Military-Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans AffairsMilitary-Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs
MICHAEL BERN, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. and intervenor Paralyzed Veterans of America. National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. also represented by GENEVIEVE PATRICIA HOFFMAN, ROMAN MARTINEZ, BARRETT TENBARGE.
LINDA E. BLAUHUT, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Washington, DC, for intervenor Paralyzed Veterans of America.
KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for petitioner Carpenter Chartered.
ALEX SCHULMAN, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioners Phillip Boyd Haisley, National Veterans Legal Services Program. Also represented by STEPHEN BLAKE KINNAIRD; BARTON F. STICHMAN, National Veterans Legal Services Program, Washington, DC.
SOSUN BAE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent in 19-1600, 2019-1687. Also argued by WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI in 19-1680, DAVID PEHLKE in 2019-1685. Also represented by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, JEFFREY B. CLARK, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, ANDREW J. STEINBERG, Office of
Before REYNA, CLEVENGER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
CHEN, Circuit Judge.
In 2017, Congress enacted the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act (AMA) to reform the administrative appeals system of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). See
Before oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing on whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the regulations identified in their petitions. We conclude that two veterans’ service organizations, MVA and PVA, have demonstrated associational standing based on claimed injuries to their members to collectively bring three of their seven challenges. Because we conclude that no Petitioner has demonstrated standing to raise any of the remaining challenges, we dismiss the petitions with respect to those challenges.
The three regulations for which MVA and PVA have standing to challenge all relate to supplemental claims—one of the three review lanes established by the AMA. Specifically,
BACKGROUND
I
Congress enacted the AMA in 2017 to reform the existing VA administrative appeals system, which was, by all accounts, “broken,” marked by lengthy delays, and plagued with a formidable backlog of cases. See H.R. Rep. No. 115–135, at 5–8 (2017) (“The current backlog for appeals exceeds 470,000 claims and is growing.“). Under the previous appeals system, often described as the “legacy system,”2 veteran disability claimants had only one pathway to seek administrative review of an unsatisfactory initial decision on their disability claim from the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). This one-size-fits-all-claims pathway was long and complicated, regardless of the extent or nature of the claimant‘s disagreement with the initial decision. Claimants initiated an appeal by filing a NOD to the AOJ‘s decision, and after an elaborate set of steps, could have their claim reviewed by the Board.3
More problematic, however, was the “continuous evidence gathering and readjudication of the same matters” that caused appeals to “churn” in the system. See S. Rep. 115–126, at 29 (2017) (Jennifer S. Lee, Deputy Under Secretary for Health and Policy Services) (“Veterans and VA adjudicators are . . . engaged in continuous evidence gathering and repeated readjudication of the same appeal. This cycle of evidence gathering and readjudication means that appeals often churn for years between the Board and the [AOJ] to meet complex legal requirements, with little to no benefit flowing to the Veteran.“). Because the legacy system permitted claimants to submit new evidence at virtually any time prior to a final Board decision—including at the Board hearing—nearly half of the appeals before the Board resulted in a remand to the AOJ for additional development and readjudication. The VA, moreover, had a statutory duty to assist the claimant in obtaining evidence in support of the appeal throughout the entire appeals process. The introduction of new evidence at the Board would often result in a remand to the AOJ for readjudication of the claim in light of that evidence. Collectively, these features resulted in a protracted administrative appeals system in which claimants waited “an average
As relevant here, the AMA sought to reduce inefficiencies of the legacy appeals system by introducing several statutory reforms. These amendments reflect Congress‘s goal of streamlining the administrative appeals system while still protecting claimants’ due process rights. See id. (“To help ensure that veterans receive timely appeals decisions in the future . . . [t]he new appeals procedures created by this bill would reduce [the] VA‘s workload and help ensure that the process is both timely and fair.“); see also S. Rep. No. 115–126, at 27 (“[T]he current system allows for repeated revisions and resubmissions of claims while maintaining an effective date for benefits based upon the original filing date of the claim. . . . The proposed changes are intended to significantly streamline the appeal process, which would allow appeals to be finalized in a shorter period of time with fewer employees.“).
Central to the AMA‘s many reforms, claimants may now choose from three procedural lanes to obtain review of their claim within one year of the initial decision (in contrast to the legacy system‘s single pathway for appeal to the Board).
The first lane is the filing of a supplemental claim, which allows a claimant to submit additional evidence to an AOJ for “readjudication” of the claim.
Should one lane of review prove unsuccessful, claimants may sequentially pursue another lane of review while maintaining the original effective date of the initial claim, so long as they “continuously pursue” that claim by selecting an appropriate alternative lane within one year of an unsatisfactory AOJ, Board, or Veterans Court decision.
decision. First, at that time, claimants can no longer seek higher-level review or appeal to the Board but can only file a supplemental claim. See
II
On August 10, 2018, pursuant to its authority under
Petitioners subsequently filed four separate petitions under
challenges to the validity of several regulations.6 Specifically, Mr. Haisley and NVLSP‘s petition challenged
The government‘s opening briefs opposed only NVLSP‘s and Carpenter Chartered‘s standing to challenge the implementing regulations. However, pursuant to our independent duty to verify standing, we requested supplemental briefing from each Petitioner to address “the precise grounds upon which it asserts standing to make each of the specific challenges raised by the petition.” See, e.g., Order Requesting Suppl. Briefing, No. 19-1600 (Sept. 16, 2020), ECF No. 55, at 1–2. Specifically, we
Petitioners to demonstrate the “actual or imminent injuries in fact, which are (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) traceable to a specific regulation” being challenged. Id. at 2. We also requested briefing on issues specific to the precise theory of standing asserted. See, e.g., id. (requesting each Petitioner relying on associational standing to “demonstrate that they have a member that would otherwise have personal standing to challenge the specific regulations“).
We have jurisdiction under
DISCUSSION
I. Standing
Before reaching the merits of Petitioners’ challenges, we must first satisfy our “independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the parties.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009). “[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). This obligation to assure standing extends to when a party seeks judicial review of final agency action, as Petitioners do here.
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” consists of three elements. Id. First, a plaintiff must personally present an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” See id. (cleaned up). This requirement ensures that the plaintiff has a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—that is, plaintiff‘s injury must be “fairly traceable” to the challenged “putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” and not the result of independent action of some third party not before the court. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2113–15 (2021) (no causation where plaintiffs’ injury—cost of purchasing health insurance—is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful [government] conduct” because the challenged Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) provision mandating health insurance coverage was rendered “unenforceable” upon elimination of the tax penalty for noncoverage). Lastly, it must be “likely” that the injury will be redressable by the requested relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also California, 141 S. Ct. at 2116 (no standing to challenge unenforceable ACA provision where plaintiffs sought only a declaratory judgment that provision is unconstitutional, which, by itself, is not an “acceptable Article III remedy” that can “redress a cognizable Article III injury“).
Petitioners bear the burden of establishing these elements under the same standard that is applied at the summary judgment stage. See Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1172–73 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (adopting the summary judgment burden of production in cases challenging final agency action). In other words, instead of resting on “mere allegations,” a plaintiff must set forth by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts” to
With respect to injury in fact, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the ‘some day’ will be—do not support a finding of . . . actual or imminent injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (cleaned up) (no actual or imminent injury where affiants merely professed intent to visit endangered species without concrete plans to do so). Nor can generalized allegations of harm untethered to the “application of the challenged regulations” establish a “concrete and particularized” injury. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 495 (no standing where harm alleged was “not tied to application of the challenged regulations” and did not identify a particular project subject to the challenged regulations that would impede petitioner‘s specific and concrete interests); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67 (“pure speculation and fantasy” or an “ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable” is insufficient to establish injury for standing).
Plaintiffs claiming standing to challenge the validity of a statute or regulation must generally assert an injury that is caused by that statute‘s or regulation‘s “actual or threatened enforcement, whether today or in the future.” California, 141 S. Ct. at 2114. Where, as here, plaintiffs seek pre-enforcement review, the Supreme Court has required plaintiffs to show that “the likelihood of future enforcement is ‘substantial.‘” Id. In other words, while a plaintiff need not “await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief,” it must demonstrate “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute‘s operation or enforcement” or show that the injury is “certainly impending.” Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat‘l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (plaintiff must demonstrate that “he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement“); Clapper v. Amnesty Int‘l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013) (allegation of future injury may suffice if threatened injury is “certainly impending” or there is a “substantial risk” the harm will occur).
We now turn to Petitioners’ thirteen rulemaking challenges. All but two of these challenges address regulatory provisions concerning procedural and substantive requirements for obtaining VA benefits—involving, e.g., initial claims, administrative review, and CUE claims. The remaining two challenges involve regulatory provisions governing attorneys’ fees for representing claimants in VA proceedings.
Petitioners consist of several veterans’ service organizations, a law firm, and an individual. Collectively, they assert numerous theories of associational standing (on behalf of both veteran and attorney members), organizational standing, third-party standing, and personal standing. We address each in turn.
A. Associational Standing
MVA, NOVA, and PVA (collectively, the Associations) claim associational standing on behalf of their members, which requires an Association to demonstrate that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the [Association‘s] purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted
We note, as an initial matter, that as to Hunt‘s second and third prongs, the parties’ only dispute is whether NOVA (and no other Petitioner) satisfies the second prong of associational standing—i.e., whether the interests NOVA seeks to protect are germane to its purpose. The government argues that NOVA‘s petition is not germane to the purposes enumerated in its bylaws, which are focused on ensuring that its members, as advocates, offer informed representation to veterans seeking benefits from the VA. Resp‘t Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1680) at 12–13. This court, however, recently resolved this dispute in NOVA‘s favor in National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, where we explained that NOVA‘s purpose is not as narrow as the government contends and more generally relates to “helping veterans obtain fair compensation for their claims“—which is “precisely the interest NOVA now seeks to protect in challenging” these rules. 981 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (NOVA). Accordingly, we conclude that the Associations satisfy the second and third prongs of associational standing. Below, we address only Hunt‘s first prong as to the Associations’ veteran and attorney members.
1. Hunt‘s First Prong: Veteran Members
The Associations make six rulemaking challenges8 asserting associational standing on behalf of their veteran members, relying on Disabled American Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (DAV). DAV held, in relevant part, that petitioner NOVA had satisfied Hunt‘s first prong of associational standing because “NOVA includes at least one veteran as a member,” and all veterans are “personally affected by the [challenged] rules,” which impact their abilities to bring CUE claims. See id. at 689. Notably, DAV did not require NOVA to identify a specific veteran member that presented an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, particularized, and fairly traceable to the challenged CUE rules.
Shortly after oral argument occurred in this case, however, this court, sitting en banc in NOVA, partially overruled DAV insofar as “it held that [standing] can be 8
established solely on the basis of NOVA member veteran status without identification of an individual affected member, the nature of [the] claimed injury, and the reasons that the challenged interpretive rule would adversely affect [that] member.” 981 F.3d at 1369. Instead, an organization challenging VA rulemaking based on associational standing must show that it has at least one veteran member with an actual or potential claim that could be affected by the challenged rule. See id. at 1369–70.
As applied here, we begin our associational standing analysis by asking whether at least one Association has at least one veteran member with an actual or potential claim that could be affected by the challenged rules at issue. In response to our request for supplemental briefing
First,
Second,
Accordingly, we conclude that the facts alleged as to Mr. Noble and Mr. Schwenker establish that these PVA veteran members suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged shortcomings of the challenged regulations, see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), and as a result, PVA has associational standing on behalf of its veteran members to challenge
By contrast, the allegations pertaining to the four remaining challenges are too vague or speculative to establish an injury in fact. The allegations with respect to
Lastly, MVA
But as MVA concedes, Congress has already provided Blue Water Navy veterans with the relief they would have obtained had their CUE claim been allowed to proceed. See Pet‘r Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1600) at 4 n.1. The Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act,
2. Hunt‘s First Prong: On Behalf of Attorney Members
The Associations also claim associational standing on behalf of their attorney members to make two sets of rulemaking challenges: the same six challenges to rules governing a veteran‘s claim for benefits addressed in the previous section (supra § I.A.1), and a challenge to
With respect to the four challenges addressed above, the Associations argue that their attorney members are injured because these rules make it more difficult for their veteran clients to obtain benefits, which, in turn, “diminish[es] the contingency fees [attorneys] will be able to earn” under such rules. Pet‘rs Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1680) at 8. The Associations contend that both this court and the Supreme Court have already recognized that “these sorts of direct economic injuries to lawyers are adequate injury in fact to meet the constitutional minimum of Article III standing.” Id. at 11 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 n.2 (2004); and Willis v. Gov‘t
Accountability Off., 448 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). For the reasons below, we decline to find the Associations have associational standing on behalf of their attorney members to make these four challenges, which concern the benefits that claimants can receive and not the contingency fees that their attorneys can recover.
As an initial matter, all three of the Associations’ cited cases involve third-party standing, and not associational standing. In third-party standing, an attorney seeks to assert a legal right belonging to a third party—i.e., the attorney‘s client—based on a close attorney-client relationship and the client‘s inability to assert its own rights. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130. The Associations’ proposed theory of associational standing, on the other hand, purports to assert a legal right to fees belonging to their attorney members, such that those members “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. We are unaware of any binding authority recognizing that attorneys have a “legally protected interest” in safeguarding their fees against regulations that govern a client‘s benefits claim; nor have we seen a case holding that attorneys personally have standing to challenge such regulations in their own right. To decide otherwise would lead to the peculiar conclusion that an attorney has personal standing (and the service organization to which the attorney belongs has associational standing) to raise a rulemaking challenge whenever an agency promulgates a regulation that could negatively impact a client‘s ability to obtain benefits.
Even setting aside the fundamental distinctions between third-party standing and associational standing, the Associations’ cited cases are readily distinguishable. Both Caplin and Willis, for instance, emphasize the petitioner‘s certainty of recovery in establishing injury in fact based on attorneys’ fees. Caplin concluded that a law firm asserting third-party standing on behalf of its client had established an injury in fact fairly traceable to the challenged action because the action prevented the firm from collecting a fee to which it was “almost certainly” entitled. See 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (“[T]here can be little doubt that petitioner‘s stake in $170,000 of the forfeited assets—which it would almost certainly receive if the Sixth Amendment claim it advances here were vindicated—is adequate injury in fact to meet the constitutional minimum of Article III standing.“). Likewise, in Willis, the outcome of the proceedings had already been adjudicated in the client‘s favor, and the attorney was undisputedly entitled to fees as a result. See 448 F.3d at 1348. This certainty is especially important where, as here, “[petitioner] is not himself the object of the government action . . . he challenges” because standing is “substantially more difficult to establish.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62. Under such circumstances, standing hinges on the “unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Id. at 562. Petitioners, then, bear the burden to “adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such a manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Id.
Here, however, the Associations’ allegations lack the certainty of recovery demonstrated in Caplin and Willis and, instead, are based on mere speculation that the challenged rules will preclude their clients from obtaining benefits that they otherwise
As for
Moreover, far from approving the fee-based theory of injury that the Associations advance here, Kowalski carefully “assume[d], without deciding” that petitioners’ allegations regarding economic injury as to their diminished fees were “sufficient” to demonstrate injury in fact. See 543 U.S. at 129 n.2 (emphasis added); id. at 129 (“In this case, we do not focus on the constitutional minimum of standing, which flows from Article III‘s case-or-controversy requirement. Instead, we shall assume the attorneys have satisfied Article III and address the alternative threshold question whether they have standing to raise the rights of others.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, the Associations’ cited cases fail to support standing on behalf of their attorney members.9
Lastly, we address MVA‘s claimed standing to challenge
B. Organizational Standing
Petitioners NVLSP, MVA, NOVA, and PVA (collectively, the Organizations) next claim that they have organizational standing in their own right (and not on behalf of their members) to make the seven rulemaking challenges discussed above. Because we previously concluded that PVA and MVA collectively have standing to make three of these challenges, we only address the Organizations’ arguments as to the remaining four challenges, to: (1)
In the present case, the Organizations claim that the challenged rules purportedly make it more difficult for veterans to obtain benefits, thereby frustrating the Organizations’ general purpose of helping veterans obtain benefits and draining their resources on educational guidance. We conclude that this asserted harm does not satisfy the Havens standard for organizational standing.
Demonstrating a concrete organizational injury requires more than showing a “setback to [an] organization‘s abstract social interests.” Id. at 379. The injury thus cannot be merely ideological, meaning that damage to the “special interest” of an organization does not qualify as an injury in fact; otherwise, “there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization, however small or short-lived.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); see also Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (FWW) (“An organization must allege more than a frustration of its purpose because frustration of an organization‘s objectives ‘is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing.‘” (quoting Nat‘l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).
As our sister court, the D.C. Circuit, has explained, allegations that “the defendant‘s conduct perceptibly impaired the organization‘s ability to provide services,” such as when “the defendant‘s conduct causes an ‘inhibition of [the organization‘s] daily operations,‘” suffice to establish a concrete injury to an organization‘s interest. FWW, 808 F.3d at 919 (quoting PETA v. U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Moreover, the consequent “drain” on resources must go beyond normal operating costs—that is, an organization does not suffer an injury in fact where it “expend[s] resources to educate its members and others” unless doing so subjects the organization to “operational costs beyond those normally expended.” Nat‘l Taxpayers Union, 68 F.3d at 1434; see also Nat‘l Ass‘n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (organization‘s expenditures must be for “operational costs beyond those normally expended to carry out its advocacy mission“). An organization‘s use of resources for litigation, investigation in anticipation of litigation, or advocacy are likewise insufficient to give rise to an Article III injury. FWW, 808 F.3d at 919.
Havens itself is instructive on this point. There, the organization‘s (HOME) purpose was to provide clients with equal opportunity housing opportunities and information, pursuant to a federal law that provided a legal right to truthful, nondiscriminatory housing information. HOME claimed organizational injury when a real estate company, Havens Realty, engaged in unlawful racial steering practices, which directly unraveled and frustrated HOME‘s nondiscriminatory counseling and referral
Here, the Organizations’ allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Havens test. What the Organizations describe falls short of a “perceptibl[e] impair[ment]” to their conduct of daily operations or to advancing their purpose and mission of providing services. The challenged rules, as discussed, merely seek to streamline procedures for filing and obtaining administrative review of benefits claims, not directly foreclose claimants from obtaining benefits; nor can it be argued that these rules impair or unwind the Organizations’ efforts in counseling and representing veterans in the benefits process (or otherwise block the Organizations’ efforts to carry out their missions). As for the purported drain on the Organizations’ resources, expenditures on educational programs to inform veterans of the governing regulatory provisions are merely part of the ordinary course of the Organizations’ operations. For these reasons, we decline to conclude that NVLSP, MVA, NOVA, and PVA have organizational standing to challenge these rules.
C. Third-Party Standing and Personal Standing
1. Mr. Haisley and NVLSP
Mr. Haisley and NVLSP filed a joint petition challenging the validity of a single regulation,
Mr. Haisley also separately argues personal standing based on his plans to allege CUE with respect to the Regional Office‘s decision on his claim for prostate cancer. Specifically, he contends that he was initially awarded a 100% disability rating for this claim in June 2016 while he had “active malignancy,” which was then lowered to 20% in March 2020 after he had completed cancer treatment and was left with “residual complications of prostate cancer.” See Pet‘rs Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1687) at Tab 1, Decl. of Phillip B. Haisley ¶ 3. We decline to find standing on these facts. When Mr. Haisley‘s declaration was filed, the ratings decision lowering his disability rating to 20% was still nonfinal. We find it difficult to understand why Mr. Haisley would purportedly let that decision become final to pursue a CUE claim, instead of timely initiating administrative review within one year based on the alleged error. Second, and more importantly, based on the specific facts alleged, if Mr. Haisley were to file a CUE claim, it appears that it would be based on an erroneous application of the ratings schedule, and not a change in judicial interpretation as addressed by
Next, NVLSP argues that it has third-party standing to challenge the CUE regulation. Third-party standing requires a Petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered an injury in fact giving it a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute and otherwise satisfies Article III‘s case-or-controversy requirement; (2) it has a “close” relationship
NVLSP does not identify a single veteran with whom it has a close relationship who has had the CUE rule applied to them, or who has an imminent, “substantial risk” of having the rule applied to them. Nor do NVLSP‘s allegations specify if the CUE argument these veterans seek to advance is premised on a change in judicial interpretation, as specified in the challenged regulation. But even aside from these issues, it is unclear what injury in fact NVLSP suffers that shows it has a personal stake in the outcome of a challenge to this regulation. NVLSP first relies on organizational injury—an argument which we have already considered and rejected above. Next, citing United States Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990), NVLSP argues that advocates have standing to challenge restrictions preventing them from pursuing desired relationships with claimants and, here, the CUE rule purportedly restricts its ability to represent certain veterans whose claims are excluded from the scope of CUE. Pet‘rs Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1687) at 8–9. But Triplett (and similar cases in this line) addressed enforcement of a fee restriction statute that applies directly “against the litigant [i.e., advocate]” and “prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the litigant . . . , to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement,” i.e., “due process right to obtain legal representation.” 494 U.S. at 720 (emphasis added); Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131 (explaining that Triplett “falls within that class of cases where we have allowed standing to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights“). Here, however, the challenged regulation applies to the third-party claimant‘s CUE claim, and not to the attorney or to the attorney‘s relationship with the claimant.
Turning to the hindrance prong of third-party standing, NVLSP argues that claimants face significant obstacles to bringing suit in their own right due to the difficulties of navigating the VA administrative system. Pet‘rs Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1687) at 13–14 (citing Rosinski v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 1, 10 (2019)). But the generic obstacle NVLSP describes would purportedly hinder all veterans from protecting their interests with respect to any VA regulation and fails to demonstrate how any of its clients are hindered from challenging the CUE regulation at issue. Kowalski, moreover, rejected a similar argument that indigent criminal defendants are generally hindered from advancing their own constitutional rights because they are unable to navigate the appellate process pro se. See 543 U.S. at 132. While an attorney would be valuable to veterans challenging the validity of the CUE regulation, we do not think that the lack of an attorney here is the type of hindrance necessary to allow another to assert the claimant‘s rights, particularly in view of Kowalski‘s finding that even pro se criminal defendants were not hindered enough for third-party attorney standing. See id.; see also In re Stanley, 9 Vet. App. 203, 213 (1996) (“VA claimants do not face the type
2. Carpenter Chartered
Lastly, Carpenter Chartered, a law firm, asserts both personal standing and third-party standing on behalf of its clients. Its petition makes all but three of the challenges addressed above (
Carpenter Chartered‘s theory of personal standing bears similarities to organizational standing; as a law firm specializing in VA benefits law, it urges that it should be treated like a veterans’ service organization. Carpenter Chartered also cites Rosinski, 31 Vet. App. 1, as purportedly establishing that law firms may have personal standing to challenge regulations such as those at issue here. We decline to conclude that a law firm has personal standing to challenge these rules for reasons similar to those already expressed for associational standing on behalf of attorney members. Carpenter Chartered has failed to establish how it suffers an injury in fact as a result of the challenged rules—especially where none of those rules (save for one) implicates attorneys. The one exception for which we might have found personal standing is
Finally, Carpenter Chartered claims that it has third-party standing on behalf of its veteran clients and, to that end, submits several signed declarations from those clients. But as we explained for NVLSP‘s third-party standing argument, we reject this theory for at least the reason that Carpenter Chartered has failed to establish that its clients are hindered from bringing suit in their own right. This rings especially true as each and every one of Carpenter Chartered‘s declarants avers that he is a client of Carpenter Chartered and would have pursued an action in his own right, if requested. See, e.g., Pet‘r Suppl. Br. (No. 19-1685) at Tab 1, Decl. of Randy B. Bomhoff, Jr. ¶ 3 (“I would have allowed Carpenter Chartered to have filed this challenge in my name.“). Accordingly, we also decline to find third-party standing under these circumstances.
II. Validity of Challenged Regulations
A. Standard of Review
Having determined that Petitioners lack standing to challenge all but three of the
We review petitions under
Our review of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute that it administers is further governed by the framework articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See Veterans Just. Grp., LLC v. Sec‘y of Veterans Affs., 818 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (VJG). Under Chevron, we first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 467 U.S. at 842. If we conclude that it has, “that is the end of the matter,” and the only question remaining is whether the regulation at issue accords with congressional intent. Id. at 842–43. Under such circumstances, we “must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent,” as ascertained by the “traditional tools of statutory construction” and statutory history. Id. at 843 n.9.
If, however, the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The administering agency, under these circumstances, is entitled to make a “reasonable policy choice.” Id. at 845. Because a court may not simply substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for an agency‘s reasonable interpretation, such interpretations are afforded “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).
B. Supplemental Claims under the AMA
The three regulations for which we find Petitioners MVA and PVA have standing to challenge all pertain to one of the new procedural lanes of AMA review—supplemental claims. Specifically, (1)
Several statutory provisions form the basis for the regulations at issue here. First,
Within one year of an AOJ decision, a claimant may generally pursue “any” one of three lanes of administrative review by filing: a request for higher-level review, a supplemental claim, or a NOD for Board review. See
By contrast, after more than one year has passed since the AOJ‘s decision, a claimant is left with only one option for administrative review—filing a supplemental claim. See
Aside from the timing of when they are filed,
The final statutory provision at issue in this appeal is
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4), in connection with a proceeding before the Department with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary, a fee may not be charged, allowed, or paid for services of agents and attorneys with respect to services provided before the date on which a claimant is provided notice of the [AOJ‘s] initial decision under section 5104 of this title with respect to the case. The limitation in the preceding sentence does not apply to fees charged, allowed, or paid for services provided with respect to proceedings before a court.
Below, we address each of Petitioners’ three challenges in turn.
C. 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(1)(i): Attorneys’ Fees
MVA first challenges the VA‘s regulation governing attorneys’ fees and asserts that this regulation is invalid for treating
1
To begin, we find it worthwhile to review the statutory history of restrictions on attorneys’ fees for VA benefits claims. Congress has thrice changed the triggering event for when attorneys’ fees may be charged, each time shifting the entry point for such fees—and thus a claimant‘s ability to retain paid representation—earlier in the administrative appeals process.
Previously, attorneys’ fees had been strictly limited to $10 since 1864 due to the “relatively uncomplicated procedure” of “applying for VA benefits” in “the initial claim stages,” see S. Rep. No. 100–418, at 63 (1988), which were “informal and non-adversarial,” see H.R. Rep. No. 100–963 (1988), at 15. This limitation was left unchanged until 1988, when Congress enacted the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA), Pub. L. No. 100–687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.), to allow, for the first time, judicial review of VA decisions. H.R. Rep. No. 100–963, at 16. At the same time, Congress also enacted
When first enacted,
Subsequently, in 2006, Congress amended
Now, under the AMA, the triggering event for attorneys’ fees has once again shifted earlier to permit paid representation after a claimant receives notice of the AOJ‘s “initial decision . . . with respect to the case.” See
Rule,
2
MVA urges us to invalidate
The government does not attempt to argue that
Starting with the words of the statutory provision itself,
Our reading of the statutory provision also comports with legislative intent, as supported by the statutory history. As the VA acknowledges, Congress shifted
We also reject the government‘s argument that a
Although the government correctly notes that
As for the VA‘s “longstanding interpretation” of legacy reopening claims as belonging to a “case” separate from that of the original claim for benefits, the government argues that “Congress has now amended section 5904(c) twice and has not overruled [the] VA‘s statutory interpretation.” Resp‘t Br. (No. 19-1600) at 46. From this purported inaction, the government presumes that Congress has implicitly ratified the VA‘s practice of restricting paid representation for legacy reopening claims and, by extension, for any “post-final decision claims based on new evidence.” Id. at 47. This argument suffers from several flaws. Included among them is our express rejection of the VA‘s interpretation in both Stanley and Carpenter, discussed infra.
To begin with, an implicit ratification theory holds no water where, as here, the regulation at issue clearly contradicts the requirements of the statutory provision. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (“There is an obvious trump to the reenactment argument . . . in the rule that where the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction.”); id. at 122 (“A regulation‘s age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute, and the fact [that the regulation] flies against the plain language of the statutory text exempts courts from any obligation to defer to it.”). Reenactment, moreover, “[cannot] carry the day” where “there is no . . . evidence to suggest Congress was even aware of the VA‘s interpretative position.” Id. Here, as we have concluded,
Far from “inaction” that would suggest implicit ratification of preexisting practices, the AMA dramatically overhauled the VA appeals process by replacing the “broken,” one-size-fits-all legacy system with a new three-lane system. Given the extent and nature of the AMA‘s reforms, we think it unlikely that Congress intended to preserve the VA‘s “longstanding interpretation” of the fee statutory provision from the superseded legacy system, especially where the regulation at issue contradicts both the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory provision and the statutory history. The AMA‘s three-lane system was intended to alleviate the legacy system‘s growing appeals backlog by allowing claimants to choose from new and more efficient administrative review pathways specifically tailored for their needs. But the AMA‘s reforms can only succeed if claimants are able to avail themselves of these additional pathways, and Congress, in turn, amended the fee provision to provide claimants with paid representation regardless of the form of administrative review sought. We would do little justice to Congress‘s amendments by clinging to a legacy administrative practice that markedly restricts paid representation for one lane of review. Cf. Stanley, 283 F.3d at 1356 (explaining that Congress amended the fee provision in 1988 because the “new right to judicial review” under the VJRA “would be a hollow right indeed without some easing of the limitation on attorneys’ fees” (quoting S. Rep. No. 100–418, at 63)).
Lastly, we reject the government‘s proposition that this court has previously endorsed the VA‘s longstanding interpretation of the fee provision—that is, “the basic principle that a reopening proceeding is separate from the original case” and thus foreclosed from paid representation until the VA issues a decision on the reopening claim itself. Resp‘t Br. (No. 19-1600) at 39 (citing Stanley, 283 F.3d at 1358). Even assuming, as the government contends, that
In Stanley, we considered an earlier (and more restrictive) version of the fee provision prohibiting attorneys from collecting fees until “the [Board] first makes a final decision in the case.” See
We later clarified Stanley‘s reasoning in Carpenter, explaining that “a veteran‘s claim based on the specified disability does not become a different ‘case’ at each stage of the often lengthy and complex proceedings, including remands as well as reopenings as in Stanley.” 452 F.3d at 1384 (emphasis added). Specifically, in Carpenter, we concluded that a later CUE challenge (which is necessarily filed after a decision on the original claim has become final and cut off from direct review) is part of the same “case” as other challenges to the initial decision. See id. at 1384. Attorneys may charge fees for work on CUE claims, we explained, because the fee provision “was designed to authorize compensation for attorney services rendered after the initial proceedings, undertaken by the veteran, have failed.” Id. A “case” therefore “encompasses all potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations, regardless of whether the claim is specifically labeled.” Id. Just as a CUE claim belongs to the same “case” as a veteran‘s original claim for benefits, thereby permitting paid representation for work performed after an AOJ‘s initial decision, so too does a
For these reasons, we hold that
D. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2500(b) : Prohibition on Concurrent Supplemental Claim and Federal Court Appeal
Section
(b) Concurrent election prohibited. With regard to the adjudication of a claim or an issue as defined in § 3.151(c), a claimant who has filed for review under one of the options available under paragraph (a) of this section12 may not, while that review is pending final adjudication, file for review under a different available option. While the adjudication of a specific benefit is pending on appeal before a federal court, a claimant may not file for administrative review of the claim under any of [the] options listed in paragraph (a) of this section.
PVA challenges only the validity of
This prohibition, PVA argues, is invalid because it “imposes new restrictions that are not contemplated in the statute.” Pet‘rs Br. (No. 19-1680) at 24. While
But more importantly, PVA contends, claimants seeking to appeal an adverse Veterans Court decision are forced to make a “hard choice” between pursuing appellate review beyond the Veterans Court and filing a supplemental claim within continuous pursuit. Pet‘rs Br. (No. 19-1680) at 24–26. This follows because
The government responds that, as a threshold matter, the primary harm PVA complains of—loss of effective date—will soon be irrelevant because the “VA plans to propose a regulatory change [to
We note that it has been over a year since the government filed its brief, and we have yet to see a notice of proposed rulemaking for the regulatory changes mentioned. Instead, on March 19, 2020, the VA issued a policy letter stating that “[e]ffective immediately, claims adjudicators must consider supplemental claims . . . filed within one year of a Federal Circuit or Supreme Court decision as continuously pursued and apply the provisions of
It is unclear what effect, if any, the VA‘s unfulfilled promise of forthcoming regulatory amendments and subsequent policy letter has on our analysis of
Both parties agree that while
Section
To the contrary,
The government responds that our reading of
Because we conclude that
E. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155 : Intent-to-File Framework
For claimants to receive VA benefits, “[a] specific claim in the form prescribed by the Secretary . . . must be filed.” See
Section
The following paragraphs describe the manner and methods in which a claim can be initiated and filed. The provisions of this section are applicable to all claims governed by part 3, with the exception that paragraph (b) of this section, regarding intent to file a claim, does not apply to supplemental claims.
In the Final Rule, the VA explained that the AMA‘s amendments to
PVA argues that this regulation is arbitrary and capricious because the VA interprets “virtually identical” statutory language in
The government, for its part, does not defend the validity of
We decline, as a threshold matter, to grant the government‘s request for voluntary remand. Much as was the
Turning to the merits, we agree with PVA that
Moreover, it is a well-established canon of statutory construction that Congress is presumed to have intended for “identical words used in different parts of the same act . . . to have the same meaning.” See Sorenson v. Sec‘y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934) (in turn quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))). To overcome this presumption, the VA must demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned decision-making by providing an “adequate explanation” for its difference in interpretation of similarly worded statutory provisions. See Nat‘l Org. of Veterans’ Advocs. v. Sec‘y of Veterans Affs., 260 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (setting aside regulation because the VA “purport[ed] to interpret virtually identical language contained in related veterans’ benefits statutes to mean different things, without providing an adequate explanation for the inconsistency”); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34 (arbitrary and capricious standard requires that an agency demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned decision-making by providing an “adequate basis and explanation” for its decision). Here, the VA has not offered any explanation for why it interpreted the substantively identical language in
CONCLUSION
In sum, MVA and PVA collectively have associational standing to challenge the validity
GRANTED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-PART
COSTS
No costs.
Notes
(a) Within one year of decision.
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), in any case in which the Secretary renders a decision on a claim, the claimant may take any of the following actions on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issues a decision with respect to that claim:
(A) File a request for higher-level review under section 5104B of this title.
(B) File a supplemental claim under section 5108 of this title.
(C) File a [NOD] under section 7105 of this title.
(2)
(A) Once a claimant takes an action set forth in paragraph (1), the claimant may not take another action set forth in that paragraph with respect to the same claim or same issue contained within the claim until—
(i) the higher-level review, supplemental claim, or [NOD] is adjudicated; or
(ii) the request for higher-level review, supplemental claim, or [NOD] is withdrawn.
(B) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a claimant from taking any of the actions set forth in paragraph (1) in succession with respect to a claim or an issue contained within the claim.
. . .
(b) More than one year after decision. In any case in which the Secretary renders a decision on a claim and more than one year has passed since the date on which the [AOJ] issues a decision with respect to that claim, the claimant may file a supplemental claim under section 5108 of this title.
(c) Circumstances under which fees may be charged. Except as noted in paragraph (d) of this section, agents and attorneys may only charge fees as follows:
(1)(i) Agents and attorneys may charge claimants or appellants for representation provided after an [AOJ] has issued notice of an initial decision on the claim or claims. . . . For purposes of this paragraph (c)(1)(i), an initial decision on a claim would include an initial decision on an initial claim for an increase in rate of benefit, an initial decision on a request to revise a prior decision based on [CUE] (unless fees are permitted at an earlier point pursuant to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) or paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section), and an initial decision on a supplemental claim that was presented after the final adjudication of an earlier claim. However, a supplemental claim will be considered part of the earlier claim if the claimant has continuously pursued the earlier claim by filing any of the following, either alone or in succession: A request for higher-level review, on or before one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issued a decision; a supplemental claim, on or before one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issued a decision; a [NOD], on or before one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issued a decision; a supplemental claim, on or before one year after the date on which the Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued a decision; or a supplemental claim, on or before one year after the date on which the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims issued a decision.
(1) Within one year from the date on which the [AOJ] issues a notice of a decision on a claim or issue as defined in § 3.151(c), except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (c), (e), and (f) of this section, a claimant may elect one of the following administrative review options by timely filing the appropriate form prescribed by the Secretary:
(i) A request for higher-level review under § 3.2601 or
(ii) An appeal to the Board under § 20.202 of this chapter.
(2) At any time after VA issues notice of a decision on an issue within a claim, a claimant may file a supplemental claim under § 3.2501.
(2) For purposes of determining the effective date of an award under this section, the date of application shall be considered the date of the filing of the initial application for a benefit if the claim is continuously pursued by filing any of the following, either alone or in succession:
(A) A request for higher-level review under section 5104B of this title on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issues a decision.
(B) A supplemental claim under section 5108 of this title on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issues a decision.
(C) A [NOD] on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [AOJ] issues a decision.
(D) A supplemental claim under section 5108 of this title on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [Board] issues a decision.
(E) A supplemental claim under section 5108 of this title on or before the date that is one year after the date on which the [Veterans Court] issues a decision.