Carlos MEDRANO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 05-12-00316-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Jan. 27, 2014.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Overruled Feb. 26, 2014.
422 S.W.3d 869
Opinion by Justice FRANCIS.
We have thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence. Although we necessarily detailed each piece of evidence in our opinion to ascertain exactly the nature of that piece of evidence—sometimes this was difficult because of the extensive use of the video clips—and although we categorized the evidence in accordance with its presentation in the State‘s brief, we make it clear here that our sufficiency review encompassed the cumulative force of all of the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences supportable from that evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Because, viewing all of the circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the cumulative force of all of the circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences from that evidence are insufficient to convince any rational factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles acted with the requisite mens rea necessary to support his conviction for murder, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to establish the mens rea element of murder.
We sustain Charles‘s first point.
V. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Charles‘s first point challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal. See
Kenda L. Culpepper, Rockwall County, District Attorney‘s Office, Rockwall, TX, Jon R. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Jessica Manojlovich, Austin, TX, for Appellee.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, FRANCIS, and MYERS.
OPINION
Opinion by Justice FRANCIS.
Following a bench trial, suspended Dallas County Justice of the Peace Carlos Medrano was convicted of illegal voting and sentenced to five years in prison, probated for five years, and a $2,500 fine.1 In eight issues, appellant brings complaints regarding the jurisdiction of the court, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the admission of certain documents. Because we conclude all issues are without merit, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Appellant won the March 2010 Dallas County Democratic Party Primary Election for the office of Precinct 5, Place 1 Justice of the Peace, defeating the incumbent Luis Sepulveda by 156 votes. Short1ly after the election, allegations of voter fraud surfaced and Sepulveda filed a civil lawsuit. The Dallas County Commissioners Court requested the Attorney General of the State of Texas investigate the allegations. The AG‘s office investigated the complaint, which included the allegation that some members of the Medrano family had registered voters to vote in the JP election who did not reside in that precinct. The AG‘s office presented the case to the Rockwall County grand jury, which ultimately indicted eight members of the Medrano family, including appellant. Appellant was charged in a two-count indictment with soliciting and aiding his nieces, Raquel and Veronica Medrano, to vote for him when he knew they did not reside in the precinct for which he was running.
On December 29, 2011, appellant and seven family members appeared before the trial court in Rockwall County, entered pleas of not guilty, and waived their right to a jury trial. The State and defense announced ready, and the State presented some evidence in each case. Appellant‘s case was recessed until February 14, 2012. The trial court noted this process facilitated the scheduling of all the cases and ensured the parties could not change their jury elections.
On that date, the joint trial of appellant and his brother, Frank Medrano III, reconvened. After hearing the evidence, the trial court acquitted appellant on the illegal voting charge involving Raquel and convicted him on the illegal voting charge involving Veronica. (Frank, who is the father of Raquel and Veronica, was acquitted of aggravated perjury.) In this appeal, we focus on the evidence relating to the charge involving Veronica.
During early voting in February 2010, appellant called Veronica to tell her to go vote. He told her if anyone asked where she lived, she was to say she lived at the Douglas Avenue address or in Dallas. Veronica and other family members met appellant, and appellant led them to an early-voting polling place, where she voted for him for JP.
Shortly after the election, Sepulveda filed a lawsuit contesting the election results and was looking for people who may have voted illegally. Veronica‘s boyfriend, Austin Stark, asked her about it. Veronica told Stark she did not vote in the election, although voting records showed she did, which led Stark to believe her family had used her vote without her knowledge. At Stark‘s urging, Veronica met with Sepulveda and told him she did not vote in the election.
In June, during the pendency of Sepulveda‘s lawsuit, Sgt. Jennifer Bloodworth and another investigator with the AG‘s office went to the Medranos’ Mesquite residence to talk to Veronica and Raquel about the circumstances of their voting. Veronica agreed to talk to Sgt. Bloodworth, but Raquel refused. Veronica initially told Sgt. Bloodworth she did not live at the Douglas Avenue address, denied signing her voter registration application form, said she did not remember signing her personal appearance form for early voting, and denied voting in the March 2010 Primary Election. By the end of the meeting, she had acknowledged signing the voter registration form and early voting form, but continued to deny voting. She said she was reluctant to tell Bloodworth the truth about the circumstances of her voting because she feared “backlash” from her family but eventually admitted that she did vote in the election.
Ultimately, Veronica was subpoenaed to testify at Sepulveda‘s July 2010 election contest trial. On the day before she was scheduled to testify, Veronica said her father showed up at her work and had her follow him to a meeting with appellant and two other Medrano family members. At the meeting, Veronica said they “went over” what she was “supposed to say” at the trial the next day, which, she explained, was “[b]asically, a bunch of ‘I don‘t knows’ and ‘I don‘t remember.‘” Veronica was told to testify she was living on Douglas Avenue when she voted in the election. Afterwards, Veronica told her sister, Raquel, about the meeting.
The next day, contrary to how she was told to testify at the meeting, Veronica testified she voted for appellant but did not live on Douglas Avenue and never intended to live on Douglas Avenue when she cast her vote. That night, Raquel received a Facebook message from her cousin, Nina Medrano Dominguez, asking what had happened with Veronica. Raquel replied, in part, as follows:
Hey nina! idk if you knew this, but when Carlos was running for the election he
had asked Veronica and I to change our address currently to say that we lived with [Rolando] so we could vote for him. Well, we were told after we voted for him that if anyone question us all we had to say was that we live at the Douglas address, it‘s reasonable because we both go to school in Dallas and I worked around the area, idk what [Veronica‘s] deal is now, but she has completely gone against us since she ended up on the news along with my name ... Well, since Carlos was in court this past week, [Veronica] got served on Monday and had to appear today... Veronica met with my dad, Carlos, Robert, your grandpa, and Sylvia last night to go over some questions that she would be asked and how to answer them. Apparently, she seemed okay with it, but I had known she went behind our family‘s back a long time ago. Her and her boyfriend went and talked to Carlos‘s opponent a while back, kept in touch with him up until the investigation.... So, today in court she told them Carlos lives with Erica at Rotan Lane and the truth, but she totally went behind our backs by NOT saying all this stuff they discussed with her last night. . . I can‘t believe she would do this to us, I feel completely betrayed because idk if she is still upset at me for something that happened a while back or if she‘s mad at the family? No one knows, I should know better than anyone yet, I have no clue why she didn‘t say what she was supposed to say....
Veronica testified when she filled out the voter registration application with the incorrect address in December 2009, she believed it was “okay” because “nobody stepped in to say it was wrong.” She testified she did not know she was ineligible to vote, although she testified she knew it was not true when she represented she lived at the Douglas Avenue address on her voter registration application, she did not reside at the Douglas Avenue address on the day she voted, she knew she was not a resident of the precinct in which appellant ran for JP, and she knew that to vote in the election, she had to lie on her voter registration card.
Bloodworth, the criminal investigator with the AG‘s office, testified she investigated the voter fraud allegations. She said she met with Veronica for the first time in June 2010 when she went to the Medrano residence in Mesquite. Both Raquel and Veronica were there, but only Veronica agreed to talk to her. At first, Veronica said she did not vote in the election but, at some point, admitted she did. Over the course of the investigation, Veronica told Bloodworth that her family told her it was okay to vote in appellant‘s race so she thought she was eligible to vote. Bloodworth testified that Veronica, who was nineteen years old at the time, “had no reason to believe she was voting illegally” and, when asked, Bloodworth agreed that Veronica did not know she was ineligible to vote.
As part of her investigation, Bloodworth obtained various documents relating to Veronica‘s residency and voting. Documents showed Veronica voted at the Grauwyler Park Recreation Center on February 16, 2010, with other Medrano family members, including appellant. Admitted into evidence were the certified copies of the Combination Form for Early Voting by Personal Appearance of each voter at Grauwyler on February 16. Bloodworth explained the forms were numbered in the top right-hand corner, and the number typically represented the order in which the voter arrived or was checked in at the polling place. Appellant‘s form was marked number 20; Veronica‘s and Raquel‘s were marked 24 and 25.
Documents also showed that, in December 2009, Veronica filled out a voter regis
Raquel, who was indicted for illegal voting and given immunity from prosecution, testified she had lived at 2331 Douglas Avenue since January 2009. Similar to Veronica‘s testimony, she said she filled out a voter registration card changing her address to Douglas Avenue at the family Christmas party. She said she believed it was at appellant‘s request, but was “not certain.” On the day she voted, she said appellant called or texted her that it was “early voting” and she and Veronica went that day in separate cars and voted at Grauwyler Park Recreation Center. Although Veronica never lived at 2331 Douglas Avenue, Raquel testified she heard Veronica on many occasions voice her intent to move to the Medrano community in the Douglas Avenue—Knight Street area of Dallas.
Robert Edward Medrano, appellant‘s second cousin, was also charged with illegal voting. He testified he voted for appellant the same day appellant called him several times “to make sure” he and his wife voted. When the voter fraud investigation began, Robert said he refused to testify before the grand jury and was ultimately indicted. Since he has been under indictment, Robert said appellant has told him if they “all stick together, everything will be okay.” But Robert said things continued to get worse, so instead of using the lawyers representing the other family members, he hired his own attorney and began to cooperate with the State. Until that point, he said only Veronica had cooperated. He testified other family members call Veronica “Fredo,” an apparent reference to the brother in the “Godfather” movie who betrayed the family.
Finally, the State also offered appellant‘s grand jury testimony. Appellant denied asking Raquel or Veronica to register to vote in his precinct, denied speaking to them about registering to vote, and denied asking them to vote for him. He said that Raquel called him during early voting and asked where she was supposed to vote. He tried to give her directions, but she did not understand him, so he met her at his house. Raquel and Veronica showed up in separate cars, and they followed him to the Grauwyler polling place. He initially testified he did not go into the polling place, but when shown his voting form, said he had “forgotten” he voted early that day and acknowledged he was at the polling place at the same time as Raquel and Veronica.
Appellant acknowledged he knew it would be illegal for Raquel and Veronica to vote in his election if they lived in Mesquite and it would be illegal for them to change their registration to Dallas if they lived in Mesquite. When asked about the “family meeting” with Veronica the night before she testified in Sepulveda‘s lawsuit, he denied discussing her testimony with her. He suggested Veronica brought the false allegations because she was angry that the family would not pay for her to return to college in Missouri.
Rolando Medrano, who was under indictment for perjury, testified for the de
Veronica‘s father, Frank, testified his daughters filled out voter registration cards at the family Christmas party in 2009, showing the Douglas Avenue address. On the way home from the party, he told them if they planned on moving in with Rolando, they would have to be prepared to “live by his rules.” He said Veronica moved out shortly after that, and he believed she was living with Rolando. On cross-examination, he admitted that when he testified before the grand jury, he did not mention the conversation in the car on the way home from the party. Also, he said Veronica never told him directly that she intended to move in with Rolando, only that she told someone else but he did not know whom.
In his first and second issues, appellant contends his conviction is void because his prosecution in Rockwall County by the AG violated the separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution. Specifically, appellant complains the legislature‘s enactment of chapter 273 of the Texas Election Code impermissibly vests the AG, a member of the executive branch, with criminal prosecutorial authority, although the constitution vests that power in the county and district attorneys, members of the judicial branch.
The
The separation of powers provision may be violated in one of two ways. First, it is violated when one branch of government assumes, or is delegated, to whatever degree, a power that is more “properly attached” to another branch. Armadillo Bail Bonds, 802 S.W.2d at 239. Second, it is violated when one branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers. Id.
The undue interference test takes the middle ground between those who would seek rigid compartmentalization and those who would find no separation of powers violations until one branch completely disrupted another branch‘s ability to function. The rigid compartmentalization theory undermines the efficiency of the government and undervalues the availability of checks and balances. The other extreme looks only for the completed coup and underestimates the incremental effect of inter-branch intrusions.
Id. (quoting N. McCabe, Four Faces of State Constitutional Separation of Powers: Challenges to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions, 62
The offices of county and district attorney are in the judicial branch of government.
The AG, on the other hand, is in the executive branch.
The Attorney General shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law.
This clause provides legislative authority to empower the AG with other duties. See2 courts have long recognized that, along with various civil duties, their primary function is “to prosecute the pleas of the state in criminal cases.” Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 254; see also Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 876 (explaining that present constitution gives authority to prosecute criminal cases to county attorneys, criminal district attorneys, and district attorneys, under regulation of legislature, which has regulated duties of district attorneys and county attorneys by giving them authority to prosecute criminal cases).
Appellant argues the election code provisions violate separation of powers by both unlawfully delegating power to the executive branch that is more properly attached to the judicial branch and by unduly interfering with the judicial branch‘s constitutionally assigned powers. He asserts the Dallas County District Attorney, through the grand jury, declined to prosecute this case “because the grand jury refused to indict.” Therefore, he argues, allowing the AG to prosecute this case in any county “circumvents, overrides, and usurps the power” of Dallas County District Attorney over this case, unduly interfering with the judicial branch while overburdening the Rockwall County District Attorney with responsibility for a case it should not have.
The
Appellant‘s argument is premised on the notion that county and district attorneys fall squarely into the judicial branch and the AG into the executive branch. But our courts have acknowledged otherwise. For instance, in Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 253 n. 9, the court noted that some duties of county and district attorneys might more accurately be characterized as executive in nature. Likewise, in Brady, the supreme court determined that the duties imposed upon the AG are both executive and judicial. Brady, 89 S.W. at 1056.
Brady involved a dispute between the county and district attorney and the AG over who had authority to prosecute suits against an oil company and railroad company for taxes and penalties owed to the State under separate statutes, both of which vested authority in the AG. Id. at 1053. In analyzing the issue, the court determined that the articles of the constitution setting out the roles of the AG and the district and county attorneys “must be construed together” because they involve the same subject matter. Id. at 1056. The court attached no importance to the fact that the “definition and duties and powers” of the AG are placed in
Allowing the AG to prosecute election code violations does not take away from the district attorney so much of his duties as to “practically destroy” his office. By enacting
Our courts have long recognized the legislature may have sound reasons for having a statewide agency pursue some claims in place of the district or county attorney. See Brady, 89 S.W. at 1056. Generally speaking, as the State argues here, this statute allows the AG to “step in” when election violation cases may be “politically sensitive” at the local level, which could discourage local prosecutors from acting. We conclude the legislature‘s enactment of
In his third issue, appellant argues that even if the statutes are constitutional, the AG, the Rockwall County grand jury, the Rockwall County district attorney, and the Rockwall County district court had no jurisdiction because there was no deputation order for the assistant AGs to prosecute this case. To support his argument, he relies on State ex rel. Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
In Pirtle, the district attorney signed deputations appointing two assistant AGs to serve as assistant district attorneys in certain pending criminal cases. 887 S.W.2d at 923. The defense filed motions to prohibit the assistant AGs from serving as assistant district attorneys and raised several grounds. The trial court ultimately granted the motion, concluding the attorneys had no prosecutorial authority by virtue of their status as assistant AGs and the deputation order was void. Id. at 924-25. The district attorney sought mandamus relief. The court of criminal appeals granted the mandamus and ordered the trial judge to vacate his order. The court explained that the district attorney had statutory authority to staff his office and, so long as the assistant AGs acted under his direction, there was no separation of powers violation. Id. at 927-28.
We conclude Pirtle is distinguishable from the facts in our case. In Pirtle, the assistant AGs did not have statutory authority to prosecute the cases independent of the local district attorney. Rather, the statute authorizing their appointment simply gave the district attorney authority to hire any assistant prosecuting attorneys that he deemed necessary to operate his office. Id. at 927. In this case, however, the AG has statutory authority to prosecute election code violations independently from the district attorney. See
To constitute an indictment, the charging instrument must charge a person and the commission of an offense. Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Without both of those elements, the charging instrument is not an indictment and does not vest the district court with jurisdiction. Id. The proper test to determine if a charging instrument alleges “an offense” is whether the allegations in it are clear enough that one can identify the offense alleged. Id. at 180. If they are, then the indictment is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Id. “Stated another way: Can the trial court (and appellate courts who give deference to the trial court‘s assessment) and the defendant identify what penal code provision is alleged and is that penal code provision one that vests jurisdiction in the trial court?” Id.
A person commits illegal voting if the person “votes or attempts to vote in an election in which the person knows the person is not eligible to vote[.]”
Here, the indictment alleged that appellant on or about the 16th day of February, 2010, and before the presentment of the indictment, in Dallas County, Texas, a county adjoining Rockwall County, did then and there, acting to promote or assist the commission of the offense, solicit, encourage, direct, or aid Veronica Medrano to vote in an election in which Veronica Medrano knew she was not eligible to vote, to wit: Veronica Medrano voted in the March 2010 Dallas County Primary Election when she did not reside in the precinct in which she was voting ... (emphasis added).
Appellant argues the indictment failed to allege Veronica was not a resident of the territory covered by the election; rather, it alleged she did not reside in the precinct in which she was voting. Appellant argues that because a qualified voter registered in Dallas County can vote at any polling place during early voting, the fact that Veronica voted when she did not “reside in the precinct in which she was voting” was not an offense and did not make her ineligible to vote. Consequently, he concludes the indictment failed to state an offense. We disagree.
In Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim.App.1997), the defendant was indicted on a charge of indecency with a child. The indictment contained all of the statutory elements comprising a criminal offense: it charged appellant, acting with intent to arouse his own sexual desire, had sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen years of age who was not his spouse. Id. at 551. The defendant, however, complained the instrument also contained factual allegations that, if true, established he was not guilty of the offense; in particular, the indictment alleged the sexual contact between appellant and the child occurred when appellant rubbed his penis between her legs. Id. Because legs were not in-cluded in the areas defined by sexual contact, the defendant argued the indictment did not charge the commission of an offense and did not confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Id.
Here, the indictment alleged Veronica voted when she did not reside in the precinct in which she was voting instead of alleging she did not reside in the precinct for which she was voting. Nevertheless, as in Duron, the indictment contained all of the statutory elements of illegal voting. Further, the caption clearly stated the offense as illegal voting, identified the election code provision, and identified it as a third-degree felony. That it contained a factual allegation that might arguably evidence appellant‘s innocence did not void the indictment. Appellant‘s remedy was to object before trial so that it could be amended. We overrule the fourth issue.
In his fifth, sixth, and seventh issues, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. In particular, he argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he acted to promote the illegal voting of Veronica, (2) Veronica knew she was not eligible to vote, and (3) he knew Veronica was not eligible to vote.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This standard accounts for the factfinder‘s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Therefore, when analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally. Id.
As shown above, the indictment alleged appellant was a party to Veronica‘s illegal voting. A person is criminally liable for an offense committed by the conduct of another if “acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense[.]”
We begin with appellant‘s fifth issue in which he contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction as a party because Veronica was an accomplice as a matter of law and the State failed to corroborate her testimony. Specifically, he argues the only evidence corroborating Veronica‘s testimony was late-filed evidence that was improperly admitted. This evidence includes the Facebook conversation between Raquel and Nina, Veronica‘s sister and cousin. But evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted, is considered in a legal sufficiency review, see Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778,
To support a conviction based on the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the offense. See
The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt; there simply needs to be “other” evidence “tending to connect” the defendant to the offense alleged in the indictment. Id. It may confirm a “mere detail” rather than the elements of the offense. Lee v. State, 29 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). Even “apparently insignificant incriminating circumstances” may provide sufficient corroboration. Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). We look at the particular facts and circumstances of each case and consider the combined force of all the non-accomplice evidence that tends to connect the accused to the offense. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). Judicial experience shows that no precise rule can be formulated as to the amount of the evidence that is required to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).
The Facebook evidence, by itself, corroborates Veronica‘s testimony that appellant was a party to her illegal voting.4 In the message, Raquel tells Nina that (1) appellant asked her and Veronica to change their address to the Douglas Avenue address so they could vote for him for JP, (2) after they voted for appellant, they were told to say they lived on Douglas Avenue if anyone questioned them, (3) Veronica met with appellant and other family members the night before she was to testify “to go over some questions that she would be asked and how to answer them” at the civil trial, and (4) Veronica did not “say what she was supposed to say.”
This evidence corroborates Veronica‘s testimony that appellant asked her to register to vote using Douglas Avenue as her residence address, where she did not reside and did not intend to reside, so that she could vote for him. It also corroborates her testimony that appellant told her to say she lived on Douglas Avenue if anyone questioned her. Finally, it corroborates her testimony about the meeting at4 which appellant and other family members encouraged her to lie at the election contest trial about her residency.
Disregarding Veronica‘s testimony, we conclude there was sufficient evidence tending to connect appellant as a party to the offense. Further, when we consider all of the evidence, including Veronica‘s testimony, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to establish appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, or aided Veronica to vote. We overrule the fifth issue.
In his sixth issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove that Veronica knew she was not eligible to vote. Appellant argues the State was required to prove Veronica knew she was voting and subjectively knew she was “not legally authorized to vote.” He argues the State failed to prove the latter “because all of the evidence was that she did not know” she was ineligible to vote. As evidence, he directs us to the testimony of Veronica and Bloodworth.
The State challenges the premise of appellant‘s argument—that it must prove Veronica knew she was ineligible rather than proving she knew the circumstances rendering her ineligible. The State asserts Veronica knew she never lived on Douglas Avenue nor intended to, nevertheless registered to vote from that address, and knew she was not a resident of Douglas Avenue on the day she registered and the date she voted. It argues that the “gist” of appellant‘s argument is “that if Veronica did not know what she was doing was illegal, she cannot have voted illegally,” We agree with the State.
We find support for our conclusion in Thompson v. State, 26 Tex.App. 94, 9 S.W. 486, 486 (1888), a case with similar circumstances. In Thompson, the defendant, a felon, was charged with illegal voting. At the time, the law disqualified any person convicted of a felony from voting. See
At his trial, the jury was instructed that “[i]f the defendant had been convicted of an assault with the intent to murder, as alleged in the indictment in this cause, and if he knew at the time he so voted that he had been so convicted, such knowledge of his conviction would be equivalent in law to knowing himself not to be a qualified voter.” Thompson, 9 S.W. at 486. The defendant argued on appeal that the instruction was “erroneous in principle” and was a comment on the weight of the evidence. The court concluded the instruction was “correct and unobjectionable,” explaining that everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. Since the defendant knew he had been convicted of assault with intent to murder, the court explained it must be conclusively presumed he knew the legal consequences of his conviction, one being he was not qualified to vote. Id.
In Thompson, the defendant was charged with voting “knowing” he was not a “qualified voter,” and here, Veronica was charged with voting when she knew she was not an eligible voter. Just as the State did not need to prove that Thompson knew the offense was a felony or that he was therefore not qualified to vote (only that he knew he had been convicted of an assault with the intent to commit murder), the State did not need to prove Veronica subjectively knew she was not eligible to vote; it needed only to prove she voted in the March 2010 Dallas County Primary Election when she knew she was not a resident of the precinct for which she was voting. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Id.
The evidence showed Veronica lived in Mesquite, registered to vote using the Douglas Avenue address covered by the JP precinct for which appellant was running, voted in the election as a resident of that precinct, and knew when she registered to vote and when she voted that she was not a resident of Douglas Avenue and did not intend to reside there. Consequently, the State provided evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Veronica knew the facts making her ineligible to vote, which is all that was required.
But even if we were to conclude to the contrary, there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Veronica had such subjective knowledge. Although Veronica testified she did not know she was ineligible to vote, the trial court did not have to believe her, particularly in light of her other testimony that she knew she falsely represented on her voter registration application that she lived at the Douglas Avenue address when she did not live there or intend to live there, knew she did not reside there when she voted, knew she was not a resident of the precinct in which appellant ran when she voted, and knew she had to lie on her voter registration card to vote in the election. Moreover, immediately above her signature on her voter registration application was a statement warning her that “giving false information to procure a voter registration is perjury” and a crime under state and federal law. On her early voting form, Veronica affirmed she lived in the precinct and that she “did not deliberately provide false information to secure registration in a precinct in which” she did not reside. The evidence shows Veronica knew she had to lie about her residency to vote for5
In his seventh issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he knew Veronica was not eligible to vote. He argues “all the evidence” showed that Veronica told her sister, father, and great-uncle she intended to move in with Rolando at the Douglas Avenue address, so there was “no way” for appellant to know her “true intent” or that she would never move.
Initially, we note Veronica testified she did not intend to reside with Rolando and she did not tell anyone she intended to reside with Rolando. Supporting Veronica‘s testimony regarding her intent were all the documents showing her residence as 2408 Boardwalk in Mesquite. To the extent other witnesses’ testimony conflicted with this, it was for the trial court, as factfinder, to resolve the inconsistency.
Moreover, as to appellant‘s knowledge, the trial court could consider evidence that appellant asked Veronica to change her address so she could vote for him, told her to say she was living on Douglas Avenue if anyone asked, and participated in a meeting at which family members told her how to answer questions at the civil trial and told her to say she lived on Douglas Avenue. Veronica‘s testimony regarding appellant‘s part in her illegal voting was circumstantially substantiated by Robert Medrano, who testified that appellant assured him if they would stick together, everything would be okay. Finally, a portion of appellant‘s grand jury testimony was admitted into evidence. There, appellant testified he knew it would be illegal for Veronica to vote for him if she lived in Mesquite rather than on Douglas Avenue in Dallas. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew Veronica was not eligible to vote. We overrule the seventh issue.
In his eighth issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting thirty-seven exhibits as business records. He asserts the records should have been excluded because the State failed to comply with
We will not reverse a trial court‘s decision to admit evidence absent a clear abuse of discretion. McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). The trial court abuses its discretion when the decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
Here, the record shows that on December 29, 2011, appellant and seven family members appeared before the trial court, entered not guilty pleas, and waived their right to a jury trial. Both the State and defense announced ready, and the State called Bloodworth, who testified briefly and provided some evidence against each defendant. The trials were scheduled to reconvene in February, beginning with appellant‘s trial.
The trial court explained the process being used was to facilitate the scheduling of all the related cases and to “foreclose either the State or defense” from changing their jury elections once verdicts were announced in the early cases. The defense notified the trial court it had filed several discovery motions, and the parties agreed to use the date the trial would reconvene, February 14, as the date it would count
On January 23, 24, and 26, 2012, the State filed business records affidavits for the complained-of evidence with the clerk. The evidence included the Facebook conversation between Raquel and Nina. When trial reconvened on February 14, appellant objected that the State did not file the business records fourteen days before the trial commenced on December 29. The State responded that the “procedures for this whole case relied upon, operated, with today, February 14th, as the first trial date” and that “all the parties acted in December with the right to reserve pretrial issues such as filings, motions, discovery” and “used 20 days from today‘s date, February 14th, as the deadline for things to be filed, tendered, discussed, followed, et cetera.” Further, the State asserted that the “particular procedure” used was to “invoke jeopardy” and was implemented “with the understanding that neither party would be prejudiced.”
The trial court agreed with the State, saying that both sides relied on the “unusual” manner in which the trials were started. The trial court stated that the “intent” for all pretrial matters was to use February 14 and “go back 20 days” as the “drop-dead date.” In overruling the objection, the trial court explained the case was started for “procedural purposes” on the “Court‘s wishes” in December, and there were discussions both on and off the record that neither side “would have any problems with regard to complying with statutory mandates because we were going to pick the date of the first trial, which is today, go back 20 days from there. And that was when all of these legal matters must be filed or brought to—whatever the law requires at that point in time.”
On appeal, appellant argues any agreement on discovery would not include
Opinion by Justice FRANCIS.
Richard Earl ORTIZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 14-12-00726-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
Jan. 23, 2014.