434 F. App'x 32
2d Cir.
2011

Anthony Jerome McKNIGHT v. Dawn Marie MIDDLETON et al.

No. 10-1664-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Oct. 5, 2011

ment agreement; we review its factual conclusions “under the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Omega Eng‘g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). A district court “may exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear fee disputes between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute relates to the main action.” Alderman v. Pan Am World Airways, 169 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court reviews a district court‘s decision to award fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.

The district court properly held that the settlement agreement was binding, enforceable, and disposed of all of plaintiff‘s claims against the defendants. See Powell v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating “settlement remains binding even if a party has a change of heart” after he agreed to the terms of the settlement). Plaintiff‘s claims of fraud and duress are not substantiated by the record.

The district court‘s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the fee dispute was proper. See Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 336 (2d Cir.2006) (observing that district courts have “power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a fee dispute” and that “the lower court‘s familiarity with the subject matter of the [underlying] suit len[ds] support to the exercise of jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, we vacate and remand in part, for the district court to make further factual findings that bear upon the award of fees including, inter alia, the timing of the commencement of counsel‘s representation and the pendency of other cases, litigated pro se, that are folded into the settlement.

Payment of the settlement amount will abide the determination of the fee dispute in light of the district court‘s findings.

Having considered all of Raghavendra‘s properly presented arguments, we hereby AFFIRM IN PART the order of the district court, because we find that the settlement agreement was binding and disposed of all of plaintiff‘s claims, and VACATE the award of attorneys fees and REMAND for further factual findings consistent with this order.

Anthony Jerome McKnight, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

Dawn Marie Middleton, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Benjamin N. Gutman, Deputy Solicitor General, and Robert C. Weisz, Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel, for Appellees County of Kings Family Court, Robert Ratanski, John Doe, State of New York, Paula J. Hepner, and Other Unknown Persons, New York, NY.

Lisa L. Shrewsberry, Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, for Appellees Harold A. Mayerson, Mayerson Stutman Abramowitz Royer LLP, and Sophie Jacobi, Hawthorne, NY.

Janet Neustaetter, for Appellees Carol Sherman, Martha Schneiderman, and The Children‘s Law Center, Brooklyn, NY.

Dennis J. Dozis, Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP, for Appellees Eileen Montrose and Louis Lauro, New York, NY.

PRESENT: WALKER, DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Anthony Jerome McKnight appeals from the district court‘s dismissal of his Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The 130-page Amended Complaint asserted 72 claims against defendants-appellees pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and federal and state wiretapping law, and for unlawful interference with his rights under a custody agreement, defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews de novo the district court‘s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

We have conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles. We affirm the district court‘s judgment for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum order.

We have reviewed McKnight‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.