Michael T. MINOTTI, Appellant, v. Brian LENSINK, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Connecticut State Department of Mental Retardation; Gareth Thorne, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Mental Retardation (former); Roger MacNamara, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Mansfield Training School, Connecticut State Department of Mental Retardation (former); Arlene Mirsky, individually and in her official capacity as Assistant Superintendent, Mansfield Training School; Manuel Jainchill, individually and in his official capacity as Personnel Director of Mansfield Training School; Delmar Pelletier, individually and in his official capacity as Institutional Unit Manager of Bennet Hall, Mansfield Training School; Lee-Ann Piche, individually and in her official capacity as Unit Coordinator, Bennet Hall, Mansfield Training School, Appellees.
No. 365, Docket 89-7619
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Argued Dec. 18, 1989. Decided Feb. 2, 1990
895 F.2d 100 | 58 USLW 2490 | 15 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1042
Henri Alexandre, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., of Connecticut, of counsel), for appellees.
Before OAKES, Chief Judge, PRATT, Circuit Judge, and SAND, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM:
Michael T. Minotti, pro se, appeals a May 19, 1989, judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, T. Emmet Clarie, Judge, dismissing with prejudice his action brought under the federal civil rights laws,
FACTS
From August 1983 until December 14, 1983, Minotti was employed by the Mansfield Training School, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded operated and administered by defendant employees and officers of the Connecticut State Department of Mental Retardation. Alleging that he was terminated from employment for not participating in defendants\’ conspiracy to defraud the United States by means of false claims for federal funding under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Minotti brought suit on September 30, 1986, under the federal civil rights laws and the False Claims Act. Pursuant to the statutory requirements for bringing a private civil action under the False Claims Act, see
On April 9, 1987, and May 14, 1987, defendants served on Minotti interrogatories and requests for production which sought, among other things, Minotti\‘s recent tax returns, documents pertaining to his past employment and to workers\’ compensation payments he was receiving, and his educational and medical histories. Nearly one year later, the district court overruled Minotti\‘s objections to these production requests and ordered him to supply the requested documents by April 23, 1988. Minotti did not comply with the district court\‘s order.
On May 31, 1988, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, citing Minotti\‘s failure to heed the court-ordered discovery deadline. On June 15, 1988, Minotti filed objections to this motion and sought additional time to comply with the discovery requests. The court reserved ruling on defendants\’ motion and extended the discovery deadline to July 1, 1988. Once again, Minotti failed to meet the deadline or to respond in any fashion.
At a hearing held January 23, 1989, on defendants\’ motion to dismiss, Minotti informed the court that he had filed documents fully satisfying the discovery requests. The court found, however, that Minotti had failed to answer any of the outstanding discovery requests. Faced with Minotti\‘s continued noncompliance with its orders, the district court on January 26, 1989, ordered Minotti to comply with all outstanding discovery requests by February 9, 1989, or to face dismissal with prejudice. In Notices of Compliance filed February 12, February 13, and May 1, 1989, Minotti again claimed he had complied fully with the court\‘s discovery order. In each situation, however, the court found that Minotti had ignored requests for tax documents and other materials. On May 19, 1989, the district court entered judgment dismissing Minotti\‘s action.
1. Dismissal as Sanction for Noncompliance with Discovery
On appeal, Minotti argues, first, that dismissal of his action was too extreme a sanction for his failure to comply fully with defendants\’ discovery requests. However,
In the present case, Minotti failed to heed discovery orders on at least four separate occasions, thus delaying the case nearly two years. Moreover, the district court explored numerous options before ordering dismissal, such as repeatedly allowing Minotti additional time to comply with the discovery orders, informing Minotti of the actions he must take in order to comply with the orders, and warning Minotti about the threat of dismissal. Although dismissal of an action or proceeding is the most severe of appropriate sanctions for noncompliance with discovery orders, see National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780-81, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (per curiam), “the requisite \‘element of willfulness or conscious disregard\’ for the discovery process ... justifies the sanction of dismissal.” Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448, 1458 (D.C.Cir.1986) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871, 108 S.Ct. 199, 98 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987). Because “all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders,” McDonald v. Head Criminal Court Supervisor Officer, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir.1988), we find that the district court acted well within its discretion in dismissing Minotti\‘s action.
2. Dismissal of Claims under the False Claims Act
Minotti nevertheless argues that dismissal of his claims under the False Claims Act was inappropriate. Citing the portion of the statute which allows dismissal of a civil action brought by a private person “only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting,”
Although no previous court has interpreted this particular consent provision, we find that it applies only in cases where a plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of a claim or action brought under the False Claims Act, and not where the court orders dismissal. Before 1981, the provision stated that a private citizen suit under the False Claims Act “shall not be withdrawn or discontinued without the consent, in writing, of the judge of the court and the United States attorney ... setting forth their reasons for such consent.”
When Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1981 to recodify the statute and to update its language to reflect modern usage, see H.R.Rep. No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1895-98, the phrase “withdrawn or discontinued” became transformed to “dismissed.” While noting that “withdrawn or” was omitted as “surplus” verbiage, see
Judgment affirmed.