MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION v. Jeffrey Thomas GONCE.
No. 38, Sept. Term, 2015.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Jan. 22, 2016.
130 A.3d 436
RYLAND, SITTING IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY. COSTS IN
Leight D. Collins, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Glen Burnie, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Raymond M. Atkins, Jr. (Towson, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, MCDONALD, WATTS and GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
WATTS, J.
In this case, we interpret
[
TR § 16-205.1 ] incorporates “implied consent” in that [TR § 16-205.1 ] provides that any individual who drives a vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have consented to take a chemical test—usually, a breath test—to measure [] alcohol concentration, if stopped by a [law enforcement] officer with reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving under the influence of alcohol. Despite [TR § 16-205.1 ]\‘s declaration of implied consent by all drivers, [TR § 16-205.1 ] recognizes that a driver detained by a[ law enforcement] officer may refuse to take the [] test. But the time for making that decision is limited—[] alcohol concentration is transient[,] and any test must be conducted within two hours of the stop.The phrase “administrative per se” refers to the administrative consequences of a refusal to take the [] test, or of test results that reveal that the driver has a[n] alcohol concentration above certain levels (regardless of whether the driver otherwise appears to be impaired). In both cases, [
TR § 16-205.1 ] provides for an automatic suspension of the driver\‘s license for specified periods. The license suspension is an administrative sanction that is distinct from any criminal prosecution of the driver that might also ensue.
Under [
Here, we decide the following question: Under
BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2014, Trooper G. Stambaugh (“Trooper Stambaugh“)2 of the Maryland State Police issued to Jeffrey Thomas Gonce (“Gonce“), Respondent, an “Officer\‘s Certification and Order of Suspension” that contained the following facts, which we summarize. At 5:00 p.m. on June 29, 2014, Gonce was driving west on U.S. Route 50 near the intersection with Castle Marina Road in Queen Anne\‘s
turn” test indicated seven out of a possible eight clues of impairment. The “one-leg stand” test indicated three out of a possible four clues of impairment.
Trooper Stambaugh did not detect any odor of alcohol on Gonce\‘s breath. Trooper Stambaugh asked to perform a preliminary breath test, to which Gonce consented. The preliminary breath test indicated a breath alcohol concentration of 0.003 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Trooper Stambaugh arrested Gonce and provided him with an Advice of Rights form, seeking permission pursuant to
Gonce agreed to take an alcohol concentration test. Specifically, at 5:30 p.m., Gonce checked a box next to the words “Yes—Agree to submit to an alcohol concentration test” and signed the Advice of Rights form. According to a “State of Maryland Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration” (bolding and some capitalization omitted) and a printout from the equipment that tested breath alcohol concentration, between
Knowing that Gonce had passed the breath alcohol concentration test, but having observed indications of Gonce\‘s impairment, Trooper Stambaugh referred Gonce to Trooper First Class M. Miller (“Trooper Miller“),5 a drug recognition expert. Trooper Miller completed a “Drug Recognition Expert\‘s Certification Form.” At 7:05 p.m., Trooper Miller evaluated Gonce. In the Drug Recognition Expert\‘s Certification Form, Trooper Miller stated:
I had reasonable grounds, which I have set forth below on this form, to believe that [Gonce] was driving ... a motor vehicle while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs[,] or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, that [Gonce] could not drive a vehicle safely, or while under the influence of a Controlled Dangerous Substance.
REASONABLE GROUNDS: [Horizontal gaze nystagmus], [Lack of convergence6], Droopy eyelids on the nod, Low raspy slow speech, Facial itching, Little reaction to light[, P]sychophysical impairment,7 0.00[0 Breath alcohol concentration], Slurred speech[,] Dry mouth, [C]onfused[.]
Trooper Miller asked Gonce to take a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances, and Gonce refused to take the drug test.
Specifically, at 8:15 p.m., Gonce signed a second Advice of Rights form, on which he checked a box next to the words “No—Drug or [Controlled Dangerous Substances] test refused ([Drug Recognition Expert] must complete & submit [Drug Recognition Expert] Certification Form)[.]” Afterward, Trooper Stambaugh confiscated Gonce\‘s driver\‘s license, served an order of suspension on Gonce, and issued him a temporary driver\‘s license.
Gonce requested an administrative hearing to show cause why the Motor Vehicle Administration (“the MVA“), Petitioner, should not suspend his driver\‘s license. On September 23, 2014, an administrative law judge (“the ALJ“) of the Office of Administrative Hearings conducted an administrative hearing. The ALJ admitted into evidence the Officer\‘s Certification and Order of Suspension, the State of Maryland Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration, the Drug Recognition Expert\‘s Certification Form, the printout from the equipment that tested breath alcohol concentration, and both Advice of Rights forms.
At the administrative hearing, Gonce did not dispute the accuracy of any facts in any document, including Trooper Stambaugh\‘s observations, Trooper Miller\‘s observations, or the results of the three-part
The way [that
TR § 16-205.1 ] is written, it\‘s a test for alcohol concentration and/or a test for drug detection[, or] for [controlled dangerous substances]. Here, [Trooper Stambaugh] would not have had reasonable grounds to request [Gonce] to take a [controlled dangerous substances] test until after he was seen by [Trooper Miller].9
(Emphasis added). The ALJ determined that Trooper Stambaugh had reasonable grounds to believe that Gonce had been driving while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance; concluded that Gonce violated
Gonce petitioned for judicial review. On March 17, 2015, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County10 (“the circuit court“) conducted a hearing. In an oral ruling, the circuit court reversed the ALJ\‘s decision and concluded that, after Gonce passed the alcohol concentration test, Gonce “was not required ... to submit to a blood test in order to avoid suspension.” In an order dated April 14, 2015, the circuit court reversed the ALJ\‘s decision.
On April 24, 2015, the MVA filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following issue:
Was a drunken or drugged driving suspect, who agreed to take an alcohol concentration test, which produced a test result of 0.00[0], subject to suspension under [TR] § 16-205.1, when he thereafter refused to submit to a [law enforcement] officer\‘s request, based on reasonable grounds, to submit to a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances?
On June 17, 2015, this Court granted the petition. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce, 443 Md. 234, 116 A.3d 474 (2015).
The MVA\‘s position is straightforward; it contends that
Gonce responds that the ALJ erred in concluding that he was subject to an automatic license suspension for refusing to take the drug test. Gonce contends that, as used in
A court defers to an administrative law judge\‘s finding of fact where the record supports that finding of fact. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14, 997 A.2d 768, 775-76 (2010) (“A reviewing court should defer to the agency\‘s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” (Citation omitted)). A court reviews with some deference an administrative law judge\‘s interpretation of a statute that the relevant administrative agency administers. See Deering, 438 Md. at 622, 92 A.3d at 502 (“A reviewing court \‘... determine[s] if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. While this standard accords less deference to an agency\‘s legal conclusions than to its fact findings, a reviewing court should give weight to the administrative agency\‘s interpretation and application of the statute that the agency administers.” (Quoting Shea, 415 Md. at 14-15, 997 A.2d at 775-76)).
In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute\‘s language, which the court applies where the statute\‘s language “is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute\‘s apparent purpose[.]” Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 227, 994 A.2d 968, 975 (2010) (citation omitted).
We begin by examining the relevant provisions of
Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of [Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.) (“CJP“)] §§ 10-302 through 10-309,11 to take a
test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ].
(Emphasis added).
Except as provided in [
TR § 16-205.1(c) ], if a [law enforcement] officer stops or detains any person who the [law enforcement] officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ], and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test, the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Detain the person; [and] (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken[.12]
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). “If the person refuses to take the test ..., the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Confiscate the person\‘s driver\‘s license issued by this State; (ii) Acting on behalf of the [MVA], personally serve an order of suspension on the person; [and] (iii) Issue a temporary license to drive[.]”
If a person is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of, or a life[-]threatening injury to,
another person[,] and the person is detained by a [law enforcement] officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or
Breath Prohibited) ], the person shall be required to submit, as directed by the [law enforcement] officer, to a test of: (i) The person\‘s breath to determine alcohol concentration; (ii) One specimen of the person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration or to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood; or (iii) Both the person\‘s breath under item (i) of this paragraph and one specimen of the person\‘s blood under item (ii) of this paragraph.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted).
“Test” means, unless the context requires otherwise: 1. A test of a person\‘s breath or of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine alcohol concentration; 2. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood; or 3. Both: A. A test of a person\‘s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted).
The facts of this matter are undisputed. We must resolve a legal question of first impression—namely, whether, under
Based on
To the contrary, as used in
Our conclusion is based not only on
This Court has previously used
Similarly, in Wheeler v. Rhoten, 144 Md. 10, 12, 123 A. 572, 573 (1923), this Court relied on
Although Gatewood and Wheeler involved
None of these three changes was substantive, however. The Revisor\‘s Note to
[
GP § 1-202 ] is new language derived without substantive change from formerArt. 1, § 8 . The phrase “the plural includes the singular” is substituted for the former phrase “vice versa” for clarity. The former phrase “except where such construction would be unreasonable” is deleted as a standard rule of statutory construction. See General Revisor\‘s Note to title.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). See also 2014 Md. Laws 424 (Vol. I, Ch. 94, H.B. 270). In turn, the General Revisor\‘s Note to Title 1 (Rules of Interpretation) of the General Provisions Article states, in pertinent part:
Throughout this subtitle,14 former language indicating that a definition applies unless such a construction would be “unreasonable” is deleted. The General Provisions Article Review Committee believes such a caveat is unnecessary because Maryland case law already factors the unreasonableness of a particular construction into a determination of legislative intent. See Board of Trustees v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995) (“[W]e seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” [ (Citation omitted)]); Wagner v. Board of County Commissioners, 263 Md. 560, 568, 284 A.2d 5, 9 (1971) (“[W]e should prefer a construction which leads to a reasonable, rather than an unreasonable and absurd[,] result.“); [] Doswell v. State, 53 Md.App. 647, 653, 455 A.2d 995, 999 (1983) (“[T]he statute should be read in a commonsense manner to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result.” [ (Citation omitted)]). No substantive change is intended.
(Emphasis added) (some alterations in original). See also 2014 Md. Laws 436 (Vol. I, Ch. 94, H.B. 270).
In short, the General Assembly\‘s express purpose in deleting the phrase “except where such construction would be unreasonable” was simply to ensure that
include any “unnecessary” language. Likewise, the General Assembly did not substantively change
Because
The predecessor of
In 1988, the General Assembly established a Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving (“the Task Force“) because “[d]runk and drugged drivers kill[ed] and injure[d] many people on the highways every year[,] and [t]he problem of drunk and drugged driving [wa]s of continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland[.]” 1988 Md. Laws 5123 (Joint Resolution No. 15, House Joint Resolution No. 53) (paragraph break omitted). The General Assembly charged the Task Force with the following duties, among others:
(1) Examining methods of increasing the effectiveness of the remedies currently available for combatting drunk and drugged driving; (2) Examining remedies developed by other states and jurisdictions to deal with the problem of drunk and drugged drivers; [and] (3) Recommending changes and additions to current laws and regulations dealing with drunk and drugged drivers[.]
1988 Md. Laws 5124 (paragraph breaks omitted). In 1988, in an interim report,
the Task Force recommended that the General Assembly enact what it referred to as an [“]administrative per se law[,“] which would provide “for the prompt suspension of the driver\‘s license of an individual who, upon being detained by a [law enforcement] officer on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol or while intoxicated, either: 1) Refused to take a [blood alcohol concentration] test; or 2) Submitted to the [blood alcohol concentration]
test, and the results exceeded a statutorily defined limit.”
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 460, 597 A.2d 939, 942 (1991) (quoting Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving, Interim Report to the General Assembly, at 6 (1988)) (fourth alteration in original).
In response, in 1989, the General Assembly passed House Bill 556 and amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1988 Supp.) § 16-205.1 to, among other things, direct law enforcement officers to confiscate a driver\‘s license and serve an order of suspension on the MVA\‘s behalf upon a refusal to take an alcohol concentration test. See 1989 Md. Laws 2331, 2332, 2337 (Vol. IV, Ch. 284, H.B. 556).
Significantly, a prior version of House Bill 556, before its enactment, included references to drug testing. See 1989 Md. Laws 2334, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2340, 2342. Under a previous version of House Bill 556, the General Assembly would have amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1988 Supp.) § 16-205.1(b)(2) to state, in pertinent part:
[I]f a [law enforcement] officer stops or detains any person who the [law enforcement] officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while under the influence of drugs or drugs and alcohol, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, or in violation of an alcohol restriction, and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test for alcohol or drugs or both, the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Detain the person; [and] (ii) Request that the person permit a test or tests to be taken of the person\‘s blood or breath, urine, or other body fluids to determine the alcohol concentration or drug content of the person\‘s body[.]
1989 Md. Laws 2336 (emphasis added) (strikethroughs and words in brackets omitted).
According to a “Summary of Amendments by Del. Horne” (bolding and some capitalization omitted), the General Assembly struck from House Bill 556 the “provisions providing for drug testing” because “[n]o entity [was] set up to handle [drug testing as of the] 1-1-90 effective date[.]” In other words, in 1989, the General Assembly refrained from amending Md. Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1988 Supp.) § 16-205.1 to provide for drug testing because preparations could not be completed before the date on which the amendment would become effective.
It was not long, however, before the General Assembly amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 16-205.1 to provide for drug testing. In 1989, in an interim report, the Task Force noted that “both arrests and convictions for drugged driving offenses ... [we]re underrepresented when compared to arrests and convictions for drunk driving offenses.” In response, in 1990, the General Assembly amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Supp.) § 16-205.1 to, among other things, add a definition of the word “test” in Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii) that included a blood test for drugs, stating:
“Test” means: 1. A test of a person\‘s breath or of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine alcohol concentration; 2. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood; or 3. Both: A. A test of a person\‘s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration; and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood.
1990 Md. Laws 1706, 1707, 1715 (Vol. III, Ch. 413, H.B. 492) (paragraph breaks omitted). Accordingly, the General Assembly amended multiple other parts of Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Supp.) § 16-205.1 to refer to “a test” without specifying an alcohol concentration test or a drug test. Significantly, the General Assembly amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Supp.) § 16-205.1(b)(2)(ii) to remove the phrase “of the person\‘s blood or breath to determine alcohol concentration” after the phrase “Request that the person permit a test to be taken[.]” 1990 Md. Laws 1717.
In amending Md.Code Ann., Transp. (1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Supp.) § 16-205.1—in particular, in defining the word “test” to include “[b]oth” an alcohol concentration test and a drug test—the General Assembly made clear that the word “test” was intended to include both tests.
Contrary to the plain language and legislative history of the statute, Gonce contends that
“Test” means, unless the context requires otherwise ... [b]oth: A. A test of a person\‘s breath or a test of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration;
and B. A test or tests of [one] specimen of a person\‘s blood to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). Gonce points out that
If a person is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of, or a life[-]threatening injury to, another person and the person is detained by a [law enforcement] officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, or in violation of [TR] § 16-813 [ (Driving Commercial Motor Vehicle with Alcohol Concentration in Blood or Breath Prohibited) ], the person shall be required to submit, as directed
by the [law enforcement] officer, to a test of: (i) The person\‘s breath to determine alcohol concentration; (ii) One specimen of the person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration or to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood; or (iii) Both the person\‘s breath under item (i) of this paragraph and one specimen of the person\‘s blood under item (ii) of this paragraph.
(Emphasis added) (paragraph breaks omitted). Gonce, therefore, contends that
Gonce is mistaken.
Although we would normally begin with a plain language analysis of the two sections, the legislative history definitively demonstrates the General Assembly\‘s intent that
In 2004, by passing Senate Bill 592, the General Assembly amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (2002 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.) § 16-205.1(a)(1)\‘s definition of the word “test” to add the phrase “unless the context requires otherwise” after the phrase ” \‘Test means\’ “; the definition still provided for multiple tests. See 2004 Md. Laws. 2189, 2190, 2191 (Vol. III, Ch. 468, S.B. 592). Notably, in passing Senate Bill 592, the General Assembly also amended Md.Code Ann., Transp. (2002 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.) § 16-205.1(c)(1) so that it read as
By adding to
If a person is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of, or a life[-]threatening injury to, another person[,] and the person is detained by a [law enforcement] officer ... the person shall be required to submit, as directed by the [law enforcement] officer, to a test of: (i) The person\‘s breath to determine alcohol concentration; (ii) One specimen of the person\‘s blood, to determine alcohol concentration or to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person\‘s blood; or (iii) Both the person\‘s breath under item (i) of this paragraph and one specimen of the person\‘s blood under item (ii) of this paragraph.
(Emphasis added). In contrast,
Except as provided in [
TR § 16-205.1(c) ], if a [law enforcement] officer stops or detains any person who the [law enforcement] officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol
... and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test, the [law enforcement] officer shall[, among other things]: (i) Detain the person; [and] (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken[.]
(Emphasis added). As explained above, at the same time that the General Assembly amended
Gonce fails to heed the rules of statutory interpretation in contending that the word “test” means both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test only
As a final matter, we dispose of Gonce\‘s contention that, assuming that we agree with the MVA (as we do), our interpretation of
The sole issue before this Court is
decide the case on a non-constitutional ground if reasonably possible.“); Prof\‘l Staff Nurses Ass\‘n v. Dimensions Health Corp., 346 Md. 132, 138, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997) (“This Court has regularly adhered to the principle that we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.” (Citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent that Gonce contends that
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. RESPONDENT TO PAY COSTS.
Notes
This Court quoted the above language in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 269 n. 6, 888 A.2d 329, 332 n. 6 (2005), but has not quoted it since. In 2013, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration published a manual on the three-part Standardized Field Sobriety Test. See DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (May 2013), https://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/2013dwisfst.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYX8-A958]. In an article dated 2013, FindLaw, a part of Thomson Reuters, summarized the three-part Standardized Field Sobriety Test as follows:The horizontal gaze nystagmus test is an evaluation of the natural moving of the human eye as it follows a horizontally moving point of reference. The presence of alcohol in the body causes the eyes to take on a jerking movement. The walk and turn test requires a person to walk toe-to-heel on a straight line for approximately nine to ten steps. The one leg stand test requires a person to stand on one leg and count out loud for approximately five to ten seconds.
FindLaw, Field Sobriety Tests, http://dui.findlaw.com/dui-arrests/field-sobriety-tests.html [http://perma.cc/WJV4-UVSL].The [three-part] Standardized Field Sobriety Test [] endorsed by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration [] consists of the horizontal gaze nystagmus [], walk-and-turn[,] and one-leg stand []:
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: This term refers to the involuntary jerking of the eye that occurs naturally when the eye gazes to the side. But this jerking (or nystagmus) is exaggerated when someone is impaired by alcohol. Officers look for three indicators of impairment in each eye: inability to follow a moving object smoothly; distinct eye[-]jerking when eye is at maximum deviation; and eye-jerking within [forty-five] degrees of center.
Walk and Turn: The purpose of this test, determined to be easily done by most unimpaired people, tests the suspect\‘s ability to complete tasks with divided attention. This is administered by requiring the suspect to take nine steps, heel-to-toe, along a straight line; turn on one foot; and then return in the same manner in the opposite direction.
One-Leg Stand: Suspects are asked to stand with one foot about six inches off the ground and count for [thirty] seconds. Swaying while balancing, using arms to balance, hopping[,] or putting the foot down indicate possible impairment.