Motor Vehicle Administration v. Gonce
130 A.3d 436
Md.2016Background
- On June 29, 2014, Trooper Stambaugh stopped Jeffrey Gonce for a registration-plate violation, observed signs of impairment, and administered standardized field sobriety tests. Gonce showed multiple clues of impairment on two of the three tests but no odor of alcohol.
- A preliminary breath test read 0.003; Gonce consented to and later took an evidentiary breath test that read 0.000 (i.e., passed the alcohol concentration test).
- Because Trooper Stambaugh still suspected drug impairment, he referred Gonce to a Drug Recognition Expert (Trooper Miller). The DRE reported multiple indicators of drug impairment and concluded there were reasonable grounds to suspect impairment by drugs.
- Trooper Miller requested a blood test for drugs; Gonce refused and signed an Advice of Rights form indicating refusal. Trooper Stambaugh then confiscated Gonce’s license and issued an order of suspension under TR § 16-205.1.
- An ALJ sustained the suspension. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed, holding that after passing the alcohol test Gonce could not be forced to take a subsequent blood test to avoid suspension. The MVA petitioned for certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (MVA) | Defendant's Argument (Gonce) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TR § 16-205.1(b)(2)–(3) permits an officer with reasonable grounds to request both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test, and to suspend a license for refusal to take the second test after the driver already took the first | The statute’s definition of “test” and GP § 1-202 support reading “test” to include both alcohol and drug tests; officers may request both and refusal of either (including a second test) triggers automatic suspension | “Test” is singular in the operative subsections; once a driver submits to and passes one test (alcohol), the officer cannot demand a second test to avoid suspension | The Court held for the MVA: TR § 16-205.1 authorizes requesting both alcohol and drug tests; refusal to submit to the drug test after taking the alcohol test supports automatic suspension. Case remanded to affirm the ALJ. |
Key Cases Cited
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering, 438 Md. 611 (2014) (explaining implied consent and administrative-per-se framework)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265 (2005) (discussion of standardized field sobriety testing in context of MVA procedures)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1 (2010) (standard of deference to agency factfinding and legal conclusions)
- Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609 (1966) (singular includes plural canon applied in statutory construction)
- Wheeler v. Rhoten, 144 Md. 10 (1923) (early use of singular/plural interpretive rule)
- Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284 (1998) (context on statutes aimed at deterring drunk and drugged driving)
- Brodie v. Motor Vehicle Admin. of Md., 367 Md. 1 (2001) (limits on raising new issues for judicial review of administrative decisions)
- Najafi v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 164 (2011) (statutory purpose of TR § 16-205.1 to protect the public rather than provide procedural protections to the accused)