DOUGLAS C. MORRIS v. SHELBY L. MOTTERN
C.A. No. 14CA0043-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
November 2, 2015
[Cite as Morris v. Mottern, 2015-Ohio-4523.]
CARR, Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE Nо. 11 PA 0125
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Shelby Mottern, appeals from a judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that established a parent-child relationship between her minor child and his alleged father, Douglas Morris, and allocated parental rights and responsibilities between Ms. Mottern and Mr. Morris. Because the Medina County court lacked statutory authority to exercise its jurisdiction in this case, this Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Mottern is the mother of B.M., born during September 2005, while Ms. Mottern was involved in a non-marital, romantic relationship with Mr. Morris. According to the allegations of Mr. Morris’s complаint, he and Ms. Mottern resided together with B.M. in Pennsylvania and then Portage County, Ohio, for the first two and one-half years of the child’s life before Mr. Morris relocated to Medina County and Ms. Mottern remained in Portage County. Notably, Mr. Morris and Ms. Mottern apparently never executed an acknowledgement that Mr.
{¶3} On June 1, 2011, Mr. Morris filed a complaint in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, explaining that he was concerned about registering B.M. for kindergarten. His complaint explicitly sought to legally establish his “paternity” of the child and to establish or modify “residential parent and legal custodian” and “parenting time, companionship or visitation.” Mother was served with a copy of the complaint on June 23, 2011.
{¶4} On July 15, 2011, Mother moved to dismiss the complaint in this case because Mr. Morris had failed to comply with the statutory requirement that the matter be filed in the county where the child resides. See
{¶6} Ms. Mottern filed timely objections to the magistrate’s decision, reiterating her argument that, as a matter of law, B.M. legally resided with her in Portage County because she was his sole residential parent. She argued that the parties’ agreement about paternity and that B.M. would spend time with Mr. Morris and attend preschool and daycare in Medina County did not legally establish B.M.’s residence in Medina County. She again emphasized that there had been no cоurt order to supersede her legal status as the sole residential parent of B.M.
{¶7} The trial court overruled Mother’s objections. Although Ms. Mottern attempted to appeal from that order, this Court dismissed Morris v. Mottern, 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0037-M, for lack of a final, appealable order.
{¶8} Following another hearing, the magistrate decided that Mr. Morris had a parent and child relationship with B.M. and that he should be designated the child’s primary residential parent. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision. Mother raised objections to the magistrate’s decision on the merits and also renewed her argument that the Medina County Domestic Relations Court lacked statutory authоrity to exercise its jurisdiction over these proceedings and should have granted her motion to dismiss. The trial court overruled all of Mother’s objections. Regarding the court’s statutory authority to preside over this action, the
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS [MR. MORRIS’S] MOTION FOR PATERNITY AND ALLOCATION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FILED IN HIS COUNTY OF RESIDENCE, MEDINA COUNTY, OHIO, WHERE MOTHER IS THE SOLE RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND SOLE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE MINOR CHILD UNDER
R.C. [] 3109.042 AND SHE RESIDES IN PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO[,] AND NO REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION OF PATERNITY HAD BEEN MADE PRIOR TO FILING SAID ACTION.
{¶9} Ms. Mottern argues that the trial court lacked statutory authority to preside over this action because B.M. legally resided with her, as the child’s sole residential parent, in Portage County. Ms. Mottern has correctly argued throughout these proceedings that, despite any informal agreement she had with Mr. Morris, the sole means for establishing a legal relationship between a parent and child in Ohio is set forth in
{¶10} The legal parent and child relationship between Ms. Mottern and B.M. was established by operation of law because she is his biological mother and gave birth to him.
{¶11} Because Ms. Mottern and Mr. Morris were not married at or near the time of B.M.’s birth, nor had they unsuccessfully attempted to marry, no presumption about Mr. Morris’s paternity arose under
{¶12} For reasons not explained on the record, despite the relative ease with which the parties could have executed an acknowledgement of Mr. Morris’s paternity of B.M. in Pennsylvania or Ohio, which would have led to a final administrative determination of his parent and child relationship with B.M., they did not do so. Instead, Mr. Mоrris attempted to bypass that administrative determination by proceeding directly to the trial court.
{¶13} Although he was authorized by
Except as provided in divisions (B), (C), (D), and (E) of this section, no person may bring an action under sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code unless the person has requested an administrative determination under section 3111.38 of the Revised Code of the existence or nonexistence of a parent and child relationship.
{¶15} Consequently, the only procedural means through which Mr. Morris was authorized by statute to bypass an administrative determination and invoke a court’s jurisdiction to determine that he had a parent and child relationship with B.M. was
(C) An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a parent and child relationship may be brought by the putative father * * * in the county in which the child resides, without requesting an administrative determination, if the putative father brings the action in order to request an order to determine the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. * * * (Emphasis added.)
{¶16} The dispute under Ms. Mottern’s first assignment of error is where B.M. resided, for purposes of
{¶17} Throughout the trial court proceedings, Ms. Mottern argued that, by operation of law, B.M. resided with her in Portage County. Mr. Morris responded that the evidence would prove that B.M. had been residing with him in Medina County. After rejecting Ms. Mottern’s argument that B.M.’s residence was determined as a matter of law, the magistrate, and later the trial judge, considered evidence about where B.M. attended preschool and daycare and
{¶18} We cannot agree with Mr. Morris that B.M.’s legal residence was established by the mere fact that he spent a lot of time with him or others in Medina County because Mr. Morris had not been legally recognized as B.M.’s father, nor did he have any legal parental rights or responsibilities. On the other hand, Ms. Mottern’s legal rights and responsibilities as B.M.’s mother were established by operation of law when she gave birth to him.
{¶19} Although the term “residential parent” is not defined in
{¶20} Moreover, although a minor child’s legal “residence” is not defined in
{¶21} Evidence that B.M. spent much of his time in Medina County should not have been considered to determine where he resided for purposes of
{¶22} Although this case fell within the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under
The term ‘jurisdiсtion’ is also used when referring to a court‘s exercise of its jurisdiction over a particular case. See State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-
Ohio-2833, ¶ 20 (Cook, J., dissenting); State v. Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462 (9th Dist.1998). ‘The third category of jurisdiction [i.e., jurisdiction over the particular case] encompasses the trial court‘s authority to determine a specific case within that class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.’
Pratts at ¶ 12.
{¶23} Examples of the third category of jurisdiction have included requirements of statutes or rules that impose constraints on the trial court’s authority to exercise its jurisdiction over a specific case. Pratts and Swiger involved restrictions on the “jurisdiction” of a single trial judge to detеrmine guilt or impose sentence on a capital murder defendant under
{¶24} Although alleged errors in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction may be forfeited if not timely raised, Ms. Mottern preserved this error for appellate review. Through hеr motion to dismiss, she argued that Mr. Morris filed this action in the wrong county. She also raised this issue through her timely objections to the magistrate’s March and August 2012 decisions.
{¶25} Although the dissent relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Z.R., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-Ohio-3306, we do not agree that its interpretation of
{¶26} Moreover, the Court construed
{¶27} In sharp contrast to Z.R., this was not a case in which the stаte sought to invoke the broad jurisdiction of the juvenile court to protect the welfare of an allegedly dependent child.3 Instead, this was a parentage dispute between two private parties. Moreover, the statutory law in both Ohio and Pennsylvania expresses an obvious intent that unmarried parents promptly execute an acknowledgement of paternity, which must be facilitated by hospital personnel at the time of the child’s birth, and will lead to a prompt and final administrative determination of the child’s paternity. Because the parties were apparently living together at the time of the child’s birth, it is unknown why they did not execute such an acknowledgement,
{¶28} Although the dissent asserts that this case is governed by the broad language of
Except as provided in divisions (B), (C), (D), and (E) of this section, no person may bring an action under sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code unless the person has requested an administrative determination under section 3111.38 of the Revised Code of the existence or nonexistence of a parent and child relationship.
{¶29} The language “no person may” has always been understood to mean that the action is prohibited unless the stated terms are satisfied. See State v. Wellman, 37 Ohio St.2d 162 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus; Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, ¶ 30 (construing the “no person may” language as mandatory). Aside from paternity determinations that might arise during a divorce or the probate of an alleged father’s estate (subsections (D) and (E)),
{¶30} Although subsections (B) and (C) provide that the mother or purported father “may” file the actions in the county of the child’s residence, that is because they are authorized but are not required to file a court action. Unlike the statute construed by the Supreme Court in Z.R.,
{¶31} Moreover, even if we could agree with the dissent that
{¶32} We agree with the dissent that problems and inconvenience may arise under numerous scenarios when unmarried parents wait months or years to establish a legal relationship between the father and the child. It is also our concern for future cases that drives the majority decision. If this Court were to authorize unmarried parents to bypass the specific requirements of
{¶33} This Court is obligated to rule on the merits of issues properly raised on appeal and cannot ignore that the trial court committed reversible error by exercising its jurisdiction over this case. The statutorily-mandated procedures of
REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶34} Ms. Mottern raises two additional assignments of error that pertain to the merits of the trial court’s decisions. Because this Court has determined that the trial court had no statutory authority to rule on the merits of Mr. Morris’s complaint, Ms. Mottern’s remaining assignments of error have been rendered moot and will not be addressed. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶35} Ms. Mottern’s first assignment of error is sustained and her remaining assignments of error were not addressed because they have been rendered moot. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J. CONCURS.
DOUGLAS C. MORRIS v. SHELBY L. MOTTERN
C.A. No. 14CA0043-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
SCHAFER, J. DISSENTING.
{¶36} Since I would overrule the first assignment of error and proceed to address the remaining assignments, I must respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s analysis for three reasons. First, I would conclude that
A. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction
{¶37}
B. R.C. 3111.381 Does Not Implicate Jurisdiction
{¶38} I disagree with the majority looking past these provisions and relying on
1. R.C. 3111.381 Relates to an Administrative Exhaustion Requirement
{¶39} The proper way to view
{¶40} I disagree with the majority’s statement that this defense was timely raised in the trial court. Ms. Mottern’s filings in the trial court requested the dismissal of this action for lack of jurisdiction and they never asserted an affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, Ms. Mottern did not file a motion relating to improper venue that requested the transfer of her case to Portage County. Absent a proper motion, I do not see why the trial court should have sua sponte transferred the case to Portage County, as suggested by the majority.
2. R.C. 3111.381 Implicates Venue
{¶41} Moreover,
{¶42} Due to the similarities between
{¶43} This conclusion is further bolstered when one considers the complexity of Ms. Mottern’s reasoning for the purported lack of jurisdiction here. In order to reach her conclusion, she first points to
{¶44} I finally note that the majority’s approach in this matter fails to account for the language of
{¶45} The first problem is that the majority’s approach renders
{¶46} Thus, under the majority’s approach, an alleged father is left with no real choice. If he decides to go through the administrative process, the end result will be that he must litigate his judicial paternity action in the county where the child or the child’s legal custodian resides.
{¶47} The second problem is that the majority’s approach fails to apply the longstanding maxim that “words in a statute should be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning * * * unless a different intention appears in the statute.” State ex rel. Gareau v. Stillman, 18 Ohio St.2d 63, 64 (1969). The provisions of
APPEARANCES:
PATRICK F. LOWERY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
MORA LOWRY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.