Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.
In 1998, the Mayor and the City of New Orleans filed suit against the firearms industry
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 30, 1998, plaintiffs, Mayor Marc H. Morial and the City of New Orleans (collectively referred to as the “City“), filed suit against numerous firearms manufacturers, retailers, distributors, and trade associations1 seeking to recover damages for economic harm suffered by the City “associated with the manufacture, marketing, promotion, and sale of firearms which are unreasonably dangerous under Louisiana law.” Specifically, the City‘s petition alleges that “[a]ctions by defendants have caused the city to pay out large sums of money to provide services including but not limited to necessary police, medical, and emergency services, health care, police pension benefits and related expenditures, as well as to have lost substantial tax revenues due to lost productivity.”
Subsequent to the filing of the City‘s original petition, the legislature enacted Act 291 of 1999, effective June 11, 1999. Section 1 of the Act purports to preclude suits from being filed by any political subdivision or local governmental authority against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition and reserves this power to the state.2 Section 2 of Act 291 provides that its provisions “shall be applicable
The legislature also enacted Acts 1999, No. 1299, effective July 12, 1999, which was codified as
Subsequent to the effective dates of these Acts, defendants filed peremptory
After a contradictory hearing, the trial court denied defendants’ exceptions, finding that
Turning to defendants’ exception of no cause of action, the trial court found that plaintiffs have a cause of action against manufacturers and sellers of firearms in spite of the enactment of
Defendants have appealed the district court‘s judgment directly to this court pursuant to
LAW AND DISCUSSION
At the outset, we note that defendants have not assigned as error, briefed, or argued the trial court‘s rulings relating to the rights of the private plaintiff, Keith Ignatik. At oral argument before this court, counsel for defendants stated that this appeal did not concern the trial court‘s ruling with respect to Mr. Ignatik. Therefore, the issues relating to Mr. Ignatik‘s rights are not before us and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to affect his rights.
The issue we must first decide is whether
The legislature is free, within constitutional confines, to give its enactments retroactive effect. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 816 (La.1992). A court must defer to the legislature‘s intent when determining whether a statute should be applied retroactively.
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.
A related statute,
No Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.
Although this statute may appear to conflict with La. C.C. art. 6 ,La. R.S. 1:2 has been limited to apply only to substantive and not procedural or interpretive legislation and the two provisions are therefore generally construed as being co-extensive. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 97-0785, p. 8 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 724, 728; Keith v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 96-2075, p. 5 (La.5/9/97), 694 So.2d 180, 183; Manuel v. Louisiana Sheriff‘s Risk Mgmt. Fund, 95-0406, p. 8 (La.11/27/95), 664 So.2d 81, 85; Stelly v. Overhead Door Co. of Baton Rouge, 94-0569, pp. 6-7 (La.12/8/94), 646 So.2d 905, 911; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 816 (La. 1992).
First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive.
Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La.1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine, 609 So.2d at 816. However, because the principle has constitutional implications under the Due Process and Contract Clauses of both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give a law retroactive effect, that law may not be applied retroactively if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights. See Keith v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 96-2075, pp. (La.5/9/97), 694 So.2d 180, 183; Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 93-1916, p. 11 (La.2/28/94), 633 So.2d 1235, 1244; Segura v. Frank, 93 1271, pp. 8-9 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 721; St. Paul Fire & Marine, 609 So.2d at 816 n. 11; Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523 (La. 1979). See also 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, § 10 (3d ed. 1991) (“Retroactive application of new legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in impairment of the obligation of contracts or in divestiture of vested rights.“).
The first step under
The Contract Clause,
No state shall ... pass any Bill of Attanider, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts....
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.
These constitutional provisions are “virtually identical” and “substantially equivalent.” Segura, 93-1271 at p. 20, 630 So.2d at 728.
In Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch, Bd., 93-1916 (La.2/28/94), 633 So.2d 1235, this court explained that the constitutional prohibitions found in the Contract Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions do not protect political subdivisions
The retroactive application of Act 779 to Rousselle‘s contract does not unconstitutionally impair the School Board‘s contractual rights. The School Board is an agency of the state and is aware of the legislature‘s broad and pervasive power to regulate public education. Accordingly, it is not protected by the constitutional prohibition against the legislature enacting laws which impair the obligation of contracts. The inhibitions found in Article I, § 23 of the Constitution are protections for the citizens and not for the State. This state may constitutionally pass retrospective laws waiving or impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions, or imposing upon itself or its subdivisions new liabilities with respect to transactions already passed, as long as private rights are not infringed. Thus, as the School Board is not protected by the contract clause prohibitions of the state or federal constitutions, there is no need to employ the four-step contract clause analysis to determine whether Act 779 unconstitutionally impairs its contractual obligations.
Id. at 1246-47 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.1976) (“Ever since the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819), it has been apparent that public entities which are political subdivisions of states do not possess constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from state impairment of contractual obligations, in the same sense as private corporations or individuals.“); Olivedell Planting Co. v. Town of Lake Providence, 217 La. 621, 47 So.2d 23, 27 (1950) (“The provisions of our Constitution relating to the impairment of the obligations of contracts only apply to contracts or vested rights of individuals or private corporations.“).9
Similarly, the City, as a political subdivision of the state rather than a “person,” is without the protections of
The City of New Orleans is not protected by the constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractual obligations or disturbance of vested rights. Therefore, the retroactive application of
The City is not without constitutional protection, however. Although the Declaration of Rights Article of the Louisiana Constitution does not protect government
The City of New Orleans is governed by the provisions of a home rule charter enacted prior to the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. These pre-existing home rule charters were continued, and essentially constitutionalized, City of New Orleans v. Board of Comm‘rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690, p. 8 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 244, by
Every home rule charter or plan of government existing or adopted when this constitution is adopted shall remain in effect and may be amended, modified, or repealed as provided therein. Except as inconsistent with this constitution, each local governmental subdivision which has adopted such a home rule charter or plan of government shall retain the powers, functions, and duties in effect when this constitution is adopted. If its charter permits, each of them also shall have the right to powers and functions granted to other local governmental subdivisions.
Although “`home rule’ does not mean complete autonomy,” Miller v. Oubre, 96-2022 at p. 9, 682 So.2d at 236, this court has recognized that, in affairs of local concern, a home rule charter government possesses “powers which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of the state, except when limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the constitution, or its own home rule charter.” Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168, 1171 (La.1984).
Article VI also fosters local self-government by giving home rule entities “the discretion to deploy their powers and functions on the local level, which may not be revoked, changed or affected by law unless necessary to prevent an abridgement of the reasonable exercise of the state‘s police power.” Id.
The legislature shall enact no law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision which operates under a home rule charter.
This Section was added to Article VI to protect home rule governments from unwarranted interference in their internal affairs by state government. Francis, 455 So.2d at 1171.
To ensure that the powers granted to home rule governments would not be used to deprive the state government of its inherent powers, Section 9(B) was added to Article VI as a counterbalance. Id. at 1172. This section, entitled “Limitations of Local Government Subdivisions,” provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of this Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged.
This provision was adopted “as a principle of harmonizing the replete home rule powers granted local governments with a basic residuum of the state‘s power to initiate legislation and regulation necessary to protect and promote the vital interests of its people as a whole.” City of New Orleans, 93-0690 at p. 20, 640 So.2d at 249. This section has also been characterized as “a positive reaffirmance of the supremacy of
Although the police power of the state is best defined on a case by case basis, it has been generally described as the state‘s “inherent power to govern persons and things, within constitutional limits, for promotion of general health, safety, welfare, and morals.” City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170, p. 11 (La.3/2/99), 739 So.2d 748, 757. See also Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128, 1142; Francis, 455 So.2d at 1172. The police power extends only to measures that are reasonable. City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170 at p. 11, 739 So.2d at 757; Francis, 455 So.2d at 1172. A measure taken under the state‘s police power is reasonable when the action is, under all the circumstances, reasonably necessary and designed to accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of the police power. City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170 at p. 11, 739 So.2d at 757. Thus, to sustain an action under the state‘s police power, courts must be able to see that its operation tends in some degree to prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, safety, welfare or morals. Id. Further, an exercise of the state‘s police power “does not justify an interference with constitutional rights which is entirely out of proportion to any benefit redounding to the public.” City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 95-0308, p. 6 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 445, 449 (quoting Francis, 455 So.2d at 1173).
In the instant case, defendants argue that
The City‘s broad authority under the Home Rule Charter of 1954 and its predecessor, Act 159 of 1912, allows it to “sue and defend, plead and be impleaded, in all courts and places and in all matters and proceedings.” It was pursuant to these powers that the City filed the instant lawsuit. As this court has previously recognized, the powers of home rule entities are limited by the police power of the state. City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170 at p. 12, 739 So.2d at 757. Therefore, under the principles set forth in Article VI as explained above, the City may freely exercise its power to sue in all matters and proceedings unless this power conflicts with a valid exercise of the state‘s police powers.
The statute at issue,
It is beyond question that this challenged statute was passed in the interest
The statute at issue is aimed at suits, such as the one filed by the City in the instant case, that attempt to indirectly regulate the firearms industry on the local level. The petition filed by the City in this case alleges that the City was damaged because defendants’ firearms
are sold without the means to prevent their being fired by unauthorized users, without adequate warnings which would prevent such shootings by alerting users of the risks of hand-guns and of the importance of proper storage of handguns, and without other safety features and warnings which would prevent shootings by unauthorized users. Defendants distribute their handguns in a manner which affords easy access to unauthorized users including criminals.... At all pertinent times the defendants have been able to manufacture, market, sell and/or promote firearms which prevent shootings by unauthorized users, including firearms which incorporate safety devices intended to prevent unauthorized users from firing firearms if and when they come into possession of them. However, defendants have failed to do so.... Defendants were... aware of safety devices, warnings, and other measures which would prevent and decrease these dangers. Defendants failed to remedy these deficiencies in their handguns, warnings, instructions, promotions and advertising; failed to adequately warn customers of these dangers; and failed to inform customers or distributors or a retailers of safety devices and measures which could prevent or decrease these dangers and failed to determine whether safety devices were feasible or effective.
As evidenced by the language in the City‘s petition, this lawsuit constitutes an indirect attempt to regulate the lawful design, manufacture, marketing and sale of firearms.11 As such, it squarely conflicts
In addition to the constitutional arguments discussed above, the City also argues that the retroactivity provision of Act 291 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it is a prohibited local or special law. We disagree with this argument.
The Louisiana Constitution prohibits the legislature from passing any local or special law which deals with any of the subjects enumerated in
A law is local if it operates only in a particular locality or area without the possibility of extending its coverage to other localities or areas should the requisite criteria exist or come to exist in the new locality or area. State v. Brazley, 00-0923, p. 4 (La.11/28/00), 773 So.2d 718, 721; Kimball, 97-2885 at p. 4, 712 So.2d at 51. Thus, a law is general, and not local, if its operation can extend to the whole territory of the state. Kimball, 97-2885 at p. 4, 712 So.2d at 51. Additionally, a law is not local even though its enforcement may be restricted to a particular locality or area where the conditions under which it operates simply do not exist in other localities. Kimball, 97-2885 at p. 5, 712 So.2d at 51 (citing City of New Orleans v. Treen, 431 So.2d 390, 394 (La.1983) (“[A] law may be
Applying the above principles, we conclude that both Section 1 and Section 2 of Act 291 operate as general laws rather than local or special laws. Section 1, which comprises the text of
Section 2 of the Act deals with retroactivity and provides that its provisions shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending on its effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after its effective date. Like Section 1, Section 2 operates as a general law as it operates uniformly upon all local governing units that desire to file suits contemplated by
Finally, the City argues that application of Act 291 as a basis for sustaining defendants’ exception of no right of action violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. We reject the City‘s argument that, in enacting Act 291, the legislature exercised power properly belonging to the judicial branch of government. The legislature has always enjoyed the power to create new rights and abolish old ones as long as it does not interfere with vested rights. See, e.g., Reeder v. North, 97-0239, p. 9 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291, 1296; Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305, 310 (La.1986). As we have already explained, the legislature‘s decision to abolish a political subdivision‘s right of action to sue firearms or ammunition manufacturers, trade associations or dealers for damages or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition did not interfere with any vested rights belonging to the City. As such, the legislature acted entirely within its province when it enacted the law at issue.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court erroneously declared
DECREE
For the reasons explained above, defendants’ exception of no right of action is sustained and plaintiffs’ action is dismissed. The district court‘s conclusion as to the constitutionality of
REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; and RENDERED.
CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JOHNSON, J., dissents for reasons assigned by CALOGERO, C.J.
LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that continuation of the City‘s lawsuit abridges the police power of the state in contravention of
First, the City‘s lawsuit does not attempt in any way to regulate the firearms
According to Black‘s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1968), to “regulate” means “to fix, establish or control” or “to direct by rule or restriction.” The City‘s lawsuit does neither. The City‘s goal is the collection of monies to compensate it for damages resulting from the actions of defendants —nothing more, nothing less.
Second, Act 291 is not a valid exercise of the state‘s police power sufficient to trump the City‘s powers enumerated in its Home Rule Charter, which pre-dated the La. Constitution of 1974. For the same reasons stated above, Act 291 is not an attempt to regulate the firearms industry (which likely is within the state‘s police power), but rather is only a legislative assertion of who has the right of action to sue for damages in certain cases. Act 291 was not passed in response to a pressing public need or a vital public interest. Rather, it was passed in response to the City‘s lawsuit with the obvious intent to halt the City‘s litigation.
Even if Act 291 constituted a “regulation,” it does not rise to the level of a valid exercise of the state‘s police power sufficient to override the powers granted to the City of New Orleans in its Home Rule Charter, which pre-dated the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. In City of New Orleans v. Bd of Com‘rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 252, we discussed the state-local government relationship contemplated by
While the state‘s police powers are admittedly broad, they are limited to such measures “as are reasonable.” City of New Orleans v. Bd of Dir. of LSM, 98-1170, p. 11 (La.3/2/99), 739 So.2d 748, 757. In determining what is reasonable, we have held that “the action taken must be, under all the circumstances reasonably necessary and designed to accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of police power.” Accordingly, “to sustain an action under the police power, the court must be able to see that its operation tends in some degree to prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, safety, welfare or morals.” Id. at 757; Francis v. Mortal, 455 So.2d 1168, 1173 (La.1984). The first question to be answered in determining whether the state police power has been abridged by a home rule municipality‘s local law is whether the local law conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is necessary to protect the “vital interest” of the state as a whole. City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 95-0308, pp. 5-6 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 445, 449; City of New Orleans v. Bd of Com‘rs, supra.
I acknowledge that these conclusions leave unanswered a myriad of legal issues raised in this litigation. However, as I write as a dissenter and not as a member of the majority, I choose to pretermit the remaining legal issues raised by my conclusions, such as the effect of 1999 La. Acts 1299 (
LEMMON, J., Concurring
Exercise of Police Power
Although agreeing with the majority in the dismissal of the action on the exception of no right of action, I also agree with the dissenters that La. Acts 1999, No. 291, enacting
The 1998 suit would have violated Section 1799, if it had been in effect when the suit was filed. However, Section 1799 was not intended to regulate any aspect of the sale, purchase, possession, ownership, transfer, transportation, license or registration of firearms. Section 1799 was clearly a regulation of certain tort suits by limiting the persons and entities who can recover damages. The Act legislatively removed from local governments the right to file suit for damages caused by the negligent design and manufacture of firearms, while reserving to the state the right to sue for such damages.1
This new legislation that preempted local governments of their right of action to file certain types of tort suits was a policy decision to set limits and define the scope of liability in such actions, just as the legislative limitation of the right of action to certain persons in the recovery of wrongful death damages under
Effect on Pending Litigation
The issue in this suit is the effect of the Act 291 on pending litigation. In this respect, but for different reasons, I concur in the majority‘s result that Act 291 validly removed the City‘s right of action to recover this type of damages.
The majority reasoned that the Legislature intended Act 291 to apply to actions pending on the effective date; that a political subdivision of the state is not entitled to the protections of the Contracts and Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions afforded to private citizens; that the City, as a home rule charter government existing at the time of the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, nevertheless, retained its existing powers, functions and duties under
I would not reach the police power issue because I disagree with the application in this case of
The purpose of Article VI was best stated in R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Local Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy.L.Rev. 63, 66 (1975), as follows:
Municipalities and other local governmental units are, of course, an integral part of state government. ”Home rule” does not mean complete autonomy—it should be more properly viewed as a rule by which local government has the freedom and flexibility to manage its own local affairs without undue legislative interference. In matters of true state-wide concern and in matters of private or civil relationships, the state should be supreme. The “home rule” provisions of Article VI were designed with this in mind; therefore, these provisions do not go as far in granting home rule powers as some might have preferred. They do not place the substantive powers and functions of local government beyond legislative control through general law. Article VI does not create separate city-states; it does, however, afford the means by which a home rule charter unit may exercise any necessary power or function except as may be expressly limited by its charter and the general laws, or as may be inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution. With regard to “structure and organization“, the home rule charter unit is supreme, as it should be. Thus, the concept embodied in Article VI completely reversed the theory of local government as a “creature of the state” with only delegated authority. The old strict constructionist theory is also replaced by one which recognizes that so long as the Legislature does not deny a power, local government possesses it,
thereby rendering any further enabling legislation unnecessary. (emphasis added).
Article VI granted all local governments with home rule charters the right, without seeking legislative authority, to manage their own affairs in any manner which is not inconsistent with the Constitution or with the charter itself, and which is not limited by general law. Section 4 of Article VI specifically reserved to local governments with home rule charters adopted before the 1974 Constitution the right to retain their existing powers, functions and duties. The purpose of that provision, however, was to continue the substantive authority of such local governments, while according them the additional powers granted to other local governments under the 1974 Constitution. Kean at 67. That provision was not intended to guarantee to those local governments with preexisting charters that there would be no interference by the Legislature, particularly in matters of state-wide concern.
The broad right granted to the City of New Orleans by its Charter to “sue and defend, plead and be impleaded, in all courts and places ... in all matters and proceedings“did not give the City an unconditional right to sue for damages, arising from injuries to numerous citizens domiciled throughout the state, which were indirectly incurred by the City as well as by all other municipalities and parishes and by the state. In this type of action involving a matter or statewide concern and an interest shared with other local governments and the state, the state necessarily has the right to preempt political subdivisions as the proper party to bring such an action. Act 291 merely codifies this preemption (although it does not regulate firearms).
The Legislature had the inherent power, within constitutional limits, to determine which parties should have a right of action to sue for this type of damages and may preempt the power of local governments to file this type of action by reserving that right to the state. Accordingly, Act 291 (even if not an exercise of police power) validly preempted the City‘s powers and could do so with respect to pending suits, because the City does not enjoy the protections afforded to private citizens by the Due Process and Contracts Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Notes
A. The governing authority of any political subdivision or local or other governmental authority of the state is precluded and preempted from bringing suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages for injury, death, or loss or to seek other injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition. The authority to bring such actions as may be authorized by law shall be reserved exclusively to the state.
B. This Section shall not prohibit the governing authority of a political subdivision or local or other governing authority of the state from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for breach of contract as to firearms or ammunition purchased by the political subdivision or local authority of the state.
If this suit had been filed by a local government with a home rule charter adopted after 1974, the exercise of police power would not be an issue.A. The legislature finds and declares that the Louisiana Products Liability Act was not designed to impose liability on a manufacturer or seller for the improper use of a properly designed and manufactured product. The legislature further finds and declares that the manufacture and sale of firearms and ammunition by manufacturers and dealers, duly licensed by the appropriate federal and state authorities, is lawful activity and is not unreasonably dangerous.
B. No firearm manufacturer or seller shall be liable for any injury, damage, or death resulting from any shooting injury by any other person unless the claimant proves and shows that such injury, damage, or death was proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product as provided in R.S. 9:2800.55.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no manufacturer or seller of a firearm who has transferred that firearm in compliance with federal and state law shall incur any liability for any action of any person who uses a firearm in a manner which is unlawful, negligent, or otherwise inconsistent with the purposes for which it was intended.
D. The failure of a manufacturer or seller to insure that a firearm has a device which would: make the firearm useable only by the lawful owner or authorized user of the firearm; indicate to users that a cartridge is in the chamber of the firearm; or prevent the firearm from firing if the ammunition magazine is removed, shall not make the firearm unreasonably dangerous, unless such device is required by federal or state statute or regulation.
E. (1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the potential of a firearm to cause serious injury, damage, or death as a result of normal function does not constitute a firearm malfunction due to defect in design or manufacture.
(2) A firearm may not be deemed defective in design or manufacture on the basis of its potential to cause serious bodily injury, property damage, or death when discharged legally or illegally.
F. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no manufacturer or seller of a firearm shall incur any liability for failing to warn users of the risk that:
(1) A firearm has the potential to cause serious bodily injury, property damage, or death when discharged legally or illegally.
(2) An unauthorized person could gain access to the firearm.
(3) A cartridge may be in the chamber of the firearm.
(4) The firearm is capable of being fired even with the ammunition magazine removed.
G. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to assault weapons manufactured in violation of 18 U.S.C. S.922(v).
That decision involved the issue of the power of the City of New Orleans to institute legislation restricting the zoning and use of land owned by the state. That decision did not involve the City‘s immunity from legislativNo governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact after July 15, 1985, any ordinance or regulation more restrictive than state law concerning in any way the sale, purchase, possession, ownership, transfer, transportation, license, or registration of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition; provided, however, that this Section shall not apply to the levy and collection of sales and use taxes, license fees and taxes and permit fees, nor shall it affect the authority of political subdivisions to prohibit the possession of a weapon or firearm in certain commercial establishments and public buildings.
Because neither the plain language nor anything in the legislative history of this statute leads us to conclude that it was intended to apply to lawsuits filed by the governing authority of a political subdivision, we find this contention without merit.