Thоmas L. Murphy appeals from the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of his complaint for breach of a contract of title insurance issued by Ticor Title Insurance Company (Ticor) and the denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. Finding no error, we affirm.
The following facts are not disputed. On January 21, 1987, Murphy and his father, Carl L. Murphy, purchased 85 acres of land in Franklin County.
The printed first page of the policy provides:
Subject to the exclusions from coverage, the exceptions contained in schеdule B and the provisions of the conditions and stipulations hereof, Ticor ... insures, as of date of policy shown in schedule A, [January 28, 1987] against lоss or damage ... by reason of:. . . (3) [l]ack of a right of access to and from the land; or (4) [ujnmarketability of title.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The printed Schedule of Exclusions frоm Coverage states: “The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy:... (3) [djefects, liens, encumbranсes, adverse claims, or other matters . . . (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy[.]” (Emphasis supplied.)
The following terms when used in this policy meаn: . . . (d) “land”: the land described, specifically or by reference in Schedule A and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real property; provided, however, the term “land” does not include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically desсribed or referred to in Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or watеrways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by this policy.
Schedule A, attached to the title insurance policy, the substantive contents of which are typed into a form, also reflects that the land referred to in the policy includes “ALSO CONVEYED: Right-of-way and easement for ingress and egress over the road presently existing.”
In 2007, a neighbor on Lakeview Lane, who is not a party to this action, blocked Murphy’s access to his property by putting up posts, a gate, chains and locks across Lakeview Lane. Murphy notified Tiсor’s agent and wrote a letter to the landowner, who removed the obstruction. In June 2009, Murphy again found his access fully obstructed by the same nеighbor’s posts, gates, chains and locks. Murphy again notified Ticor of the loss of his right of access and made a claim for the reduction in the property’s marketability and market value in excess of $50,000. Ticor, by letter of November 12, 2009, denied Murphy’s claim because the neighbor’s actions occurred after January 28, 1987, the date of purchase.
1. Murphy’s first enumeration of error is that the trial court failed to apply rules оf construction applicable to insurance contracts in making its determination. The second enumeration is that the trial court did not аddress ambiguities in the contract and construe them in favor of Murphy. They are addressed together.
Under Georgia law, insurance compаnies are generally free to set the terms of their policies as they see fit so long as they do not violate the law or judicially cоgnizable public policy. Thus, a carrier may agree to insure against certain risks while declining to insure against others. In construing an*100 insurance policy, we begin, as with any contract, with the text of the contract itself.4
One of the most well-established rules of contract construction is thаt the contract must be construed as a whole, “and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any pаrt.”
“As with any insurance policy, we construe the policy exclusions most strongly against the insurer and in favor of providing the indemnity sought. The policy’s tеrms are also construed as reasonably understood by an insured.”
[W]hen faced with a conflict over covеrage, a trial court must first determine, as a matter of law, whether the relevant policy language is ambiguous. A policy which is susceptible tо two reasonable meanings is not ambiguous if the trial court can resolve the conflicting interpretations by applying the rules of contract construction. Where a term of a policy of insurance is susceptible to two or more reasonable constructions, and the resulting ambiguity cannot be resolved, the term will be strictly construed against the insurer as the drafter and in favor of the insured.8
As noted by the trial court, “[a] policy of title insurance has been defined as the opinion of the insurer concerning the validity of title, backed by an agreement to make that opinion good if it should prove to be mistaken and a loss should result in consequence.”
There is no allegation that, in 1987, there were any defects in the title conveyed to the Murphys and insured by Ticor as of thаt date.
2. Based on our discussion in Division 1, we find Murphy’s remaining three enumerations of error without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Johnson v. E. A. Mann & Co.,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Welch v. Ga. Dept. of Transp.,
Carl Murphy deeded his interest in the property to appellant prior to initiation of the current litigation.
(Footnotes omitted.) Reed v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
OCGA § 13-2-2 (4). Fix v. McAllister,
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Matrix Finanсial Sues. Corp.,
(Footnote omitted.) Harkins v. Progressive Gulf Ins. Co.,
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hays v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Green v. Sams,
(Citation omitted.) Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co.,
We also note that there is no evidence to show that Murphy does not still have the legal right to use the easement, only that a neighbor is interfering with it.
White v. Lawyers Title-Ins. Corp.,