CHRISTOPHER MITCHENER v. CURIOSITYSTREAM, INC.
Case No. 25-cv-01471-NW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 6, 2025
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS; Re: ECF No. 19
Noël Wise
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a citizen of California residing in this district. See FAC ¶ 5 CuriousityStream is a Maryland corporation that operates www.curiositystream.com (“Website“). Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that CuriosityStream installed “certain software on the Website designed by [third party] TikTok to seamlessly cause the extraction and transmission of data from every devicе that accesses the Website” (“TikTok Software“). Id. ¶¶ 11. According to Plaintiff, “each person who visits the Website can be personally identified” because the TikTok Software “fingerprint[s]” Website visitors,” allowing the Website to “collect[] as much data as it can about a normally and otherwise anonymous Website visitor.” Id. ¶¶ 11-13. The gathered information is then shared with TikTok “for the purpose of finding as much matching and similar information and data in
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the TikTok Software can “gather device and browser information, geographic information, referral tracking, and URL tracking by running codes or ‘scripts’ on the Website that send the visitor‘s details to TikTok.” Id. ¶ 14. As part of Defendant‘s alleged use of the TikTok software, CuriosityStream employs “Auto Advanced Matching” technology to collect further visitor information provided by the visitor to the Website. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff claims the TikTok Software automatically runs and sends information to TikTok the moment a visitor makes a connection to the site, without visitors’ consent to the tracking of their web activity. Id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff contends the TikTok software is a “trap and trace device” under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA“). Under CIPA, a “trap and trace device” is defined as “a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not the contents of a communication.”
CIPA imposes civil liability and statutory penalties for the installation of trap and trace devices without a court order. Id. ¶ 23;
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 12, 2025, and Defendant moved to dismiss on March 12, 2025. ECF Nos. 1, 9. Instead of opposing, Plaintiff filed the FAC on April 2, 2025. ECF No. 19. Defendant timely moved to dismiss the FAC on April 16, 2025. Mot., ECF No. 21.
This case is one in a rash of similar actions brought by Plaintiff‘s counsel, Tauler Smith LLP, alleging violations of
The undersigned judge dismissed a substantively identical complaint from Tauler Smith earlier this summer. See Kishnani v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 25-CV-01473-NW, 2025 WL 1745726 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2025)2 (original complaint filed on the same date as the instant action). For the reasons set forth in that decision, and reproduced below, thе Court grants Defendant‘s motion to dismiss with prejudice.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“In the absence of standing, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.” Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must show an injury, trace that injury to the defendants’ conduct, and prove that courts can provide adequate redress for the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A plaintiff must show that he suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560. For an injury to be particularized, it “must affect the plaintiff in a pеrsonal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016).
“[A]n injury in law is not an injury in fact. Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant‘s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427 (2021) (emphasis added). In other words, the legislature‘s creation of a statutory prohibition or obligation and a cause of action does not relieve courts of the responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm under Article III. Id. In the privacy context, “[u]nless the retention of unlawfully obtained or created information amounts to the type of concrete injury recognized by the Supreme Court, it is insufficient to establish standing.” Phillips v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 74 F.4th 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2023).
As a result, general allegations of unlawful conduct are, in themselves, insufficient alone to confer standing. Lee v. Biden, 876 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754–57 (1984)); Daghaly v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, No. 23-4122, 2024 WL 5134350, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2024) (Plaintiff fails to allege an injury in fact if he relies only on “general allegations about how [Defеndant] intercepts website visitors’ communications and monitors their actions” while “allegations about [Plaintiff‘s] own interactions with [the website] are sparse.“); see also Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 18-cv-07600-VC, 2019 WL 2172706, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019) (“[A] reference to invaded ‘privacy and statutory rights’ [is] insufficient to describe a concrete and рarticularized harm.“); Parker v. Salvation Army, No. 20-CV-08585-JSW, 2021 WL 6618584, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2021) (same).
While in certain circumstances “[i]ntrusion on privacy alone can be a concrete injury,” Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018), the nature of the injury turns on whether a plaintiff has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Kumandan v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-04286-BLF, 2023 WL 8587625, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2023) (violation of CIPA requires showing “that class members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in intercepted communications.“); Rodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc., No. 2:24-CV-08735-RGK-JC, 2025 WL 1122387, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2025) (“[A]n invasion of privacy requires a reasonable expectation of privacy to have been violated.“).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Fails to Allege an Injury in Fact
To sufficiently allege an injury in fact and “survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must idеntify the ‘specific personal information she disclosed that implicates a protectable privacy interest.‘” Khamooshi v. Politico LLC, No. 24-CV-07836-SK, 2025 WL 1408896, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2025) (quoting Mikulsky v. Noom, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (S.D. Cal. 2023)). Because Plaintiff did not, he lacks Standing to bring his claim. See Hughes v. Vivint, Inc., No. CV 24-3081-GW-KSX, 2024 WL 5179916, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2024), adopted, No. CV 24-3081-GW-KSX, 2024 WL 5179917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024) (“As Plaintiff does not clearly allege what personalized information of hers was actually collected, she does not identify any harm to her privacy.“); Mikulsky, 682 F. Supp. 3d at 864 (no injury in fact because “the Court is unable to determine whether the ‘personal information’ Plaintiff inputted is protected or whether it was merely information akin to basic contact information that would not triggеr a protectable privacy interest.“).
Plaintiff made four general allegations about how Defendant caused Plaintiff‘s alleged injury:
- The Defendant‘s Website software “cause[s] the extraction and transmission of data . . . so that each person who visits the Website can be personally identified.” FAC ¶ 11
- The Defendant‘s Website software “collects as much data as it can and matches it with
existing data that TikTok has acquired.” Id. ¶ 13. - The Defendant‘s Website software “gather[s] device and browser information, geographic information, referral tracking, and URL tracking . . . to send the visitor‘s details to TikTok.” Id. ¶ 14.
- The Defendant‘s Website softwаre “scans every page of the Website visited for additional information about the visitor, such as name, date of birth, and address.” Id. ¶ 14.
Taken together, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant invaded his privacy by impermissibly collecting Plaintiff‘s “data” and “information.” A court considering a near identical complaint (see supra n.1) found the allegations insufficient to confer Article III standing because:
Plaintiff fails to allege any basic facts from which the Court could infer a concrete injury, like when and how many times she visited the site, what information she provided, what information Defendant caрtured, whether she was aware of Defendant‘s tracking practices, or if she has any reason to believe that she was indeed de-anonymized.
Heiting v. FKA Distrib. Co., No. 2:24-CV-07314-HDV-AGR, 2025 WL 736594, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2025) (internal citation omitted). “Plaintiff cannot establish constitutional standing based on conclusory statements.” Steinmeyer v. Am. Ass‘n of Blood Banks, 715 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 2024).
Likewise, even if Plaintiff‘s allеgations were sufficiently concrete and particularized (they are not), Plaintiff has failed to allege the invasion of a legally protected right. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The mere “collection of basic contact information by . . . software[,] or where the plaintiffs merely visited the website[,] are not сoncrete harms.” Smidga v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-1578-MJH, 2024 WL 1485853, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2024) (collecting cases); Carolus v. Nexstar Media Inc., No. 24-CV-07790-VC, 2025 WL 1338193, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025) (refusing so find an injury in fact where plaintiffs alleged only that defendant tracked “browser and device data” and “other identifying information” alongside IP addresses). IP addresses, for example, can provide “device and browser information” and “gеographic information” the collection of which purportedly invaded Plaintiff‘s privacy in the instant case, FAC ¶¶ 14, but it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that “there is no legally protected privacy interest in IP addresses.” Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2020); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Internet users have no expectation of privacy in . . . the IP addresses of the wеbsites they visit.“); Carolus, 2025 WL 1338193, at *1 (no injury in fact where plaintiff alleges only “that a given device visited [Defendant‘s] website and the general location of that device, including what zip code it‘s in.“).
And though Plaintiff alleges that Defendants could gain “additional information about [a] visitor such as name, date of birth, and address,” and that allegation could intrude on Plaintiff‘s right to privаcy, he fails to convert that hypothetical into concrete harm to him. FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff does not allege that the Website collected his biographical information, and a “class representative must be a part of the class and . . . suffer the same injury as the class members.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156. A plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim on behalf of a class if he does not have standing to bring it for himself. Hawkins v. Comparet–Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing O‘Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1974)).
Without standing, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant‘s motion is GRANTED.
B. The TikTok Software is Not a Track and Trace Device
Even if Plaintiff did allege that additional information about him was collected by the Website, the FAC still fails because, if that type of information is сollected, the statute ceases to apply. Plaintiff‘s single claim turns on whether Defendant‘s Website and the related software constitute a “trap and trace device” as defined by
As the Superior Court of Lоs Angeles County explained when a substantively identical claim (see supra n.1) came before it:
the crucial distinction from other devices is that . . . “trap and trace devices” are designed to capture information about the communication, but not the content of the communication itself. Indeed, other devices accomplish that, and a host of statutes and caselaw are directed at those other devices too. For purposes of Section 638.51, “trap and trace devices” by definition are tools which provide information about the “who,” “when,” and “where” of communications—but not the “what.”
* * *
Though neither party discusses the distinction between information about a communication versus information within a communication, it crystalizes the futility of Plaintiff‘s suit (and the myriad identical cases Plaintiff‘s counsel has filed in both federal and state courts). If Defendant only collects information regarding the “metadata” of the communication, Plaintiff‘s right to privacy is not invaded because he has no expectation of privacy as to that type of data (e.g., his IP address or general geographic location). If Defendant instead collects content information from communication between the parties (e.g., information provided from Plaintiff to Defendant directly), then the TikTok software is not a trap and trace device and
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 6, 2025
Noël Wise
United States District Judge
