This dispute arises out of the sale of certain goods and services by appellant Allied Mills, Inc., to appellee P.I.G., Inc. Specifically, Allied sold P.I.G. breeder gilts, and provided a feed program and feed. After several months it became evident the pigs were suffering from various illnesses both hereditary and resultant from an inadequatе feed program.
On May 6, 1981, P.I.G. filed suit for compensatory - damages, - alleging - several grounds of recovery. Discovery was held open until October 12, 1988. P.I.G. filed a motion on Aрril 19, 1983, requesting the court order Allied to produce its annual shareholder's reports for the years 1978-1983. Allied in turn filed a motion for a protective order on May 4, 1983. A motion to amend the pleadings to include a plea for recovery of punitive damages was filed by P.IL.G. on May 17, 1982.
On June 3, 1983 the trial court held a hearing ion the parties' motions Allied filed a memorandum in opposition to P.I. G.'s motion to amend its complaint on this date, and the trial court took that matter under advisement. The trial court granted P.LG.'s motion to compel discovery at that time. On June 20, 1988, the trial court granted P.I.G.'s motion to amend its pleadings. The matter was certified and Allied brings this interlocutory appeal.
On appeal Allied contends:
(1) thе trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law by granting P.I.G.'s motion to amend its complaint to include a plea for punitive damages;
(2) the trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law in its order that Allied produce its annual shareholder's reports for the years 1978-1983; and
(3) the trial court erred in failing to grant, either in whole or in part, Allied's motion for a protective order.
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Allied argues the trial court should not have allowed P.I.G. leave to amend its complaint. Severаl grounds are forwarded by Allied in support of this contention. First, Allied contends the amendment should not have been allowed because there is no clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages as required by Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, (1982) Ind.,
The grant or denial of a motion to amend a pleading, made after a responsive pleading has been filed, rests in the sound discretion of the triаl court and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Hoosier Plastics v. Westfield Sav. & Loan, (1982) Ind.App., 483 N.E2d 24; B & D Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., (1979)
Allied also contends the amendment should havе been disallowed because it unnecessarily complicates the litigation and might confuse the jury. Amendments to the pleadings are to be liberally allowed so thе parties may present all issues involved in a lawsuit before a jury. Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Co., (1977)
Allied raisеs one final argument against the trial court's grant of P.LG.'s amendment to the pleadings. It is Allied's contention that the motion should not have been allowed because it was filеd after the statute of limitations had expired and results in prejudice to Allied's case. This argument is unavailing.
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the time of filing оf the original pleading. Thus, if the original pleading was timely, an amendment to that pleading submitted after the statute of limitations has run will also be considered timely. Parsley v. Waverly Concrete & Gravel Co., (1981) Ind.App., 427 N.E2d 1. Again the grant or denial of an amendment to a pleading rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. A party who opposes a motion to amend the pleadings must do more than utter a bald statement that he is prejudiced in order to establish an abuse of discretion. Curtis v. Hannah, (1981) Ind.App.,
Next, Allied attacks the trial court's ruling on P.I.G.'s motion for production of certain financial statements. Alliеd vehemently argues the sanctity and privacy interest of a company's financial statements transcends the complainant's need to know that information. While acknowledging a company's or individual's privacy interest in their financial records, this Court does not believe this privacy interest renders such documents undiscoverable.
As with an amendment to a pleading the grant or denial of a discovery order rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Costanzi v. Ryan et al., (1978) 175
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Ind.App. 257,
The documents requested by P.ILG., the shareholder's annual financial reports for the years 1978-1983, are an accurate and concise compilation of evidence supрorting each of these factors relevant to an award of punitive damages. These annual reports may also include information relating to other irrelеvant matters and may include sensitive information which should not be subject to discovery. Keeping in mind the sensitive nature of these documents, discovery should be ordered in a limited fashion which protects a party's privacy interest in the financial reports, insofar as it is practicable. There is no abuse of discretion in ordering discоvery of the relevant portions of financial reports. 1
Which brings the Court to Allied's final argument. It is Allied's contention the trial court erred in failing to grant, in whole or in part, its motion for a protective order. First, Allied's motion for a protective order was essentially a request not to grant P.IL.G.'s motion to order discovery. As this issue has already bеen decided adversely to Allied, there is no reason to discuss it further.
As to Allied's contention the motion for protective order should have been granted in part, thеre was no such request placed before the trial court. Failure to request available relief at the earliest possible opportunity results in a waiver of any error in that regard. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7); Walker v. Jennings, (1975)
Affirmed.
Notes
. It is incumbent upon the party opposing discovery of these sensitive documents to object in a manner which directs the court to limit discovery to the relevant portions and protects the areas which are irrelevant and should not be discovered. A party may not simply object to discovery of the information as a whole and expect the court to cull through the material without direction as was done by Allied in the case at bar.