Opinion
Government Code section 84305
1
requires candidates for public office, and individuals or groups supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot measure, to identify themselves on any mass mailings they send to prospective voters. In
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.
(1994) 8
*692
Cal.4th 851, 855 [
After our decision in
Griset I
became final and after the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari, plaintiffs, in the same action, again asked the superior court to declare section 84305 unconstitutional. Plaintiffs relied on a decision by the United States Supreme Court,
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n
(1995)
The superior court denied plaintiffs’ request and entered judgment for defendant Fair Political Practices Commission. On plaintiffs’ appeal from that judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed.
The threshold issue in the matter now before us (Griset II, which arises from the same action as Griset I) is whether the Court of Appeal had the authority to entertain plaintiffs’ second appeal in the same action, to again consider the constitutionality of section 84305 after our decision in Griset I had become final. We conclude the Court of Appeal lacked such authority.
I. Facts and Proceedings
A. Administrative Proceedings
In 1988, Daniel Griset was a candidate for reelection to the Santa Ana City Council. A month before the election, the Griset Campaign Committee, which Griset controlled, sent prospective voters a mass mailing using the letterhead Washington Square Neighborhood Association. The mailing did not identify Griset or the Griset Campaign Committee as the sender. That same month, the Santa Ana Progress Committee, also controlled by Griset, sent prospective voters four mass mailings attacking Griset’s opponent. The mailings identified the Santa Ana Progress Committee as the sender but failed to say that candidate Griset controlled the committee.
(Griset I, supra,
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In March 1990, the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) initiated administrative enforcement proceedings against Griset and the two committees he controlled, alleging that the above described mass mailings violated section 84305.
(Griset I, supra,
B. Judicial Proceedings Before High Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Griset I
In October 1990, while the administrative proceedings before the FPPC were pending, plaintiffs (Griset and the two committees he controlled) brought this action in the Orange County Superior Court against the FPPC challenging the constitutionality of section 84305 and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and the FPPC’s administrative enforcement action against plaintiffs proceeded.
After the FPPC imposed a $10,000 fine against plaintiffs in the administrative proceeding, plaintiffs amended and supplemented their superior court complaint to allege four causes of action. The first cause of action was for a writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) directing the FPPC to rescind its administrative decision. The second cause of action asked the court to declare Government Code section 84305 unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to plaintiffs. The third cause óf action sought to enjoin the FPPC from collecting any fine from plaintiffs. The fourth cause of action sought to enjoin the FPPC from enforcing section 84305 in the future against plaintiffs or others. Central to all four causes of action was plaintiffs’ allegation that section 84305 violated the right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 2 of the California Constitution.
In July 1991, plaintiffs filed motions in the superior court for a peremptory writ of mandate on their first cause of action, for summary adjudication that there was no defense to their remaining causes of action, and for summary judgment.
The superior court found section 84305 unconstitutional in prohibiting anonymous mass mailings by individuals or committees other than candidate and candidate-controlled committees during an election campaign, but constitutional in prohibiting anonymous mass mailings by candidates and candidate-controlled committees, as in plaintiffs’ case. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs’ motions. The court’s order denying plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of administrative mandate stated the order was “a final determination *694 of [plaintiffs’] First Cause of Action for administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5,” adding “no further proceedings are to be held on that cause of action.” The order denying the motions for summary adjudication and for summary judgment expressly stated that the court’s denial was not based on the existence of “any triable issue as to any material fact.” The trial court’s rulings were not formally entered as a judgment.
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. They then appealed from the superior court’s order denying their petition for a writ of administrative mandate. A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court held that section 84305 was constitutional as to candidates and candidate-controlled committees such as plaintiffs. The court also concluded the statute was unconstitutional with regard to persons and entities other than candidates and committees under their control. We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review.
We unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
(Griset I, supra,
We filed our decision in
Griset I
on November 28, 1994, and issued the remittitur on December 29, 1994. In February 1995, plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review by writ of certiorari. On April 19, 1995, while plaintiffs’ petition was pending, the high court issued its decision in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, supra,
C. Proceedings After High Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Griset I
In August 1995, plaintiffs “renewed” in the superior court their 1991 motions for summary adjudication and for summary judgment as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that under the high court’s decision in
McIntyre, supra,
This time, the Court of Appeal held section 84305 to be unconstitutional
in its entirety
(that is, not only as to persons and entities other than candidates and the committees they controlled, but also with regard to candidates and candidate-controlled committees), and it reversed the superior court’s judgment for the FPPC. The Court of Appeal’s majority found no procedural impropriety in plaintiffs’ second appeal in the same case. In its view, plaintiffs could “revive” the litigation because the superior court had not entered a formal judgment in 1991. After recognizing that in
Griset I, supra,
The Court of Appeal majority then concluded that the high court’s decision in
McIntyre, supra,
The dissenting Court of Appeal justice was of the view that in
Griset I, supra,
We granted the FPPC’s petition for review.
*696
To determine the threshold issue of whether the Court of Appeal had the authority to again consider the constitutionality of section 84305 after our decision in
Griset I, supra,
II. Nature and Scope of Griset I
Was the superior court’s decision at issue in
Griset I, supra,
Generally, a reviewing court acts in the procedural context of either a direct appeal or a writ proceeding. (See
Leone
v.
Medical Board
(2000)
We next consider the nature and scope of the superior court’s ruling that was the subject of plaintiffs’ appeal in
Griset I, supra,
A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.
(Jennings
v.
Marralle
(1994)
A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by statute.
(People v. Chi Ko Wong
(1976)
In addition, allowing an appeal in that situation would be contrary to the “one final judgment” rule, a fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the case. “The theory is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 58, p. 113; see
Knodel v. Knodel
(1975)
We now consider whether the 1991 superior court order at issue in
Griset I, supra,
A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) In its 1991 order denying plaintiffs’ petition for writ of administrative mandate, the superior court described its order as a final determination of plaintiffs’ first cause of action for administrative mandate. Unless the order also resolved plaintiffs’ other three causes of action, there would not be a final determination of the parties’ rights and thus the order could not be an appealable judgment. As this court has explained, “an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining.”
(Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara
(1994)
In 1991, when plaintiffs filed their original notice of appeal, some Court of Appeal decisions had suggested that a party could appeal from a judgment
*698
denying a petition for writ of mandate even though other causes of action remained pending between the parties. (See
California Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education
(1980)
Having examined the assumption, evidently made by the Court of Appeal, that plaintiffs’ 1991 appeal at issue in
Griset I, supra,
As we observed earlier, a judgment is a final determination of the rights of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) In
Lyons v. Goss
(1942)
Applying that test here, we conclude the 1991 superior court ruling that was the subject of appellate review in
Griset I, supra,
When the superior court in 1991 denied plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of administrative mandate on plaintiffs’ first cause of action to direct the FPPC to rescind its imposition of a $10,000 fine against plaintiffs, the court—for reasons expressed in its order denying plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and for summary adjudication—upheld the constitutionality of section 84305 as to candidates and candidate-controlled committees such as plaintiffs and stated that plaintiffs’^petition for a writ of mandate “is denied on the merits.”
The superior court’s ruling on plaintiffs’ first cause of action also disposed of plaintiffs’ second cause of action asking the court to declare section 84305 unconstitutional not only as to candidates and candidate-controlled committees, but also as to others. The court’s statement of its reasons for its decision, attached to the order denying plaintiffs’ motions for summary adjudication and summary judgment, shows that the court found the statute constitutional with respect to candidates and candidate-controlled committees, but unconstitutional as to individuals or committees other than candidates and candidate-controlled committees. The court remedied the constitutional infirmity by narrowing the definition of “committee” to include only a candidate-controlled committee. Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the superior court’s ruling fully addressed and resolved the constitutionality of the statute as requested in plaintiffs’ second cause of action.
Also, the superior court’s ruling necessarily disposed of plaintiffs’ third cause of action, which sought to enjoin the FPPC from collecting the $10,000 fine it had imposed against plaintiffs in the administrative proceeding. Because plaintiffs collectively are a candidate and two candidate-controlled committees, the court’s ruling upholding section 84305’s constitutionality as to candidates and the committees they control necessarily determined plaintiffs’ lack of entitlement to an injunction restraining the FPPC from collecting the fines.
*700
Finally, the superior court’s ruling disposed of plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, which sought to enjoin the FPPC from enforcing the statute in the future against plaintiffs and others. The court’s ruling limited the statute’s scope by construing the statute to apply only to candidates and candidate-controlled committees, thereby curing any facial defect in the statute and leaving no unconstitutional application of the statute to enjoin. (See
Broad-rick v. Oklahoma
(1973)
Thereafter, in affirming the superior court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal necessarily affirmed the superior court’s disposition of all causes of action between the parties. Although, in reviewing the Court of Appeal’s decision, we chose not to reach the question of the constitutionality of the statute with regard to individuals or committees
other than
candidates and candidate-controlled committees (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2(a) [on “review of the decision of a Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court may review and decide any or all issues in the cause”]), we did not disturb the Court of Appeal’s unqualified affirmance of the trial court’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 84305 as to candidates uand the committees they control.
(Griset I, supra,
In summary, because the superior court’s ruling reviewed in
Griset I, supra,
Our decision in
Griset I, supra,
III. Jurisdiction of Superior Court and Court of Appeal
A reviewing court has authority to “affirm, reverse, or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 43.) The order of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned. “The order of the appellate court as stated in the remittitur, ‘is decisive of the character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled. The lower court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case, and if it should do so, the judgment rendered thereon would be void.’ ”
(Hampton
v.
Superior Court
(1952)
In
Griset I, supra,
When, as here, there is an appeal from a void judgment, the reviewing court’s jurisdiction is limited to reversing the trial court’s void acts. (See 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 20, p. 566; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
supra,
Appeal, § 19, p. 80.) In an attempt to reexamine our decision in
Griset I, supra,
Our decision in Griset I, once it became final, terminated this litigation as to all causes of action in plaintiffs’ complaint. Because plaintiffs thereafter did not commence a separate lawsuit, but instead improperly sought to revive this litigation after its final conclusion, there was no pending legal proceeding to which the above mentioned doctrines or their exceptions properly could be applied. And because Griset I resulted in affirmance of the trial court’s final judgment in this proceeding, the Court of Appeal erred in holding that it had authority to entertain a second appeal in the same action concerning the merits of plaintiffs’ causes of action.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The Court of Appeal is directed to reverse as void the superior court’s judgment entered on December 20, 1995.
George, C. J., Mosk, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
Notes
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Government Code.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the FPPC under former Orange County Superior Court, Local Rules, former rule 518(1). That rule, adopted in 1984 and repealed in 1998, allowed a trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment even though that party had not itself moved for summary judgment.