METROHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER v. HOFFMANN-LAROCHE, INC.
No. 96-1953
Supreme Court of Ohio
November 5, 1997
80 Ohio St.3d 212 | 1997-Ohio-345
PFEIFER, J.
Submitted May 7, 1997. ON ORDER CERTIFYING A QUESTION OF STATE LAW from the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, No. 1:93 CV 484.
{¶ 2} On September 9, 1987, Linda Carr, a thirty-nine-year-old woman, was admitted to the emergency room facility of petitioner MetroHealth Medical Center (MetroHealth). The next day, in preparation for a gastroscopy, physicians in the employ of MetroHealth administered drugs used for conscious sedation and nausea. One of the drugs, Versed, was manufactured by respondent Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. (Hoffmann). During the gastroscopy, Linda Carr suffered a respiratory arrest and subsequently died.
{¶ 3} Michelle Carr (Carr), Linda‘s sister and the personal representative of her estate, filed a wrongful death action as case No. 165957 in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. In that case, Carr named MetroHealth and several of its employees as defendants. Carr then named as a new party defendant Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc. (RBL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Hoffmann. RBL was dismissed from that lawsuit because it had no involvement with Versed. Carr then filed an amended complaint, naming Hoffmann as a new party defendant. Hoffmann was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court based upon the two-year
{¶ 4} Subsequent to the dismissal with prejudice of Hoffmann, MetroHealth settled the remaining claims of the Carr estate. Hoffmann was named along with MetroHealth in the release. Within one year of the settlement, MetroHealth filed its suit against Hoffmann in case No. 246845 in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio by Hoffmann and is pending as the within action.
{¶ 5} In the present case, MetroHealth seeks contribution and indemnification from Hoffmann. Hoffmann has moved for partial summary judgment on MetroHealth‘s contribution claim, on the theory that its liability for Linda Carr‘s wrongful death was already extinguished when MetroHealth settled with Carr, by virtue of the dismissal with prejudice based upon the statute of limitations.
{¶ 6} The cause is before the court pursuant to Rule XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice.
Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, L.L.P., and Stephen D. Walters, for petitioner.
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Hugh E. McKay, Ezio A. Listati and Richard M. Markus, for respondent.
Michael L. Cioffi, in support of respondent for amicus curiae, American Premier Underwriters, Inc.
{¶ 7} The United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, has certified the following questions to this court for our determination:
[1] For purposes of
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 and§ 2307.32 , is a contribution defendant‘s liability for wrongful death extinguished by the contribution plaintiff‘s settlement with the underlying claimant, which settlement includes a full and final release naming both the contribution plaintiff and contribution defendant, where the contribution defendant had already been dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law from the underlying claimant‘s action based upon the statute of limitations?[2] For purposes of
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(B) , is a contribution defendant‘s liability for wrongful death extinguished by the contribution plaintiff‘s settlement with the underlying claimant, which settlement includes a full and final release naming both the contribution plaintiff and contribution defendant, where res judicata barred the underlying tort claim against the contribution defendant?
{¶ 8} For the reasons that follow, we answer each certified question in the affirmative.
{¶ 9} At common law, contribution was the right of a person who has been compelled to pay what another should have paid in part to require partial (usually proportionate) reimbursement and [arose] from principles of equity and natural justice. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Trowbridge (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 11, 70 O.O.2d 6, 321 N.E.2d 787, paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds in Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 391, 653 N.E.2d 235. However, contribution was not allowed between concurrent or joint tortfeasors. Id. at 15, 70 O.O.2d at 8-9, 321 N.E.2d at 790. To alleviate this inequity, the General Assembly enacted a statutory scheme that enabled a tortfeasor
{¶ 10} Former
{¶ 11} Former
{¶ 12} Former
{¶ 13} Former
{¶ 14} A contribution claim may go forward notwithstanding the lack of a judgment on the underlying claim against the contribution defendant, notwithstanding even the lack of an action on the underlying claim.
{¶ 15} Hoffmann argues that the expiration of the limitations period on the underlying tort claim extinguished its liability and therefore that a subsequent contribution action is also barred. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Shenefield (1992), 85 Ohio App.3d 563, 620 N.E.2d 866. But, see, Henry, supra. Acceptance of that position by this court would enable plaintiffs to absolve chosen defendants of liability. The plaintiff could wait to file a complaint until a claim against one of the defendants, but not the other, was time-barred, thereby destroying the disfavored defendant‘s statutory right to contribution. See Smith v. Jackson (1986), 106 Wash.2d 298, 301-302, 721 P.2d 508, 509-510; Sziber v. Stout (1984), 419 Mich. 514, 536-537, 358 N.W.2d 330, 339-340. Such a situation is inequitable and was clearly not intended by the General Assembly.
{¶ 16} The injustice of the position advocated by Hoffmann is further illustrated by the intolerable paradox discussed in Henry, 89 Ohio App.3d at 423, 624 N.E.2d at 800. Hoffmann‘s position is that a contribution defendant‘s liability is not extinguished by a settlement within the meaning of
{¶ 17} A defendant who loses at trial to the underlying claimant has a clear right to pursue contribution from a joint tortfeasor unless the joint tortfeasor has been adjudicated not liable. To hold otherwise with respect to a defendant who loses by settling would penalize tortfeasors for settling. The statutes do not support and we cannot justify such a rule. To the contrary, we should strive to remove obstacles to settlement efforts.
{¶ 18} Based on our analysis of the entire statutory scheme, we are convinced that the General Assembly‘s primary intention in enacting
{¶ 19} The certified questions before us compel stark yes or no answers. Such choices make our task easier, because we need do no more than answer yes or no, and harder, because it is so difficult to foresee all the situations that will be governed by our answer. See Kutner, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: The Effects of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations (1980), 33 Okla. L.Rev. 203 (fourteen hypothetical cases involving contribution and statutes of limitations). With that in mind, we are convinced that a negative answer to the first certified question would frustrate the purpose of the statutory scheme and exacerbate the plight of parties seeking contribution.
{¶ 21} We turn now to the second certified question. The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion (historically called estoppel by judgment) and issue preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel). Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 653 N.E.2d 226, 228. Claim preclusion prevents a party from litigating a cause of action after a prior court has rendered a final judgment on the merits of that cause as to that party. Krahn v. Kinney (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1062, citing Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67, paragraph one of the syllabus. Issue preclusion precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action. Krahn, 43 Ohio St.3d at 107, 538 N.E.2d at 1062, quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 734, 443 N.E.2d 978, 981.
{¶ 22} This court recognized in Natl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitmer (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 149, 151-152, 24 O.O.3d 248, 249, 435 N.E.2d 1121, 1123, that a contribution action differs from the underlying action when it stated that [i]t is clear from the provisions of the Act [
Judgment accordingly.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
COOK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 24} The applicable statute of limitations, not the release obtained by MetroHealth Medical Center (MetroHealth) in connection with its settlement, extinguished any potential liability on the part of Hoffmann-LaRoche (Hoffmann) for Linda Carr‘s death within the meaning of former
{¶ 25} A joint tortfeasor‘s right to seek contribution from others who may be liable for the victim‘s injury is derived solely from statute. Former
{¶ 26} In interpreting a statute, courts must first look to its language to determine what the legislature intended. Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. Words and phrases of the statute must be read in context and accorded their common usage.
In common usage, extinguish is defined, among other things, as bring to an end, to reduce to silence or ineffectiveness and to cause to be void: NULLIFY. Webster‘s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1990) 440. Liability is a legal term which can be broadly defined, as in this case, as responsibility for torts. Black‘s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 823. One who is liable is responsible, chargeable or answerable. Id. at 824. Certainly, a successful demonstration of an immunity or affirmative defense renders a plaintiff‘s claim of liability against a defendant ineffective and brings that liability to an end for all legal purposes. The defendant is no longer chargeable with that liability and is not answerable to the plaintiff.
{¶ 27} When read in context with the foregoing, the clear import of the phrase by the settlement is that, for the statute to create a right of contribution in favor of the settling tortfeasor, the settlement release and no other independent event must extinguish a joint tortfeasor‘s liability to the victim. On the other hand, if some other independent event, such as expiration of a statute of limitations or a dismissal with prejudice, has extinguished a tortfeasor‘s liability to the victim prior to any settlement, liability no longer exists to be extinguished by a later settlement release.
{¶ 28} The majority bases its interpretation of former
To accept appellee‘s position, under which the statute of limitations, when successfully invoked as a bar to the plaintiffs’ action, may also serve as a bar to co-tortfeasor claims for contribution, is to accept an intolerable paradox: the plaintiffs’ belated suit against defendant‘s co-tortfeasor prejudices the defendant‘s right to contribution, when the complete absence of a suit clearly would not. Id. at 423, 624 N.E.2d at 800.
{¶ 29} With respect to the first certified question, it does not matter whether the underlying tort victim named the contribution plaintiff in the tort action, or even that the tort victim filed suit at all. What is important is whether a settlement release obtained from the tort victim extinguished any potential liability on the part of a co-tortfeasor. In this case, the applicable statute of limitations for the tort victim to sue Hoffmann expired before MetroHealth obtained its settlement release. Accordingly, there was simply no remaining liability attributable to Hoffmann for the settlement release to extinguish and, consequently, there is no basis for MetroHealth to compel Hoffmann‘s contribution.
{¶ 30} With respect to the second certified question, it is true that but for Hoffmann‘s status as a defendant in the underlying tort action there could be no res judicata bar. That res judicata operates in favor of a party because he prevailed in an earlier lawsuit, however, is neither intolerable nor a paradox. In this case, res judicata, although different in character, acted exactly like the statute of limitations in that it — not the later settlement release — extinguished any potential liability of Hoffmann to the tort victim.
{¶ 31} Additionally, the majority rejects the plain language of the statute based on a hypothetical scenario where a plaintiff in a tort action wait[s] to file a complaint until a claim against one of the defendants, but not the other, is time-
Courts have no legislative authority and should not make their office of expounding statutes a cloak for supplying something omitted from an act by the General Assembly.
There is no authority under any rule of statutory construction to add to, enlarge, supply, expand, extend or improve the provisions of the statute to meet a situation not provided for. (Citation omitted.)
{¶ 32} Applying the plain language of former
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.