Medrano v. Excel Corp.Medrano v. Excel Corp.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Jolly, Wiener, Fitzwater, Grady Jolly
GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a little twist in the basic question of whether a state claim for retaliatory discharge under workers’ compensation law is pre-empted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Our plaintiff and appellee, Miguel Medrano, sustained work-related injuries and filed two workers’ compensation claims, both of which he settled. On the date of the settlement, he was still under medical restrictions relating to work duties that could not be accommodated by his employer, Excel Corporation. Applying the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA), Excel terminated Medrano‘s employment. Medrano—asserting diversity jurisdiction—filed a wrongful discharge complaint against Excel. In his complaint, Medrano alleged that Excel discharged him in violation of article 8307c of the
I
Excel employed Medrano as a butcher at its Plainview, Texas, meat packing plant in June 1989. During November of that year, Medrano suffered injuries to his left wrist, his right arm, and his right shoulder. As a result of his injuries, Medrano was unable to work for a substantial part of 1990. Medrano filed two workers’ compensation claims and collected weekly compensation benefits.
Medrano returned to work on October 5, 1990, with the restriction that he could not use a knife or hook for more than 65% of the time. Medrano was still recovering from his shoulder injury, which restricted him to light duty for four months. On November 12, however, Medrano‘s doctor determined that his current position was too stressful to his shoulder and further restricted Medrano‘s work conditions. On November 13, Medrano was medically prohibited from all use of knives or hooks. On November 28, 1990, Medrano settled his two workers’ compensation claims for approximately $27,000.00. On this date, there were no jobs available at Excel that could accommodate Medrano‘s medical restrictions.
On December 13, 1990, Medrano and thirty-seven other Excel employees filed suit against Excel, alleging harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of
On October 25, 1991, the jury found for Medrano. It concluded that Excel had terminated Medrano in retaliation for his pursuit of workers’ compensation benefits. On November 8, 1991, Excel filed motions for a JNOV and for a new trial, again arguing that Medrano‘s claim was pre-empted by section 301; again, both motions were denied by the district court. On November 26, 1991, the district court entered judgment in favor of Medrano in the amount of $60,000.00. Excel appeals.
II
On appeal, Excel raises three issues. First, Excel argues that Medrano‘s claim of retaliation, as presented to the jury, was pre-empted by section 301 of the LMRA. Second, Excel argues that Medrano failed to present evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. Third, Excel argues that Medrano failed to present evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. Third, Excel argues that Medrano failed to present evidence to support an award of exemplary damages.
On the other hand, Medrano first argues that Excel has failed to preserve its claim of pre-emption for appeal; if the issue has been preserved, Medrano argues that his claim is not pre-empted. Medrano also defends his jury award against Excel‘s evidentiary attack.
III
A
Section 301 of the LMRA states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Medrano‘s claim against Excel was for wrongful discharge under article 8307c of the
Protection of claimants from discrimination by employers; remedies; jurisdiction
Section 1. No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the Texas Workmen‘s Compensation Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.
Section 2. A person who violates any provision of Section 1 of this Act shall be liable for reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation, and an employee discharged in violation of the Act shall be entitled to be reinstated to his former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.
C
In this case we are asked to “determine if [Medrano‘s] claim is sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of section 301.” International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2167, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).2 We conclude that it is not. Although this holding may at first appear somewhat at odds with our holdings in Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway Express I), 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1991), and Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway Express II), 936 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1991), and the Supreme Court‘s holding in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), an examination of the cases demonstrates the distinction.
The state-law claim in Roadway Express I, as in the instant case, was based on article 8307c. In Roadway Express I, we stated that “the basic issue in this case is whether a retaliatory discharge occurred” and concluded that “[r]esolution of this issue does not require an interpretation of the CBA.” Roadway Express I, 931 F.2d at 1090. We held that because the retaliatory discharge claim was not “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA and did not depend upon a provision of the CBA, the state law claim was not pre-empted. Roadway Express II, 936 F.2d at 792. Furthermore, we observed that in the “typical case” involving such a retaliatory discharge, the claim could be resolved without an interpretation of the CBA. Id.
The case before us today, however, is not a typical straightforward case alleging a retaliatory discharge in violation of article 8307c. Unlike the plaintiff‘s claim in Roadway Express I and II, Medrano‘s claim is indeed inextricably intertwined with a consideration of the terms of the CBA. Medrano actually drew on the settlement provision of the CBA itself to establish a violation of article 8307c. Medrano‘s claim is distinctive in that he alleged Excel—by applying a specific provision of the CBA—discriminated against him because he settled a workers’ compensation claim, not because he filed one. Throughout trial,
In Lingle the Court concluded that the “purely factual questions” necessary to show retaliatory discharge in that case “pertain[ed] to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff‘s state law retaliatory discharge claim was independent of the CBA because “resolution of the state-law claim [did] not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. To the contrary here—and we repeat ourselves—Medrano‘s claim clearly requires construing the CBA. The unquestioned basis of Excel‘s discharge of Medrano was the settlement provision of the CBA; that point is not in dispute. What is disputed in this case is whether the provision itself was illegal or discriminatory. Unlike the facts presented in Lingle, here the CBA must be construed for resolution of Medrano‘s state law claim. “No matter in what glamorous garb it is dressed, the basic thrust” of Medrano‘s claim is that the enforcement of the settlement provision of the CBA “itself constitutes a tort under state law.” Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703, 704 (5th Cir.1985).3
At trial, Medrano acknowledged that he was discharged pursuant to the settlement provision of the CBA, but argued that this provision itself constituted discrimination against employees who settle their claims. In essence, Medrano‘s claim was that Article XVII, Section 11(F), of the CBA was an admission by Excel that it discriminated against Medrano in violation of article 8307c because this section of the CBA allowed Excel to discriminate against any workers’ compensation claimant who settled his claim while Excel was unable to accommodate him at work. Throughout the trial, Medrano referred to this provision of the CBA and attempted to show the jury that Excel discriminated not only against Medrano individually but against any employee who settled a workers’ compensation claim as opposed to an employee who did not.
Medrano‘s attorney began his attack on the settlement provision of the CBA during voir dire,4 and his challenge to the CBA continued during opening statements. Medrano called six witnesses, three of whom were questioned extensively about the terms of the CBA. Excel called only three witnesses, but on cross-examination Medrano‘s attorney again concentrated on the terms of the CBA. Even during his closing arguments, Medrano‘s attorney‘s emphasis was on the CBA. Medrano was not challenging the actions of his employers under section 8307c; instead, he was challenging a provision of the CBA that was applied by his employer. Because the resolution of Medrano‘s claim required an interpretation of the CBA, his claim was clearly pre-empted by section 301.
REVERSED.