In The Matter Of: SERGIO MIGUEL MEZA; SHARON SAUCEDA MEZA, Debtors. SERGIO MIGUEL MEZA; SHARON SAUCEDA MEZA, Appellees, versus TIM TRUMAN, Appellant.
No. 05-10739
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
October 16, 2006
Appeal from
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
Chapter 13 Trustee Tim Truman appeals the district court‘s affirming the following bankruptcy court holding:
I.
Debtors filed a voluntary petition for chapter 13 bankruptcy in April 2001. Truman, the standing chapter 13 Trustee for the Northern District of Texas, was appointed Trustee.
On 17 January 2002, Debtors filed their bankruptcy plan. The plan, confirmed on 2 April 2002, required Debtors to “pay the sum of $350.00, per month, ... for 50 months ... for a total of $17500“. Debtors’ unsecured creditors, owed a total of $23,181.59, were to receive “approximately .00%” for their claims.
Nearly two years later, on 26 February 2004, Trustee received Debtors’ 2003 federal income-tax refund, in the amount of $3,029. Under the plan, “the Trustee [wa]s authorized to receive, endorse, and apply to any delinquent payments under the Plan, any Income Tax Refund payable to debtor(s) during the pendency of this case“. (Emphasis added.) Debtors, however, were not delinquent in their payments. Nevertheless, Trustee wanted the non-exempt portion of this refund, $1,545 in disposable income, applied to amounts due under the plan.
Accordingly, on 23 March, Trustee filed a motion to modify Debtors’ plan; the requested modification would increase the distribution to Debtors’ unsecured creditors from zero percent under the confirmed plan to “approximately 8.40 %“. This would increase Debtors’ total payment from $17,500 to $19,045. Trustee provided Debtors 20 days notice, as required by
On 7 April, however, approximately a month before the scheduled hearing, Debtors paid Trustee $5,600, which paid in full the balance of their confirmed plan. To do so, Debtors refinanced their home, which was exempt property under the plan. On 3 May, Debtors filed an objection to Trustee‘s proposed modification, asserting it was untimely. Because they had already completed payments under the plan, Debtors claimed they were entitled to a discharge from bankruptcy.
Following a hearing on 7 July 2004, the bankruptcy court ruled the modification request was untimely: “By the time the Modification was presented to the Court, the Debtors had completed all payments required by the terms of the plan. Thus, in accordance with the unambiguous language of
II.
The decision whether to modify a chapter 13 plan is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Mendoza, 111 F.3d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1997). Along that line, legal conclusions of the bankruptcy and district courts are reviewed de novo. Id. at 1266. Although we may benefit from the bankruptcy and district courts’ analysis of the matter, the amount of persuasive weight accorded to the court‘s conclusion is subject to our discretion. In re United States Abatement Corp., 79 F.3d 393, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,
(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to -
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim other than under the plan.
(b)(1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is disapproved.
A.
Some courts have required an unanticipated, substantial change to occur before permitting such plan modification. See In re Hoggle, 12 F.3d 1008, 1011 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Congress designed § 1329 to permit modification of a plan due to changed circumstances of the debtor unforeseen at the time of confirmation.“); In re Furgeson, 263 B.R. 28, 37-38 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing cases supporting this view); see also 5 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2d § 124:2 (noting several courts require “a substantial or even unanticipated change in circumstances, or else the creditor is bound by confirmation of the original plan“) (emphasis in original). A growing number of courts, however, do not require such a change. See, e.g., Barbosa v. Soloman, 235 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2000) (“refrain[ing] from adopting the substantial and unanticipated test for seeking a modification pursuant to § 1329“); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that, “[b]y its terms, § 1329 does not provide for any threshold requirement to modify a bankruptcy plan“); In re Sutton, 303 B.R. 510, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2003) (citing Witkowski for the proposition that § 1329‘s plain language imposes no substantial change requirement); In re Sounakhene, 249 B.R. 801, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000) (“A showing of substantially changed circumstances is not a prerequisite to plan modification.“); In re Phelps, 149 B.R. 534, 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting “Congress specifically provided for a change in circumstances test under other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including at least one in Chapter 13“). Because we agree with this latter approach, we need not consider whether Debtors’ income-tax refund constituted a substantial or unanticipated change.
B.
Consistent with
On the other hand, it appears a trustee‘s motion is timely if filed before payments are completed. See In re Profit, 283 B.R. 567, 572 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (stating relevant issue as “[w]hether Trustee‘s motion to modify the chapter 13 plan was timely filed before all plan payments had been completed, pursuant to
Plan modification often occurs in the context of debtors who cannot afford to make the monthly payments under their confirmed plans. E.g., In re Taylor, 215 B.R. at 883 (seeking to reduce monthly plan payment). Where a modification is sought because the debtor can make larger payments to creditors than those imposed by the plan, courts have still emphasized that a modification may not be filed after the debtor has completed plan payments. E.g., In re Sutton, 303 B.R. at 515-16 (asserting “an absolute right to request modification of the plan between confirmation of the plan and completion of plan payments“); In re Solis, 172 B.R. at 532 (“A confirmed chapter 13 plan may be modified ... to increase or reduce payments after confirmation but before completion of debtor‘s payments.” (emphasis added)). One bankruptcy court in our circuit, encountering a creditor who sought plan modification after the debtor completed payments ahead of schedule, explained:
This rationale does not, however, extend to a situation where, as here, the trustee files a modification motion prior to the debtor‘s tendering full payment. In this regard, for a debtor‘s filing a proposed modification under
Here, Trustee filed a proposed modification prior to Debtors’ attempt to pay the plan balance. Obviously Debtors’ making their final payment did not nunc pro tunc make untimely that modification filing. Because the modification was timely filed, and would become effective after the notice period unless disapproved, it precluded Debtors from making their final payment under the earlier confirmed plan.
In sum, we cannot conclude from this record that Debtors’ objection was untimely. In any event, as discussed below, instead of holding Trustee‘s modification motion untimely, the bankruptcy court should have considered it on its merits.
In concluding that Debtors were permitted to complete plan payments after Trustee had filed his proposed modification, but before a hearing on it was held, the bankruptcy court relied in part on a treatise which noted: “[T]he literal language of section 1329(a) would appear to permit a debtor to complete payments during the 20 days that a request to modify must be pending under
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to district court for remand to bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE
CIRCUIT JUDGE
