MODZELEWSKI‘S TOWING & STORAGE, INC., ET AL. v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES ET AL.
(AC 45605)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
May 14, 2024
Moll, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.
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Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
Syllabus
The plaintiff licensed motor vehicle dealers and repairers, T Co. and R Co., appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who determined that the plaintiffs had overcharged the owner of a damaged tractor trailer for certain nonconsensual towing and recovery services. The plaintiffs had been summoned by the state police to provide towing and recovery services after the tractor trailer, which was insured by the defendant S Co., was damaged in an accident on Interstate 84. The plaintiffs used special equipment to clear the tractor trailer from the highway and tow it to the plaintiffs’ storage facility where it remained for twenty-eight days. The plaintiffs subsequently charged the owner of the tractor trailer for the towing and recovery services, which S Co. paid. S Co. thereafter filed a complaint with the Department of Motor Vehicles, claiming that the plaintiffs’ charges were unreasonable and excessive in light of industry standards and the department‘s regulations (
- This court found unavailing the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court improperly concluded that, because the charges they levied were not based on an hourly rate, they were violative of the applicable regulations: although the plaintiffs contended that the regulations did not require that rates for exceptional services be based solely on labor but may include a charge for the special equipment used to perform those exceptional services, the plaintiffs’ use of a ratio of factors, such as depreciation, insurance, maintenance and the cost of equipment, to determine their rates for equipment usage was violative of the regulations, which did not provide for the inclusion of those factors in setting an hourly rate for exceptional services but, rather, permitted only an hourly charge for exceptional services that was based on labor; moreover, because the plaintiffs did not maintain a breakdown as to which portion of their charges was based on labor and which portion was based on the cost of equipment, there was no evidentiary basis on which their charges could be found to constitute regulatory compliant labor charges.
- The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the rate schedule they posted in their workplace did not comply with the applicable regulation (
§ 14-65j-3 ): the rate schedule did not comply with§ 14-65j-3 in form, as some of the listed items indicated a per hour price, others indicated a minimum number of hours and others stated a dollar amount, and, because the words labor, storage or diagnosis did not appear on the schedule, the hourly labor rate for those items could not be ascertained; moreover, the schedule did not comply with§ 14-65j-3 in substance, as the only reasonable conclusion regarding items that listed a piece of equipment and an hourly rate or a dollar amount without specifying whether that amount was a labor, storage or diagnosis charge was that those charges were simply equipment charges. - There was substantial evidence in the record to support the imposition of a civil fine against the plaintiffs, as they improperly billed S Co. for equipment charges, for which there was no support in the regulations, failed to maintain accurate records to justify or explain those charges, billed S Co. for items not listed on the plaintiffs’ own rate schedule and charged an administrative fee, which was not permitted under the regulations; moreover, this court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that, because they had raised a bona fide issue as to the interpretation of the regulations, which have not been subject to judicial review, the fine could not have been based on the commissioner‘s assertion that the plaintiffs’ charges were excessive, as the regulations plainly do not permit towing companies to levy equipment charges, and, although
§ 14-63-36c of the regulations entitles towing companies to an additional charge for labor, it does not mention equipment costs; furthermore, the plaintiffs’ contention that the commissioner‘s reasoning underlying imposition of the fine was based on an incorrect assertion that prior determinations by our Supreme Court that fees based on equipment charges were impermissible was unavailing, as there was no indication in the record that the hearing officer had relied on those cases, our Supreme Court has not addressed the issue pertaining to equipment charges for nonconsensual tows, and the hearing officer‘s decision regarding the fine clearly was linked to his conclusion that the plaintiffs had charged fees in excess of those permitted. - Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim, the trial court did not err in concluding that the hearing officer properly declined to dismiss S Co.‘s complaint as to R Co.: substantial evidence in the record supported the hearing officer‘s finding that R Co. was involved in the tow at issue, including the plaintiffs’ invoice to S Co., the check paid to and presumably cashed by the plaintiffs, and the fact that those documents seemed to use the corporate names of the entities interchangeably or names that were not formally affiliated with either entity; moreover, there was no documentary evidence to support the plaintiffs’ assertion that none of the wreckers used at the accident scene was registered to R Co., the plaintiffs having acknowledged that their invoice to S Co. failed to identify which wreckers were used at the accident scene, as required by statute (
§ 14-66b ); furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiffs’ assertion that the commissioner had all but conceded R Co.‘s lack of involvement because R Co. was not named in any documentation in the record, as the documents cited by the hearing officer, which also did not name T Co., did not mean that T Co. was not involved in the tow.
Argued January 11—officially released May 14, 2024
Appeal from the decision of the named defendant ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant Sentry Select Insurance Company restitution for alleged overcharges for towing and recovery services, and to pay a civil penalty to the Department of Motor Vehicles, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the action was withdrawn as to the defendant Sentry Select Insurance Company; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee; subsequently, the court remanded the case to the named defendant for further findings; thereafter, the named defendant‘s hearing officer issued a supplemental decision; subsequently, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to the named defendant for further proceedings and rendered judgment dismissing the appeal; thereafter, the court issued a clarification of its decisions, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jesse A. Langer, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey D. Bausch, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Drew S. Graham, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion
CRADLE, J. The plaintiffs, Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc., and Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the final decision of the named defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), concluding that the plaintiffs had violated the regulations established by the commissioner governing permissible fees for the nonconsensual towing1 and storage of motor vehicles and ordering the plaintiffs to make restitution to the defendant Sentry Select Insurance Company (Sentry),2 and to pay a civil penalty to the Department of Motor Vehicles (department). On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the fees charged for the tow at issue were in conflict with
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs are licensed motor vehicle dealers and repairers. On December 4, 2014, the plaintiffs were summoned by the Connecticut State Police to perform recovery and towing services involving a tractor trailer in connection with an accident that had occurred on Interstate 84 in Danbury. The tractor trailer, which was severely damaged and had become wedged beneath the metal guardrail, was owned by David Tuttle doing business as Big Daddy Trucking of Waymart, Pennsylvania (Big Daddy), and was insured by Sentry. Upon receiving the call from the state police, the plaintiffs
On August 28, 2020, after a hearing, the department‘s hearing officer issued his decision with respect to Sentry‘s complaint. The hearing officer first indicated that, because Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc., and Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., are both owned and operated by James E. Modzelewski, his decision would reference the two entities as a single entity for purposes of the administrative appeal. The hearing officer explained that the plaintiffs had asked that the case be dismissed as to Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., because it was not involved in the tow at issue. The hearing officer denied that request on the ground that the
On July 1, 2021, after a hearing, the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee, issued a decision agreeing with the hearing officer‘s interpretation of the applicable regulations, concluding that
On November 18, 2021, the hearing officer issued a written decision in response
The hearing officer then addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs had submitted invoices “in keeping with the labor charges,” which of the charges may be considered labor charges, and whether some of the labor charges also include an equipment charge. The hearing officer explained: “Evidence in the hearing record . . . is the invoice in this case. This invoice is not a record for services related to the tow itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor other than, again, where it was found to be expressed as an hourly labor charge as opposed to an equipment charge. When the plaintiffs’ invoice listed a charge that was found to be consistent with an hourly labor charge, such as the scene supervisor, it was an allowed charge. When the plaintiffs’ invoice listed a charge that was found to be an equipment charge and not an hourly labor charge, such as the 75 ton rotator, it was disallowed. When the plaintiffs’ invoice listed a charge that was neither an hourly labor charge nor an equipment charge, such as the 10 percent administration billing fee, it was disallowed. Whether some of the equipment charges also included labor charges cannot be determined, and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence on that issue. The core issue remains [that] charges must be at hourly labor rates. As to the question of whether some of the labor charges also include an equipment charge, my analysis of the evidence was [that] some of the equipment charges may
And, finally, the hearing officer addressed the court‘s third issue, namely, assuming that there are charges for labor, whether those charges are reasonable and necessary. The hearing officer found: “Where the evidence demonstrated an hourly labor charge that was found to be reasonable and necessary, it was approved. Other than what was provided on the invoice . . . it was admitted that there was no record kept of hourly labor charges.” (Citation omitted.) The hearing officer found the total allowed charges to be $4651.78, and listed each of the claimed charges set forth on the plaintiffs’ invoice and indicated whether it was allowed, and in what amount, or disallowed as an equipment charge and whether the rate was listed in the plaintiffs’ rate schedule.6 The hearing officer explained: “The plaintiffs in this case viewed many of the charges as exceptional services, [as] enumerated in testimony by [Modzelewski]. . . . However,
On December 14, 2021, the plaintiffs filed with the court a motion to remand the case to the hearing officer for additional evidence, arguing that “[t]he remand decision [of the hearing officer] did not address any of the issues the court ordered briefed as set forth in the [court‘s remand] order” and that “[t]he remand decision does not adequately address the ambiguity highlighted in the court[‘s] remand [order].” The plaintiffs sought a remand for “an abbreviated proceeding limited to how [they] formulated [their] fee schedule . . . .” The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The court explained that it had remanded the matter to the hearing officer for further findings as to whether the plaintiffs had followed the applicable regulations regarding “the setting of rates and the posting of a sign at [their] office.” The court reasoned that “[t]he original record as supplemented by the further decision of the [department] hearing officer is sufficient for the determination of the issues raised by the plaintiffs. There is no need for an additional remand. A remand does not offer the parties an opportunity to relitigate the case ab initio.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
After considering the parties’ supplemental briefs and additional oral argument, the court issued a memorandum of decision on April 11, 2022, dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal from the decision of the hearing officer. The court agreed with the hearing officer‘s determination that charges for exceptional services must be based on labor only and that the “pro rata cost of equipment may not be a factor.” The court concluded that there was substantial evidence presented to support the hearing officer‘s findings that the plaintiffs had failed to post a sign that complied with the regulations in that the sign posted by the plaintiffs included fees that “included not just those [charges] for labor” but also charges that “reflected the cost of the [plaintiffs‘] machinery.” The court further concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer‘s determinations as to which of the plaintiffs’ charges to Sentry were permissible and which were not; that the fine levied against the plaintiffs was appropriate pursuant to General Statutes
The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to reargue or for reconsideration of the court‘s ruling, requesting clarification on whether the department can determine if a “rate” is reasonable and necessary as opposed to whether the “service” is reasonable and necessary to effectuate the tow. In response to that motion, the court clarified its two previous decisions as follows: “Assuming that the towing company fully meets the requirements of
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles that govern our resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims. “[J]udicial review of the commissioner‘s action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [(UAPA), General Statutes
“The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative fact-finding under the UAPA. [See] General Statutes
“Even for conclusions of law, [t]he court‘s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . . [Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute‘s purposes. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is . . . involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucky 13 Industries, LLC v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 558, 563–65, 270 A.3d 188, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 905, 272 A.3d 1127 (2022).
I
The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly concluded that the charges they levied in connection with the tow at issue in this case violated
“When construing a statute, [the court‘s] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, [the court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes]
“Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a [regulation] is a question of law for the courts where the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference, particularly where . . . the [regulation] has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Costas v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. App. 719, 729–30, 280 A.3d 108, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 911, 283 A.3d 507 (2022). Because the present case presents a question of law and does not involve the department‘s time-tested interpretation of its regulations, the standard of review is de novo. See Connecticut Motor Cars v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 300 Conn. 617, 622, 15 A.3d 1063 (2011).
Pursuant to General Statutes
The commissioner concedes that, pursuant to
As to the plaintiffs’ charges in this case, the plaintiffs argue that the rate they charged as to each piece of special equipment was “the amount for the operator to operate the specific ‘special equipment’ pursuant to
II
The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly concluded that their posted rate schedule did not comply with the applicable regulations. We disagree.
As set forth herein,
An examination of the plaintiffs’ posted rate schedule reveals that it did not comply with
As to substance, to the extent some of the line items on the plaintiffs’ posted rate schedule list a piece of equipment and then an hourly rate, perhaps those are the items to which Modzelewski referred when he testified that the rate listed included the operator and the equipment. Insofar as those rates include an equipment charge, they violate
III
The plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in concluding that the hearing officer properly imposed a civil fine of $4000 against them. We are not persuaded.
The hearing officer found, inter alia, that, “[r]ather than using and charging approved rates, the [plaintiffs] established, posted and used [their] own rate schedule based on equipment” and concluded that the plaintiffs had “charged fees in excess of the maximum rates and charges permissible under . . . Connecticut Statutes and Regulations” and, accordingly, ordered restitution and a civil fine of $4000 pursuant to
In his brief to the trial court, the commissioner argued, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed because the issue of whether a towing company could levy equipment charges under
The court disagreed with the commissioner that the issue had been decided by our Supreme Court but agreed with the hearing officer that “[c]learly . . .
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he [commissioner‘s] stated reasoning for the [fine] . . . demonstrates that it was improperly imposed.” The plaintiffs contend that the reasoning underlying the imposition of the fine was improper because it was based on the incorrect assertion that our Supreme Court had already determined that fees based on equipment charges were impermissible. They also argue that the fine could not properly have been based on the commissioner‘s assertion that their charges were excessive because they “raised a bona fide issue as to the interpretation of
First, there is no indication in the record that the hearing officer relied on either of the cases cited by the commissioner in imposing the fine on the plaintiffs. Rather, the hearing officer‘s decision in this regard clearly was linked to his conclusion that the plaintiffs charged fees in excess of those permitted. Second, the court also explicitly disagreed with the commissioner‘s argument that the issue had been decided in the cases cited by the commissioner but agreed that the fees charged by the plaintiffs were improper and that the fine therefore was justified.
The language of the applicable regulations plainly does not permit towing companies to levy equipment charges. We therefore disagree with the plaintiffs’ characterization of their interpretation of the applicable regulations as “bona fide.” As the plaintiffs acknowledge, the issue pertaining to equipment charges for nonconsensual tows has not been addressed by our courts. We disagree with the plaintiffs’ assertion that they were “exercising their statutory rights,” an argument for which they have provided no support. The plaintiffs charged Sentry equipment charges, for which there is no regulatory support. They failed to maintain accurate records to justify, or even explain, those charges. Furthermore, they charged Sentry for items not listed on their own rate schedule,16 and they charged Sentry an administrative fee, which is not even arguably permitted under the regulations. We therefore conclude that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the imposition of the fine.
IV
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in concluding that the hearing officer properly denied their request to have Sentry‘s complaint against Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., dismissed.
In their prehearing brief, the plaintiffs argued that “[Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] was not involved in the tows underlying the present matter. [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] is a separate entity with a separate place of business. . . . [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] has a separate repairer license and its own fleet of wreckers. . . . The state police] called [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc.] to the accident scene. . . . Accordingly, [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] should be removed as a respondent in this matter.”17 (Citations omitted.)
At the hearing, Modzelewski testified before the hearing officer that Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., has its own equipment and its own fleet of wreckers, none of which was used in the tow at issue. Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., did not respond to the accident, and Big Daddy‘s tractor trailer was not stored at Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.‘s facility in Newtown. As to why the invoice sent to Sentry bore the name “Modzelewski‘s Recovery, Inc.,” Modzelewski testified before the hearing officer: “The computer program that we use to write our recovery bills, when we enter it, it pops up recovery, and recovery bill it pops up recovery,
The hearing officer declined to dismiss Sentry‘s complaint as to Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc. The hearing officer explained: “[The plaintiffs ask] that the case as against [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] be dismissed, claiming it was not involved in the tow. However, the invoices from the [plaintiffs] were entitled Modzelewski‘s Recovery, Inc. The payment check issued by [Sentry] was to Modzelewski Tow & Storage, Inc., not Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc. There is also the lack of documentary evidence in compliance with General Statutes
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing officer‘s determination that both Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc., and Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., were involved in this matter.
The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the hearing officer‘s “inclusion [in these proceedings] of [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] is not supported by substantial evidence on the whole of the record.” The plaintiffs argue that Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., is a separate licensee, with a separate fleet of wreckers and is located in a separate municipality. The plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he photographs [of the accident scene], particularly one of a heavy duty wrecker showing a Danbury decal, connect [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc.]—as opposed to [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.]—to the tow [at issue].”
First, we note that the hearing officer found that there was no evidence submitted by the plaintiffs that they complied with
Moreover, even if we assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ factual assertions, they are not dispositive of the issue of whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer‘s finding that Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., was involved in the tow at issue. As noted, in declining to dismiss Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., from the administrative proceedings, the hearing officer relied on the invoice given to Sentry
We disagree with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the commissioner “all but conceded this when [he] stated that there is ‘no documentation on the record that names [Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc.] as a participant in this matter.‘” This argument misses the mark. The documents cited by the hearing officer also do not name Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc. That fact obviously does not mean that Modzelewski‘s Towing & Storage, Inc., was not involved in the tow at issue. On the basis of the documentation relied on by the hearing officer and the lack of documentary evidence to support the plaintiffs’ contention that Modzelewski‘s Towing & Recovery, Inc., was not involved in the tow at issue, there was substantial evidence from which it reasonably can be inferred that both of the plaintiffs were involved in the tow at issue.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“Total charges found to be allowed were $4651.78. As to the invoice listed charges . . .
“*Scene Supervisor, listed as $250.00 x 4, total charge $1,000 + tax = $1063.50 allowed as a charge calculated at an allowable hourly labor rate;
“*75 Ton Rotator First Hour, listed as $1750.00 x 1, and 75 Ton Rotator listed as $ 750.00 x 3, total charge $ 4000.00 + tax = $4254.00 disallowed as not found to be calculated at an approved hourly labor rate; nonetheless allowed $325.00 x 4, total allowed charge $1300.00 + tax = $1382.55, based on [the commissioner‘s] approved rates . . .
“*OSHA Rigging Supervisor, listed at $250.00 x 4, total charge $1000.00, disallowed as evidence was wreckers for towing vehicles are exempt from OSHA riggers. . . . No evidence to the contrary was produced at the hearing . . .
“*Major Response Incident Truck, listed as $750.00 x 4, total charge $3000.00 + 6.35% = $3190.50, disallowed as found not to be calculated at an approved hourly labor rate;
“*Heavy Duty Flatbed, listed at $325.00 x 4, total charge $1300.00 + tax = $1382.55, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge, and [the commissioner‘s] rates and charges applicable are charges based on distance and vehicle weight;
“*45 Ft Man Lift, listed at $450.00 x 4, total charge $1800.00+tax = $1914.30, disallowed as found not calculated at an approved hourly labor rate, and not listed in [plaintiffs‘] rate schedule;
“*Communications Systems, listed as $175.00 x 4, total charge $700.00 + tax = $744.45, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge, and not listed in [plaintiffs‘] rate schedule;
“*Light Tower, listed as $175.00 x 4, total charge $700.00 + tax = $744.45, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge;
“*Low Bed Trailer, listed as $325.00 x 4, total charge $1300.00 + tax = $1382.55, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge;
“*Tractor Unit, listed as $325.00 x 4, total charge $1300.00 + tax = $1382.55, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge, and there was no evidence it was an hourly labor rate;
“*Diesel Pump Off, listed as $800.00, total charge $800.00 + tax = $850.80, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge, with no evidence it was an hourly labor rate charge;
“*Spill Kit, listed as $55.00 x 5, total charge $275.00 + tax = $292.46, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge;
“*Fuel Surcharge, listed as $50.00 x 6, total charge $300.00 + tax = $319.05, disallowed with exception of $4.00 + tax = $4.25, consistent with the decision in DMV case No. CCC-2011-1587, dated May 28, 2013, also involving [these plaintiffs] . . .
“*Truck Cover, listed as $110.00, total charge $110.00 + tax = $116.98, disallowed as found to be an equipment charge;
“*10% Administration Billing Fee, listed as $2258.50, total charge $22589.50 + tax = $2401.898, disallowed as not a permissible charge;
“*Storage, listed as $44.00 x 28 = $54.00 x 28, total charge $1232.00 + $1512.00, + tax, corrected without objection to reflect $716.47 overcharge.” (Citations omitted.)
“(1) The hourly charge for labor;
“(2) The conditions, if any, under which the shop may impose charges for storage, and the amount of any such charges; and
“(3) The charge, if any, for a diagnosis.
“(b) Each sign shall have the following headings ‘LABOR CHARGES,’ ‘STORAGE CHARGES,’ ‘DIAGNOSIS CHARGE’ and ‘$‘. All headings shall be 120 point bold face type, caps, sans-serif such as helvetica bold, standard bold compressed or similar.
“(c) Other information on such sign shall be at least 48 point medium face type, caps, sans-serif such as helvetica medium, avant garde demi or similar. . . .”
Subsection (d) of