Mary Doe v. Porter-Gaud SchoolMary Doe v. Porter-Gaud School
Case Information
*1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION
MARY DOE, as mother and guardian of John )
Doe , and JOHN DOE, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) No. 2:22-cv-02093-DCN vs. )
) ORDER PORTER-GAUD SCHOOL, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________________)
The following matter is before the court on defendant Porter-Gaud School’s (“Porter-Gaud”) motion to dismiss, ECF No. 15. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This complaint arises from Porter-Gaud’s investigation into an allegation of rape between two minors who attended the school. Porter-Gaud is “an independent coeducational college preparatory day school” in Charleston, South Carolina. ECF No. 8, Amend. Compl. ¶ 3. In December 2018, the then fifteen-year-old John Doe engaged in a consensual sexual еncounter with his classmate and neighbor, Catherine Roe. Id. ¶ 5. The two minors allegedly thereafter engaged in multiple sexual encounters with each other on separate occasions. Id. ¶¶ 6–9. Five months after the initial encounter, Catherine Roe told her parents that the initial encounter was non-consensual rape, though the remainder of the sexual interactions were mutually consensual. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. John Doe denies the claims of coercion on any occasion. Id. ¶ 11. Initially, both sets of *2 parents decided that the matter was settled and that the teens should just stay apart. Id. ¶ 12.
Catherine Roe, however, was not satisfied by that arrangement and instead told the Porter-Gaud school administrators and counselors that John Doe had raped her. Id. Porter-Gaud followed mandatory reporting procedures and called the police to investigate the allegations of rape. Id. ¶ 13. The police did not prosecute John Doe because “there was no evidence of [John] Doe’s guilt and even if Ms. Roe had told the police her side of the story, it still would have been a: ‘he said/she said’ case with cоrroborating witnesses supporting Mr. Doe, not Miss Roe’s account of the evening.” Id. The police ended their investigation with no action taken against John Doe. Id. ¶ 14. Catherine Roe was also dissatisfied with this outcome, allegedly “physically assault[ing] Mr. Doe at school on two occasions . . . [and] loudly calling him a rapist in front of many students, faculty and parents.” Id. Porter-Gaud thereafter brought in “investigators from New York with the #MeTOO Movement.” Id. ¶ 15. John Doe’s family hired counsel and provided the investigators with known witness information. Id. Eventually, the investigators dropped their investigation and Porter-Gaud notified John Doe that there was no policy violation on his part and he was free to return as a student in good standing. Id. ¶¶ 16–20. School officials refused to notify the other witnesses and students that they found John Doe had engaged in no wrongdoing. Id. ¶ 20.
Mary Doe, on behalf of her son John Doe, alleges that the investigation took a toll on her son and family emotionally, and on their family financially because they had to hire counsel. See id. ¶¶ 15–20. Mary Doe filed this complaint in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas on May 29, 2022. ECF No. 1-1, Compl. At the time of the *3 complaint’s filing, John Doe was an adult who turned eighteen on July 31, 2021. Compl. ¶ 2. Porter-Gaud removed the complaint to this court on July 1, 2022 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. ECF No. 1. On July 21, 2022, Mary Doe filed an amended complaint, now the operative complaint, which named her son John Doe as a co-plaintiff (collectively, the “Does”). ECF No. 8, Amend. Compl. Porter-Gaud filed a motion to dismiss on July 1, 2022, which the court determined was mooted by the amended complaint. ECF No. 11. On August 26, 2022, Porter-Gaud again filed a partial motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 15. The Does responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss on September 29, 2022, ECF No. 18, to which Porter-Gaud replied on October 13, 2022, ECF No. 22. As such, the motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for review.
II. STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) examines whether the
pleading fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. It is the petitioner’s
burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to “regard the pleadings’ allegations as mere
evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without
converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, Fredericksburg &
Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States,
To resolve a jurisdiсtional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider
undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. The court may dismiss a
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “(1) the [the
pleading] alone; (2) the [pleading] supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the
*4
record; or (3) the [pleading] supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution
of disputed facts.” Johnson v. United States,
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a сomplaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v.
Martin,
III. DISCUSSION
The court first examines Porter-Gaud’s jurisdictional arguments regarding standing under Rule 12(b)(1) before turning to the issue of whether the Does have failed to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Standing
Porter-Gaud alleges that Mary Doe has failed to properly allege third-party standing on behalf of her son because her son is no longer a minor and was not a minor at the time the complaint was filed, even though the alleged injuries giving rise to this action occurred while he was a minor. See ECF No. 15 at 2. However, since John Doe has joined this case as a plaintiff and has standing for each of the causes of action, the court finds that plaintiffs have adequately alleged standing. See Amend. Compl.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), courts consider whether the suit constitutes a case or
controversy over which federal courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Article III. See
CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.,
[T]he general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the reрresentative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
Ordinarily, a party “must assert h[er] own legal rights” and “cannot rest h[er]
claim to relief on the legal rights . . . of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin,
Therefore, if the court finds that John Doe is an adult, his mother Mary Doe does
not have representative standing. Whether an individual is a minor is determined by
reference to state law. See Mulready v. Mulready,
“At least one plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of
requested relief” for that claim to proceed. Kenny v. Wilson,
In the instant case, the Does allege five causes of action: (1) slander and libel; (2)
slander and libel per se; (3) negligence/recklessness/willfulness; (4) malicious
prosecution; and (5) violation of the John Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protections rights and Title IX. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 24–33. The allegations set
forth by John Doe—notably, that Porter-Gaud publicly slandered his name by
perpetuаting allegations of rape; that the school’s actions in responding to the rape
allegations were reckless, willful, and wanton; that the multiple investigations constituted
malicious prosecution; and that Porter-Gaud consequently violated federal laws—convey
standing for this case, meaning that John Doe has adequately alleged injury-in-fact that a
favorable ruling will redress. Because John Doe has standing, the court does not examine
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Mary Doe’s standing. See Watt,
B. Failure to State a Claim for Relief
Porter-Gаud further alleges that even if there is standing, Mary Doe has not pled facts that support a cause of action that would lead to individual damages for Mary Doe, nor have the Does alleged facts that amount to malicious prosecution. Upon review, the court grants Porter-Gaud’s partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for all claims asserted by Mary Doe and for the malicious prosecution claims brought by John Doe. The court explains below.
1. Individual Damages to Mary Doe Porter-Gaud argues that Mary Doe has not pled facts that support the allegations of individual damage to herself—meaning, she has only alleged injuries in her representative capacity on behalf of her adult son John Doe. ECF No. 15 at 1. The amended complaint alleges the Does suffered damages—including out-of-pocket expenses from defending the false allegations, as well as emotional damages—caused by Porter-Gaud, but it does not specify what exact expenses those damages reference. Amend. Compl. at 10. In their response in opposition, the Does argue for the first time that Porter-Gaud has a contractual duty to the parents who pay for their children’s education “to fairly and equally treat and respect each child.” ECF No. 18 at 4. Mary Doe argues that since she paid tuition to the school and Porter-Gaud accepted that payment, Porter-Gaud accepted that contractual duty and thereafter breached that duty by treating John Doe inequitably compared to Catherine Roe. Id. at 5. Porter-Gaud, in reply, explains the elements of each of the causes of action and demonstrates that even *10 with the amended сomplaint, the Does have failed to state any facts that provide Mary Doe with a cognizable claim for relief, since all the facts alleged support injuries solely suffered by John Doe. ECF No. 22 at 2–4. The court examines each cause of action as it relates to Mary Doe below.
a. Slander and Libel & Slander and Libel Per Se
The court finds that Mary Doe has not alleged any facts that support a plausible
claim for defamation of Mary Doe. “The tort of defamation allows a plaintiff to recover
for injury to her reputation as the result of the defendant’s communicаtion to others of a
false message about the plaintiff. Slander is a spoken defamation while libel is a written
defamation or one accomplished by actions or conduct.” Holtzscheiter v. Thomson
Newspapers, Inc.,
b. Negligence/Recklessness/Willfulness It is difficult to evaluate this claim because it is unclear what the bases are for Mary Doe’s negligence claim. See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29 (“The actions and inactions of the defendants as references above amount to recklessness, willfulness and wanton behavior toward the plaintiffs.”). The only clarity that the Does have provided as to this claim comes from their response in opposition to the partial motion to dismiss, where Mary Doe raises a novel breach of contractual duty claim that she somehow ties to a *11 negligence cause of action. Noting that a contractual duty claim typically should be pursued in a breach of contract claim not a negligence cause of action, the court first evaluates whether a negligence cause of action could encompass such a claim, and thereafter determines that it is without merit. Consequently, the court finds that Mary Doe has failed to state any facts that support her cause of action for Negligence/Recklessness/Willfulness and grants Porter-Gaud’s partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for that cause of action.
“[N]egligence is the failure to use due care, i.e., that degree of care which a
person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances.”
Berberich v. Jack,
“To state a cause of action for negligence under South Carolina law, a plaintiff
must show: ‘(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty by a
negligent act or omission; (3) a negligent act or omission resulted in damages to the
plaintiff; and (4) that damages proximately resulted from the breach of duty.’” In re
Blackbaud, Inc., Customer Data Breach Litig.,
The Does have not provided the court any facts that establish that Porter-Gaud
owed Mary Doe, as John Doe’s mother, a duty of care. See Cockrell v. Lexington Cnty.
Sch. Dist. One,
It is dubious whether a contract exists. Preliminarily, there is no express contract
because the alleged contract of paying tuition and sending a child to school is not
manifested by words, oral or written, and thus the contract would, at best, be one that is
implied-in-fact. See Stanley Smith & Sons v. Limestone Coll.,
Mary Doe attempts to establish a negligence cause of action by alleging a duty
arising from an implied contract. To do so, she points to the fact that “both parents and
students sign agreements to abide by school policies when a student is enrolled at Porter-
Gaud,” and thereafter asserts that those are “mutual promises that both Plaintiffs and
Porter-Gaud are held to.” ECF No. 18 at 4. She allegеs that the payment of tuition
creates a duty “to the parents to educate their children, provide for the safety and well-
being of their children, and to fairly and equally treat and respect each child.” Id. She
alleges that “by accepting that payment, Porter-Gaud agreed to educate, protect, and
fairly treat John Doe.” Id. at 5. But Mary Doe does not specify where exactly she finds
such a duty—in other words, what exact contractual provision was violated. Courts that
have found an implied-in-fact contract between students and schoоls have relied upon
violations of specific provisions of the school’s codes, brochures, catalogues, or
regulations to establish such a contract. See, e.g., Clemson Univ.,
Even if the court accepts that Porter-Gaud and Mary Doe were in privity of
contract—one implied by the conduct of paying tuition—that would be insufficient by
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itself to establish duty. See Ellis v. Tall Ships Charleston, LLC,
The court grants Porter-Gaud’s partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with regards to Mary Doe’s negligence/recklessness/willfulness cause of action.
c. Remaining Claims The court agrees with Porter-Gaud and finds that Mary Doe has not adequately alleged any facts that support a claim of malicious prosecution, nor the Does’ amalgamated claim for “Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection Rights and Title IX.” See Amend. Compl. Mary Doe was not prosecuted, consequently there was no malicious prosecution. Further, Mary Doe has asserted no facts that support her allegation that she, personally, was denied due process, equal protection, or rights protected by Title IX. Thus, the court grants Porter-Gaud’s partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with regards to those causes of action.
Upon doing so, the court finds that it has dismissed all of Mаry Doe’s causes of action and, in turn, dismisses her from the complaint, allowing John Doe to proceed as the sole remaining plaintiff.
2. Malicious Prosecution Finally, Porter-Gaud alleges that to the extent John Doe has pled a claim for malicious prosecution, that cause of action should be dismissed since no prosecution occurred. The court agrees and grants Porter-Gaud’s motion to dismiss John Doe’s malicious prosecution claims for failure to state a claim.
For a plaintiff to bring a valid malicious prosecution action, judicial proceedings
must be initiated against a plaintiff, meaning the plaintiff must be charged with a crime.
Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores,
Porter-Gaud alleges that the amended complaint lacks any specific allegations concerning the institution or continuation of judicial proceedings. ECF No. 15 at 10. The closest that the amended complaint comes to identifying a proceeding “provides that Porter-Gaud ‘falsely prosecut[ed]’ Doe after the police closed their investigation.” Id. *17 (citing Amend. Compl. ¶ 21(A)). Porter-Gaud alleges that the internal investigation by Porter-Gaud is not a civil or criminal proceeding that is required for a valid claim of malicious prosecution. Id. Since there was no judicial proceeding instituted by or at the insistence of Porter-Gaud, “no judicial proceeding was resolved in favor of Doe.” Id. The court agrees.
Under South Carolina law, “[i]n order to sustain an action for malicious
prosecution, once must first be charged with the commission of a crime and exonerated.”
Elletson,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE January 6, 2022
Charleston, South Carolina