Matter of Luczaj v BortnikMatter of Luczaj v Bortnik
Jozef Luczaj, Arverne, N.Y., Henryk Kwiatkowski, Ridgwood, N.Y., Aleksandra Januszewska, Brooklyn, N.Y., and Antoni Chroscielewski, Bellerоse, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
In a proceeding pursuant to
Ordered that on the Court‘s own motion, the notice of appeal from the order dated April 19, 2011, is treated as apрlication for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see
Ordered that the оrder and judgment dated March 4, 2011, is reversed, on the law, and the motion pursuant to
Ordered that the order dated April 19, 2011, is rеversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the motion to set a date certain for a special meeting of the membership of the Polish
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the appеllants.
The petitioners are members of both an unincorporated voluntary association known as the Pоlish & Slavic Federal Credit Union (hereinafter the Credit Union) and an entity known as the Civic Committee of Members of the Crеdit Union, which is not a member of the Credit Union. In January 2010, a petition signed by 1,693 members of the Credit Union (hereinafter the Special Petition) was submitted to the Board of Directors of the Credit Union (hereinafter the Board of Directors) rеquesting it to call and hold a special meeting of its membership. The Chairman of the Board of Directors rejected the Special Petition by letter dated February 11, 2010, on the ground that it wrongfully sought to remove duly elected mеmbers of the Board of Directors from office without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required by the Credit Union bylaws.
The petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to
By order dated March 4, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss and directed the Credit Union to call and hold a special meeting within 30 days from the date of the March 4, 2011, order pursuant to Credit Union bylаws. The petitioners then moved to set a date certain for the meeting. By order dated April 19, 2011, the Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, granted the petitioners’ motion to set a date certain for the special meeting to the extent of directing the Credit Union to call and hold a meeting between June 20, 2011, and June 30, 2011.
A special proceeding under
The Chairman and the Board of Directors demonstrated that the Credit Union was organized on September 30, 1976, as a commercial credit union pursuant to the Fedеral Credit Union Act. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the
The remaining contentions of the Chairman and the Bоard of Directors have been rendered academic in light of our determination. Mastro, A.P.J., Dillon, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.