Moulton v. StateMoulton v. State
SPAIN, J.
Claimant was sentenced in 2000 to a prison term of 3½ years upon his guilty plea to the crime of robbery in the first degree. While the sentencing court did not impose or address the mandatory postrelease supervision (hereinafter PRS) (
Almost two weeks after Garner, a parole revocation hearing was reportedly held in this matter on May 12, 2008, after which claimant‘s parole was revoked based upon a finding that he had violated his DOCS-imposed PRS, notwithstanding claims raised by his counsel at the hearing that the administratively imposed PRS was a nullity under Garner.3 He was then sentenced to prison for the remaining 11 months of his term, where he
The Court of Claims erred in dismissing claimant‘s false imprisonment cause of action because his parole violation prosecution and confinement after Garner were not privileged; defendant is not entitled to immunity for incarcerating claimant on a parole violation premised upon an administratively-imposed PRS that was known to be a nullity under controlling law. On defendant‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “the [claim] is liberally construed, the facts alleged [in the claim and any submission submitted in opposition to the dismissal motions] are accepted as true, [claimant is] accorded every favorable inference and the court determines only whether the facts alleged in the [claim] ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory‘” (Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).
To establish a claim for false imprisonment, claimant needs to show that defendant intended to confine him, that he was conscious of the confinement, that he did not consent to it, and
To begin, claimant sufficiently alleged that his confinement was not privileged and it was defendant‘s burden to establish that its confinement of claimant after Garner was privileged; defendant failed in the Court of Claims to produce a Division of Parole arrest warrant or a court order so as to demonstrate their validity or that the arrest or confinement of claimant was privileged (see Hollender v Trump Vil. Coop., 58 NY2d at 425; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457-458; cf. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389, 394-395 [2011]; Standsblack v State of New York, 79 AD3d 1242, 1243 [2010]; Holmberg v County of Albany, 291 AD2d 610, 612-613 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]).5 Further, to clarify, claimant does not challenge his arrest prior to Garner but, rather, premises his claims on his continued detention and reincarceration—after Garner—for a parole violation based upon an administratively-imposed
While defendant suggests that when Garner was issued, the remedy was not clear for invalid DOCS-imposed PRS, we note that Sparber very clearly indicated that, where the sentencing court failed to pronounce a period of PRS as statutorily required, “the sole remedy” for this error was not expungement of all PRS but, rather, “to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required pronouncement” (People v Sparber, 10 NY3d at 471; see Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 NY3d at 363 n 4; Vincent v Yelich, 718 F3d at 173).7 Here, claimant was arrested and detained on April 18, 2008, Garner and Sparber were handed down on April 29, 2008 and the revocation hearing was not held until May 12, 2008; there is no indication in this record that any effort was made by DOCS, the Division of Parole or the District Attorney to bring claimant before a court for resentencing despite his counsel‘s argument at the hearing that his detention on that PRS term was unlawful. Indeed, even after legislation was passed in June 2008 establishing a mechanism for judicial resentencing, defendant apparently did not take measures to have claimant lawfully resentenced by a court to PRS even as he remained incarcerated on an invalid parole revocation (
Defendant submitted no evidence, and makes no viable legal claim, that its continued imprisonment of claimant after Garner—on a nullified, administratively imposed period of PRS and without the required resentencing by a court—was privileged. Defendant‘s argument that claimant‘s confinement was privileged under Donald v State of New York (17 NY3d 389 [2011], supra) is unavailing. Donald involved a challenge to DOCS’ imposition of PRS, in which the Court of Appeals ruled that DOCS’ discretionary actions in imposing PRS and confining him for violating it, while ultimately determined to be mistaken by Garner, were privileged and rendered defendant immune from liability. The critical distinction is that the claimant in Donald was incarcerated on a violation of PRS administratively imposed before Garner, at a time when “DOCS made the ‘reasoned judgment’ that it should interpret . . . sentences as including PRS”8 (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d at 395, quoting Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95, 99 [2000]; see Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314, 1315 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d at 717-718). Here, by contrast, claimant‘s parole revocation hearing and sentencing on a violation of administratively imposed PRS occurred almost two weeks after Garner, at a time when defendant knew or should have known that the PRS was a nullity and that claimant “could not validly be punished for violating the terms of [PRS] until af
Further, defendant does not have immunity for the actions of its parole officials. To be sure, inherently discretionary parole decisions of government officials have been recognized to be quasi-judicial decisions entitled to absolute immunity (see Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 517-518 [1986]; Mertens v State of New York, 73 AD3d 1376, 1377 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 706 [2010]; Nelson v State of New York, 67 AD3d 1142, 1143 [2009]; see also Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 216-217 [1988]). “Where, however, the official has stepped outside the scope of his [or her] authority and acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or without a colorable claim of authority, there is plainly no entitlement to absolute immunity, even if the underlying acts are . . . quasi-judicial in nature” (Della Pietra v State of New York, 71 NY2d 792, 796 [1988] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). That is, “[t]here is a distinction between acts performed in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear absence of any jurisdiction over the subject matter. The former is privileged, the latter is not” (Sassower v Finnerty, 96 AD2d 585, 586 [1983], appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 756 [1984], lv denied 61 NY2d 985 [1984] [citation omitted]; see Collins v State of New York, 69 AD3d at 51-52). In Garner, the Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a writ of prohibition because DOCS acted “in excess of [its] jurisdiction”9 by imposing a period of PRS (Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 10 NY3d at 362).
As the Court of Appeals subsequently recognized, DOCS is plainly vested with the power to make “judgments as to the scope of its own authority in interpreting the directions it has received from the court system,” and that the reasoned, albeit mistaken, judgment of DOCS prior to Garner, based upon then-existing case law, that it was authorized to impose a mandatory period of PRS, even when the sentencing court did not pronounce a period of PRS, was privileged (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d at 395-396; see Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d at 717; Collins v State of New York, 69 AD3d at 52-53). Here, by distinction, after Garner, defendant‘s officials no lon
In view of the foregoing, we find that, for the period between claimant‘s April 18, 2008 arrest and the Garner decision on April 29, 2008, defendant “was entitled to rely upon the then-existing interpretation of the law” regarding DOCS-imposed PRS (Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d at 717) and established its privilege for his detention during that period. However, defendant has not established its privilege to continue to detain claimant on a DOCS-imposed PRS violation for the period after Garner up until his release on a habeas corpus petition on October 2008. As claimant has, and has stated, a cause of action for false imprisonment (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 456), the Court of Claims erred in granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss this claim.
Furthermore, given the preceding analysis, and viewing the evidence most favorably to defendant, the nonmoving party
We similarly conclude that claimant stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution. To make out a claim for malicious prosecution, claimant must establish: “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the [claimant], (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice” (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457; see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d at 84; Smith-Hunter v Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 [2000]). Defendant argues that the Court of Claims correctly determined that, while claimant established the first element, he failed to establish the remaining ones. On the second prong, claimant need not “demonstrate innocence” of the parole violation in order to satisfy that favorable termination prong; rather, claimant can satisfy it by showing that “there can be no further prosecution of the [alleged parole violation]” (Smith-Hunter v Harvey, 95 NY2d at 199, 196). We believe it self evident, under the facts here and despite the lack of state law on point,10 that defendant could not, after Sparber and Garner, ever lawfully prosecute claimant on a parole violation that occurred before
While defendant argues that claimant‘s release was on a mere “procedural error,” relying on the analysis in People v Sparber (10 NY3d at 471), that assertion misapprehends the holding. What Sparber referred to as a “procedural error” was the sentencing court‘s failure to pronounce PRS and DOCS’ imposition of a period of PRS, occurring before Garner established that DOCS could not do so, which could be remedied by a court meting out a resentence; Sparber did not hold that defendant‘s post-Garner conduct, as here, in holding a revocation hearing and imprisoning claimant on a parole violation was a mere “procedural error.” Thus, we find that claimant satisfied the second, i.e., favorable termination, prong. As for the third prong, as we concluded with regard to the false imprisonment claim, even if probable cause existed at the time of arrest, it did not exist after Garner so as to authorize defendant to prosecute claimant at a parole revocation hearing on an administratively imposed period of PRS that was invalid and, according to the Second Circuit, unconstitutional as a matter of federal due process.
Finally, regarding the last prong, “[a]ctual malice is defined as with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d at 717 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Wolston v Reader‘s Digest Assn., Inc., 443 US 157, 160 [1979]). Unlike the pre-Garner cases in which we recognized that DOCS was entitled to rely on then-existing case law holding that “PRS was automatically imposed by operation of law and DOCS was only enforcing that which was already there [when it administratively imposed PRS]” (Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d at 717 [and cases cited therein]), here, subsequent controlling case law—Garner and Sparber—clearly apprised defendant and its officials that such PRS was invalid and that claimant could not be held for a parole revocation hearing and imprisoned on a parole violation so based. Defendant did not need the “benefit of hindsight” (id.); rather, claimant has alleged that defendant had the knowledge and notice that this PRS was invalid or acted with reckless disregard of whether it was valid so as to sufficiently allege actual malice.
Accordingly, claimant‘s malicious prosecution claim should not have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (
Rose, J.P., Stein and Garry, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as (1) granted that part of defendant‘s motion to dismiss the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution causes of action, and (2) denied claimant‘s cross motion for summary judgment on the false imprisonment cause of action; defendant‘s motion denied to said extent, claimant‘s cross motion granted to said extent and summary judgment awarded to claimant on said cause of action; and, as so modified, affirmed.