ZEONID MODRYTZKJI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, and THE CITY OF CHICAGO, COMMISSION ON ANIMAL CARE AND CONTROL, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1-14-1874
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
September 30, 2015
2015 IL App (1st) 141874
Fourth Division. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois-Civil Department Municipal Division First District. No. 13 M1 450143. The Honorable Joseph M. Sconza, Judge Presiding.
Justices Howse and Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The City of Chicago Commission on Animal Care and Control (Commission) declared that two St. Bernard dogs owned by plaintiff, Zeonid Modrytzkji, were “dangerous animals” as defined by section 7-12-020 of the Chicago Municipal Code.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On July 9, 2012, at approximately 6 a.m., plaintiff‘s friend, Tom Doris, was walking his two dogs, Mala and Munia. At the same time, Sara Lorenzo was walking her small dog Maverick. When Sara and Maverick exited the gangway next to their building, Maverick was immediately scooped up by Munia. Munia held Maverick in her mouth and shook him as Mala lunged toward him and nipped at him. Despite attempts from Sara and Tom to get Munia to release Maverick, Munia did not let him go until minutes later when Daniel Lorenzo, Sara‘s husband, heard the commotion, ran outside, and punched Munia in the mouth. Maverick passed away on the way to the Animal Emergency & Treatment Center of Grayslake.
¶ 4 From that incident, plaintiff was issued five Administrative Notices of Ordinance Violations. He received two violations for owning unlicensed animals, one each for Mala and Munia, two citations for not having valid rabies certifications for each dog, and one citation for Munia being an unrestrained animal.
¶ 5 Additionally, Commission inspector Tony Delrio investigated the incident. He
¶ 6 On November 19, 2012, plaintiff appeared at the Department and requested that the dangerous animal determination hearing occur at the same time as the five ordinance violation hearings on December 10, 2012. Plaintiff‘s request was granted. Ultimately, plaintiff pleaded liable to the unrestrained dog ordinance violation, the remaining ordinance violations were nonsuited, and the dangerous dog determination hearing was continued to March 12, 2012. At that hearing, plaintiff motioned to dismiss the case because the hearing was not held within 30 days of his request as required by section 7-12-050(e) of the Chicago Municipal Code.
¶ 7 Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the Department to the circuit court. During those proceedings, the City was granted leave to supplement the record. The supplement contained documents that were not admitted at the Department hearing, specifically the victim reports that were excluded. However, plaintiff‘s exhibits that were admitted were not in the record. On May 15, 2014, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Department, from which plaintiff now appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶ 8 ¶ 9 The City contends that the Department did not have jurisdiction1 to conduct a hearing on the dangerous animal determinations because plaintiff‘s request
appeal. We note that the City failed to successfully make an argument regarding authority at the Department and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the City challenged jurisdiction in the circuit court. However, a challenge to jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Robinson v. Human Rights Comm‘n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726 (1990) (citing Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 215 (1985)). A determination of the Department‘s jurisdiction necessarily informs the issue of jurisdiction in the circuit court and in the appellate court. Thus, we initially consider whether the Department had “jurisdiction” or authority to act. Whether an administrative agency has jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Vogue Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Office of the State Fire Marshal of State, 354 Ill. App. 3d 20, 23 (2004).
¶ 10 An administrative agency‘s authority is limited to that which is specified by statute. Farrar v. City of Rolling Meadows, 2013 IL App (1st) 130734, ¶ 14. ” ‘Since an administrative agency *** is a creature of statute, its jurisdiction or authority must be found within the provisions of the statute by which it acts.’ ” J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., 2015 IL App (5th) 140092, ¶ 35 (quoting Byington v. Department of Agriculture, 327 Ill. App. 3d 726, 730 (2002)). Thus, parties seeking review of an agency decision must “strictly comply” with the procedures set forth in the statute or ordinance. Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees of St. Clair County, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 182 (2006).
¶ 11 The City of Chicago has the authority under its home rule powers to establish administrative agencies.
¶ 12 Accordingly, the Department has authority to hear an owner‘s appeal of the Commission‘s determination that his or her dog is a “dangerous animal.” However, the ordinance states that an owner has a right to appeal the determination “within seven days of the service of the notice.” It does not provide for written requests for hearings that are filed beyond seven days of the notice and there is nothing in the Chicago Municipal Code that authorizes the Department to conduct hearings when a request for a hearing is untimely. Because the Department only has limited statutory authority, its powers cannot be expanded beyond what is authorized by the Chicago Municipal Code. See Farrar v. City of Rolling Meadows, 2013IL App (1st) 130734, ¶ 14; J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., 2015 IL App (5th) 140092, ¶ 35.
¶ 13 Furthermore, Illinois courts have recognized that the same rule governing commencement of administrative review actions in the circuit court also applies to the initiation of administrative proceedings. Under the Administrative Review Law, the 35-day time limitation to commence review of an administrative decision in the circuit court is jurisdictional, and therefore the court cannot hear a case filed beyond 35 days of the final administrative decision. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co., 109 Ill. 2d at 209-10;
¶ 14 Here, it is undisputed that the Commission sent notice of the dangerous animal determination to plaintiff on September 24, 2012, and that plaintiff‘s request for a hearing was received by the Commission on November 5, 2012, over 40 days later. Plaintiff was required by the ordinance to file his request for a hearing by October 1, 2012, and he failed tocomply. Plaintiff did not argue before the Department or in his brief that he did not receive the notice of the dangerous dog determination and his right to request a hearing in a timely fashion. Further, we note that the record reveals that plaintiff was aware that the Commission was conducting an investigation of his dogs before the determination was sent. Therefore, because plaintiff‘s request for a hearing was untimely, the Department did not have authority to conduct a hearing on plaintiff‘s dogs’ “dangerous animal” status and related orders. A decision of an administrative agency that does not have authority from the enabling statute is void. Weingart v. Department of Labor, 122 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1988); Wabash County, Illinois v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 408 Ill. App. 3d 924, 930 (2011). Therefore, the Department‘s decision is void and the Executive Director‘s determinations which were mailed on September 24, 2012, stand.
¶ 15 We next consider the City‘s argument that the circuit court was deprived of jurisdiction because the Department‘s decision was void. Initially, we note that plaintiff complied with the requirements of the Administrative Review Law when appealing the Department‘s decision to the circuit court. See
¶ 16 Finally, the City similarly argues that this court lacks jurisdiction. Although, like the circuit court, this court cannot hear the substantive arguments regarding the propriety of a judgment entered without jurisdiction, “that does not mean that the appellate court has no jurisdiction at all.” People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 29. The appellate court must have a means to exercise the authority conferred on it by law to review, recognize and correct any action that exceeds the lower court‘s jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over this matter. However, for the reasons stated, we are limited on review to considering whether the Department had authority to act. See Kyles, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 432. As discussed above, we find that the Department did not have authority to conduct the hearing on the dangerous animal determinations and consequently its order was void. Accordingly, we do not reach plaintiff‘s additional claims of error.
CONCLUSION
¶ 17 ¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is vacated and the order of the Department is vacated.
¶ 19 Orders vacated.