Marino Scafidi v. LvmpdMarino Scafidi v. Lvmpd
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 22, 2020
San Francisco, California
Filed July 23, 2020
Before: William A. Fletcher and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges, and Donald W. Molloy,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court‘s summary judgment, and remanded, in an action alleging (1) that plaintiff was arrested without probable cause for sexual assault; and (2) that the police defendants (a) misrepresented the results of the alleged victim‘s sexual assault exam on a warrant affidavit, (b) manipulated the crime scene to make it look like plaintiff had drugged the alleged victim, and (c) falsely accused plaintiff in the police report of having drugged her.
The panel first held that the district court erred by concluding that the probable cause determination made by the Nevada justice of the peace at the preliminary hearing precluded plaintiff from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. The panel held that plaintiff‘s allegations that defendants fabricated evidence or undertook other wrongful conduct in bad faith created a triable issue of material fact as to probable cause, pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court‘s decision in Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 110 P.3d 30, 48-49 (Nev. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008), and this Court‘s decision in Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court‘s order as to plaintiff‘s claims under
Addressing plaintiff‘s state-law claims, the panel declined to consider, for the first time on appeal, plaintiff‘s argument that
COUNSEL
Kirk T. Kennedy (argued), Las Vegas, Nevada; Gary A. Modaferri, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Craig R. Anderson (argued) and Kathleen A. Wilde, Mаrquis Aurbach Coffing, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendants-Appellees Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Lieutenant McGrath, Sergeant Comiskey, Detectives Pool, Beza, and Christensen, and Crime Scene Analyst Grammas.
Stephen B. Vogel (argued) and Jamie S. Hendrickson, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellee Jeri Dermanelian.
No appearance for Defendants-Appellees FCH1, LLC; Palms Place, LLC; University Medical Center; and FP Holdings, L.P.
OPINION
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Marino Scafidi was criminally charged with three counts of sexual assault under Nevada law. During the proceedings that followed, state courts suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, and determined that the police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Ultimately, all charges were dismissed pursuant to a motion by the State.
Scafidi subsequently brought a federal civil rights claim and state tort claims against, as relevant here, the Las Vegas Metro Police Department (“LVMPD“), five officers, a crime scene investigator, and the nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the alleged victim. Hе contends that the Las Vegas police officers staged an incriminating crime scene photo by moving his sleeping medications from the hotel bathroom drawer into a mint container by his clothes in the bedroom; falsely stated in a warrant application that the alleged viсtim‘s sexual assault exam revealed sexual assault when it in fact only revealed sexual intercourse; threatened him for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks to him.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that Scafidi was precluded from relitigating the state justice of the peace‘s determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. Alternatively, the district court concluded that Scafidi‘s state claims against the LVMPD were barred becаuse he failed to comply with Nevada‘s administrative presentment statute, and that the individual officers were entitled to discretionary immunity. Scafidi timely appealed. We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to the LVMPD on Scafidi‘s state-law claims. We reverse and remand on the remaining сlaims.
I. Legal Standards
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.;
When we adjudicate a state-law claim, our task “is to approximate state
II. Discussion
A. Preclusive Effect of Probable Cause Determination at Preliminary Hearing
The district court concluded that the probable cause determination made by the Nevada justice of the peace at the preliminаry hearing precluded Scafidi from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. In the court‘s view, the existence of probable cause necessarily meant that Scafidi‘s federal and state-law causes of action all fаiled. Because controlling Nevada state precedent expressly rejects the view that a probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing precludes later relitigation of that question, we reverse.
“[F]ederal courts must ‘give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.‘” Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980);
A panel of this court previously held that under Nevada law, a probable cause determination in a preliminary hearing has preclusive effect in a subsequent suit. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288-89 (9th Cir. 1994). Relying on our decision in Haupt, the district court concluded that Scafidi was collaterally estopped from relitigating whether there was probable cause for his arrest, detention, and prosecution.
After Haupt was decided, but before the district court issued its order, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that a probable cause determination in a preliminary hearing does not prеclude a plaintiff from litigating that issue in a subsequent suit. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 110 P.3d 30, 48-49 (Nev. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008). Under Jordan, the preliminary hearing probable cause determination is only prima facie evidence of probable cause, which can be overcome in a later proceeding with evidence of “false testimony or supprеssed facts.” Id. at 49 & n.65.
The standard articulated in Jordan accords with thе standard under California law, which we have previously considered. In Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that under California law, when the plaintiff in the later proceeding alleges “fabricated evidence” or “other wrongful conduct by state or local officials,” an earlier determination of probаble cause in a California preliminary hearing does not preclude a plaintiff from contesting the issue of probable cause in a later proceeding. Id. at 1068. In so holding, we noted that “in virtually every other jurisdiction, it is a long-standing principle of common law that a decision by a judge or magistrate to hold a defendant to answer after a preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause [in a subsequent tort suit].” Id. at 1067; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 663 (1977); Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 465, 473 (Nev. 1998) (Nevada‘s issue preclusion test identical to California‘s).
Here, Scafidi contended in the district court that the police defendants misrepresented thе results of the alleged victim‘s sexual assault exam on a warrant affidavit, manipulated the crime scene to make it look like he had drugged the alleged victim, and falsely accused him in the police report of having drugged her. Under Jordan, Scafidi‘s allegations of “fabricated evidenсe, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith” create a triable issue of material fact as to probable cause. Jordan, 110 P.3d at 49 n.65 (2005) (quoting Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067)).
The district court refused to consider Scafidi‘s contentions. Instead, it relied on Haupt to determine that Scafidi was precluded as a matter of law from сontesting probable cause for both his federal and state-law claims. Because Jordan, not Haupt, controls this appeal, we reverse the district court‘s order as to Scafidi‘s claims under
B. State-Law Claims
The district court granted summary judgment on the state-law claims on two alternative grounds. Therefore, our decision under Jordan that the probable cause determination at the preliminary hearing is not preclusive does not automatically result in reversal as to those claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court‘s holding as to the LVMPD. We reverse the district court‘s holdings as to the rеmaining defendants.
1. Nevada‘s Administrative Claim Statute
Scafidi argues that
The claim statute bars claims against “political subdivision[s] of the State” only. See
Nevada discretionary-act immunity bars actions under state law against employees of political subdivisions of the state that are “[b]ased upon the exercisе or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion involved is abused.”
A police officer‘s decision to arrest and detain is a discretionary act generally covered by
However, discretionаry-act immunity does not apply to bad-faith conduct. See Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 P.2d 888, 891 (Nev. 1991). “[Nevada Revised Statute] § 41.032 does not protect a government employee for intentional torts or bad-faith misconduct, as such misconduct, ‘by definition, [cannot] be within the actor‘s discretion.‘” Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 733 (Nev. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Falline, 823 P.2d at 891-92), rev‘d on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). “[W]here an officer arrests a citizen in an abusive manner not as the result of the exercise of poor judgment as to the force required to make an arrest, but instead because of hostility toward a suspect or a particular class of suspects . . . or because of a willful or deliberate disregard fоr the rights of a particular citizen or citizens, the officer‘s actions are the result of bad faith and he is not immune from suit.” Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Falline, 823 P.2d at 892 n.3).
The district court concluded that there was no “evidence that would permit a jury to find that [the LVMPD] acted with malice in investigating and prosecuting Plaintiff, even if their evidencе collection and preservation might be described as incomplete.” In so doing, the district court ignored evidence of bad-faith misconduct in the record. If credited, Scafidi‘s affidavit establishes several acts of affirmative misconduct that could cause a reasonablе juror to conclude that the police defendants acted in bad faith. According to Scafidi, police defendants staged an incriminating crime-scene photograph; misrepresented the results of the alleged victim‘s sexual assault exam in a warrant affidavit; threatened Scafidi with extrajudicial violence in retaliation for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks about Scafidi.
In their motion for summary judgment, the police defendants did not offer any evidence that negated the evidence in Scafidi‘s sworn statement. Becausе Scafidi‘s statements create a genuine dispute on the issue of bad faith, the district court erred in determining on summary judgment that discretionary-act immunity applied.
Conclusion
We do not, of course, rule on the truth of Scafidi‘s evidence. We decide only that
Each side shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.