CONRAD MURPHY VS. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.
SJC-13437
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
December 14, 2023
GAZIANO, J.
Suffolk. October 2, 2023. Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
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Parole. Sex Offender. Commissioner of Correction. Constitutional Law, Parole, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Parole, Sex offender, Commitment. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Civil commitment, Action in nature of certiorari. Statute, Construction.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 15, 2022.
The case was heard by Catherine H. Ham, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Mary P. Murray for the defendants.
Matthew J. Koes for the plaintiff.
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
GAZIANO, J. The issues before this court stem from a policy of the Department of Correction (DOC) declaring that civilly committed individuals categorically are ineligible for medical parole under
1. Background. a. Criminal case. The plaintiff was convicted of indecent assault and battery in September 1987. After two additional convictions for sexually violent conduct, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to charges of mayhem, indecent assault and battery, assault with intent to rape, armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in December 1989. The 1989 convictions arose from an incident in which the plaintiff induced a sixteen year old girl to enter his apartment, beat her with a hammer, threatened to kill her, and sexually assaulted her. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of from fourteen to seventeen years on the convictions of mayhem, assault with intent to rape, and armed assault with intent to murder; a concurrent term of from three to five years on the conviction of indecent assault and battery; and a term of from eight to ten years, suspended with three years of probation, on the conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.
b. Civil commitment. Near the end of the plaintiff‘s sentence, the Commonwealth moved to commit him as a sexually dangerous person. The plaintiff was adjudged to be a sexually dangerous person on August 6, 2010, and civilly committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for a period of from one day to life. See
The plaintiff sought review of the DOC‘s denial in the Superior Court pursuant to
The defendants timely appealed from the judge‘s decision to the Appeals Court. Thereafter, the judge granted a request by the defendants to stay her order, pending the defendants’ appeal. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.
2. Discussion. The plaintiff appeals from the denial of medical parole under
a. Applicable law.
Once an individual is found to be a sexually dangerous person, that individual may be released from civil commitment only after a finding that the individual no longer is sexually dangerous. See Conlan v. Commonwealth, 383 Mass. 871, 872 (1981). See also
Once a sexually dangerous person files a § 9 petition, the judge then orders examination of the petitioner by two qualified examiners. See
If both qualified examiners opine that an individual is no longer sexually dangerous, that individual must be discharged; if at least one qualified examiner instead opines that an individual remains sexually dangerous, a trial is held on the § 9 petition. See LeSage, 488 Mass. at 180. If the matter proceeds to trial, the qualified examiner reports are admissible at trial.
Petitioners may move the court to expedite the date of the § 9 hearing, which the court then may allow pursuant to its inherent authority. See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 491 Mass. 369, 372-373 (2023) (courts have wide discretion on setting timeline for when case goes to trial); Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 469 Mass. 690, 699 (2014) (“courts possess inherent power to ‘manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases‘” [citation omitted]). See also Rule 20(2)(c), (3) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018) (parties may request “[i]mmediate scheduling of a prompt and firm trial date“).
Different factors motivated the Legislature in enacting the medical parole statute in 2018. Specifically, the Legislature was concerned with several trends, notably, “the aging prison population, the rising cost of health care, and the fact that elderly infirm prisoners are ‘considered among the least likely to re-offend when released‘” (citation omitted). Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 21 (2020). See Harmon v. Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 472 (2021). Under the medical parole statute, prisoners are eligible for medical parole if they are either terminally ill or permanently incapacitated. See
b. Statutory interpretation. The issue before this court is whether the medical parole statute applies to civilly committed sexually dangerous persons. This is not the first time we have been called on to interpret the medical parole statute for purposes of determining its applicability to a particular class of persons. In Harmon, 487 Mass. at 478, we addressed whether the medical parole statute applied to pretrial detainees. We held it did not. Id. at 481. We began with examining the statute‘s plain language and found the term “prisoner” ambiguous. Id. at 479. After considering the Legislature‘s intent in enacting this statute, we held that the “most important term” in the statute was not “prisoner” but, rather, “parole.” Id. Based on the ordinary definition of parole, we held that the medical parole statute applied only to prisoners eligible for ordinary parole. Id. at 480.4 We further reasoned that because pretrial detainees had an alternative avenue to seek relief, this interpretation was consistent with the purpose underlying the medical parole statute. See id. (Legislature was concerned with aging prison population whose sole recourse for release was executive clemency).
Our interpretation of the medical parole statute in Harmon controls the outcome here. Simply put, sexually dangerous persons
487 Mass. at 480. See Chapman, 482 Mass. at 297 (former sexually dangerous person released from civil commitment based on qualified examiners’ findings that his age and medical condition rendered him no longer sexually dangerous). Accordingly, because civilly committed sexually dangerous persons are categorically ineligible for medical parole under
c. Substantive due process. The judge concluded in her order, and the plaintiff argues on appeal, that the plaintiff‘s substantive due process rights were violated when the DOC failed to consider the plaintiff‘s medical parole petition on its merits. It bears noting at the outset that we have repeatedly held that the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons under the SDP statute does not violate substantive due process under the State or Federal constitution. See Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 166 (2004) (“we conclude that the confinement of [a sexually dangerous person] is narrowly tailored to the Legislature‘s expressed interest in protecting the public from harm by persons convicted of sexual offenses who are likely to be sexually dangerous“). See also LeSage, 488 Mass. at 181, 190; Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 192-193 (2018); Bruno, 432 Mass. at 504. Neither does the categorical ineligibility of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons to petition for medical parole under
“Substantive due process prohibits governmental conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or infringes on rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty‘” (citation omitted). G.F., 479 Mass. at 191. The nature of the right at stake determines the standard of review we apply. See Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 226, 231 (2022). Because the process outlined in § 9 infringes on a fundamental right -- freedom from physical restraint -- we apply strict scrutiny. Id. See Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 55 (2022). To withstand strict scrutiny, “government conduct that infringes on a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling and legitimate government interest.” LeSage, 488 Mass. at 181. See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 491 Mass. 390, 401-402 (2023). The government interest animating the SDP statute is the protection of the public from harm by persons likely to be sexually dangerous. See LeSage, supra at 181-182. See also Bruno, 432 Mass. at 504 (SDP statute reflects “Legislature‘s concern with protecting the public from harm by persons who are soon to be released and who are likely to be sexually dangerous“).
The judge held that § 9 violates the plaintiff‘s substantive due process rights due to both the plaintiff‘s inability to petition for release solely based on his medical condition and the length of time the plaintiff must wait to be heard on his § 9 petition. We disagree. If a sexually dangerous person can show that his medical condition is so compromised that he no longer is sexually dangerous, § 9 provides that such an individual will be released. For instance, in Chapman, 482 Mass. at 297, a sexually dangerous person was found no longer sexually dangerous due to “the combination of [his] age and his deteriorating physical condition resulting in him no longer being able to manage independently.” Moreover, the plaintiff may seek expedited review of a decision denying release based on terminal illness or physical or mental incapacity.5 See part 2.a, supra.
3. Conclusion. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that civilly committed sexually dangerous persons categorically are ineligible for medical parole under
So ordered.