argument showing that he was prevеnted from receiving a
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the TWC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and Murray was not denied due process of law. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.