Miller Lakes Community Servs. Assn. v. SchmittMiller Lakes Community Servs. Assn. v. Schmitt
Dated: March 21, 2011
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Miller Lakes Community Services Association, Inc. (“Miller Lakes“), appeals the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment on its complaint in favor of appellees, David and Becky Wigham (“Wighams“); Richard and Norma Cooper, individually and as trustees of the Cooper Family Trust (“Coopers“); and Wolfgang and Toni Schmitt (“Schmitts“). Cross-appellants, the Wighams, appeal the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment on their counterclaims in favor of Miller Lakes. This Court dismisses the appeal and cross-appeal for lack of a final, appeаlable order.
I.
{¶2} Miller Lakes is a homeowners’ association which is responsible for maintaining certain real estate, including Miller Lakes Road, which it owns and is used in common by various homeowners in the development. It acquired ownership and its concomitant
{¶3} The Schmitts acquired six contiguous parcels of land in the area beginning in 1990. The 1990 deed grants them an easement to pass over the private roadway now known as Miller Lake Road in consideration of their agreement to pay for one fourth of the cost of maintaining the easement portion of the roadway, including snow removal and mowing. The Wighams acquired three contiguous parcels of land in the area in 1998. Their deed expressly grants them an easement over the roadway now known as Miller Lake Road, extending 25 feet on each side of the centerline. The deed, however, contains no language regarding payment or allocation of costs for maintenance or repair of the easement. The Coopers acquired property in the area in 1977. Their deed expressly grants them an easement over another tract of land for both a driveway and access to and from the nearby road, as well as an easement 60 feet wide over what now constitutes Miller Lake Road. In 2004, the Coopers transferred the property by quitclaim deed to themselves as trustees of the Cooper Family Trust (“Cooper Trust“). The quitclaim deed conveyed the property “[s]ubject however to all easements, covenants and restrictiоns of record.”
{¶4} The Schmitts, Wighams, and Cooper Trust are not members of the homeowners’ association and there is no dispute that there is no requirement that they become members. However, because they are not members, they do not pay association fees which Miller Lakes
{¶5} Miller Lakes sent an invoice dated May 28, 2008, to the Schmitts for monies due for snow removal in 2005, 2006 and 2007, as well as a non-itemized charge for “May 16, 2005 Balance Due.” The Schmitts’ May 28, 2008 invoice total was $624.36 аnd calculated the three snow removal fees at twenty percent of one-twenty-eighths (1/28) of the annual cost of snow removal within the Miller Lakes area. Miller Lakes sent an invoice dated May 28, 2008, to the Coopers personally for monies due for snow removal in 2006 and 2007, as well as a non-itemized charge for “2006 Invoice Balance Due.” The Coopers’ May 28, 2008 invoice total was $604.68 and calculated the two snow removal fees at twenty percent of one-twenty-eighths (1/28) of the annual cost of snow removal within the Miller Lakes area. Miller Lakes sent an invoice dated May 28, 2008, to the Wighams for monies due for snow removal in 2006 and 2007, as well as а non-itemized charge for “2006 Invoice Balance Due.” The Wighams’ May 28, 2008 invoice total was $424.16 and calculated the two snow removal fees at twenty percent of one-twenty-eighths (1/28) of the annual cost of snow removal within the Miller Lakes area. Neither the Schmitts, the Coopers, Cooper Trust, nor the Wighams paid Miller Lakes for any of the invoiced amounts.
{¶6} Miller Lakes filed a complaint against the Schmitts, the Coopers, Cooper Trust, and the Wighams seeking declaratory relief, declaring that the defendants were required to pay a proportionate share of the costs necessarily expended by Miller Lakes to maintain and rеpair the easement road and provide other concomitant benefits. Miller Lakes further alleged one claim each for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, as well as specific damages claims arising out of the three unpaid invoices. The Coopers and Cooper Trust filed separate answers. The Schmitts
{¶7} Miller Lakes filed a motion for partial summary judgment, in which it sought summary judgment on its claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. It did not seek summary judgment on its remaining three claims on the theory that those claims merely specified specific damages sought. In addition, Miller Lakes filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the Schmitts’ counterclaims and a motion for partial summary judgment against the Wighams, seeking summary judgmеnt on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment but expressly declining to address their claim for unjust enrichment on the theory that that claim was merely a claim for damages. The Coopers and Cooper Trust filed a response in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on the claims in the complaint. In аddition, they filed a motion for summary judgment. The Schmitts filed a motion for summary judgment on Miller Lakes’ claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and the damages claim specific to the Schmitts. They opposed both Miller Lakes’ motion for partial summary judgment on its own claims and its motion for summary judgment on their
{¶8} On September 10, 2009, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing. The trial court noted that it had met with counsel in August 2009, to discuss the pending motions for summary judgment, and that no record was made of that meeting. The trial court further noted that it had informed counsel at that time that it planned to grant the Wighams’ motion for summary judgment, that it had granted leave to the Coopers to file a motion for summary judgment on a similar issue, and that it was going to deny Miller Lakes’ and the Schmitts’ motions for summary judgment, “thinking there was a factual issue that had to be tried.” Thе court never issued an order to that effect, however.
{¶9} On November 19, 2009, the trial court issued a purported “Final Judgment Entry: Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions.” The trial court purported to grant the Wighams‘, the Coopers‘, Cooper Trust‘s, and the Schmitts’ motions for summary judgment in regard to Miller Lakes’ claims. The trial court purported to grant Miller Lakes’ motions for summary judgment on the Schmitts’ counterclaims and on the Wighams’ claim for declaratory judgment. In conclusion, the trial court ordered that the “complaint and all counterclaims are dismissed with prejudice.” In addition, the trial court found that there was no just reason for delay.
{¶10} Miller Lakes appealed and the Wighams cross-appealed.
{¶11} Miller Lakes raises seven assignments of error and the Wighams raise one assignment of error, which we decline to restate here.
{¶12} As a preliminary matter, this Court is obligated to raise sua sponte questions related to our jurisdiction. Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., Inc. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186. This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals only from final judgments.
{¶13} This Court has previously held:
“‘[T]o terminate the matter, the order must contain a statement of the relief that is being afforded the parties.’ Hawkins v. Innovative Property Mgt., 9th Dist. No. 22802, 2006-Ohio-394, at ¶5, quoting Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc. (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 215. This Court has further held that ‘[a]n order is not final until the trial court rules on all of the issues surrounding the award, “leaving nothing outstanding for future determination.“’ Carnegie Cos., Inc. v. Summit Properties, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 24553, 2009-Ohio-4655, at ¶18, quoting State v. Muncie (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 446.” No-Burn, Inc. v. Murati, 9th Dist. No. 24577, 2009-Ohio-6951, at ¶8.
{¶14}
“[C]ourts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. *** The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect. The declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree.”
{¶15} In a plurality decision, this Court discussed the effect of a trial court‘s failure to declare the rights and obligations in a declaratory judgment action:
“In order to properly enter judgment in a declaratory judgment actiоn, the trial court must set forth its construction of the disputed document or law, and must expressly declare the parties’ respective rights and obligations. If the trial court fails to fulfill these requirements, its judgment is not final and appealable.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Revis v. Ohio Chamber Ballet, 9th Dist. No. 24696, 2010-Ohio-2201, at ¶38 (Dickinson, P.J., concurring).
{¶16} In this case, the trial court purportedly granted summary judgmеnt in favor of the Schmitts, the Coopers, Cooper Trust, and the Wighams in regard to Miller Lakes’ claim for declaratory relief. It further purportedly granted summary judgment in favor of Miller Lakes on the Wighams’ counterclaim for declaratory judgment. The trial court, however, failed to declare any rights and/or obligations of the partiеs. Instead, it merely dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. The separate claim and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief sought a declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations as they would have arisen out of the deeds conveying easements. Notwithstanding the trial court‘s order granting summary judgment to variоus parties in regard to the multiple claims for declaratory relief, the mere dismissal of those claims failed to declare any rights and/or obligations, leaving the status of the parties unresolved. Although the trial court did say that it found that Miller Lakes had waived its right to and was moreover estopped from enforcing the easements in the Wighams’ and Coopers’ deeds, such a finding does not itself declare the parties’ rights and obligations. The issue regarding the Wighams was unjust enrichment as there was no provision for payment in their easement and, therefore, nothing to “enforce.” Accordingly, because the trial court failed to construe the deeds and еxpressly declare the parties’ rights and obligations, it did not render final judgment in regard to those claims.
{¶17} Furthermore, notwithstanding the trial court‘s use of
{¶19} Second, the trial court‘s use of
{¶20} In this case, Miller Lakes’ claims alleging unjust enrichment and quantum meruit are dependent upon the resolution of its claim for declaratory relief. Miller Lakes sought a declaration that the homeowner-defendants аre obligated to pay a proportionate share of the costs
III.
{¶21} The trial court has not issuеd a final, appealable order. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and cross-appeal.
Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.
Costs taxed to Appellant/Cross Appellee and Cross-Appellant/Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
DICKINSON, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
JAMES M. RICHARD, Attorney at Law, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
TIMOTHY B. PETTORINI, Attorney at Law, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
ROBERT J. REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellees.
ROBERT D. KEHOE, Attorney at Law, for Appellees.