DAVID BRIAN MANIS, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. LUCIA PAULETTE MANIS, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2014-05-070
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
11/17/2014
[Cite as Manis v. Manis, 2014-Ohio-5086.]
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 11DR34549
Ernst & Associates, David E. Ernst, Emma K. Franklin, 11 South Broadway, Suite 200, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for defendant-appellant
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, Lucia Paulette Manis (Mother), appeals from a decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, terminating her shared parenting agreement and placing her daughter with the child‘s father, plaintiff-appellee David Brian Manis (Father). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
{2} Mother and Father are the parents оf a five-year-old daughter, I.M., born on
{3} A short time after the divorce, Father moved from Springboro to Camden, Ohio to live with his parents and Mother remarried. Following her marriage to Joe Matthews in October 2012, Mother cоntinued to reside in Springfield. The parties abided by the terms of the shared parenting plan during this time. However, in June 2013, Mother separated from Matthews following a domestic violence incident in which Matthews physically and sexually assaulted Mother in their home after Mother confronted Matthews about his use of steroids. I.M. was present in the home when the assault occurred. Immediately after the assault, Mother left Springfield for Youngstown, Ohio to be with her family. I.M. went with Mother to Youngstown, where Mother has remained since mid-June 2013. Father was not informed of Mother‘s move to Youngstown until after the move had occurred.
{4} On August 22, 2013, Father filed а motion to modify the shared parenting plan or, in the alternative, to terminate the shared parenting plan and be named the custodial and residential parent of I.M. A hearing on the motion was held on January 23, 2014, before a magistrate. At the hearing, Father testified on his own behalf and called his mother, Sаndra Manis, and his sister, Rebecca Pauline Howard, as witnesses. Mother also chose to testify on her own behalf at the hearing, but she elected not to present any additional witnesses.
{5} On January 27, 2014, the magistrate issued a decision granting Father‘s motion
{6} Mother timely appealed, raising two assignments of error. As the assignments of error are related, we will address them together.
{7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SPECIFICALLY FINDING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ELEMENTS OF
{9} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{10} THAT
{11} In her first and second assignments of error, Mother argues that the trial court incorrectly applied
{12} The standard of review in custody cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion. C.D. v. D.L., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2006-09-037, 2007-Ohio-2559, ¶ 14, citing Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 416-417 (1993). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “When applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court‘s role is to ascertain whether the award of custody is supported by competent and credible evidence.” In re D.M., 196 Ohio App.3d 50, 2011-Ohio-3918, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). Further, in reviewing a trial court‘s decision, an appellate court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court because the ‘discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court‘s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.‘” Renner v. Renner, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-01-004, 2014-Ohio-2237, ¶ 16, quoting Caldwell v. Caldwell, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2008-02-019 and CA2008-03-021, 2009-Ohio-2201, ¶ 15.
{13} As an initial matter, we note that Mother and Father base their arguments on appeal around the requirements of
{14}
The court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that includes a shared parenting plan approved under [
R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i) ] upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever it determines that shared parenting is not in the best interest of the children. The court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that includes a shared parenting plan approved under [R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(ii) or (iii)] * * * if it determines, upon its own motion or upon the request of one or both parents, that shared parenting is not in the best interest of the children.
Accordingly, under the first part of
{16} Nevertheless,
{17} In addition to the factors listed above,
{18} Here, the trial court made numerous findings related to the bеst interest factors, including the following findings: (1) Mother wishes to have I.M. reside with her in Youngstown and Father wishes to have I.M. reside with him if Mother resides in Youngstown; (2) I.M. has a close relationship with family members on Father‘s side—she spends time with Father‘s sisters, Father‘s nieces and nephews, and Father‘s mother, who has provided daycare fоr I.M. since her birth; (3) I.M. is doing well in school in Youngstown and she has made friends in Youngstown; (4) there was no evidence concerning problems with either parent‘s mental or physical health; (5) Father has not denied Mother her parenting time, and although Mother did not deny Father parenting time, Mother failed to follow the spirit оf the parties’ shared parenting plan when she unilaterally moved to Youngstown without telling Father; (6) Father fell behind in child support in 2013, and as of the date of the January 23, 2013 hearing, was $300 behind in his child support obligation; (7) neither Mother nor Father had been convicted or pled guilty to child abuse or child neglect; and (8) although Mother has not moved outside the state of Ohio, she did relocate almost four-and-one-half hours away from Father‘s residence.
{19} The court also made the following findings relevant to the factors set forth in
{20} In addition to the above mentioned findings, the court also considerеd Mother and Father‘s living arrangements and their income. With respect to Mother, the court noted that Mother had moved from the marital home she shared with Father in Springboro, Ohio into a residence she shared with Matthews in Springfield, Ohio, and then moved from the Springfield residence into her mother‘s home in Youngstown, Ohiо. In August 2013, Mother obtained a two-bedroom apartment in Youngstown to share with I.M. Father moved from the marital home he shared with Mother in Springboro into his parent‘s two-bedroom rental home in Camden, Ohio. Father‘s parents occupy one bedroom, I.M. occupies the other bedroom, and Father sleeps in the basement. Mother is currently employed by the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services in Youngstown and earns approximately $30,000 a year. Father lost his job in December 2013 and is collecting unemployment while he looks for work. At the January 23, 2014 hearing, Father testified that he anticipates making arоund $30,000 once he finds employment.
{21} Having thoroughly reviewed the record before us, we conclude that the findings made by the trial court were supported by competent and credible evidence. Although Mother contends the trial court failed to address all of the best interest factors set forth in
{22} We further find no merit to Mother‘s contention that the trial court, in determining that Father should be named residential parent, ignored evidence. Mother contеnds the trial court failed to consider evidence tending to show that Father is not involved in certain aspects of I.M.‘s life, such as her “secular and religious education,” and that he is unable to “assume parenthood without the daily assistance of his parents.” Contrary to Mother‘s contentions, the recоrd demonstrates that the trial court considered the evidence she presented on these matters. However, in considering these issues, the court did not find the fact there is not a religious school close to Father‘s current residence or that Father has never lived alone with I.M. and utilizes his own mother as a daycare provider to be detrimental to Father‘s ability to parent or be named the custodian of the child. “It is the role of the trial court to determine the relative weight to assign each factor, in relation to the others, when determining the [child‘s] best interest.” Ruble v. Ruble, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2010-09-019, 2011-Ohio-3350, ¶ 18. We will not second-guess the trial court‘s determination of the weight to be given to these factors. See In re A.B., 2010-Ohio-2823 at 35.
{23} Given the evidence presented, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the shared parenting plan and designating Father the residential
{24} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.