McCarty v. Hospital Corp. of America
580 N.E.2d 228
Ind.
1991
Check Treatment

John W. McCARTY, Appellant (Plaintiff Below) v. HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, and Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Appellees (Defendants Below)

No. 77S01-9110-CV-847

Supreme Court of Indiana

Oct. 28, 1991

580 N.E.2d 228

of the officers. Chambers was one of the persons in the crowd and was struck by fire returned by the wounded officer. However, no one, including several officers present, was able to state that Chambers was the one who fired the fatal shot or that he in fact fired any shot.

Sometime after the shooting, a man named McDonald, after first consulting with a minister who was a personal friend, went to Chambers’ attorney and gave a sworn statement that he shot the officer. He told the attorney that on three prior occasions he had informed friends that he had committed the shooting. However, after his arrest, McDonald repudiated his statements and eventually was released.

Justice Powell, writing for the United States Supreme Court, observed that:

“In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to present this portion of his defense by the strict application of certain Mississippi rules of evidence. . . . that the application of these evidentiary rules rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of due process of law.”

, , .

After observing that the specific facts of the case required the implementation of an exception to the hearsay rule, Justice Powell stated:

“In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprive Chambers of a fair trial.” , , .

In , cited by the majority, the rule and its exceptions were recognized including a quotation from . There this Court correctly held that the admissibility of such a statement depends in a large part upon the trustworthiness of the person making the statement. In Taggart, the person making the statement had offered it for sale to Taggart for $5,000.

In the case at bar, there was no confusion such as that which existed in where authorities were unable to pinpoint who fired a shot from a large crowd. The only issue in this case was that either Eric Nelson or appellant perpetrated the robbery. Although Nelson had at one time been identified in a photographic array, which did not include appellant, when appellant was placed in a lineup in which Nelson was not included, the bank tellers identified him as the holdup man. The issue turns upon the great similarity of the appearance of Nelson and appellant. Also, unlike the facts in , very little reliability could be placed upon Nelson‘s braggadocio statements to other inmates in the jail where he was held on other charges. These statements were never made to persons in authority or to any one other than inmates of the jail. The ruling in is undoubtedly correct in stating that a given set of facts can justify a departure from the general rule. However, I see nothing in the factual situation in the case at bar which can justify such a departure.

I therefore would hold that in the case at bar the rule was applied properly. I would affirm the trial court.

Mary A. Findling, Price & Shula, Indianapolis, Eric A. Frey, Frey Hunt Hassler & Lorenz, Terre Haute, for appellant.

John D. Nell, Julie L. Michaelis, Wooden McLaughlin & Sterner, Indianapolis, for appellees.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

KRAHULIK, Justice.

Hospital Corporation Corporation of America (“HCA“) and Terre Haute Region-al Hospital, Inc. (“THRH“) seek transfer requesting that the trial court‘s grant of partial judgment on the pleadings be reinstated. The trial court granted a partial judgment after determining that several counts, V through IX, of the amended complaint were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed. . The sole issue in this case is whether the amendments relate back to the original complaint and are thus considered to come within the limitations period. We accept transfer in order to resolve alleged conflicts between published opinions of the Court of Appeals.

I. Facts

In October of 1982, McCarty instituted an action against the hospital alleging that an operation performed there by Dr. Manuel Cacdac was unnecessary. McCarty also accused the hospital of failing to investigate the need for the operation and of concealing its knowledge of the fact that Cacdac was performing unnecessary surgeries. McCarty simultaneously filed against Cacdac asserting virtually the same claims. The two cases were consolidated.

In January of 1988, McCarty was granted leave to amend. The amendments included additional claims that (1) the hospital breached an implied-in-fact contract by failing to employ qualified doctors at a time when it knew or should have known that Cacdac was performing unnecessary surgeries; (2) that a nurse, an agent of the hospital, assigned the responsibility of investigating the need for surgeries occurring at the hospital, failed to recognize that this surgery was unnecessary; (3) that the hospital failed to institute an adequate investigation procedure to determine the necessity of operations at the hospital; and (4) that the hospital and its agents entered into a conspiracy with the doctor to perform unnecessary surgeries and that they aided and abetted the doctor in performing these surgeries. The hospital argues that the amendments represent entirely new claims or causes of action and, as such, they do not relate back to the period before the expiration of the statute of limitations pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 15(C).

II. Discussion

The doctrine of “relation back” provides that a pleading may be amended to add a new claim or defense after the statute of limitations period has run so long as it “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Ind.T.R. 15(C). If the new claim or “cause of action” meets this requirement, it will be treated as though it were part of the original pleading, thereby circumventing bar by the limitations period.

To apply Rule 15(C), a court must determine what is meant by the phrase “conduct, transaction or occurrence.” Indiana courts have taken somewhat divergent positions and, occasionally, we have created undue limitations on the right to amend. For example, in , trans. denied (1986), , Michael filed an action against the city for injuries she received when a city truck driver collided with her car. The action, filed in 1978, was based on claims of respondeat superior. In 1983, the trial court allowed amendments, including claims of negligent entrustment. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiff and held that negligent entrustment was “an entirely new claim which will not relate back under Indiana law.” . The court read T.R. 15(C) to say that “relation back of an amendment which states an entirely new cause of action” is prohibited. Consequently, the court concluded that because the negligent entrustment claim was premised on the negligence of the city itself, while respondeat superior claims concerned only the city‘s liability for its employees’ negligent acts, the amendment stated a new cause of action and, as such, would not relate back.

Although this Court denied transfer, two justices felt that the “relation back” issue was decided improperly and deserved additional discussion. Justice DeBruler, joined by Justice Shepard, dissented to the denial of transfer of Michael, and stated that the emphasis on “cause of action” language results in “an unduly rigid approach in applying the rule, in that it has not given adequate weight to the factual circumstances.” (DeBruler and Shepard, JJ., dissenting). The opinion considered “[t]he general set of facts initially relied upon [including] Adams’ conduct in driving the city truck, drinking alcohol, the collision, the injuries to Michael, Adams’ status at the time as a city employee, and the conduct of the city supervisors in setting up the scope of Adams’ employment.” Additionally, the opinion referred to “[t]he factual dimension added to these by the amendment includ[ing] Adams’ history of driving and alcohol abuse, and the knowledge of city supervisors of such history, as they went about assigning him tasks and dealing with him.” The opinion concludes that “based upon a factual analysis of this type, it was clearly reasonable for the trial court to declare that the claim in the new count . . . arose out of the ‘conduct, transaction or occurrence’ initially relied upon.” .

We believe that the analysis set forth in this dissent is correct. Therefore, we now hold that the factual circumstances that gave rise to the original claims, the general injuries sustained, and the general conduct causing those injuries constitute the “conduct, transaction or occurrence” referred to in Rule 15(C). Thus, it is these factual circumstances that must be examined to determine whether relation back is proper.

One guide to conducting this inquiry is to determine whether evidence tending to support the facts alleged in the amended complaint could or would naturally have been introduced under the former pleading to support the original complaints. So long as the factual circumstances upon which the amendment is based are similar to those in the initial complaint, a change in legal theory does not create a new “cause of action.” An amendment stating an entirely new claim for relief is permissable so long as it arises from the same factual circumstances pled in the initial complaint.

The purpose of the doctrine of relation back is to allow a party who, through the course of discovery, realizes a new claim or defense the opportunity to use this claim or defense despite the running of the statute of limitations. Allowing liberal amendment to pleadings affords all parties the opportunity to present a complete picture of the issues involved in a lawsuit to the trier of fact. . This policy is not prejudicial to nor does it place an undue hardship upon defendants. Once a defendant receives notice of a claim or defense raised against him, he should be aware that he may be subject to any possible additional claims or defenses stemming from “the general injury and general conduct” at issue and not merely those claims or defenses resembling those already pled. It would be difficult indeed for such a defendant, currently involved in litigation over an issue arising from a particular matter, to contend that he had no notice that he might be taken to task over a second issue arising out of the same matter.

The policy upon which statutes of limitation are premised, viz. guarding against stale claims, lost evidence and faulty memories of witnesses, is not endangered by this application of the relation back doctrine. Once a claim has been made, a defendant is put on notice that the factual circumstances surrounding that claim are in issue.

III. Conclusion

In this case, injuries received by McCarty, allegedly due to both the operation performed by Cacdac and the hospital‘s conduct with respect to that operation gave rise to the allegations contained in the original as well as in the amended complaints. As such, the amendments do relate back to the original complaint and are not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we accept transfer, vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse the partial judgment entry of the trial court, and remand this cause to the trial court.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ., concur.

GIVAN, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.

GIVAN, Justice, concurring.

Although I agree with the result of the majority in this case, I cannot agree with the dictum contained in the majority opinion stating that the case of , trans. denied (1986), was incorrectly decided. That observation is entirely unnecessary in the decision of this case. The present case is readily distinguishable from the Michael case in that, as stated in the majority opinion, McCarty had sued the hospital and Dr. Cacdac separately and the cases were consolidated.

There is no question that the majority has reached the right decision that the amendment filed in January of 1988 by McCarty in fact did relate back to the original allegations. I think the dictum concerning the Michael case is in error and entirely unnecessary.

KRAHULIK

Justice