RAYMOND’S AUTO REPAIR, LLC v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(SC 19454)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
July 12, 2016
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
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Argued January 20—officially released July 12, 2016
Drew S. Graham, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).
Kenneth A. Votre, with whom was Richard E. Fennelly III, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
ZARELLA, J. This is the second of two administrative appеals in which the principal issue is whether state laws regulating the fees charged for certain services provided in the course of the nonconsensuаl towing of a motor vehicle are preempted by federal law. The defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), appeals from the judgment of the trial court reversing the decision of the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) that the plaintiff, Raymond’s Auto Repair, LLC, had charged a fee in excess of that allowed by state law for its use of an 1140 rotator truck in recovering a damaged vehicle prior to the actuаl towing of that vehicle and, therefore, must pay restitution in the amount of $600 to the complainant, Pauline Pressley. On appeal to this court, the commissioner claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that the fee
The following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth in the decision of the department’s hearing officer. On Dеcember 8, 2012, Pressley’s granddaughter lost control of her vehicle, which careened off the road and went down an embankment. After the first towing company called to the scene determined that it could not perform the tow, the state police contacted the plaintiff to perform a nonconsensual tow in accordance with
Thereafter, the plaintiff provided Pressley’s granddaughter with an invoice for the services performed on December 8, 2012. The total cost of the services was $1306.24, including $1000 for the plaintiff’s use of the 1140 rotator truck for approximately one hour. Pressley paid the plaintiff the amount indicated in the invoice, even though the plaintiff had posted a rate of $400 per hour for the use of an 1140 rotator truck in recovering a vehicle the size and weight of thе vehicle driven by Pressley’s granddaughter. The department likewise determined that its regulations relating to nonconsensual tows allowed a charge of only $400 for the use of special equipment like the rotator truck and sought a refund for Pressley regarding this and other expenses.
The hearing officer concluded that ‘‘[t]he [plaintiff] did not charge [Pressley] in accordance with its posted rates. More specifically, the [plaintiff] should have charged [Pressley] $400 for one . . . [hour’s] use of the [1140 rotator truck], rather than $1000 as invoiced. As such, [Pressley] was overcharged a total of $600 for use of the [rotator truck] in this instance.’’ The hearing officer thus ordered the plaintiff to reimburse Pressley in the amount $600 with respect to this service.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which sustained the appeal. The court
The commissioner appealed from the trial court’s judgment,3 claiming that state regulation of the pretowing recovery services at issue is not subject to federal preemption. Oral argument was heard on January 20, 2016, in conjunction with Modzelewski’s Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (SC 19453), in which the commissioner raised a similar claim regarding pretowing recovery services. On January 26, 2016, we ordered the parties to address the following question in supplemental briefs: ‘‘Does
Our resolution of the commissioner’s claim is controlled by our decision in Modzelewski’s Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 322 Conn. 20, A.3d (2016), in which we concluded that state regulation of pretowing recоvery services, such as the plaintiff’s use of the 1140 rotator truck in the present case, is not preempted by
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiff’s appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.