Morgan v. JonesMorgan v. Jones
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part; Appeal Dismissed in Part
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 1, 2022
Law Office of M. Erin Wilkins, LLC, and M. Erin Wilkins, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Mark G. Jones, pro se.
{¶1} This appeal concerns the trial court‘s appointment of a receiver to sell the residence owned by former spouses, defendant-appellant Mark Jones and plaintiff-appellee Victoria Morgan. Jones appeals the trial court‘s entry granting Morgan‘s motion for the аppointment of a receiver for the sale of the parties’ residence and the trial court‘s entry “denying defendant‘s motion for a new trial/denying immediate stay of appointment of receiver/denying approval of buyout transaction.” He additionally appeals the trial court‘s entries granting the receiver‘s application to sell the property, specifying the conditions for the sale of the property by the receiver, and approving further dutiеs and authority of the receiver (collectively referred to as “the additional entries“).
{¶2} In three assignments of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred in entering the order appointing the receiver and the subsequent entries related thereto; that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial; and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for approval of a buyout transaction. Because we find that the additional entries are not final, appealable orders, we dismiss the appeal as far as it relates to these entries for lack of jurisdiction. We otherwise find Jones‘s assignments of error to be without merit, and we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Background
{¶3} This is the second appeal that this court has heard concerning the sale of the parties’ residence. Morgan and Jones were granted a final judgment of divorce in 2019. Incorporated into the final judgment was the parties’ antenuptial agreement for the disposition of real and pеrsonal property.
{¶5} In October 2020, after this court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment granting the divorce, Morgan filed a motion to appoint a receiver to sell the residence. The motion was denied in March 2021. Approximately one month later, on April 22, 2021, after the parties received an offer to purchase the residence, Morgan filed a motion to order Jones to accept the offer that the parties had received, or, in the alternative, to appoint a receiver. The motion also requested that the court hold an expedited hearing on the motion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on April 28, 2021. On May 3, 2021, it issued an entry appointing a receiver to sell the parties’ residenсe. The entry provided that “The Receiver shall have all powers necessary to conduct and carry out the sale of the residence, including but not limited to, negotiation, acceptance of a reasonable offer, entering into contract, and finalizing the sale.”
{¶6} On June 1, 2021, Jones filed a motion that requested the trial court do three things: grant a new trial pursuant to
{¶7} Jones filed a notice of appeal on July 28, 2021, stating that he was appealing from the trial court‘s May 3, 2021 entry appointing the receiver and the “subsequent Entries of the trial court related thereto, including Motion For a New Trial.”
Determination of Jurisdiction
{¶8} Before considering the merits of Jones‘s appeal, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This court only has jurisdiction to review final and appealable orders.
{¶9} In Cornell v. Shain, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190722, 2021-Ohio-2094, ¶ 30, we held thаt an order granting the appointment of a receiver is a final, appealable order under
{¶ 10} But we reach a different conclusion with respect to the additional entries. In Cornell, we held that “an interim order merely governing the receivership, though made in a special proceeding, generally does not affect a substantial right and is not immediately appealable under
{¶11} We next consider whether Jones‘s appeal from the trial court‘s entry appointing the receiver was timely filed. The follоwing dates are relevant to our determination. The trial court entered the order appointing the receiver on May 3, 2021. Jones filed the motion for a new trial on June 1, 2021. The trial court entered the order denying the motion for a new trial on June 29, 2021, and Jones filed his notice of appeal on July 28, 2021.
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{¶13}
{¶14} Because the motion for a new trial was timely,
{¶15} Jones has therefore timely appealed the trial court‘s entries appointing the receiver and denying his motion for a new trial. We now turn to the merits of Jones‘s appeal.
Appointment of a Receiver
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred in entering the order appointing the receiver and “the four subsequent Related Entries.” The related entries that Jones references are the entry denying Jones‘s motion for a new trial/denying immediate stay of appointment of receiver/denying approval of buyout transaction, and the additional entries. For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the appeal to the extent that it relates to the additional entries.
{¶17} Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to exercise his right to be heard and to file a memorandum in opposition to
{¶18} Included in Morgan‘s motion was a request for an expedited hearing. Local Rule 1.16 of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Domestic Relations Division, (“Loc.R. 1.16“) provides that a party may request an expedited hearing in extraordinary circumstances. Morgan‘s motion alleged that the parties had received an offer on the home, that this was the first offer that they had received since the home was listed in March 2020, that Jones had rejected the potential buyer‘s showing requests, and that Jones, at the time of the motion, had not responded to the offer. While the record contains no entry from the trial court approving Morgan‘s request for an expedited hearing, the hearing was held on April 28, 2021, six days after the motion was filed. And while Jones did not file a memorandum in opposition to Morgan‘s motion, he appeаred at the hearing and defended against it. Jones cross-examined Morgan‘s witness and argued his position.
{¶19} We find no error in the trial court‘s granting of Morgan‘s request to hold an expedited hearing under these circumstances. The parties had received a seemingly reasonable offer on their home that had a set expiration date, necessitating the need for the hearing to occur quickly. Even if the trial court failed to strictly comply with
{¶20} “A trial court has the inherent power to control its own docket and the progress of the proceedings in its court.” Holbrook v. Holbrook, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-05-055, 2018-Ohio-2360, ¶ 17. Trial courts have great latitude in the enforcement of their own local rules, which “are of the court‘s own making, generally administrative in nature, designed to facilitate case management and provide guidelines for orderly case administration, and do not involve substantive principles of law or implicate constitutional rights.” Id. For this reason, a trial court has the discretion to deviate from its own local rules based on the circumstances before it. However, if “the local rule implicates due process, and the trial court‘s failure to follow it deprives a party of a reasonable opportunity to defend against the disposition of the case in favor of the other party, the trial court is bound to comply with the local rule.” Id. Where an appellant alleges that a trial court has violated a local rule, she or he has the burden to show resulting prejudice. Id.
{¶21} Here, Jones has shown no resulting prejudice. His failure to receive advance notice of the hearing and his lack of opportunity to file a memorandum in opposition to Morgan‘s motion did not deprive him of a reasonable opportunity to defend against the motion. Jones appeared at the hearing, argued on his own behalf, and cross-examined Morgan‘s witness. He did not seek leave to file a memorandum in response or to supplement any arguments he made at the hearing. We accordingly reject Jones‘s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Jones to exercise his right to be heard and to file a memorandum in opposition.
{¶23} Jones‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Motion for a New Trial
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
{¶25} Motions for a new trial are governed by
{¶26} Here, Jones has asserted a multitude of reasons why he should have been granted a new trial, but he does not tie these reasons to any specific ground set
{¶27} Jones seemingly argues that he should have bеen granted a new trial on the grounds set forth in
{¶28} Jones argues that he was entitled to a new trial on the issue of the appointment of a receiver because he was prevented from having a fair trial. See
{¶29} Jones next argues that should have been granted a new trial because of Morgan‘s misconduct. See
{¶30} Jones contends that a new trial is warranted because he was surprised by Morgan‘s motion and the “last-minute scheduling” of the hearing. See
{¶31} Jones argues that he should be granted a new trial because the trial court‘s appointment of a receiver was not sustained by the weight of the evidence. See
{¶32} Jones next argues that he was entitled to a new trial on the grounds set forth in
{¶33} In addition to the grounds discussed above, Jones argues that he should be granted a new trial on Morgan‘s motion because it was inequitable to enter the receiver order based on the reasons offered by Morgan, the appointment of the receiver was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, Morgan‘s motion was moot, and because there exists substantial evidence in opposition to the motion that would be presented if a new hearing were granted. For the reasons set forth above in our response to Jones‘s previously asserted challenges to the trial court‘s denial of his motion for a new trial, we find these аrguments to be without merit.
{¶34} The trial court did not err in denying Jones‘s motion for a new trial. The second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Motion for a Buyout Transaction
{¶35} In his third assignment of error, Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for approval of a buyout transaction.
{¶36} As we explained when discussing the procedural history of the case, in the same motion in which he requested a new trial, Jones also requested that the trial court approve a buyout transaction for Jones to buy out Morgan‘s ownership interest
{¶37} In denying Jones‘s motion for approval of the buyout offer, the trial court stated that it “is disinclined to order one party to accept a buyout transaction where the other party is not negotiating in good faith.” Jones argues that the trial court‘s decision deprived him of his contractual rights under section 9.5 of the parties’ antenuptial agreement, which contained each party‘s right of first refusal to purchase the other party‘s portion of jointly-acquired property. This section provides that:
In the event the parties hereto later jointly acquire residential property of any kind by deed to both spouses, and thereafter there is a dissolution of the marriage or in the event of the prospective sale of such residence, each party hereto shall have the right-of-first-refusal to purchase such portion of such rеsidential property owned by the other party at the then current fair market price. If a dispute arises as to the then current fair market price, the parties shall agree upon a qualified real estate appraiser (who may be a mutually agreeable real estate broker) who shall determine the current fair market price. Either party shall have the option to buy or sell at the determined fair market price. The buyout shall be an all cash transaсtion consummated within ninety (90)
calendar days after the purchase transaction has been agreed upon. If both parties wish to buy, then the buyer shall be the party hereto who is the highest bidder.
{¶38} The trial court did not ignore this provision in denying Jones‘s motion to approve the buyout transaction. Jones‘s transaction statement included various incidental amounts that impacted the ultimate amount of money that one party would owe the other, including residence expenses and rеpair costs that had been incurred. These additional deductions from the purchase price were not part of the buyout provision, and the court was free to disregard the “offer” made by Jones. The clear language of the buyout provision required Jones to buy out Morgan at the current fair market price, without any adjustments that he later purported to add to the equation. Following our review of the record, we cannot find that the trial court erred in declining to аpprove the buyout transaction and in determining that a buyout offer that resulted in Morgan owing Jones approximately $46,000, while simultaneously surrendering her share of the residence, was not made in good faith.
{¶39} The third assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.
Judgment affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part.
CROUSE and WINKLER, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.