MERCER v. JOHNSON
S18A0748
Supreme Court of Georgia
August 14, 2018
304 Ga. 219
HINES, Chief Justice.
FINAL COPY
In 2004, appellant Jessie Mercer was convicted of the kidnapping of Richard Love and his wife, Parchando Love, as well as armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for kidnapping Mr. Love, but not for kidnapping Mrs. Love. Specifically, he contended that the State failed to prove the element of asportation, but the Court of Appeals rejected that contention. See Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606 (658 SE2d 173) (2008). In 2011, appellant filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his kidnapping convictions under the new standard for determining asportation set forth in Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696 (670 SE2d 73) (2008).1 On June 29, 2016, the habeas court denied the petition.
We subsequently granted appellant‘s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal and now reverse the habeas court‘s judgment.
1.
Under Garza, a court considers four factors in determining whether the movement of the victim constitutes asportation sufficient to sustain a kidnapping conviction. Those factors are:
(1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the victim independent of the danger posed by the separate offense.
Gonzalez v. Hart, 297 Ga. 670, 672 (777 SE2d 456) (2015). “These factors are considered as a whole; it is not necessary that all four factors weigh in favor of asportation.” Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 49 (2) (757 SE2d 646) (2014). “What must be kept in mind is the purpose of the Garza test, which is to determine whether the movement in question served to substantially isolate the victim from protection or rescue, the evil which the kidnapping statute was originally intended to address.” Gonzalez, 297 Ga. at 672.
2.
With these principles in mind, we turn now to the evidence of the movement of the Loves and whether it is sufficient to establish asportation for the two kidnapping convictions. The evidence shows that three armed intruders, including appellant and Rasaul Rayshad,2 broke into the Loves’ home on the night of January 26, 2004, and then went upstairs and entered their bedroom. See Mercer, 289 Ga. App. at 606. They pointed handguns at the Loves, placed both of them on the floor, and taped up their arms and legs. See id. at 606-607. Mrs. Love had turned on an alarm before the intruders entered the bedroom, and the intruders pulled her up and pushed her against an aquarium in order to have her turn off the alarm.
The driver of the intruders’ get-away car said that the intruders went to the Loves’ house to collect money that the Loves owed Rayshad. The Loves sold cars for a living and, either the day of the intrusion or shortly before it, they sold a Cadillac for $5,000 and hid the money under a mattress in their bedroom.
(a)
We turn first to whether the movement of Mr. Love, which consisted only of moving him from a standing position to the floor, was sufficient to constitute asportation. Mr. Love‘s movement, which took place soon after the intruders entered the couple‘s bedroom, was of an extremely short duration and occurred during the ongoing armed robbery. Moreover, this movement did not present “a significant danger to the victim independent of the danger posed” by the armed robbery, during which the intruders were constantly pointing their handguns at the Loves, and did not serve “to substantially isolate the victim from protection or rescue.” Gonzalez, 297 Ga. at 672. Accordingly, this movement did not constitute the asportation necessary to support appellant‘s conviction for kidnapping Mr. Love. See id. at 673-674 (holding that the act of pulling victim by the hair as she was trying to exit the door of an apartment and throwing her against a wall was insufficient to establish asportation; the movement was of minimal duration, occurred during the commission of and as an inherent part of the crimes of aggravated assault and family violence battery, and did not present a significant danger to the victim that was independent of family violence battery); Garza, 284 Ga. at 703-704 (2) (concluding that the movement of one victim from a standing position to the floor and then to a chair
(b)
With regard to Mrs. Love, the record shows that there were several movements of her that are insufficient to establish asportation, largely for the same reasons that the evidence was insufficient to establish asportation regarding Mr. Love. Those movements include the intruders placing Mrs. Love on the floor and then pulling her up and pushing her against an aquarium in order to have her turn off the house alarm. Her movement to the safe and back to the bedroom is stronger evidence of asportation, but nevertheless insufficient. First, that movement was of short duration. See Levin v. Morales, 295 Ga. 781, 783 (764 SE2d 145) (2014) (describing movements from a bedroom in a “small duplex apartment” to various places, including to the living room, the back door, the kitchen, and the bathroom, each time going back to the bedroom, as “of a short duration“); Peoples, 295 Ga. at 46 (1) (b), 49-50 (2) (concluding that the movement of a victim from the front door to a bathroom that was down a hallway was of short duration); Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 244-245 (5) (675 SE2d 28) (2009) (saying that “the movement of the victims from one room to another within the duplex was of minimal duration“); Garza, 284 Ga. at 704 (3) (describing both the movement of a victim from one room in a house to an adjoining bedroom and then another movement of that victim from that bedroom down a hallway and back to the bedroom as of “short duration“).
Finally, although the movement may not have been an inherent part of either the aggravated assaults or armed robbery, the fourth Garza factor does not support asportation. In this regard, when appellant dragged Mrs. Love from the bedroom to the safe and then back to the bedroom, it cannot reasonably be said that the movement placed her in more danger than if she had stayed in the bedroom. There, she faced three armed intruders who were demanding money and saying things like, if “you don‘t tell me where the motherf---ing safe at, I‘m gonna blow her brains out; you better tell me where the motherf---ing safe is; I‘m gonna kill this b----; I‘m gonna kill this b----.” See Levin, 295 Ga. at 783 (holding that “[a]ppellant encountered the victim in her bedroom, and moving her back and forth to that room would not have put her in any more danger than she had been from the very beginning of the incident“). Similarly, the movement to the safe and back was not in the nature of the evil the kidnapping statute was designed to defend against, as it did not “serve[ ] to substantially isolate the victim from protection or rescue.” See id.
Judgment reversed. Melton, P. J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias, Blackwell, Boggs, and Peterson, JJ., concur.
Decided August 14, 2018.
Habeas corpus. Hancock Superior Court. Before Judge Wingfield, Senior Judge.
Sarah L. Gerwig-Moore; Peters, Rubin & Sheffield, Foss G. Hodges; Miller & Key, J. Scott Key, for appellant.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
