Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees

(Nos. 98649, 98668 cons. DIS- UNIT COMMUNITY SCHOOL

COLLINSVILLE THE RE- al., v. Appellants, NO. et TRICT OF BOARD SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF GIONAL al., Appellees. CLAIR COUNTY et ST. January

Opinion 2006. filed Bitzer, Dunham, and L. Bo John W. Leskera John Leskera, Collinsville, appellant man for Collinsville & Unit School District No. 10. Community Bush, Louis, East appellant of East St. for Pearson School District No. 189. St. Louis Belleville, Urban, Sprague J. & Sprague, Robert Mark Ostendorf et al. appellees the judgment THOMAS delivered CHIEF JUSTICE court, with opinion. McMorrow, Karmeier con- Freeman, Justices judgment opinion. curred

Justice Garman concurred in part and dissented part, opinion. with

Justice Fitzgerald dissented, opinion. with dissented, Justice Kilbride also opinion. OPINION appeal This joinder involves the requirements of the (Review Law) (735 Administrative Review Law (West 2000)). et seq. At issue is whether 5/3 —101 circuit court erred in allowing the plaintiff in an adminis trative review action additional time to amend its join, defendants, the petitioners underlying proceeding. The appellate court held that the circuit court in allowing erred amend ment of the complaint and dismissed the cause of action. 348 Ill. App. below, 3d 685. For the reasons discussed we judgment reverse the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND 25, 2000, On October a group of Fairmont City residents filed a “Petition for Detachment and An- nexation” with the St. Clair County Regional Board of (Board). School Trustees petition sought The to detach a City section of Fairmont from East St. Louis School (East Louis) District No. 189 St. and annex it to Collins- (Collins- ville Community Unit School District No. 10 ville). The petition signed individuals, was by over 400 representing more than two-thirds of the registered vot- ers in the area proposed to be detached. In accordance (105 with section 7—6 of the School Code ILCS 5/7—6 (West 2000)), 10 of the petitioners designated were “Committee of Ten” attorney to act as in fact for all of the petitioners.1 first page identified part: petition

1Section 7—6 states “When a contains more The by of the Committee of Ten name. the members counsel. represented by were also petitioners on the January hearing the Board held a Both school districts detachment petition. opposed evidence, Board considering annexation. After alia, granted finding, inter the educa- petition detachment subject tional welfare of the students will be better served in Collinsville rather than East St. Louis. did granting petition expressly The Board’s order not identify any party “party caption as a of record.” The on only the order referred to the for detachment petition Collinsville, from East St. Louis and annexation to did not identify parties. otherwise The text of the “Petitioners,” generally Board’s order referred and noted that a “Committee of Ten” had been ap- not, however, did pointed. identify order the commit- by tee members name.

Collinsville filed a for petition rehearing, which the Board denied. The Board’s order denying rehearing, like order, the Board’s earlier did expressly identify the record, nor did identify it the committee members name. (see statutory

Within the 35-day period 735 ILCS (West 2000)), Collinsville filed a for 5/3 —103 in the circuit court of St. Clair County. Board, Collinsville named as defendants the Board, members of the the St. Clair County regional superintendent schools, Louis, East St. and the East St. Louis superintendent of schools. East St. Louis and superintendent immediately joined its in Collinsville’s signatures, petition designate than 10 shall a committee of 10 petitioners attorney petitioners, any fact all 7 of may binding stipulations petitioners whom make on behalf all any question respect as to hearing joint or or *** hearing, regional trustees, may accept and the board of school stipulation such proof lieu of evidence or of the matter 6(c) (West 2000). stipulated.” 105 ILCS 5/7 — complaint. Collinsville did not name aas defendant the any any Ten, committee, Committee of member of the or of the other numerous individuals who initiated the subject administrative action that was of Collins- complaint. ville’s complaint,

Two weeks after Collinsville filed its two Ten, members of the Committee of Mark Ostendorf and Garcia, intervene, Paul filed a motion to which the circuit granted. court Ostendorf and filed Garcia also a motion arguing dismiss, to that the committee members and the signatories petition other to the for detachment and an- necessary parties nexation were who had not been made statutory 35-day period. defendants within the See (West2000). ILCS 5/3—103 disposition Prior to the circuit court’s of the motion dismiss, to filed a Collinsville motion to amend the complaint remaining eight to add the members of the party Committee of Ten as relied defendants. Collinsville statutory exception 35-day permits on a rule that amendment of a where the omitted defendant “was not named the administrative its final (West 107(a) order as a of record.” 735 ILCS 5/3— 2000). April 2002, the circuit court allowedthe motion to amend and denied the motion to dismiss. The case proceeded on the merits. The circuit court affirmed the granting Board’s order for detachment and annexation. appealed. and East St. Louis indi

Collinsville The Ten, vidual members of the Committee of on behalf of cross-appeal, arguing petitioners, filed a that the denying erred in motion to dismiss. A circuit court majority agreed petition appellate of the court with the ers and the order of the circuit court. 348 Ill. vacated App. appellate 3d 685. The court held that the 35-day rule, to forth in set section 3— (735 107(a) (West 2000)), was Review Law 5/3 — where, here, inapplicable petitioners were refer masse, enced the final administrative order en were testified, present and were counsel at represented by hearings. all the relevant 348 Ill. 3d at App. ap 698. pellate court stated that it stretching logic “would be to find that because names of the 10 were petitioners order, out in the spelled their involvement case any less than as of record.” App. 348 Ill. 3d at 696. Because the school districts failed to name and serve the petitioners required by Law, the Review appellate court concluded that “the trial judge lacked jurisdiction request allow school districts’ amend their complaints and to thereafter specifically name each of the parties of record. The trial judge should have the granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss.” 348 Ill. 3d at App. appellate 698-99. The court thus allowed the order, Board’s granting for detachment and annexation, to stand. 348 111.App. 3d at 699.

Collinsville and East St. Louis each filed a petition (see for leave to appeal 315), 177 Ill. 2d R. which we al lowed and have consolidated for review.

ANALYSIS operative facts in this case are undisputed. Thus, this appeal only legal concerns issue of whether amendment of the complaint proper was under joinder requirements of the Review Law. our Accordingly, review proceeds de novo. See Hobbs v. Insur Hartford (2005) ance Midwest, 11, Co. 214 Ill. 17 (apply ing de novo standard where salient facts were undisputed Watts, and appeal legal issue); involved ESG Inc. v. Pol (2000) (same). Board, lution Control 26, 191 Ill. 2d 29 Under the Constitution, Illinois final judgments from the circuit courts appealable are as a right,” “matter of but final appealable administrative decisions are only “as provided by 1970, VI, 6,§§ law.” Ill. Const. art. 9. Because of a review final administrative decision may only be statute, a court is said to exercise provided by obtained as statutory jurisdiction” when it reviews an “special Watts, Ill. 2d at 30. administration decision. ESG language “is limited to the statutory jurisdiction Special powers it and court has no from conferring of the act v. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. any other source.” (1985). A Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d Department of statutory seeking special to invoke a court’s strictly comply procedures must with jurisdiction Watts, 30; 2d at Fred by statute. 191 Ill. prescribed ESG Brothers, Lockett v. man 109 Ill. 2d at 210. See also (“Since (1990) Board, Ill. 2d Police Chicago is a from com departure the Administrative Review Law law, strictly it establishes must be procedures mon its justify application”). adhered to order to Here, expressly of the School Code section 7—7 of the Board judicial review of a decision provides Law. See 105 ILCS accordance with Review 5/7 —7 (West 2000). that Collins- plain The Review Law makes strictly required comply Louis ville and East St. were sought of an its “Unless review provisions: man- within the time and administrative decision before proceeding ner herein provided, obtaining barred from the administrative shall be decision.” 735 of such administrative judicial ILCS 5/3 —102 Review of the proceeding,

As to the time and manner to review a final administra states that an action Law of a by filing the “shall be commenced tive decision days 35 of summons within and the issuance complaint sought to be that a of the decision copy from the date affected the deci the upon reviewed was served 2000). (West If is complaint the sion.” 735 ILCS 5/3 —103 on the circuit filed, no is conferred timely jurisdiction order review of the administrative judicial court and 409, 2d District, 207 Ill. Forest Preserve barred. Nudell v. 183 (2003); Lockett, Here, Ill. 2d 423 133 at 354-55. Collins- in circuit ville filed its the court. timely must made a The Review Law also directs who be “the 35-day period: defendant within the persons, plaintiff, and all than the were other who parties record to the administra proceedings of before tive shall be agency, made defendants.” ILCS 5/3— Although some panels appellate court, case, in including panel have present joinder requirements described the Law as Review “jurisdictional,” this court has not done so. See Mc Comm’n, 1, 2d Gaughy Rights v. Illinois Human 165 Ill. (1995). Rather, 11-12 we have described the joinder requirements “mandatory.” Lockett, Ill. E.g., at 355; Commissioners, Cox v. Board Fire & Police (1983); Annunzio, Ill. 2d 403-04 Cuny v. 411 Ill. (1952). join necessary parties, however, failure to is no being nonjurisdictional. less serious for Noncompli ance joinder provisions with the Review Law requires proceeding. McGaughy, dismissal of the review 165 Ill. 2d at 12. present case, petitioners, who instituted

the detachment and proceedings annexation before Board, were clearly parties of record who have should joined been in the administrative review action. See ESG (state’s Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 33 as a party status of record “could not more clear” where the state instituted the before proceedings agency). Collinsville and East St. Louis not dispute do the petitioners were They argue, however, record. that under the 107(a) (735 contained Review Law 3— 107(a) (West 2000)), their failure to name 5/3 — serve the petitioners 35-day within the statutory period did not require dismissal. Section states: (b) “Except provided [involving subsection review zoning of a appeals], any decisions board of action any final agency, decision an administrative agency persons, than administrative and all other the parties plaintiff, proceedings who were of record the agency the shall be before made defendants. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction upon name an based failure to member, acted her employee, agent, or who in his or of- board, agency, ficial of an commit- capacity, tee, government entity, agency, or where the administrative board, committee, entity, government or has been named Naming provided as a defendant as director in this Section. head, agency capacity, or her official shall or his include be deemed to as defendant the administrative board, committee, entity agency, government or that the direct head. No action for administra- named defendants tive or jurisdiction for lack of based review shall dismissed board, agency, upon the failure to name an administrative committee, government entity, the director or or where agency head, capacity, in his or her official has been named provided a in this Section. as defendant as action, during the a review the court course If of party a that record to the administrative determines required a proceedings was made as defendant preceding paragraph, only party that was not named if party by the administrative in its order as final record, days plaintiff grant the court shall then from which the date the determination in to name serve permit as court shall unnamed defendant. proceed- newly participate served defendant justice may require.” ings to extent the interests of added.) 107(a) 2000). (West (Emphasis 735 ILCS 5/3— that, St. because the argue Collinsville and East Louis or did not name the explicitly petitioners Board’s order record, parties the circuit court Committee of Ten They complaint. amendment of the required was to allow misconstrued section appellate court contend petitioners on were by focusing whether record, Board’s final rather than whether the parties record. The petitioners parties order named 35-day rule that the petitioners counter situations, present in two neither which applies only Alternatively, that, here. the petitioners argue under the case, facts of this the Board’s order sufficiently identified petitioners record, as precluding of thus 107(a). amendment of the under section 3— We turn our petitioners’ attention first to the argu- ment that the exception 35-day rule set forth in 107(a) situations, section applies only two neither 3— of which is In present support here. of this argument, the petitioners note that the exception, which is set forth in the second paragraph 107(a), of section expressly 3— applies only if a party of record is not made a defendant “as required preceding paragraph.” 735 ILCS 107(a) (West 2000). According petitioners, 5/3 — i.e., the “preceding paragraph,” the first of paragraph 107(a), section addresses two situations: where a 3— plaintiff fails to name aas defendant appropriate official, but names the administrative agency, and plaintiff where a fails to name the adminis- trative defendant, but names the appropriate administrative official. The petitioners argue that under the doctrine pari materia, of in the first and second 107(a) paragraphs of section must be read with refer- 3— ence to each other and construed harmoniously, giving effect to both The paragraphs. petitioners maintain that the exception to the 35-day rule contained in the second of paragraph must be construed as limited to the two situations described the “preceding paragraph.” Because this is not a involving case failure to name either the agency or the appropriate official, the petitioners conclude that exception simply does not come into play.

Under the doctrine pari materia, of in two statutes dealing with the subject same will considered with other, reference to each “so that they may be given harmonious effect.” Land v. Board Education (2002). City 414, 202 Chicago, Ill. 2d 422 This doctrine

186 applicable of the same statute also to different sections of our fundamental rules and is consonant with one provisions statutory view all of the construction —“to agree Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. We as a whole.” statute doctrine, construe the second that under this we must 107(a) harmoniously paragraph with the of section 3— doing paragraph.” “preceding so, however, we are plain language liberty disregard the statute. at statutory construction, all to which rule of The cardinal give subordinate, ef is to ascertain other rules are Sylvester legislature. Industrial v. the intent of the fect to (2001); 225, In re Estate Comm’n, Ill. 2d 232 (2000). language 326, Dierkes, Ill. 2d ordinary given plain mean its statute, which must be legislature’s ing, intent. In re indicator of the is the best (2003). plain Based on the D.F., Ill. 2d excep language that the we conclude of section 3— may applied 35-day where, here, a rule tion to the plaintiff petitioners in the name as defendants fails to proceeding. underlying administrative addresses, terms, in must broad who 3—107 Section in administrative review action: defendants an be made any any “[I]n an final decision of action to agency agency, and all the administrative administrative parties plaintiff, persons, who were other than the proceedings the administrative before record to 107(a) agency 735 ILCS made defendants.” shall be 5/3— 2000). (West frequently addresses two The statute then ap- plaintiff recurring names the scenarios: where propriate official, fails to name the but administrative plaintiff agency, names and where the administrative appropriate agency, name the but fails to prohibits dismissal The statute official. The fact that either circumstance. under involving certain two scenarios the statute addresses greater mean that does not detail defendants apply to other 35-day rule cannot exception limiting itself contains no such exception scenarios. The to whether generally refers language. “as required made a defendant of record was parties The universe of preceding paragraph.” “by preceding defendants “required” to be made the administrative is not confined to paragraph” involved only parties and administrative official—the Rather, scenarios on which the focus. petitioners the two the “adminis “preceding paragraph” requires agency and all who were persons” trative “All persons” par record be made defendants. who were record include construe petitioners ties of here. To 107(a) in petitioners suggest the manner the 3— ignore plain language would of the statute and render the first sentence of section superfluous. See Quad Silvis, Inc. Ill. 2d Open, City Cities v. (2004) (“We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, or sentence is given meaning reasonable void”); and not deemed superfluous Bonaguro or v. Board, County Electoral 158 Ill. 2d Officers (1994) (“Statutes construed, possible, should be if so that no meaningless”). term is rendered or superfluous that,

Justice Fitzgerald points reaching out this result, majority “the overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in section 3—105” of the Review J., Law. 218 Ill. 2d 200 (Fitzgerald, dissenting). at Indeed do, the simple we reason that section 3—105 has nothing to do absolutely appeal. According Justice Fitzgerald, “sections 3—105 and 3—107 of the an joinder requirements Review Law both involve the for added.) administrative review action.” 218 Ill. (Emphasis J., (Fitzgerald, dissenting). only 2d at 201 difference 107(a) that, between the two statutes is while section 3— “ “general sets forth the ‘the adminis requirement” and all than agency persons, plaintiff, trative other parties who were of record proceedings before the ” administrative shall agency defendants,’ be made sec tion 3—105 sets “specific” forth the more requirement that, in school board proceedings involving a committee “ ‘only the administrative involved and ” each of the committee of 10 shall be served.’ (Emphasis omitted.) added and 218 Ill. 2d (Fitzgerald, J., at 201-02 107(a) (West dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3 — 2000). Fitzgerald suggests that, Justice then as the more specific provision, section 3—105 controls. 218 Ill. 2d at (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).

There are problems several with Justice Fitzgerald’s with, To approach. begin Fitzgerald Justice quite never explains how a statement concerning who must be served can possibly be characterized as a more specific state- ment of who must be explanation named. Such an would incumbent, seem joinder wholly as service and are legal concepts. distinct Service relates to formal “[t]he writ, summons, delivery of a legal process.” or other (8th 2004). Dictionary Joinder, Black’s Law by ed. *** contrast, uniting relates to “the in single a (8th 2004). claim.” Dictionary Black’s Law ed. Obvi- ously, these are not the same As thing. importantly, clearly distinction is in plain language manifested sections 3—105 and 3—107. Titled “Service of Sum- mons,” speaks where, how, section 3—105 solely to “[sjummons a upon any whom issued action to review the final any decision of administrative agency shall be served.” 735 ILCS 5/3 —105 says absolutely nothing Section 3—105 about who must joined complaint or named as defendants 107(a), contrast, review. Section 3— solely to speaks who “shall be made defendants” says for administrative absolutely where, how, about or a summons nothing upon whom (West 2000). must be served. 735 ILCS 5/3 — statute, and sec- is a service section 3—105 Simply put, 107(a) speaks statute statute. Neither joinder is a tion 3— that “sections Fitzgerald’s assertion to the other. Justice *** require- the joinder both involve and 3—107 3—105 action” is demonstra- administrative review ments for an bly false. “committee say that section 3—105’s

Which is not to legisla- a more statement specific 10” clause is not is, more undeniably question It is. The tive intent. 3—105 answers in relation to what? Section specific clearly: question any to review the final action

“Summons issued any agency shall decision of administrative administra- by registered or certified mail on the be served except in agency each of the other defendants tive and on decision of the the case a review of a final administrative trustees, regional regional superintendent of school board Education, schools, Superintendent as the or State be, designated may case when a committee of 10 has been Code, the School and in such provided Section 7—6 of only agency involved and each of case added.) (Emphasis the committee of 10 shall he served.” 735 ILCS 5/3 —105

This statute could not be more clear. The rule general that summons must be on “the administrative served In certain agency and on each of the other defendants.” cases, however, school board summons must be served “only the administrative involved and each [on] words, of the committee of 10.” other the “committee general joinder of 10 clause” is an not to 107(a), requirements general of section but 3— requirements service of section 3—105. may, absolutely nothing

Be that as it there is 107(a) sup- text of either section 3—105 or section 3— compli- conclusion that lack of port Fitzgerald’s Justice invoking section 3—105 is a bar to ance with 107(a)’s 35-day rule. The second exception to the two, only sets forth paragraph of section 3— two, (1) conditions for application of that exception: party of record was not made a defendant “as required (2) by the preceding paragraph;” party same was not named the administrative agency in its final 107(a) (West order as a of record. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 2000). Compliance with section 3—105 is mentioned nowhere.

Nevertheless, both Fitzgerald Justice and Justice Garman insist that disregard we should plain language of the exception because Collinsville was “on notice, by virtue of section that they were ” required to serve ‘each of the committee of 10.’ 218 Ill. 2d at (Fitzgerald, J., 202 dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS (West 2000); (Garman, J., 218 Ill. 2d at 199 5/3 —105 (“Section concurring part and dissenting part) 3—105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees”). The obvious with problem position, this aside complete from a lack support text, in the statutory is the fact that it effectively renders the exception to the 35-day rule a This nullity. is because section puts 3—105 every administrative plaintiff “on notice” as to actions, who must be served. In most this will be “the *** agency each of the other defen (West 2000). dants.” 735 ILCS In school board 5/3 —105 proceedings involving a committee this will be “the and each of the committee of 10.” 735 ILCS way, Either section 5/3 —105 3—105 leaves no doubt as to who must be served. if Consequently, simply knowing who must be served is a bar to invoking exception 35-day 3—107’s rule, then no party will ever be able to avail itself of that exception.

Justice Fitzgerald goes suggest on to that our read- ing of “artificially sections 3—105 and 3—107 is nar- “[sjection row” because is simply naming 3—107 not a J., (Fitzgerald, dissenting). Ill. 2d at 202 provision.” “[sjection Fitzgerald, 3—107 ad According to Justice defendant,” party a and “a must ‘made’ dresses who be party that simply by naming a defendant is ‘made’ Ill. 2d at 202-03 complaint.” caption Rather, Fitzgerald J., Justice (Fitzgerald, dissenting). must defendant, “a maintains, party be “made” a statutory period.” named and served within the both J., dissenting). Conspicuously (Fitzgerald, Ill. at 203 Fitzgerald’s analysis point on this is absent from Justice likely which is attributable to any authority, citation to flatly the fact its conclusion is contradicted that Act, established plain language the Review court’s law, history surrounding and the legislative case 35-day of section 3—107’s enactment rule.

As asserts plain language, Fitzgerald Justice not “made” a until it is defendant both named served with summons. J., dissenting). Ill. 2d at 203 Section 3—105 (Fitzgerald, Indeed, says that section states that “[t]he otherwise. shall, by filed plaintiff complaint, affidavit designate the last of each upon known address defendant added.) whom made.” (Emphasis service shall be 735 (West 2000). Likewise, ILCS section 3—105 5/3 —105 of a the directs the clerk the court “mail of sum copy to *** defendants, mons to each of the addressed to last of principal place known of residence or of business place added.) (Emphases each such 5/3— defendant.” that, confirms under the language This Law, a as such sum Review “defendant” exists before fact, In to by requiring plaintiff mons is served. file setting “the last with an affidavit forth complaint defendant,” section 3—105 con know address of each firms as such anyone designated that a “defendant” a words, In other is made by plaintiff. simply by being complaint. defendant named As for law, this court’s case v. McGaughy Illinois Hu Comm’n, (1995), man Rights 165 Ill. 2d is instructive. Law, course, governs Review circuit court review of administrative orders. Not all orders, however, are reviewed in the circuit court. Some are directly in the appellate reviewed The procedures court. governing direct appellate court review of administrative orders are forth in Supreme set Court Rule 335. See 155 335(a). 2d Ill. R. In this court was McGaughy, asked to consider consequences petitioner’s failure to comply strictly Supreme with 335(a), Court Rule which states:

“The for review he Appellate shall filed specify parties Court and shall seeking review and shall designate the respondent part and the order or thereof to be reviewed. The all other of record added.) respondents.” (Emphasis shall be named 155 Ill. 2d 335(a). R.

Two at petitions were issue McGaughy. The first “failed Department to name the Rights ***, Human joining only the Rights] [Human Commission and the Department State Police respondents.” McGaughy, *** second, Ill. 2d at 1. As for the caption “[t]he read only, Tn the Matter for Request by: Betty Review Barnes,’ L. Commission, and failed to name the Department, or employer] [the Mc respondents.” Gaughy, began 165 Ill. at 2. The court its analysis Lockett, held that thoroughly reviewing which the failure 107(a)’s comply strictly with section joinder 3— requirements mandates dismissal of a review. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 9-12. The court then the same consequence concluded that strictly should attach the failure to comply 335(a). joinder requirements reaching Rule conclusion, emphasized: court joinder requirements

“[T]he of section Rule Supreme Administrative Review Law and Court 335(a) (Compare substantively similar. are 5/3— (‘the (West 1992) 107(a) and all agency *** *** be made parties of record shall who were persons 335(a) (‘The defendants’) agency and all with Ill. R. respondents’).) There shall be named other of record parties or the rule the statute language nothing plain is divergent development two justify the that would mat the review procedural standards ters, meanings these do that we not believe added.) (Emphasis Mc vary.” requirements should similar Ill. 2d at 12. Gaughy, 165 335(a)’s require- words, Rule McGaughy In other treated parties other record agency ment all “[t]he that and there- synonymous as respondents” shall named 107(a)’s from section legally indistinguishable fore 3— *** all agency and that “the administrative requirement *** Once shall be made defendants.” of record parties unsupported contrary Fitzgerald’s the Justice again, by being assertion, simply is “made” defendant Indeed, that, linchpin McGaughy “named.” context, exactly thing. this the two mean the same words out, reading

As it turns McGaughy’s Assembly’s the General perfectly vindicates 3— intent, history. The legislative evinced the relevant as 1, 35-day January rule enacted on exception was 1994, 1, Act Act as of Public 88—1. See Pub. part Il- January Speaking § eff. 1994. on the floor of the Senate, body linois chief in that sponsor the bill’s purpose described the follows: Senate, deals [the bill] amended in the also “As parties who be named in an administrative review should * * * because, occasion, on There have been some difficulties does not name the final order the administrative Therefore, bill, parties ought all who to be named. amended, person bring provides petitioner —the ing name all the action for administrative review —will in the final order of the those who are named 194 action,

administrative and if subsequently then a court named, determines party ought that another to be the person bringing granted the action he twenty- will leave of days parties one to petition add those other to the for added.) (Emphases review." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., 12, 1993, Proceedings, Senate March at 20 (remarks Hawkinson). of Senator remarks, These which describe the focus of section 107, speak exclusively to who be named must and 3— Moreover, make no mention whatsoever of service. Sena- tor Hawkinson’s statement the exception that 21 grants days “to add those other to parties petition” flatly the refutes Fitzgerald’s Justice assertion “a party that is not ‘made’ a simply by naming defendant that party the caption complaint.” As Senator Hawkinson’s state- confirms, ment exactly that’s what it means to be “made” a defendant.

Finally, that, we note if even Justice Fitzgerald’s reading correct, section is the school districts 3— may still exception 35-day invoke the to the Again, rule. exception states:

“If, during action, the course of a review the court party determines that a of record to the administrative proceedings by was not made required a defendant as preceding only and if paragraph, party was not named in its order party final as a record, grant plaintiff days then the court shall from the date of determination in which to name and party (Emphasis serve the unnamed as defendant.” added.) to

According Fitzgerald, to Justice be “made” a defen dant, party “a must both named and within served added.) statutory period.” Ill. 2d (Emphasis at J., true, If (Fitzgerald, dissenting). this is then the compliance school districts’ lack of with section 3—105’s not a barrier to the requirement service invocation 107(a)’s exception. contrary, triggers On the it Indeed, by reason exception. Fitzgerald’s Justice own unserved, it Ten was long the Committee ing, as as therefore The not made a defendant.” “was applies.* then, is whether only remaining, question The identified the petitioners Board’s order above, the As Board’s it did not. discussed Clearly, record. any identify did not petition granting order referred caption on the order of record.” “party from East Louis detachment St. only Collinsville, it did not otherwise annexation the Board’s And while the text of identify parties. and noted “Petitioners” generally referred order of Ten” had been the order appointed, that a “Committee committee any of the or identify petitioners did not by the court conceded appellate members name. Even the school districts noting “[n] this that either point, an seeking nor detachment and petitioners involved the in explicitly ‘parties nexation were labeled as record’ the at 348 Ill. at App. final orders issue.” 698.3 that circuit court

Accordingly, properly we hold that, asserting Fitzgerald 2We also if Justice is correct in note is until it both and party that a not “made” a defendant is named served, paragraph then the set forth second 107(a) statutory provision at easily specific is the most section 3— play, noncompliance both 3—105 and as it excuses with section Indeed, Fitzgerald’s approach, section 3—107. under Justice agency’s apply party from the exception would a omitted when (1) petition in final not named for administrative order (2) review, review, petition not with the for administrative served (3) or in for administra- neither named nor served with tive review. point by insisting that appellate got around this 3The court error, names, or purposefully of their clerical

“the omission nonpar petitioners into from the final order does not convert the undeniably true. But whether App. ties.” 348 Ill. 3d at 694. This is Rather, issue. petitioners were of record is in petitioners parties of record were named as issue is whether the Board’s final order.

granted the school districts’ motion excep- to amend. The tion set in forth the second paragraph section two, two, sets forth and only ap- conditions for 3— (1) plication of that a exception: record was not made defendant required by the first paragraph (2) 107(a), same party that was not named by the in its final as party order 107(a) (West 2000). of record. 735 ILCS Both of 5/3 — those conditions are present case, in this school districts therefore days were entitled to 21 which name and serve the additional defendants.

CONCLUSION above, For the reasons set forth the judgment of the reversed, appellate court is judgment of the circuit affirmed, court is and the cause is remanded to circuit court for further proceedings consistent deci- sion. reversed;

Appellate court judgment circuit court judgment affirmed-, cause remanded. GARMAN, JUSTICE concurring part and dissent- ing part: agree

I Fitzgerald’s with Justice conclusion Col- Community linsville Unit School District No. 10 is barred obtaining judicial from relief because of its failure to with strictly comply section 3—105 of the Administrative (735 (West 2000)). However, Review Law ILCS 5/3 —105 I agree majority’s also with the that determination sec- tion service, joinder. 3—105 addresses it Accordingly, school district’s failure to of serve committee members, join them, and its rather than its failure to that mandates of dismissal this action. both majority Fitzgerald’s

As and Justice dissent note, a of an party seeking review administrative deci- strictly sion must comply procedures with established Watts, Control Inc. v. Pollution Law. ESG by the Review Chicago Police (2000); v. 26, 2d Lockett Board, 191 Ill. (1990). must compliance 349, Strict Board, 133 Ill. Law, entitled of Review section 3—103 begin of Action”: “Commencement decision

“Every review a final administrative action to is- filing and the by of a shall be commenced that a days from the date within 35 suance summons upon sought reviewed was served of the decision to be copy decision[.]” affected 5/3 —103 (West 2000). summons, how once goes 3—105 on establish Section issued, must be served: final any action to review the issued

“Summons agency shall any administrative decision on administra- by registered or certified mail be served except in agency and on each of the other defendants tive a review of a final administrative decision the case of trustees, regional regional superinten- board of school Education, schools, Superintendent of or State dent may be, of 10 has been the case when a committee Code, provided School designated as in Section 7—6 only agency involved and in such case the administrative each of 10 shall be served.” 735 ILCS and of the committee 2000). (West 5/3 —105 Thus, 3—105 require sections 3—103 and summons days agency to be issued within 35 for the administrative defendants, cases except of the other where each Where there is a appointed. committee 10 has been requires issuance of committee of the Review Law each member summons for the notes, correctly the majority of the committee 10. As the committee says nothing about whether provision 218 Ill. should be as defendants. joined and its members However, require they it be served 2d at 188. does days, regardless within 35 properly with summons issued they joined. of whether are contrast, solely to joinder. speaks

Section 3— In addition establish- 735 ILCS 5/3 —107 198

ing joined, who must be it petitioners allows a second chance to join defendants who not were named as of record in the final administrative 735 ILCS order. 5/3— (West 2000). 107 However, the district’s failure to join the committee 10 was the critical district’s shortcoming. Rather, strictly the district failed comply the with Law Review when it failed to obtain issuance summons the committee 10of and its members within (735 days 35 mandated section 3—103 ILCS 5/3— (West 2000)). Although the application of section 3—107 allows the joinder belated certain it parties, cannot excuse district’s failure to timely serve the committee of 10 and its members in accordance requirement sections 3—103 and 3—105. The conse quence for this failure to is comply dismissal proceeding. review v. McGaughy Illinois Human Rights (1995). Comm’n, 165 Ill.

Most petitioners for administrative will not find themselves in the school position. district’s The sec tion requirements unique 3—105 for service are and specific only involving their treatment of cases a com mittee of 10 under the School Code. Other petitioners are merely required to serve “the administrative *** each of the other ILCS defendants.” 735 5/3— notes, As majority a a party made by being defendant complaint. named 218 Ill. 2d Thus, at 191. in most cases section 3—105 does not until a require service defendant is named. When petitioners fail name a party of record who was not order, named in final agency’s most will be able to fall on the 3—107 exception back section that allows time to join extra then to serve that defendant. 735 (West 2000). However, when committee 5/3 —107 is involved, requires Review Law issuance no 35-day summons within limit of section 3—103 when is named matter whether or the committee J., defendant. 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, dissenting). ap properly appellate has court In cases where excep language plied 3—107 at issue ap legitimate suggest about the confusion tion, the facts Village join. propriate In United Methodist to defendants Property Appeal Communities, Tax Inc. v. Retirement (2001), petitioner App. Board, 3d 456 321 Ill. change appealed taxpayer to notice of assessment App. county Methodist, Ill. 321 of United board review. appealed of decision review then the board 3d at 458. He Property Appeal Board, did not name which Tax party in final order. United its of review as board appeal App. On of the Methodist, Ill. 3d at 458-59. 321 joined only petitioner Appeal decision, the Board’s applied appellate Appeal section court Board. The 113(b) (735 113(b) Law of Review 5/3 — (West 1998)), language identical to the contains which exception, 3—107 and allowed amendment section as a to add the board of review review App. Methodist, 3d at 460-61. defendant. United 321 Ill. property petitioner appealed case, In tax an earlier directly bypassing Appeal Board, of board entirely. Apartments, Inc. v. review Villa Retirement App. Property Appeal 745, Board, Tax 302 Ill. 3d 750-51 (1999). Holding of that the board review was neverthe appellate party record, less a of court determined petitioner entitled to amend its that the was to add the as a defendant. Villa Retire board App. ment, 302 Ill. 3d at 751-52. cases,

In each of these it was unclear whether join appropriate an Board of Review was But no as to service exists instant serve. confusion precisely case. Section 3—105 informed the district regional appealing a decision of the whom to serve when (West2000). school board of trustees. 735 ILCS 5/3—105 explicit language, the district did contravention of this 10 the committee of obtain issuance of summons for days. and its members within 35 200

The section 3—107 allowing joinder belated cannot excuse this failure to comply with the Review Law’s service requirements. regard, In this I join Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: I agree with the majority that one of our fundamental “ statutory rules of construction is ‘to view all of the ” provisions a statute as a whole.’ 218 Ill. 2d at 185- 86, quoting Land v. Board Education City (2002). 414, Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d rule, Under this provision each aof statute must be construed in connec every tion with other Lulay, v. Ill. 2d (Lulay (2000)), and not as provisions {Michigan isolated Avenue County Cook, National Bank v. Ill. (2000)). however, The majority, fails to follow this rule overlooking provisions other of the Administra (Review Law) (735 tive Review Law ILCS et 5/3 —101 (West 2000)), seq. relevant to the issue before us. In particular, the majority overlooks the of service summons (735 provisions in contained section 3—105 ILCS 5/3— (West 2000)). 105, 105 Consideration of section in 3— (735 conjunction with section 3—107 ILCS 5/3 —107 (West 2000)), leads to conclusion that the appellate judgment, dismissing court the complaint for administra review, tive should be affirmed. I Accordingly, dissent. states,

Section 3—105 of the Review Law relevant part: any

“Summons issued in action review the final any administrative decision of agency shall by registered be served or certified mail on the administra- agency except tive on of each the other defendants a the case a review administrative decision the of final of of trustees, regional regional superintendent board school of schools, Education, Superintendent or State of of be, may designated case when a committee 10 has been Code, provided by Section 7—6 the School and in only agency such case the administrative involvedand each

201 added.) (Emphasis 10 shall be served.” the committee (West 2000). ILCS 5/3 —105 is appeal to this of section 3—105 The relevance challenged a “final administrative Collinsville evident. and of school trustees” regional board decision in accordance designated 10” was “committee of 2000). (West 105 ILCS Code. See the School 5/7 —6 105, “each of the committee to section Pursuant 3— 2000). (West served.” 735 shall be 5/3 —105 therefore, solely appeal, focus of between Rather, interplay consider we must 3—107. and 3—105. sections 3—107

“[Sjettled call for statutory construction principles Single v. general.” People control over specific (1984). Accordingly, where a ton, Ill. 2d to the same provisions relating contains two statute subject, specific provi and one specific general, one Knolls Condominium applied. sion controls and should (2002). Here, sec Harms, 202 Ill. 2d Ass’n v. of the Review Law both involve tions 3—105 and 3—107 requirements an administrative joinder requirement: general sets out the action. Section 3—107 persons, all other than agency “the administrative record to the proceed who were plaintiff, shall be made ings agency before the administrative (West 107(a) 2000). Section defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) rule, general to this also contains an the omitted allowing amendment of where defendant “not named the administrative was final order as of record.” 735 ILCS its 5/3— hand, on the other addresses Section 3— final administra- casé: “the of a review of a specific case trustees,” board school regional tive decision of designated.” 735 a “committee of 10 has been where (West 2000). only the such case “[I]n ILCS 5/3 —105 each committee administrative involved and added.) 10 shall be served.” (Emphasis 735 ILCS 5/3— (West 2000). Section 3—105 specifically addresses present general situation and controls over the more 107(a). provisions Accordingly, the school 3— argument districts’ that the petitioners or the Commit tee of Ten were not “named” in the Board’s final order “parties of record” is The irrelevant. school districts notice, by were on virtue of section they that were required to serve “each of the committee 10.” statute, law, Under the and our case Collinsville’s failure strictly to comply with the to its Review Law fatal (West 2000) complaint. See 735 ILCS (barring 5/3 —102 sought review unless within the time and manner Law); Watts, provided the Review Inc. ESG v. Pollu (2000) Board, Control tion 191 Ill. 2d 26 (affirming dismissal administrative review based on join failure to the party who instituted the underlying administrative proceeding); McGaughy v. Illinois Human (in (1995) Comm’n, 165 Ill. 2d Rights consolidated ap one peal, dismissing administrative action and review af other, firming dismissal of the petitioners where served respondents but failed name those their Board, review v. petitions); Chicago Lockett Police (1990) Ill. (affirming dismissal of for failure to name a party review record).

The majority maintains because section 3—105 process, addresses service of and section 3—107 addresses defendant, who must named as a section 3—105 can not be specific deemed the more controlling statutory two 218 Ill. 2d provisions. majority’s at 188. reading statutory artificially of these sections is narrow. simply naming provision. Section 3—107 is not Section 3—107 addresses who must be “made” a defendant an 735 ILCS proceeding. 5/3 —107 simply A not “made” a party is defendant naming party caption that named and be both party A must review. Thus, 3—107 section statutory period. within served an unnamed “name and serve” additional time to allows (West 2000). Similarly, 735 ILCS party. 5/3 —107 majority statute as simply is not a service 3—105 how sure, section 3—105 addresses To be contends. in a review ac- made on defendants shall be service mail. Section or certified by registered tion — be as defen- however, who must served also addresses administra- present in a such one: “the dants case as of 10.” each of the committee involved and tive 2000). (West Thus, 3—107 sections 5/3 —105 fashion, speak, in as to who must and 3—105 both some in a “made” a defendant case such as the joined or one, specific. but section 3—105 is the more present of section Even if the characterization majority’s and section 3—105 as a naming provision 3—107 correct, is I with the provision disagree majority’s service this case. conclusion that section 3—105 is irrelevant to firmly administra progeny Lockett and its establish that complaining party unless the is tive review barred set forth in the Review compliance procedures with states, majority seeking As the “A to invoke Law. special statutory jurisdiction strictly comply court’s must (Emphasis prescribed by statute.” procedures added.) expressly 218 Ill. 2d at 182. Section 3—105 of the committee of required Collinsville to serve “each obligation 10.” 735 ILCS That was 5/3 —105 name the com any obligation not made on to dependent mittee, members, underlying petitioners or the its failed to serve the committee defendants. Collinsville “strictly thus with the comply members and failed by statute.” procedures prescribed “was not intended I the Review Law recognize a bar to relief.” unwary be a for the to establish trap (1966). Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d case, this however, trap no set. was Section 3—105 the Review Law set forth terms explicit how a case of type must proceed. Accordingly, Collinsville’s failure to serve the members of the Committee of Ten cannot be over I looked. hold that would because sought review was not in the manner provided Law, the Review the school districts are “barred” from obtaining judicial review. 735 (West 2000). ILCS 5/3 —102 KILBRIDE, JUSTICE also dissenting: I agree with Fitzgerald’s Justice dissent that section 3—105 controls in I appeal. this separately write to that, explain even if the in exception section 3—107 were applicable, the conditions application of that excep- tion have not been met in appellate this case. The court’s dismissal of the for administrative should be in affirmed either case. I Accordingly, respect- fully dissent. majority

The concludes that the exception contained in section 3—107 the of Administrative Review Law (Review Law) the allows school an opportunity districts name and serve the of members the Committee of Ten as defendants. 218 Ill. 2d at 194. exception The in sec only however, tion 3—107 if applies, party the who was not made a defendant “was named the by not administra tive agency its final order as a of record.” 735 107(a) (West 2000). The majority finds 5/3 — exception applies because the order Board’s failed to identify petitioners the as of 2d parties record. 218 Ill. at of be and mittee Ten must named referred to specifically exception as “a of record” not to I apply. for the narrowly. believe the construed more exception should be The of Ten as petitioners identification the Committee of in the order was sufficient to name the members of that Thus, parties as of the section group exception record. 3—107 that the school districts to add the would allow Ten defendants is not members of the Committee of as applicable on the of this based facts case.

I note the of would also that circumstances this case the cannot be show this construction of See unwary.” considered unfair or “a for the Chest trap (1966) (Review 2d 567, nut v. 34 Ill. “was Lodge, Law petition The unwary”). not intended to be a for the trap Ten, the ers, represented by who Committee of were The Ten proceedings. instituted Committee of represented petitioners proceed- throughout these ings. The record shows there were three hear- separate ings petition. before the Board on this attorney The petitioners appeared each hearings. at of these Julia Martinez, one of the Ten, members of the Committee during testified The proceedings. Board members referred to petitioners” repeatedly “the throughout hearings. The entire proceeding focused on petition, prominently identifying the members of by the Committee of Ten name on page one. The “[tjhe specifically following states Petitioners are designated as the Committee of Ten to act attorney as sum, fact for all Petitioners.” the record replete to the petitioners references and the Committee of Ten. facts,

Based claim on these the school districts cannot they did not know that the of the Commit- members tee of Ten parties were record. status members of the Committee Ten as of record Thus, could not be more apparent. denying the school districts add additional time to the members Com- mittee Ten as defendants would unfair. Finally, noted both Fitzgerald Justice Garman, Justice 3—105 clearly required to school districts serve each member of the Committee J., of Ten. 218 2d at (Fitzgerald, dissenting); Ill. 201-02 (Garman, J., 218 Ill. 2d at 197 concurring part dissenting in part). The school districts failed serve members Committee of Ten when this action after Additionally, was initiated. the school districts were granted leave to add the members the Committee of defendants, obligated Ten the school districts were Nonetheless, arrange for service of the defendants. record, according completely the school districts failed to serve the members the Committee of Ten— add they granted even after were leave to these members, failing to serve the committee defendants. In strictly comply failed school districts Law. Review ap- sum, should be resolved based on appeal Justice explained 3—105

plication if the However, exception even Fitzgerald’s dissent. the condi- applicable appeal, to this section 3—107 were have not met. of that been application tions for court dismiss- Accordingly, judgment appellate be af- for administrative review should ing firmed.

(No. 98763. ex rel. THE THE OF PEOPLE OF STATE ILLINOIS HEALTH, THE OF PUBLIC Ap- DEPARTMENT WILEY, M.D., E. Appellant. v. THELMA pellee, Opinion January 2006. filed 194-95. The notes the of majority caption that the order identify did not the parties, and the text of the did order any of the identify petitioners individual or members of the Committee of Ten by name. 218 Ill. at 195. I disagree with the conclusion that the order did not sufficiently of of identify members the Committee parties Ten as of record the meaning within of the recites, in pertinent order body of the Review Law. more than two- signed by that “the Petition was part, of the area legal registered voters thirds (2/3) in the involved, appointed of Ten was that a Committee forth in 105 set legal requirements Petition met by have been Illinois Statutes Compiled 5/7 Code, a committee of Under the School Petitioners.” at as designated a group petitioners 105 ILCS torney petitioners. for all fact 5/7— 6(c) Thus, order, by referring ap Ten, identifies the Committee pointment any Under charac group petitioners. members of that as terization, are of record. As noted petitioners parties petitioners “clearly parties were majority, Thus, 2d at is sufficient record.” 218 Ill. 183. the order identify the members of the Committee Ten record. petitioners my view, gives sec- majority broad The majority tion 3—107 too of a construction. apparently require would that each member of the Com-

Case Details

Case Name: Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 20, 2006

Citation: 843 N.E.2d 273

Docket Number: 98649, 98668 cons.

Court Abbreviation: Ill.