MIAMI VALLEY HOSPITAL v. JOSHUA MIDDLETON
Appellate Case No. 24240
Trial Court Case No. 09-CVF-751
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
September 30, 2011
2011-Ohio-5069
Rendered on the 30th day of September, 2011.
MICHAEL T. WILLIAMS, Atty. Reg. #0059933, Dreyfuss Williams and Associates, 1801 East Ninth Street, Suite 1110, Cleveland, Ohio 44114-3103 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
THOMAS J. INTILI, Atty. Reg. #0036843, and DANIELLE A. GROVES, Atty. Reg. #0081136, Thomas J. Intili Co., LPA, 40 North Main Street, 1500 Kettering Tower, Dayton, Ohio 45423-1001 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} The action below was initiated by Miami Valley Hospital against Joshua Middleton for collection on a medical bill. Middleton has appealed two decisions of the Dayton Municipal Court. The first decision, filed October 13, 2009, dismissed Middleton‘s
{¶ 2} Because we are unable to say that the municipal court abused its discretion by dismissing the third-party complaint, that decision of the trial court is affirmed. We conclude that the municipal court‘s denial of leave to withdraw admissions was, if unreasonable or arbitrary, harmless since Middleton elsewhere in the record admits liability for the medical treatment and the amount of the judgment was based on submitted affidavits, not the failure to respond to requests for admissions. The court‘s denial of additional time to complete discovery and respond to the motion for summary judgment, which was entered almost five months after the second request for an extension was made, was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the municipal court properly granted summary judgment for the Hospital. The Hospital‘s bill was prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of its charges, and Middleton failed to set forth specific facts showing that the charges were unreasonable. The judgment containing these three rulings is also affirmed.
1. Facts and procedural posture.
{¶ 3} On September 25, 2008, Middleton was injured in an automobile accident. He was taken by ambulance to Miami Valley Hospital for emergency medical care. Unfortunately, Middleton did not have health insurance, so the Hospital billed him for its services. After discharging Middleton, the Hospital sent him a statement with a balance of $5,573.10. A few months later, the Hospital filed an action against Middleton in Dayton Municipal Court for a
{¶ 4} Along with his answer, Middleton filed a third-party complaint against the person he alleges was at fault in the accident. For his injuries, Middleton claimed more than $25,000 in damages. He also claimed indemnity for any amount that he owed the Hospital. After Middleton had filed the third-party complaint, the Hospital served him with discovery requests, including a request for admissions. When Middleton did not respond to these requests, the Hospital moved for summary judgment based, in part, on its request for admissions, which the hospital argued were deemed admitted because Middleton failed to timely respond. Opposing, Middleton argued that, because the amount demanded by the third-party complaint exceeded the municipal court‘s jurisdictional limit, the municipal court lost its authority over the case on the date he filed the third-party complaint. Therefore, the request for admissions and the motion for summary judgment were legal nullities. All the municipal court could–and must–do, Middleton argued, was certify the case to the court of common pleas. Replying, the Hospital moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. On December 29, 2009, the municipal court dismissed the third-party complaint. Since Middleton had not yet responded to the summary judgment motion on its merits, the court gave him 14 days to do so.
{¶ 5} In his January 2009 merit response, Middleton asked the court for leave to withdraw his admissions and asked for a
{¶ 6} In early March 2010, soon after the initial 30-day extension ended, Middleton served the Hospital with written discovery requests. A few days later, Middleton asked the court for more discovery time. He pointed out that the discovery rules grant a responding party at least 28 days to respond, and Middleton told the court that he wished to depose the Hospital. So, he asserted, it was simply impossible to complete discovery within the 30-day period that the court had originally ordered, let alone complete discovery and prepare a response to the summary judgment motion.
{¶ 7} Five months later, on August 2, 2010, the municipal court denied Middleton‘s request for more time, denied his request to withdraw his admissions, and granted the Hospital summary judgment. Deducting the amount that had been paid from the amount demanded in the complaint,1 and consistent with an “Affidavit Evidencing Account Balance” filed March 29, 2010, the court entered judgment against Middleton in the amount of $3,905.94. Middleton appealed.
{¶ 8} Middleton‘s assignments of error assert that the trial court erred in four respects: 1) the dismissal of his third-party complaint, 2) the denial of leave to withdraw his admissions, 3) the grant of summary judgment, and 4) the denial of his motion for additional time to conduct discovery.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} The facts in Jacobs are quite similar to those here. Jacobs‘s vehicle was
{¶ 11} The Jacobs Court affirmed. It concluded that the third-party claim failed to satisfy Civil Rule 14‘s conditions and failed to serve its purposes. The Court said that the personal-injury claim did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the primary claim for unpaid rental charges: the primary claim was based on contract; the third-party alleged tortfeasors were strangers to that contract. And, said the Court, the two claims did not share the same subject matter–the same circumstances or issues. Moreover, “the judgment in the primary claim has no effect on the third-party claim,” and several negligence-related issues would still have to be determined. Jacobs, at 242 (“It would still have to be determined whether the alleged tortfeasors were negligent; whether their negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; whether appellant was contributorily negligent; and the appropriate measure of damages, if any.“). Finally, the Court said that “no purpose of
{¶ 12} Middleton correctly points out that here, unlike in Jacobs, the third-party claim does have an issue in common with the primary claim–the reasonable value of the Hospital‘s services. If the alleged tortfeasor is found liable, Middleton may recover “the reasonable value of the medical care required to treat [his] injury.” Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, at ¶7. As Middleton also argues, this means that, if the two claims are tried separately, it is possible that inconsistent judgments on the reasonable value issue will result. What to do with a third-party claim–try it with the primary claim, sever it, or try it separately–is a question left to the trial court to answer in its discretion. Jacobs, at 241 (holding that, “under
{¶ 14} Similarly, while it is possible that inconsistent judgments could result concerning the reasonable value of the Hospital‘s services, we cannot say that this potentiality alone renders the court‘s decision unreasonable or arbitrary. See Ballard Welding (“Nothing on the face of the trial court‘s judgment appears to be arbitrary or unreasonable although there is the potential for inconsistent judgments depending on the defenses which might be raised * * *.“). Finally, in this case, the likelihood of inconsistent judgments is perhaps non-existent. In his personal injury claim, Middleton can recover the reasonable value of necessary medical expenses incurred. The Ohio Supreme Court in Robinson held that a
{¶ 15} The first assignment of error is overruled.2
3. Denial of leave to withdraw admissions
{¶ 16} The Hospital served Middleton with six requests that asked him to admit (1) that he was hospitalized at Miami Valley Hospital on September 25, 2008, (2) that he received medical treatment there on that date, (3) that he received a statement from the Hospital
{¶ 17} Middleton does not dispute that he owes the Hospital something or that he received a statement or any other matter. He disputes only the amount he owes. In none of the admitted matters did Middleton admit that owes the Hospital a particular amount.3 Furthermore, the trial court granted judgment against Middleton in the specific amount of $3,905.94. That figure is derived from the Affidavit Evidencing Account Balance filed March 29, 2010, not from any admission Middleton failed to make. Accordingly, we do not need to determine if it was error for the municipal court to deny Middleton‘s request for leave to withdraw his admissions because any such error would be harmless.
{¶ 18} The second assignment of error is overruled.
4. Grant of summary judgment
{¶ 19} Middleton‘s third assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred by Entering Summary Judgment for Plaintiff-appellee.” However, “Middleton admits that he was
{¶ 20} “The value of medical services, as a general rule, is to be ascertained and fixed by the usual price paid for like services at the time and place of performance.” Chiropractic Clinic of Solon v. Kutsko (Dec. 5, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70119, citing Sabroske v. Williamson (1958), 79 Ohio Law Abs. 257. Put differently, “‘the measure of the value of medical services is * * * the reasonable value of the services in the community where they are rendered, by the person who rendered them.‘” Neurosurgical Assoc., Inc. v. Borowsky (Sept. 18, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41197, quoting 42 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Physicians and Surgeons, Section 174. The Hospital therefore is entitled to the reasonable value of the medical services it rendered Middleton. See St. Vincent Med. Ctr. v. Sader (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 379, 384; Borowsky (“‘It is a settled general rule that a physician or surgeon is, in the absence of an agreement as to the amount of his compensation, entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services.‘“), quoting 42 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Physicians and Surgeons, Section 174; Sabroske.
{¶ 21} The reasonable value of medical services is a question of fact. One Ohio court
{¶ 22} Under
{¶ 23} The third assignment of error is overruled
5. Denial of additional extension of time for discovery
{¶ 24} Middleton‘s fourth assignment of error challenges the municipal court‘s denial of his
Sept. 24, 2009 Motion for Summary Judgment filed
Dec. 29, 2009 Entry Dismissing the Third Party Complaint and Granting Defendant 14 Additional Days to Respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment (14 days would end January 12, 2010)
Jan. 19, 2010 Defendant‘s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Defendant‘s Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance
Jan. 27, 2010 Entry Granting Defendant‘s Motion for Continuance (“The Defendant has thirty (30) days to complete discovery and respond to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court shall then rule on the Motion for Summary Judgment without hearing.“) (30 days would end February
March 8, 2010 Defendant‘s Notice of Service of Interrogatories and Document Requests upon Plaintiff
March 9, 2010 Defendant‘s Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Response to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment
{¶ 25} In its decision denying additional time for discovery, the court noted that two previous continuances had been granted and that the defendant had not filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, or the request for an additional continuance until after the response time had expired.
{¶ 26} “An appellate court may not reverse the decision to grant or to deny a
{¶ 27} We also note that some of the matters that Middleton apparently wanted to discover might not be evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment. The defense argues: “Pursuant to Robinson v. Bates * * * Middleton is permitted to introduce into evidence at trial the amounts MVH charges others for the same or similar hospital services, including without limitation persons whose medical bills are covered by health insurance or by government-sponsored programs like Medicare and Medicaid, to rebut MVH‘s claim that its billings to Middleton are reasonable.” Affidavit of Thomas J. Intili, ¶4 (attached to the January 19, 2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Defendant‘s Rule 56(F) Motion for Continuance) But Robinson was a personal-injury case concerned with whether the collateral-source rule bars from evidence the
{¶ 28} Given the two previous continuances, the timing of the respective filings, and the nature of the discovery requested, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Middleton‘s request for a continuance to conduct further discovery.
{¶ 29} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
6. Disposition
{¶ 30} Having overruled each of the assignments of error, we affirm the municipal court‘s December 29, 2009 judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, and we affirm the court‘s August 2, 2010 judgment overruling Middleton‘s motion to withdraw admissions, denying his motion for additional time, and granting the Hospital‘s summary judgment motion.
Copies mailed to:
Michael T. Williams
Jennifer L. Gardner
Thomas J. Intili
Danielle A. Groves
Hon. Deirdre E. Logan