Jаmes Miracle, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Ohio Department of Veterans Services et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16AP-885
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 6, 2018
2018-Ohio-819
KLATT, J.
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2016-537) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Lee Ann Rabe and Emily Simmons Tapocsi, for appellees. Argued: Lee Ann Rabe.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
D E C I S I O N
KLATT, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, James Miracle, appeals a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio that dismissed his action against defendants-appellees, the Ohio Department of Veterans Services (“ODVS“) and the Office of the Governor. For the following reasons, we reverse that judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} On July 14, 2016, Miracle filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Miracle‘s claims arose out of the
{¶ 3} Miracle began his employment with ODVS on February 23, 2015. In a job review Miracle received on June 9, 2015, Miracle attained “meets expectations” or “exceeds expectations” ratings in each category. However, six days later, ODVS’ human resource director informed Miracle that ODVS was terminating his employment. Whеn Miracle asked the human resource director to explain the reason for his discharge, she told him that ODVS “was moving in a different direction” and ODVS was “not obligated to give [him] a reason” because he was only a probationary employee. (Compl. at ¶ 36.)
{¶ 4} Miracle later learned that Jai Chabria, then a senior advisor for the governor, had ordered ODVS to fire him. Apparently, Chabria wanted Miracle discharged to end the negative press his hiring had garnered from the Sandusky media.1
{¶ 5} Miracle‘s complaint asserted three claims for wrоngful discharge in violation of public policy: (1) defendants violated the clear public policy, derived from
{¶ 7} Miracle now appeals the November 22, 2016 judgment, and he assigns the following errors:
- The trial court erred when it dismissed Appellant‘s Complaint for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief May be granted, pursuant to
Civ. R. 12(B)(6) . - The trial court erred in determining that no clear public policy emanates from
Ohio Revised Code § 124.27 . - The trial court erred in determining that Appellant could not establish the jeopardy element of a wrongful discharge claim arising out of the public policy articulated in
Ohio Revised Code § 124.56 . - The lower court erred when it held that it did not have authority to make an immunity determination regаrding Jai Chabria. Appellant did not fail to state a claim for relief arising under State law and if permitted to proceed against Chabria personally, in a Court of Common Pleas, would have additional claims to pursue against him.
{¶ 8} We will address Miracle‘s first three assignments of еrror together. By these assignments of error, Miracle argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims pursuant to
{¶ 10} Here, defendants argue that Miracle‘s first claim for wrongful discharge fails because Miracle did not establish the existence of a clear public policy to support the claim. To satisfy the clarity element of a claim for wrongful discharge, “a terminated еmployee must articulate a clear public policy by citation to specific provisions in the federal or state constitution, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common law.” Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 130 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 24. Relying on
{¶ 11} In moving for dismissal of the first claim, defendants ignored the public policy Miracle stated in his complaint. Defendants, instead, argued that Miracle сlaimed that
{¶ 12} With regard to Miracle‘s second claim for wrongful discharge, defendants conceded for purposes of their motion to dismiss that Miracle stated a clear public policy. Thus, defendants admitted that
{¶ 13} The trial court interpreted defendants’ argument as an attack on the jeopardy element. We disagree. To satisfy the jeopardy element, a plaintiff must show that the clear public policy at issue is at risk if the employer is permitted to discharge employees in circumstances like those underlying the plaintiff‘s discharge. Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 70. Because defendants moved for a dismissal under
{¶ 14} First, defendants contended that, because
{¶ 16} Defendants’ second argument misconstrues the text of the complaint. In pleading his second claim, Miracle alleged:
59. Jai Chabria, in his capacity as Senior Advisor to the Governor of the State of Ohio, and those persons acting at his direction, abused their authority, when they terminated Plaintiff despite the fact that he was satisfactorily performing the duties of his position.
60. Defendants abused their authority, when they terminated Plaintiff despite the fact that Plaintiff was satisfactorily performing the duties of his position.
61. Political optics are not sufficient grounds for termination.
62. If this decision is allowed to stand, the clear public policy prohibiting abuse of power will be jeopardized.
(Compl. at ¶ 59-62.) Given these allegations, we conclude that Miracle sufficiently stated wrongful action on the part of both defendants. Miracle alleged that both defendants’ actions—not just Chabria‘s actions—resulted in the tеrmination of his employment.
{¶ 17} In its determination of defendants’ challenge to the second claim, the trial court reasoned that Miracle could not establish the jeopardy element because he conceded that the governor had the authority to order the termination of his employment. However, as we stated above, the jeopardy element turns on whether the discharge of probationary
{¶ 18} Although Miracle asserted three claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, on appeal, he only argues error regarding two of those claims. Miracle, thus, has tacitly abandoned his third claim for wrongful discharge (based on
{¶ 19} By Miracle‘s fourth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to determine Chabria‘s immunity. The refusal resulted from the trial court‘s conclusion that Miracle failed to state any claim in his complaint. As we have found that the trial court erred in dismissing two of Miracle‘s claims, we also find that the trial court erred in its denial of the immunity determination. Accordingly, we sustain Miracle‘s fourth assignmеnt of error.
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain in part and overrule in part Miracle‘s first assignment of error, and we sustain Miracle‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error. We remand this case to the Court of Claims of Ohio for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision.
Judgment reversed; case remanded.
BROWN, P.J., and BRUNNER, J., concur.