Mistysyn v. LynchMistysyn v. Lynch
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Allen Mistysyn appeals a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas that modified his child support obligation. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Mistysyn and Wendy Lynch divorced in March 2015 after 19 years of marriage. They have two childrеn, one who was born in 2000 and the other in 2002. Mother retained the marital home, which was worth $360,000, after buying out Father‘s interest in it. She also bought out his partial interest in a vacation home that she owned. The parties also divided approximаtely ten million dollars in assets they had acquired during the marriage. Father agreed to pay Mother $8,000 a month in spousal support for 39 months and $1,250 per child in child support.
{¶3} At the time of the divorce, Father earned a base salary оf $350,000. He could also earn stock options and bonuses depending on the profitability of his employer. In January 2017,
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT‘S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 9, 2018 IS NOT A FINAL APPEALABLE JUDGMENT.
{¶4} On April 9, 2018, the trial cоurt entered a journal entry that denied Father‘s objections to the magistrate‘s decision. Although Father has appealed the entry, he argues in his first assignment of error that it was not final and appealable because it did not inсlude language required under
{¶5} “In cases referred to a magistrate, the determination of appellate court jurisdiction is complicated * * *.” Harkai v. Scherba Indus. Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 219 (9th Dist.2000). “[We] must differentiate between those requirements that affect appellate court jurisdiction, that is, entry of a judgment setting forth relief, and those that impose procedural requirements on the trial court, such as adoption of a magistrate‘s decision.” Id. at 219-220. “In the first instance, the absence of a final ordеr or judgment precludes appellate review. In the second instance, provided there has been a final order or judgment entered, the filing of a notice of appeal in compliance with the appellate rules vests jurisdiction in the appellate court.” Id. at 220.
{¶7} The magistrate entered her decision on September 14, 2017. That same day, the trial court entered a judgment that adopted the findings and conclusions of the mаgistrate and modified the child support order. Father objected to the magistrate‘s decision within fourteen days and later supplemented his objections. On April 9, 2018, the trial court overruled Father‘s objections. Father argues that its entry is not appealable because the court did not indicate it was “adher[ing]” to its judgment under
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ADOPTED THE DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE ORDERING A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILDREN WERE NOT LIVING AT THE SAME STANDARD OF LIVING THEY WOULD HAVE ENJOYED HAD THE MARRIAGE CONTINUED.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ADOP[T]ED THE DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE INCREASING THE CHILD SUPPORT FROM $1,250.00 PER MONTH PER CHILD, TO $10,000.00 PER MONTH[,] WHERE THE INCREASED AMOUNT WAS UNREASONABLE.
{¶8} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it modified the child support order. This Court reviews the modification of a child support order for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. Hill, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27915, 2016-Ohio-910, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶9} A court may nоt modify a child support order unless there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Trombley v. Trombley, 9th Dist. Medina No. 17CA0012-M, 2018-Ohio-1880, ¶ 8. Father does not contest the trial court‘s determination that the increase in his income following his promotion to chief financial officer constituted a substantial change in circumstances. He argues, however, that the court should not have modified the support order because there was no change in the standard of living the children would have enjoyed if the marriage had continued. He also argues that the amount of the increase was excessive.
{¶10} If the parties’ combined gross income exceeds $150,000, a court determines the obligor‘s child support obligation on a case-by-case basis considering “the needs and the standard of living of the children who are the subject of the child support order and of the parents.” J.M. v. L.M., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011126, 2018-Ohio-3417, ¶ 13, quoting
{¶11} Regarding the standard of living of the parties’ children, the magistrate found that the children were living in the same house as they had during the marriage, which was worth $360,000. Father, on the other hand, had remarried and had purchased a house worth $1,125,000 with his new spouse. The magistrate found that, if the marriage had continued, the children would be living in that house instead of visiting it every other weekend. She also found that the income coming into Father‘s household was many times greater than the income coming into Mother‘s household. She found that any suggestion that the children‘s lives had remained the same was “not true.” Instead, she found that the lifestyle of the children was less than it would have been if the parties had remained married. The magistrate determined that the children could not enjoy the lifestyle they would have had on the current level of support. She also reasoned that Mother should not be required to spend down her assets just to allow the children to enjoy that lifestyle. The trial court adopted thе magistrate‘s findings as its own.
{¶12} Mother testified on direct examination that she lives within her budget, meaning that she cannot afford a country club membership or tickets to events. She testified that, although she takes the children on vacation, they stay at average hotels. She testified that she cannot afford to put a pool in at her house, but the children could swim at the city pool. She testified that she and the children live in a middle-class house that has 3,000 square feet. She hаd considered moving, but the children wanted to stay in the home.
{¶13} On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that she owns a second home that she recently rebuilt for $700,000. She also acknowledged that she has an adjusted gross incomе of $540,000. She testified that it was becoming harder to provide for the children‘s needs despite
{¶14} Father testified that he purchased his new home in 2015, which was the same year as the parties’ divorce. He did not become the chief financial officer of his company until January 2017. He testified that he had joined a cоuntry club, but it was also in 2015. He testified that, when the children are with him, he lets them decide what they want to do. They might hang out by the pool at his house, go to dinner, or go to a movie. He testified that he also took them to Cedar Point using the seasоn passes Mother had purchased for them. Father could not think of any way in which the children‘s lifestyle had changed since his promotion. Regarding future expenses, he testified that, if the children‘s college expenses exceеded the amount the parties had set aside during the marriage, he would make up the difference and, if their expenses were less, he would pay them the leftover amount.
{¶15} We note that the lifestyle changes that the trial court relied on to support its decision occurred more than a year before Father‘s promotion. The trial court did not
{¶16} According to an exhibit submitted by Mother, she spends $1,650 a month in direct costs for the children. She calculated that, if she adds two-thirds of her total household expensеs to that sum, it rises to $5,227 a month. The trial court did not provide any explanation for why Father‘s new child support obligation should be nearly twice that amount. Accordingly, upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court‘s modification of the child support award was unreasonable and arbitrary. Father‘s third and fourth assignments of error are sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPROVED AND ADOPTED THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION AND THE CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATION WORKSHEET, WHERE THE DECISION AND THE WORKSHEET WERE BASED ON PROSPECTIVE, POSSIBLE INCOME FOR FATHER.
{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Father argues that the magistrate and trial court miscalculated his income. In light of this Court‘s resolution of Father‘s third and fourth assignments of error, we conclude that this argument is moot based on the facts of this case. We, therefore, decline to address Father‘s argument.
III.
{¶18} Father‘s first assignment of error is overruled. His third and fourth assignments of error are sustained. We decline to address his second assignment of error because it is moot.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandаte, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
CALLAHAN, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN S. HAYNES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELIZABETH A. THOMARIOS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.