*1 Superior Court for reconsideration under Commonwealth White, v. (1995).
682A.2d 776 Gary SON, Appellant, MONTE
v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD
(TRINITY INDUSTRIES), Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 1996. Sept. Decided *2 Paczak, Pittsburgh, Gary for Susan Monteson. Bordonaro, Erie, Trinity E. for Industries.
Richard Jr., Corbett, Harrisburg, Commonwealth. Thomas W. ZAPPALA, CAPPY, FLAHERTY, CASTILLE Before NIGRO, JJ.
OPINION ZAPPALA, Justice.
We granted allocatur to determine whether the referee1 erred in concluding that Employer was entitled to a suspen sion of Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits. For the below, reasons set forth affirm. we Appellant, Gary (Claimant), Monteson suffered a work- 31, 1989, related back injury on October while working for Trinity Industries (Employer). Employer issued a notice of compensation payable dated November 1989. On Decem- 7, 1989, ber Claimant signed a final receipt and returned to work. On January Claimant reinjured his back at work and benefits were pursuant reinstated to a supplemental agreement 15,1990. January dated Claimant’s treating physi- cian released 10,1990, Claimant to work and on April a second receipt However, final was signed. Employer laid off Claim- *3 ant and other workers with 5, similar seniority April effective 1990. Claimant then applied for and unemployment received April benefits from 1990 to 1990. June
Claimant was subsequently hired Greenwood Nissan as a 9, car salesman on later, June 1990. days Two Employer offered Claimant pre-injury job. rejected Claimant offer of employment. later, Two weeks Greenwood Nissan terminated Claimant’s employment due to his failure to sell cars. Claimant remained unemployed 1991, until March when he was hired as an independent Sosmetal, agent by Inc. to sell automotive repair materials. He was terminated by Sosmetal in October 1991. 22,1991,
On November Claimant petition filed a to set aside 10, 1990, the April final receipt. Claimant alleged that at the signed time he the final receipt he was not fully recovered from his injury. Claimant sought reinstatement of his 10, 1990, benefits as of April when he was laid upon off his return to work.
1. This case was heard to the enactment of Act 44 of 1993 in which the title changed of referee was compensation judge." to "workers’ 77 P.S. 701.
635 fully recovered that had not The referee found Claimant 1990, 10, signed the April when he original from his symptoms receipt suffering and that he was still final to set granted The referee original injury. benefits from disability total receipt, the final reinstated aside 1990, 10, 1990, 8, to June awarded April suspend for June 9 and June benefits 11, The referee determined as of June ed benefits it to of benefits because Employer suspension was entitled a its voluntarily accept refused proven had that Claimant to his work-related for reasons unrelated offer of (Fuller Co.), v. Dugan WCAB citing Commw. (1990).2 218, A.2d 1038 Board Compensation Appeal appeal, the Workmen’s
On
Dugan
but
misplaced,
was
held that the referee’s reliance
Employer
Board
error was harmless. The
held
benefits as of June
entitled
a
job
Employer
offer from
Claimant had refused
because
and because
law does
reasons unrelated to
indefinitely.
require
employer
keep
open
not
an
faith
that the
did not exercise bad
Board also found
11,1990, job
refusing
offer.
Employer’s
June
Utilizing
analysis
affirmed.
The Commonwealth Court
Division,
v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments
Pieper
forth
set
(1990),
Pa.
A.2d 301
Commonwealth Court
not entitled to reinstatement
determined that Claimant was
offer of
Employer’s
employ-
because his refusal of
The court noted that
was unrelated to
work
ment
have
residual effects
although Claimant continues to
some
*4
that his refusal of
his work-related
he admitted
from
not
thereto.
Employer’s offer was
related
proceed
of
in workers’
scope
review
of whether constitutional
is limited to a determination
ings
partially
a
Dugan,
Court held that where
In
the Commonwealth
voluntarily
he has
inten-
employee
retires and testifies that
no
disabled
work,
testimony supports
finding
any
a
returning
of
form of
tion
market,
justifying
suspen-
Claimant has withdrawn from
sion of benefits.
violated,
committed,
an
law has
rights have been
error of
been
fact
substantial
any findings
supported by
or
of
are not
Temps,
Compensation Ap-
evidence. JFC
Inc. v. Workmen’s
(1996).
Board,
545 Pa.
Having suspension benefits was referee, within the of the we must now examine authority whether the In suspension proper. Pieper, Court addressed the issue of whether the Commonwealth Court by requiring committed an error of law the claimant establish a causal connection between his and his in order to present disability qualify rein statement of compensation. We determined that no causal connection had to be shown in a of benefits situa tion. We then set forth the for a claimant proof burden seeking reinstatement of benefits: suspended
A “suspension supported by finding of benefits” is that the longer of the claimant is no disability, it employer offering whether arises *5 the ability the of or from employment, replacement suitable provides that employment other to secure suitable claimant to a claimant seek Should compensation. or equal greater only lifted, required he to demonstrate suspension have Simply, longer no exist. suspension for the that the reasons continued, his has show that while a claimant must earnings loss of has recurred. his omitted). (Citations Id. A.2d at 304. at two prove law a claimant to requires that the We also stated no for the in order to show that reasons things of the claimant first, no fault through exist: that longer affected again adversely is once his/her rise to the second, injury gave which that at 584 A.2d Id. claim fact continues.3 original claimant’s at 305. Employer’s his refusal of initially asserts that result of his fear faith but was the
offer was not based bad a career as his desire to continue reinjuring himself and his burden that he satisfied car salesman. He concludes no fault of his own by establishing through that under Pieper subsequently his Nissan employment with Greenwood Thus, his Sosmetal, asserts that Inc. terminated. he was recurred. earnings continued and his loss of injury to that failed reasoning in this The fatal flaw earning own his through power no fault?of his establish loss adversely Claimant’s was rather was injury from his work but earnings did not result he fact that obtained alternative due to return he terminated.4 Claimant was released which was restrictions, by treating without position, pre-injury economic He until he was laid off for worked physician. Compensation Pieper analysis v. 3. in Dillon Workmen's We affirmed the (1994), (Greenwich Collieries) Appeal Board imprecisely “disability” used in recognizing term was while earnings. signify physical injury loss in Pieper to rather than returning reinjuxy upon fear of Board found that Claimant’s Therefore, his unsupported by evidence. prior position was medical between subjective fear not create a causal connection does loss. and income reasons. Although Claimant continued to suffer symptoms the work injury, he admitted that his termination from subse- quent employment totally unrelated to his work *6 and that injury did not affect the work he had been performing. recognize,
We that a causal connection need not be estab- lished between the prior injury work and the present disability in suspension a of benefits case. This rule of law should not be construed to eliminate the requirement of a causal relation- ship injury between the work and subsequent the in reduction Otherwise, earnings. any in reduction income aby claimant who suffers from residual effects of a work injury would trigger reinstatement of at partial least benefits regardless of why the reason the in loss income arose. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the purpose of the workers’ compensation § law. Section 413 states:
... That where compensation has been suspended because the employee’s earnings are to or in equal excess of his wages prior injury to the that payments under the agree- ment or may award be any resumed at time during the for period which compensation partial disability pay- able, unless it be shown that the loss in earnings does not result the due disability injury. to the added). 77 P.S. 772 (emphasis section, Pursuant to this the employer has the opportunity to establish that compensation should remain suspended a despite claimant’s loss in earnings because that loss was attributable to factors other than the injury. work
Although not controlling, our decision in Harle v. W.C.A.B. Press), (Telegraph (1995), Pa. supports proposition order to be compensable a loss earnings must result from the claimant’s work In injury. Harle, thumb, the claimant injured received total disability benefits, and then was eventually released to return to his prior position. however, His employer, had ceased conducting business. The claimant later obtained a position similar else- where at a wage. lower granted referee the employer’s termination on ground that the claimant’s disabili- affirmed. The Board had ceased. ty relative continued to the claimant testimony that on medical Relying thumb, the joint in the of his of motion range have a reduced there was not substan- concluded that Court Commonwealth a necessary for termi- findings support tial evidence benefits, benefits to a modification of and therefore nation of appropriate. Court and of the Commonwealth vacating In decision if benefits, a held that even we ordering remains, a claimant is not enti- physical impairment residual benefits, based including partial tled to wages, pre-injury post-injury between his the difference work is related unless that difference the reduc- Similarly, relationship between in the instant case. necessary earnings in Claimant’s tion *7 same, properly the referee failed to establish As Claimant If Claimant’s compensation benefits. his workers’ suspended impair- in the future the residual he seek reinstatement may the work ment from at that time. compensation workers’ J., in C.J., NEWMAN, not NIX, participate did Former and of this case. the consideration or decision CAPPY, J., dissenting opinion. files a CAPPY, Justice, dissenting. court this matter is whether question before the Act)1 (the Act Compensation under the Workers’
claimant work, off being laid acquires after who seeks job pre his new and resume employer, required quit or employer him his former when offered position I would compensation future benefits. losing risk workers’ and, job, required quit his new find Claimant is not thus, majority opinion. from the respectfully I dissent majority adequately does not I believe that
Because I appeal, in this will set deciding are to be frame the issue we amended, 736, seq. 1 ef P.L. as P.S. 1. Act of June forth procedural the factual and background this dissent in order to make the issue clear.2
Claimant in this matter suffered a to his 31, back on October 1989 and subsequently received workers’ signed benefits until he a final receipt on De- 7, cember 1989 and returned to work with Employer. After reinjuring 1, his back 1990, at work on January Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits were pursuant reinstated to a supplemental agreement 15, dated January 1990. Once Claimant was released to work by his treating physician, he signed 10,1990, a second final receipt April but was laid off 5, April effective part as of a massive lay-off by Employ- being er. After unemployed slightly over two months and receiving unemployment compensation April benefits from 1990, 1990 to June of Claimant was able to secure 9, a car When, as salesman on June days two after Claimant job, started this new Employer offered Claimant his job, pre-injury rejected the offer. Claimant was not salesman, however, successful car and he was terminated after only job two weeks on the for failure to sell enough cars. He was likewise unsuccessful at subsequent sales with Sosmetal, Inc., and, thus, 1991, in October of he found himself receiving unemployment compensation. In November sought to set aside the April 1990 final receipt sought reinstatement of his April benefits as of 1990,when he was laid off upon his return to work.
The referee held that Claimant was entitled to reinstate
ment of his
compensation benefits,
worker’s
but only through
*8
11, 1990,
date,
June
because on that
Claimant voluntarily
accept
refused to
Employer’s offer of employment for reasons
unrelated to his work-related injury, citing Dugan v. W.C.A.B.
(Fuller Co.),
218,
(1990).3
131 Pa.Cmwlth.
The that Claimant here continues to suffer from his work-related back injury gave which rise to his original claim for compensation, satisfying the second part Pieper concludes, however, standard. The majority Claimant has failed to meet the requirement of Pieper he that, through own, show no fault of his earning his power again adversely once affected by injury. majority opinion concludes that Claimant’s “loss of
earnings did not result from injury his work but rather was due to the fact that he obtained alternative employment from which he majority was terminated.” The reasons that Claim- earning ant’s power adversely affected his termination from the sales employment he took after being laid off Employer; Claimant’s work-related injury back did not affect his ability perform this sales employment and his termi- and, therefore, nation from employment; Claimant’s earn- ing power is adversely not work-related result, majority
As creates an requirement additional that, to Pieper seeking where a claimant reinstatement of his worker’s compensation benefits has secured new after being job by laid off from his his employer and loses that employment, new he must show a causal connection between his loss of this new employ- ment in order to show his once adversely majority’s I dissent from affecting earning power. -with Pieper reasoning departure here it represents as *10 I agree. which cannot his of sus- sought claimant reinstatement
In the Pieper, inAs the instant compensation benefits. pended worker’s had a work-related matter, Pieper in suffered the claimant compensation for he worker’s injury back which received benefits, and, with his em- returning to work full-time after compen- receiving unemployment had been laid off and ployer, benefits. sation to the claimant did not have estab in Pieper
We held injury his work-related lish a causal connection between in to for reinstate present disability eligible his order be to but had meet compensation of his worker’s ment set forth The continu prongs supra. two of the standard the in Pieper back was ance of the claimant’s work-related that the of the Pieper ruled in established. We he again by disability” where was “once affected claimant compensa unemployment that he no received proved longer part-time job as a only tion and able maintain at a income.4 bartender reduced in language in case turns majority present
The the Act, 772, 77 P.S. Compensation section 413 the Worker’s Press), 482, 658 v. (Telegraph and Harle W.C.A.B. (1995), requirement it is attempt 766 in an to buttress the A.2d on Claimant here. placing majority the language quoted section
states: has because suspended
... where been That to or in excess of his earnings equal the are employe’s agree- under the payments to the wages prior any during at time may ment award be resumed or for pay- which compensation period upon employer Pieper that burden is to rebut 4. We noted in earnings by establishing availability proof claimant's of loss of Pieper, n. capable performing. 526 Pa. at work claimant at n. 8. A.2d able, unless it be shown that the loss in earnings does not result from the due to the injury.
I do not language supportive find this of the majority’s imposition of a causal connection here. The above-quoted language from section 413 addresses a situation “where com pensation suspended has been because the employe’s earnings in equal are to or excess of wages prior injury.” to the Further, Such is not the present case matter. quoting portion of section 413 lends no answer the issue of whether the Claimant’s earning power is once adversely Moreover, I find Harle equally unsupportive of the majority’s position. The claimant injured Harle had his thumb at work. He received work benefits, and, er’s compensation when he was released *11 physician light duty work, to return to employer had conducting ceased business. The employer in Harle filed a termination asserting the claimant’s disability had ceased. The Commonwealth Court found that the claimant’s medical disability ceased, that, had not entirely and since the claimant’s pre-injury position was not available and the claim ant had obtained a similar position elsewhere at a wage, lower modification partial of benefits to disability was appropriate. This court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s remand of the benefits, matter for calculation of instead ordering the matter remanded to the Board with instructions that the claimant’s benefits be suspended.5 reason for finding suspension
Our of the claimant’s benefits appropriate in Harle was that since the claimant continued to physical suffer residual impairment could, from his injury, he future, in the if his earning power were to be affected residual impairment injury, from his seek reinstatement of partial proving Pieper standard for Harle, reinstatement of suspended not, benefits. in We did address what proof the claimant would present have to in such Harle, joined 5. While the opinion author of this dissent this court's joinder certainly joinder this was not reasoning intended as in the majority finding here is now in Harle. earning power that his to establish proceeding a future adversely affected once of- rejected Employer’s time Claimant at the
Importantly, by his back adversely affected fer, was not as a car salesman employed injury because he was Claimant When employment. did not affect his back into Claimant’s offer, days two only made rejected Employer’s new em- he had secured believed employment, new Claimant injured again at being feared car salesman and as a ployment reject- for Claimant job. majority penalizes Employer’s pre-injury to his offer to return ing Employer’s creating By salesman. an unsuccessful being fails to conduct majority requirement, connection causal to work and availabili- capacity any inquiry into the Claimant’s stated Dillon work, previously we have matters which ty earning loss of injured employe’s an affect the extent of power. work, to the proved capacity to
As to Claimant’s his work- disabled from partially that he has remained Board continues. disability still and that related back its Employer sustained finding by no the referee There is capable of a availability of proving burden any make referee did not n. 3. The supra See performing. Claimant, however, after he was long as to how findings, unemploy- received employment, from his sales terminated Thus, and would I dissent vigorously compensation. ment *12 and remand the Commonwealth Court reverse the order of disability benefits the referee for reinstatement Claimant.