Michael G. v. Super. Ct.Michael G. v. Super. Ct.
MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
S271809
Under California‘s child dependency law, when a child is removed from a parent‘s custody, the juvenile court ordinarily must order reunification services to help the parent address the conditions that led to the child‘s removal. Reasonable reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for a minimum period of six or 12 months, depending on the age of the child, and generally may be extended for up to a maximum total period of 18 months. This statutory timeline is designed to achieve a delicate balance between families’ interests in reunifying and children‘s interests in avoiding protracted uncertainty about who will care for them.
The question in this case is whether a juvenile court is automatically required tо grant a further extension of services if it finds that reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to 18-month extension period. Under the governing statutes, the answer is no. Once a child has been out of the parent‘s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan for the child‘s care. A parent who has not received reasonable services may seek an extension of services beyond 18 months, but such extensions are not automatic: In addition to ensuring other statutory conditions are met, the juvenile court must consider the child‘s interests in deciding whether the extension, and consequent delay to the child‘s permanent placement, is warranted. (
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusion.
This case arises from dependency proceedings involving the minor A.G. At the start of the proceedings, A.G. was 14 years old and living in the care of her father (Father).1 In a dependency petition filed under
At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had received his case plan several months earlier but had yet to sign the plan or engage in the recommended services, which included parenting classes and individual counseling. Father also resisted completing a psychological evaluation. Father attempted to keep in touch with A.G. via periodic phone calls, but she was reluctant to communicate until he received mental health servicеs. Given this information, the juvenile court found that Father had been offered reasonable services but had made minimal progress in mitigating the circumstances that had led to the juvenile court‘s intervention. The court concluded that returning A.G. to Father “would create [a] substantial risk of detriment to [her] safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” and continued the case. (See
At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had made moderate progress since the last hearing: He had signed the case plan, begun individual counseling, and completed parenting classes. He had also completed his psychological evaluation. The Agency reported that Father was eager to increase communication with A.G., and the parties established a schedule for regular phone calls. While the Agency believed returning A.G. to Father‘s custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being, it recommended continuing the case to the 18-month review because “there [wa]s a substantial probability that the child w[ould] be returned to the physical custody of her parent” by then. (See
At the 18-month hearing, however, the Agency reported that returning A.G. to Father‘s custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her
Father contested the Agency‘s recommendation. He argued that he had completed all aspects of his case plan, including his psychological evaluation, but the social worker assigned to his case had not obtained or reviewed his evaluation report in a timely fashion, facilitated visitation with A.G., or contacted him about further mental health services. Father asked the court to find that the Agency had not offered or provided reasonable reunification services during the most recent extension period, exercise its discretion to continue the case and to extend reunification services, and wait to set a section 366.26 hearing where A.G.‘s permanent placement would be decided.
The court found that while the Agency had provided reаsonable services for the first 12 months of reunification, it had not provided reasonable services in the period between the 12- and 18-month hearings. The court was, in particular, troubled by the Agency‘s failure to timely consider the report of Father‘s psychological evaluation, once Father had finally consented to participate, and to offer Father appropriate mental health support. But while the court acknowledged that it could exercise discretion to continue the case and order more services, it declined to do so. Given Father‘s inconsistent visitation with A.G. and uneven progress over the past 18 months in addressing the causes that led to A.G.‘s removal, the court found that additional services would neither be in A.G.‘s best interests nor reasonably likely to lead to reunification. The court ended reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
Father filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court‘s decision tо terminate reunification services. He argued that he was entitled to an extension, given the court‘s determination that the services provided in the 12- to 18-month extension period were not reasonable. The Court of Appeal denied the petition. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1138 (Michael G.).) The Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court was not statutorily required to grant an extension of services. On the contrary,
As the Court of Appeal observed, some appellate courts have expressed uncertainty about the proper course of action when a court determines at the 18-month hearing that the parent did not receive reasonable reunification services during the 12- to 18-month extension period. (Michael G., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143; see In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 [collecting cases]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251-1252 (T.J.); see also J.C. v. Superior Court (June 28, 2017, G054816) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Aug. 23, 2017, S243357 (stmt. of Liu, J.).) We granted review to address the issue.2
II.
A.
The purpose of California‘s dependency law is “to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” (
Dependency proceedings span up to four stages: jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency. (See In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391; In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 624-626.) At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant harm. (
This case concerns the reunification stage. When a child has been removed from a parent‘s custody, the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the reunification of the family. (
During the reunification stage, the juvenile court must hold periodic review hearings to evaluate the status of reunification efforts and appropriate next steps. (
“If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the 18-month hearing and the court determines that reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or guаrdian, the court shall develop a permanent plan.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 1075, § 5, p. 3471.)
But in 1991, the Legislature amended that language, deleting the conjunctive “and,” and separating the directive to develop a permanent plan from the requirement to determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided:
“If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the 18-month hearing, the court shall develop a permanent plan. . . . The court shall determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or guardian.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 4, p. 3647.)
At the same time, the Legislature amended a different provision, section 366.26, which governs the conduct of the permanency planning hearing, to prohibit the termination of parental rights if, “at each and every hearing at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court has found that reasonable efforts were not mаde or that reasonable services were not offered or provided.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842 [shortening “each and every hearing” in this provision to “each hearing“; currently codified as
Nearly two decades later, the Legislature again amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 (section 366.22) to establish a narrow exception allowing certain parents who have faced specified barriers to reunification, such as recent incarceration, to receive an extension of services at the 18-month hearing if the court determines, among other things, that reasonable services had not been provided and that extending services is in the best interests of the child. (Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3440-3441 [currently codified as
B.
The juvenile court in this case concluded at both the six- and 12-month hearings that Father had received reasonable reunification services. The court extended services past the applicable statutory minimum рeriod of 12 months after finding a substantial probability that the child would be
The provision governing the 18-month review, as amended, сurrently reads:
“Unless the conditions in subdivision (b) are met and the child is not returned to a parent or legal guardian at the [18-month] hearing, the court shall order that a hearing be held pursuant to Section 366.26 in order to determine whether adoption, . . . tribal customary adoption, guardianship, or continued placement in foster care is the most appropriate plan for the child. . . . The hearing shall be held no later than 120 days from the date of the [18-month] hearing. The court shall also order termination of reunification services to the parent or legal guardian. . . . The court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (
§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3) .)
As both sides acknowledge, this provision imposes no express requirement that reunification services be extended beyond 18 months if the services offered or provided in the 12- to 18-month period were not reasonable. On the contrary, to promote the prompt resolution of the child‘s custody status and her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services. As we have elsewhere explained, the time limit reflects a considered legislative choice: “[I]n order to prevent children from spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.) If the child has already been out of the parent‘s custody for 18 months and still cannot be safely returned, the statute instructs that the court ordinarily must proceed to schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at which the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and place the child for adoption or else select another permanent plan. (
The plain text thus answers the question before us. Unlike the statutory provisions governing the six- and 12-month hearings, the statutory provision governing the 18-month hearing contains no provision requiring the court to extend services if it concludes that reasonable services have not been offered or provided. (Compare
The legislative history reinforces this straightforward reading of the text. As already explained above, in 1991, the Legislature amended the dependency law to separate the juvenile court‘s obligation to determine the reasonableness of services from its decision to set a permanency planning hearing. The history indicates this was a deliberate choice. As the Legislative Counsel‘s Digest explained of the рroposed amendment: “This bill would require a court to determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or guardian but would delete that requirement as a precondition for developing a permanent plan.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 475, 4 Stats. 1991 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 352.)
Notably, at the same time, the Legislature amended section 366.26 to prohibit the termination of parental rights at the permanency planning hearing if, “at each and every hearing at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court has found that . . . reasonable services were not offered or provided.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842 [shortening “each and every hearing” in this provision to “each hearing“; currently codified as
In sum, we can safely conclude that the statute means what it says. Though a court at the 18-month review hearing must determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent, an affirmative answer is not a statutory prerequisite to setting the permanency planning
Father acknowledges the text of section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3) is clear. But he argues that it is in tension with a separate provision also governing the conduct of the 18-month review hearing, Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (section 361.5), subdivision (a)(4)(A). He focuses on the following language:
“The court shall extend the time period [up to 24 months after the loss of custody] only if it finds that it is in the child‘s best interest to have the time period extended and that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of the child‘s parent or guardian who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22 within the extended time period, or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian.” (
§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A) , italics added.)
Focusing on that same language, some Courts of Appeal have concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) authorizes the extension of services at the 18-month hearing in any case in which reasonable services have not been provided. (In re M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 23; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255-1256.) Father, drawing on this reasoning, contends that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A)‘s instructions about extensions conflict with the instructions in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3). He argues that the conflict shоuld be resolved in favor of the more lenient approach.
Father‘s argument is based on a misreading of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A). That provision does not, in fact, generally authorize an extension of reunification services after 18 months whenever a court determines that reasonable services have not been provided. A fuller rendition of
“Notwithstanding paragraph (3) [governing extensions after 12 months], court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 24 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of the child‘s parent or guardian if it is shown, at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 366.22, that the permanent plan for the child is that the child will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period. The court shall extend the time period only if it finds that it is in the child‘s best interest to have the timе period extended and that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of the child‘s parent or guardian who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22 within the extended time period, or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian.” (
§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A) , italics added.)
As the italicized text makes clear, section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) applies only “at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 366.22” - which, as we have already explained, takes place only if the parent fits into one of three narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced specified obstacles to reunification, such as recent incarceration or institutionalization.8 There is, therefore, no conflict between
Although the governing provisions do not offer automatic relief to parents who have not received reasonable services in the period immediately preceding the 18-month review, neither do they leave parents without any possible remedy. We have already discussed the statutory remedy for the three narrow involved a different issue. There, the parent was never offered or provided reasonable reunification services at any point during the first 18 months after the child was first removed from parental custody. (T.J., at pp. 1249–1251, 1256–1257; accord, In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 595 [citing
Each case deals with an issue different from the one we confront here, and largely for reasons explained at greater length below (see pt. II.C., post [discussing the court‘s extension authority under
By its terms, the statutory discretion to continue “any hearing” under
The harder question is whether the authority to continue a permanency planning hearing also includes the authority toextend reunification services in the meantime, notwithstanding the usually applicable 18-month time limit on services. (See
family when appropriate.‘” (In re D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762, quoting In re M.S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–595.) Nor did it intend to strip the trial court of any flexibility to adjust the default timelines when doing so may be required to remedy a critical defect in the process or
This flexibility applies to the timeline for reunificatiоn services just as it applies to the timeline for selecting a permanent plan. Under the statutory scheme, the two are inextricably intertwined: The very purpose of the reunification stage is to facilitate services that promote the preservation of the family before the court must finally determine whether the family can, in fact, be preserved. Considering the terms and intended operation of the dependency system, we consider it unlikely that the Legislature would have given courts the discretion to delay the selection of a permanent plan where, for example, reasonable services have not been provided, without also giving courts the corresponding discretion to order additional reunification services in the meantime. The Agency here agrees that courts have such authority. The Courts of Appeal are uniformly in accord. And although the Legislature has amended the dependency statutes many times since courts first recognized the availability of this “‘emergency escape valve‘” under
In sum, a parent who is denied reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month hearings is not statutorily entitled to an automatic extension of services at the 18-month review. This means the juvenile court may set the
D.
Father argues that constitutional concerns should prompt us to read the statutory scheme differently. He contends that when a court has already determined that reunification services should be extended until the 18-month review because there is a substantial probability of reunification — as it did in his case — the failure to provide reasonable reunification services necessarily undermines the accuracy and fairness of any subsequent decision to abandon reunification and proceed to a
Father‘s constitutional avoidance argument is unavailing. Although we ordinarily construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional problems, we do so only when such a reading is fairly possible. (E.g., People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373 [“the canon [of constitutional avoidance] ‘is qualified by the proposition that “avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion” ’ “].) Here, Father offers no plausible interpretation of the statutory text that wouldauthorize us to craft the sort of automatic extension provision he seeks. We cannot, as Father asks, rewrite the statute “merely to eliminate a potential constitutional conflict.” (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826.)
More fundamentally, however, Father fails to establish that the statute as written raises significant constitutional concerns. In enacting the dependency statutes, the Legislature sought to achieve a careful balance between family reunification on the one hand and permanency for the child on the other. (See In re Matthew C., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 400; In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.) Under this scheme, the balance tips towards permanency as the time since removal increases. (See Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“The effect of these shifting standards is to make
a permanency planning hearing and extend reunification services in exceptional circumstances.Father emphasizes that the possibility of a discretionary extension of services under
To be clear: Nothing in our holding should be read to condone the Agency‘s failure in this case. The Agency should have provided Father reasonable services at every period in the reunification stage. The possibility of family reunification dеpends on the joint efforts of social services agencies and parents. By not providing reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month hearings, the Agency failed to uphold its end of the bargain.
But as the Legislature rightly recognized, any possible remedy for the deficiencies in the Agency‘s services would affect more than just the parent‘s interest; it would also affect the child‘s interest in a timely, safe, and stable placement. The Legislature struck a balance between these vital interests by setting a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification efforts, subject to extension in certain exceptional cases only if, among other statutory requirements, a court determines that the extension, and resulting
III.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.