649 F.Supp.3d 164
D.S.C.2023Background
- Porter-Gaud School investigated allegations that, while a minor, John Doe raped classmate Catherine Roe; police investigated and took no action. The school also conducted an external #MeToo-style investigation and later informed John Doe it found no policy violation.
- After the investigations, Roe allegedly continued to assault and publicly accuse Doe; Doe’s family retained counsel; school refused to notify other students/witnesses that Doe was cleared.
- Mary Doe (mother) filed suit in state court on behalf of John Doe; John turned 18 before the suit was filed. Porter-Gaud removed to federal court; John later was added as a co-plaintiff.
- The amended complaint asserts five causes of action: defamation (slander/libel and per se), negligence/recklessness/willfulness, malicious prosecution, and violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process/equal protection and Title IX.
- Porter-Gaud moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court denied dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because John Doe (now a named plaintiff) has Article III standing, but granted in part and dismissed all of Mary Doe’s individual claims and John Doe’s malicious prosecution claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (representative/prudential) | Mary (as guardian) may sue for harms suffered while John was a minor; John joined as plaintiff | Mary lacks representative standing because John was an adult when suit filed | John has Article III standing as plaintiff; Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal denied as to the Doe plaintiffs |
| Mary Doe's individual damages (defamation, negligence, constitutional/Title IX) | Mary alleges emotional and financial harms and invokes a contractual duty arising from tuition payments | No facts show Mary personally was defamed or owed a separate legal duty by Porter-Gaud | Court dismissed all of Mary Doe’s claims for failure to state a claim; Mary is dismissed from the suit |
| Negligence / implied contract duty | Mary contends tuition/payment and school policies create a contractual duty to parents to protect and fairly treat students | Alleged tuition/payment does not identify specific contractual promises or special relationship creating a tort duty | Court found no plausible implied-in-fact contract or special relationship; negligence/recklessness claims by Mary dismissed |
| Malicious prosecution (John) | School’s investigations and reporting amounted to prosecution | No judicial or criminal proceedings were initiated; internal/external investigations are not prosecutions | Malicious prosecution claim dismissed for failure to state a claim because no charge, arrest warrant, or judicial proceeding occurred |
| Remaining federal claims by John (due process/equal protection/Title IX, defamation/other torts) | John alleges reputational injury, emotional and economic harm from school’s actions | School argued various deficiencies but primarily challenged jurisdiction and certain claims | Court allowed John to proceed on claims not dismissed; only the specific claims noted above were dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1991) (Rule 12(b)(1) may consider evidence outside pleadings)
- CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 2011) (Article III case-or-controversy standing principles)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Article III standing requirements)
- Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (prudential standing and zone-of-interests analysis)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 220 (standing requires concrete injury-in-fact)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (prohibition on raising third-party rights)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility and evaluating factual allegations)
- Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 99 S.E.2d 384 (S.C. 1957) (malicious prosecution requires charge and exoneration)
- Pallares v. Seinar, 756 S.E.2d 128 (elements required for malicious prosecution claim)