TIFFNEY MOON, GUARDIAN, et al. v. TROTWOOD MADISON CITY SCHOOLS, et al.
C.A. CASE NO. 25779
T.C. NO. 12CV6239
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
March 21, 2014
2014-Ohio-1110
(Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
RAYMOND H. DECKER JR., Atty. Reg. No. 0069208, 36 East Seventh Street, Suite 2420, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees
OPINION
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Tiffney Moon and her minor daughter, “D.” (collectively, “Moon“), appeal from the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment to Trotwood-Madison City Schools, Principal Tyrone Nadir, Vice Principal Taiwo Sutton, and unnamed substitute sixth grade
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 3} Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Moon, as required by
{¶ 4} On January 23, 2012, D. was a sixth grade student at Trotwood-Madison Elementary School. Nadir was the school‘s principal, and Sutton was the vice principal. On January 23, the school‘s sixth grade teachers were on professional leave, as approved by Nadir. The approximately 174 sixth grade students were supervised by six substitute teachers. One teacher was assigned to each classroom (for an average of one teacher per 29 students).
{¶ 5} At the end of each school day, the students in each class are to form a line in an orderly fashion, and the teacher leads his or her line through the hallway. Students are to remain in the line until they reach the parking lot where the school buses are located. Dismissal procedures are discussed and practiced at the beginning of the year and quarterly. No other student has been injured during the dismissal process during the past five years.
{¶ 6} At the end of the school day on January 23, 2012, the substitute teachers stood at the front of each class of students. According to D.‘s affidavit, the sixth grade students went into the hallway, but they did not line up for dismissal. Sixth grade students began to run through the hallway. A group of students pushed D., causing her to fall, and “trampled” her while she was on the ground. Another group of students helped her up. A substitute teacher asked D. if she were okay; D. shook her head yes. No teacher or
{¶ 7} On August 28, 2012, Moon brought suit against Trotwood-Madison City Schools (“the school district“), Nadir, Sutton, and three John/Jane Doe substitute teachers,1 claiming recklessness by (1) the substitute teachers in failing to control the students, (2) the school district, Nadir, and Sutton in failing to provide adequate supervision, and (3) the school district in the failure of its employees to prevent or control the dangerous activities of its students. The school district, Nadir and Sutton filed an answer denying the claims and asserting several affirmative defenses, including that they were immune from liability under
{¶ 8} The school district, Nadir and Sutton subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that they and the unnamed substitute teachers were immune from liability. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The trial court concluded that Trotwood-Madison City Schools, a political subdivision, was immune under
{¶ 9} Moon appeals from the trial court‘s judgment, raising one assignment of error.
II. Sovereign Immunity
{¶ 10} In their sole assignment of error, Moon claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the school district, Nadir, Sutton, and the substitute teachers. They argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Trotwood-Madison City Schools and its employees acted recklessly.
{¶ 11} Pursuant to
{¶ 12} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party‘s pleadings. Dresher at 293;
{¶ 13} We review the trial court‘s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Schroeder v. Henness, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012 CA 18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42. “De Novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.” Brewer v. Cleveland City Schools Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997), citing Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 119-20, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980). Therefore, the trial court‘s decision is not granted deference by the reviewing appellate court. Powell v. Rion, 2012-Ohio-2665, 972 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).
{¶ 14} ”
A. Trotwood-Madison City Schools
{¶ 15} It is undisputed that Trotwood-Madison City Schools is a “political subdivision,” as defined by
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} The only exception in
{¶ 18} The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Trotwood-Madison City Schools.
B. Nadir, Sutton, and the Substitute Teachers
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} The terms “wanton” and “reckless” describe different and distinct degrees of care and are not interchangeable. Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraph one of the syllabus. They are sometimes described “as being on a continuum, i.e., willful conduct is more culpable than wanton, and wanton conduct is more culpable than reckless.” Id. at ¶ 42 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
{¶ 21} Recklessness is a high standard. Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 118 Ohio St.3d 392, 2008-Ohio-2567, 889 N.E.2d 521, ¶ 37. “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson at ¶ 34, adopting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500 (1965).
{¶ 22} Mere negligence in the performance of an employee‘s duties is insufficient to meet this high standard. See O‘Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 74. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, an individual‘s conduct “‘is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if * * * such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.‘” Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994), quoting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500, at 587 (1965).
{¶ 23} Even when viewing the evidence in Moon‘s favor, Nadir and Sutton‘s conduct does not meet the high standard of recklessness, as a matter of law.2 Nadir and
{¶ 24} As stated above, Moon opposed the summary judgment motion with an affidavit by D. The affidavit indicated that, at the end of the day, the sixth grade students went into the hallway, they did not line up, and they began running through the hallway. (We note that Moon repeatedly states on appeal that all of the substitute teachers supervising dismissal stood at the front of the line of students.) D. was injured when some students
{¶ 25} Even accepting D.‘s statements as true, there is no evidentiary support for Moon‘s conclusory assertion that the one teacher per 29 students ratio was reckless. Although D. was injured by other students’ running down the hallway on January 23, 2012, that fact does not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nadir and Sutton acted recklessly in determining the necessary level of supervision and assigning teachers on that day. Nadir and Sutton were entitled to immunity, as a matter of law.
{¶ 26} We likewise find no genuine issue of material fact as to the substitute teachers’ recklessness. Moon asserts that the substitute teachers “failed to control the students and students ran through the hallway, pushed [D.] to the ground, and trampled her.” In essence, Moon argues that the sixth grade students’ wrongful conduct establishes recklessness on the part of the substitute teachers. Moon further states that “six (6) people standing in front of a group of 174 running students created a substantial risk of injury.”
{¶ 27} Again, without minimizing the trauma that D. experienced, there is no evidence that the substitute teachers acted with a “conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances.” The administrators’ evidence demonstrated that the elementary school had established dismissal procedures, that the six substitute teachers supervised dismissal of the sixth grade students on January 23, 2012, and that the substitute teachers were at the front of the lines of students. D.‘s affidavit indicates that the students did not follow the dismissal procedures and, instead, ran down the hallway. (Despite D.‘s affidavit, Moon repeatedly emphasizes in their appellate brief that “[a]ll the substitute teachers supervising the dismissal stood at the
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting judgment, based on sovereign immunity, to the defendants on Moon‘s claims.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} The trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
FAIN, J. and WRIGHT, J., concur.
(Hon. Thomas R. Wright, Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
Sean Brinkman
Aaron G. Durden
Raymond H. Decker Jr.
Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman