Kenneth Mahai v. State of Maryland
No. 41
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
July 20, 2021
Opinion by Getty, J.
September Term, 2020. Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 107109037, P.C. 11825. Argued: March 8, 2021.
CRIMINAL LAW - COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS - POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS - APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL DENIED - Court of Appeals held that
Barbera, C.J.,
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Getty
Booth
Biran
JJ.
Opinion by Getty, J.
Filed: July 20, 2021
The Court
BACKGROUND
A. Stabbing and Police Investigation.
The murder of Jermaine Morrison occurred in broad daylight on Nome Street at the Holabird Park Apartments in Woodmere, Baltimore City, Maryland. Several witnesses in the vicinity of the murder recounted their observations to investigators from the Baltimore City Police Department about a street fight that resulted in deadly violence.
One witness, Angel Rodriguez, stated that he left for lunch about noon on October 25, 2005, from his job in the maintenance department of the Holabird Park Apartments. He also lived in the same apartment complex at 1717 Nome Street. On the walk to his apartment, he encountered two individuals that he knew, Mr. Morrison and Kenneth Mahai. Mr. Rodriguez could see and hear Mr. Morrison and Mr. Mahai arguing about “being on the same street.”
A second witness, Stephen Smith, was walking from his residence at 1719 Nome Street to a nearby gas station. Mr. Smith observed Mr. Mahai and Mr. Morrison engaged in a fistfight. A third person, unknown to Mr. Smith, broke up the fight, and Mr. Smith watched Mr. Morrison leave on foot.
Phyllis Becote, who lived near Nome Street, was a third witness. About the same time that the first two witnesses saw the street fight, she was alerted by her son that a man had just fallen down on the street. Ms. Becote went outside and saw Mr. Morrison laying on the ground. She instructed her son to call for emergency assistance and then attempted to determine what was wrong with Mr. Morrison. Moving his shirt aside, she saw “a lot of blood.” In response, Ms. Becote covered the bleeding wound and waited for an ambulance to arrive.
A fourth - and key - witness, Sharon Mosely, was also a resident of Nome Street. While Ms. Mosely was visiting a friend who lived in the same apartment building as she did, Mr. Mahai entered the apartment and told Ms. Mosely and her friend that he had “just got in a[n] altercation with this guy and he stabbed the guy three times.” Mr. Mahai then cleaned a knife off, threw the knife into the trash, took the trash out, and dumped it by a nearby shop.
Meanwhile, Mr. Morrison was transported to Johns Hopkins Bayview Hospital by ambulance where he was pronounced dead. A postmortem examination was conducted by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of Maryland. The medical examiner concluded that Mr. Morrison died of stab wounds to his chest, abdomen, and arm.
While investigating Mr. Morrison‘s death, the police conducted witness interviews of Ms. Becote, Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Smith, and Ms. Mosely. Ms. Becote was interviewed in a neighborhood canvas. Mr. Rodriguez was later interviewed and told the police that Mr. Mahai and Mr. Morrison were “neighborhood drug dealers” who had an altercation “over territory.” In his police interview, Mr. Smith stated that he observed Mr. Mahai hit Mr. Morrison twice in the “chest area” and additionally identified Mr. Mahai in a photo array. Finally, Ms. Mosely provided the police with a taped statement recounting her observations of Mr. Mahai‘s actions and statements on October 25. Ms. Mosely also identified Mr. Mahai in a photo array and wrote on the array form a short description of the same facts that she provided in the taped statement.
Less than a month after Mr. Morrison‘s death, Mr. Mahai was arrested on November 20 and charged with the murder of Mr. Morrison. The following month, a grand jury indicted Mr. Mahai on December 19 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.
An initial trial date was set for April 24, 2006. However, the trial was repeatedly postponed. Mr. Mahai requested the first postponement due to a change in his counsel. The second postponement occurred at the request of Mr. Mahai‘s counsel because of additional discovery that had been provided by the State. The State then requested the third, fourth, and fifth postponements because of the State‘s continued difficulty in locating their key witness, Ms. Mosely. At the time of the fourth postponement, Mr. Mahai began asserting his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and that the delay in “bringing [him] to trial was now of constitutional proportion[.]”
On December 6, the State requested yet another postponement because of the ongoing problems in locating witnesses. The circuit court granted the State an additional twenty-four hours to produce its witnesses. However, the next day the State was still unable to produce its witnesses and again requested a postponement. The circuit court denied this request, and the State, pursuant to
C. Second Indictment, Trial, and Sentencing.
On February 7, 2007, the court issued another warrant for Mr. Mahai‘s arrest for the same charges of the murder of Mr. Morrison. On April 13, Mr. Mahai was arrested. Six days later, a grand jury indicted Mr. Mahai in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on the same first-degree murder and weapons charges as the first indictment.
Mr. Mahai filed a motion to dismiss on May 17. In the motion, Mr. Mahai raised the identical arguments from his prior trial that his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated as a result of the eighteen-month delay from the time of his first arrest until the time of this motion. The circuit court judge denied Mr. Mahai‘s motion from the bench. The circuit court judge reasoned that the period of time and causes for the delay were not sufficient to warrant dismissing the case, and the judge had “heard nothing that would deny [Mr. Mahai] a right to a fair trial.”
A three-day jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on August 8, 9, and 10. The jury found Mr. Mahai guilty of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. On September 28, the circuit court judge sentenced Mr. Mahai to life in prison for first-degree murder and a consecutive three-year term for carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. The remaining weapon conviction, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, was merged for sentencing purposes. Mr. Mahai timely noted an appeal.
D. Appeal and Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.
On September 8, 2009, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Mr. Mahai‘s murder conviction but reversed his weapon convictions. Mahai v. State, No. 1748, Sept. Term, 2007 (filed Sept. 8, 2009). The court first applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), that weighs both the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant, and the court held that Mr. Mahai‘s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
Next, the intermediate appellate court turned to Mr. Mahai‘s argument that various jury instructions were erroneous and misleading. Mr. Mahai conceded that his defense counsel at trial (“trial counsel“) had not objected to these instructions at trial. However, he argued that on appeal the court should review the instructions for plain error. The court individually analyzed each jury instruction at issue.
On the issue of the opening and closing jury instructions pertaining to reasonable doubt, the court held that plain error review of these instructions was not warranted. On the issue of the opening and final instructions on the state‘s failure to use investigative techniques, the court held there was no plain error. Notably, on the issue of the jury instruction pertaining to whether a penknife is a dangerous weapon, the court held that the circuit court committed plain error by failing to include a necessary element of the offense of carrying a dangerous weapon. Consequently, on the basis of this plain error, the intermediate appellate court reversed Mr. Mahai‘s convictions for carrying a dangerous weapon openly with intent to injure and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. These two charges were remanded for a new trial.1
Finally, Mr. Mahai contended that his trial counsel‘s failure to object to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to his alleged use of a penknife deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. In analyzing this argument, the court noted that a postconviction proceeding was the appropriate way for Mr. Mahai to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and absent any showing on the record otherwise, the court must adhere to the presumption that trial counsel‘s conduct was reasonable professional conduct. Concluding that Mr. Mahai failed to rebut this presumption, the court did not address Mr. Mahai‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Mahai filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, which was denied on December 18, 2009. Mahai v. State, 411 Md. 741 (2009).
E. Postconviction Petition and Hearing.
On September 6, 2017, nearly ten years after Mr. Mahai was sentenced for his first-degree murder conviction, he filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which was later supplemented by postconviction counsel. The supplemented petition sought a new trial, permission to file a belated motion for modification of his sentence, and permission to file a belated application for review of his sentence by a three-judge panel. The petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel on the basis of nine individual claims.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City held a hearing on Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction petition over two days, September 9 and 10, 2019. At the hearing, Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel argued that his trial counsel failed to object to a defective voir dire process that permitted jurors to self-assess their ability to be fair, and his appellate counsel failed to present a claim of plain error in connection with the voir dire process on direct appeal. Mr. Mahai further contended that his trial counsel‘s failure to object to the improper voir dire deprived him of his right to an impartial
Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel argued that the trial judge inappropriately assisted the prosecution by asking various questions of witnesses to “fill in the gaps” of the prosecution‘s case. Noting that Mr. Mahai‘s trial counsel did not object to these questions, Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel asserted that both the trial court‘s error and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel prejudiced Mr. Mahai.
Additionally, similar to an argument raised on direct appeal, Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel pointed to inconsistent jury instructions pertaining to reasonable doubt - one given at the beginning of trial and one given prior to jury deliberations. Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel argued that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to these instructions or to request a curative instruction.
Mr. Mahai‘s postconviction counsel also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for modification of his sentence and a motion for a three-judge panel to review his sentence - both of which he requested in a written letter to his trial counsel on the day following his conviction. His postconviction counsel argued, in the aggregate, the prejudice resulting from these issues entitled Mr. Mahai to a new trial.
In response, the State argued that Mr. Mahai waived his voir dire arguments when he failed to raise them on direct appeal. On the issue of the trial judge‘s role in jury communication and witness questioning, the State noted that the Court of Special Appeals had already held that there was no excessive interference on the part of the trial judge. Additionally, the State argued there was no prejudice resulting from the trial judge‘s conduct and that lack of objection by trial counsel was a deliberate and strategic tactic at trial instead of ineffective assistance.
The State further argued that the trial judge‘s jury instructions were proper, and, in any event, no prejudice resulted from the reasonable doubt jury instructions given. Lastly, the State did not object to the postconviction court allowing Mr. Mahai to file a belated motion for sentence modification or a belated application for a three-judge panel to review his sentence.
On February 27, 2020, the postconviction court entered a written opinion and order denying Mr. Mahai‘s petition for relief. The opinion thoroughly addressed each issue raised in the petition and argued at the hearing. Regarding trial counsel‘s failure to object to the formulation of the voir dire questions, the court held that “nothing [was] improper about the questions posed to the jury” and therefore Mr. Mahai‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground was meritless. Regarding trial counsel‘s failure to object to what Mr. Mahai construed as inconsistent jury instructions pertaining to reasonable doubt, the court drew a distinction between “a trial judge giving preliminary instructions and jury instructions after the presentation of evidence prior to deliberation[.]” The court reasoned that the trial judge intended to give an “overview of what was to come from the trial” by giving preliminary remarks on reasonable doubt, and did not intend these preliminary remarks to be taken as jury instructions. Thus, the lack of objection or request for a curative instruction by trial counsel did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, regarding trial counsel‘s failure to file post-trial motions for sentence review and modification, the court ruled that Mr. Mahai had not provided sufficient evidence that he timely asked trial counsel to file these motions.
F. Application for Leave to Appeal Postconviction Denial.
On March 17, 2020, Mr. Mahai filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Special Appeals. In an order issued on August 14, 2020, the Court of Special Appeals denied Mr. Mahai‘s application for leave to appeal without explanation.
Subsequently, Mr. Mahai timely petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which we granted on November 10, 2020. Mahai v. State, 471 Md. 263 (2020). Before us are the following questions:
- Does
Article IV, § 14A of the Maryland Constitution , which authorizes the Court of Special Appeals to exercise only intermediate appellate jurisdiction, preclude the Court of Special Appeals from exercising final appellate jurisdiction by issuing a summary denial of an application for leave to appeal without addressing the issues raised, which has been held to bar further appellate review underCJ § 12-202 ? - Did Petitioner receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when counsel failed to object to jury instructions regarding the definition of reasonable doubt?
- Did Petitioner receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when counsel failed to object to voir dire questions that shifted the burden of determining bias to the venirepersons?
- Did Petitioner receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a motion for modification of sentence and a motion for sentence review?
For the reasons more fully stated below, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To declare an act of a coordinate branch of government unconstitutional is an exercise of judicial review “of a grave and delicate nature, which never can be warranted but in a clear case.” Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 628 (1865) (emphasis omitted). “We begin with a presumption that the statute is constitutional,” and the party challenging the statute has the burden of overcoming this presumption. Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 626 (2013) (citing Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 610-11 (2001)). To overcome this presumption, there “must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.” Anderson, 23 Md. at 628.
DISCUSSION
A. Parties’ Contentions.
Mr. Mahai, Petitioner, argues that the Court of Special Appeals is constitutionally precluded under
Moreover, Mr. Mahai points out that pursuant to
Conversely, the State of Maryland, Respondent, argues that
Moreover, the State argues that the clause “the judgment of the Court of Appeals shall be final and conclusive” in
The State further emphasizes that criminal defendants do not possess a constitutional right of appeal, and instead “the right to seek appellate review is statutory; the Legislature can provide for, or preclude, the right of appeal.” Fuller v. State, 397 Md. 372, 382 (2007) (citations omitted). Here, the State notes that Maryland‘s Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act denies postconviction petitioners a plenary right of appeal and instead provides that “a person aggrieved by the order . . . may apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the order.”
Additionally, the State notes that the Court of Special Appeals’ decision to grant or deny an application for leave to appeal is unreviewable by this Court pursuant to
In sum, the State asserts that Mr. Mahai has failed to carry his burden to extinguish all “reasonable doubt” about the constitutionality of
B. Analysis.
When reviewing a statute for constitutionality, “[w]e begin with a presumption that the statute is constitutional, and the burden rests on Petitioner to show why that is not the case.” Walker, 432 Md. at 626. “We are reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional if, ‘by any construction, it can be sustained.‘” Galloway, 365 Md. at 611 (quoting Beauchamp v. Somerset Cty. Sanitary Comm‘n, 256 Md. 541, 547 (1970)). A “[r]easonable doubt in [a statute‘s] favor is enough to sustain it.” Beauchamp, 256 Md. at 547 (quoting Pitts v. State Bd. of Exam‘rs of Psychologists, 222 Md. 224, 227 (1960)). “The Court will not denounce a statute as void on the ground that the lawmaking power has violated the Constitution,
Here, Mr. Mahai challenges the constitutionality of
A review by way of certiorari may not be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted:
- Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction proceeding;
- Leave to appeal from a refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus sought for the purpose of determining the right to bail or the appropriate amount of bail;
- Leave to appeal in an inmate grievance commission proceeding;
- Leave to appeal from a final judgment entered following a plea of guilty in a circuit court; or
- Leave to appeal from an order of a circuit court revoking probation.
This Court has interpreted the limitation to its jurisdiction in
Under [CJ § 12-202(1)], this Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding. However, once the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to appeal in such a case and transfers the case to its appeal docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal, and we do have jurisdiction under [CJ] § 12-201 . . . to review the Court of Special Appeals’ decision on the appeal itself.
Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 506 n.4 (1975).
More specifically, as the State correctly asserts, we may review any decision of the Court of Special Appeals that amounts to anything more than a discretionary grant or denial of leave to appeal regardless of whether the case has been transferred to the Court of Special Appeals’ regular docket. See Grayson, 354 Md. at 12 (holding that this Court had jurisdiction to review the Court of Special Appeals’ denial of applications for leave to appeal where the Court of Special Appeals’ held two postconviction petitions were not allowable as a matter of law). However, “[i]t is the long and well-established law that t[his] Court has no certiorari jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief when the Court of Special Appeals has simply denied an application for leave to appeal in a post-conviction proceeding.” Sherman v. State, 323 Md. 310, 311 (1991) (citing Williams, 292 Md. 201).
Here, Mr. Mahai asserts that the “denial of an application for leave to appeal operates, for all intents and purposes, as an affirmance of the lower court‘s decision.” To the extent that this statement may be read as an argument that the Court of Special Appeals’ denial of Mr. Mahai‘s application for leave to appeal was the equivalent of a decision on the merits of his claim, we have directly disposed of
We now turn to the crux of this case - Mr. Mahai‘s constitutional challenges to
The General Assembly may by law create such intermediate courts of appeal as may be necessary. The General Assembly may prescribe the intermediate appellate jurisdiction of these courts of appeal, and all other powers necessary for the operation of such courts.
Any judge of the Court of Appeals or of an intermediate court of appeal who heard the cause below either as a trial judge or as a judge of any intermediate court of appeal as the case may be, shall not participate in the decision. In every case an opinion, in writing, shall be filed within three months after the argument, or submission of the cause; and the judgment of the Court of Appeals shall be final and conclusive.
“When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the construction of statutory language.” Fuller v. Republican Cent. Comm. of Carroll Cty., 444 Md. 613, 629 (2015) (quoting Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 (2004)). We first look to the plain language of the constitutional provision “with a goal of ‘discern[ing] the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision . . . .‘” Id. (quoting Davis, 383 Md. at 605).
605). “If the meaning remains ambiguous, we consult the history of the enactment or adoption, which we may consult in any event as a check or verification on the apparent plain meaning.” Miles v. State, 435 Md. 540, 554 (2013) (citing Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454 (2007)).a. Plain language analysis of Article IV, § 14A.
Beginning with the plain language of
To support his interpretation of the plain language of
The Indiana Supreme Court held that the legislation was unconstitutional because it created a court equal in rank with the Indiana Supreme Court stating:
That the effect of the act is to make the Appellate Court within the jurisdiction conferred upon it coordinate with the Supreme Court, and to withdraw from the latter court all revising and reviewing power, and therefore make the Appellate Court supreme . . . is manifest. That such power, under our Constitution, cannot be exercised by the Legislature, is well settled. . . . There cannot be a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with this court, for otherwise it would be supreme.
Id. at 521–22 (citations omitted). The court went on to state:
It is vain to argue that the act in question has due regard for the supremacy of the Supreme Court. That this is not true is apparent from the fact that it confers final jurisdiction upon the Appellate Court in all cases for the recovery of money without any limitations as to the amount and, in effect, excludes the Supreme Court from exercising any jurisdiction whatever in such cases. That this results in respect to such cases in making the Supreme Court virtually inferior to the Appellate Court is self-evident. . . . That which the Legislature is by the Constitution prohibited from doing directly it cannot do indirectly.
Id. at 523. Mr. Mahai points to this language and argues that similar to the jurisdictional statute in Ex parte France,
Here, as the State correctly asserts, unlike the statute in Ex Parte France,
Therefore, the broad and exhaustive final jurisdiction granted to the Indiana intermediate appellate court on important
Instead, we find persuasive the plain language analysis offered by the State. The State argues that the word “intermediate” in
We agree. The Court of Special Appeals’ appellate jurisdiction was initially given by the Maryland Legislature and has since been expanded by statute. “At the time of its nativity, the intermediate appellate court‘s jurisdiction was limited to criminal matters involving sentences other than death” and was codified at
Additionally, we find this plain language analysis further supported by the fact that “intermediate” is used as a descriptive adjective a total of four times in
Next, we consider the State‘s plain language analysis of the final clause in
Furthermore, we have held that
Thus, we have determined that the “final and conclusive” clause in
b. History of the Adoption of Article IV, § 14A.
To verify our plain language analysis, we now consult the history of the adoption of
The immediate purpose of [Article IV, § 14A] was to enable the General Assembly to relieve this Court of the substantial increase of criminal appeals which had inundated the Court and yet provide at least one appeal as of right, either to this Court or to an intermediate court to be created by statute. There was also an underlying general purpose to provide sufficient flexibility in the grant of power by the constitutional amendment to provide for a grant of appellate power to the intermediate appellate court or courts to be created over certain—or perhaps ultimately all—civil cases.
On March 23, 1966, the General Assembly passed three bills relevant to this case: Senate Bill 73, Senate Bill 10, and Senate Bill 74. 1966 Md. Laws, ch. 10, 11, and 12. Senate Bill 73 was a constitutional amendment that created
Senate Bill 10 was enabling legislation that created the intermediate appellate
Senate Bill 74, in pertinent part, created Article 5, § 21A of the 1957 Maryland Code, which expressly precluded appeals to this Court on the basis of an intermediate court‘s grant or denial of leave to appeal in postconviction proceedings. 1966 Md. Laws, ch. 12. Article 5, § 21A provided:
In any criminal case, post conviction or defective delinquent proceeding in which a decision has been rendered by the Court of Special Appeals upon appeal from the circuit court of any county, the Criminal Court of Baltimore, or one of the law courts of Baltimore City if it shall be made to appear to the Court of Appeals upon petition of any party, whether a defendant or the State, that a review is desirable and in the public interest, the Court of Appeals shall require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case to be certified to the Court of Appeals for its review and determination, except no such petition shall be entertained by the Court of Appeals from the denying or granting by the Court of Special Appeals of an application for leave to prosecute an appeal in post conviction and defective delinquent proceedings and from the denying or granting by the Court of Special Appeals of a petition for review filed under Section 21 of this article.
1966 Md. Laws, ch. 12 (emphasis added). This language is now codified at
Several months later on November 8, 1966,
Mr. Mahai correctly points out that “[t]he constitutional amendment and implementing legislation was largely conceived and originally promoted by the Maryland State Bar Association.” Walston, 267 Md. at 566. In Walston, we stated:
[T]he State Bar Committee reconsidered the whole subject and on June 24, 1965, recommended the creation of the Court of Special Appeals limited originally to appellate jurisdiction in criminal (other than death cases), post-conviction and defective delinquency cases. The Committee‘s basic premise was that ‘a litigant is entitled to at least one appeal as of right in each case and where this appeal was to the Court of Special Appeals, a petition for a writ of certiorari could be filed to the Court of Appeals by
the litigant adversely affected whether it be the accused or the State.’ . . . This Report was unanimously adopted by the Maryland State Bar Association, 70 Maryland State Bar Association at 134 (1965).
Id. (emphasis omitted). Mr. Mahai relies on this language as an assertion that the framers of the constitutional amendment intended to provide each adversely affected litigant with the opportunity to petition this Court for a writ of certiorari.
While we agree that the Report of the Seventieth Annual Maryland State Bar Association is useful in discerning the intent of the Maryland Legislature in framing
The recommendation as you all know is for the creation of a Court of Special Appeals. The jurisdiction of this Court would be, first, all criminal cases where no death penalty was imposed; secondly, applications under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act in cases where no death penalty was imposed. . . . That, in broad outline, is the suggested initial jurisdictional limits for this Court.
***
The next thing that should be brought to your attention is how the Court of Appeals will fit into this general scheme. First there are two areas in which appeals will be taken directly to the Court of Appeals, and will not go, as the Committee envisions it, to the Special Court. . . . Conversely, no petition for writ of certiorari will be allowed to the Court of Appeals in the following two types of cases: first, those in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied a petition for writ of certiorari where the appeal came from a court of limited jurisdiction; and secondly, those in which the Court has denied an application for leave to appeal in post-conviction and defective delinquent matters. So much then for the jurisdiction.
Maryland State Bar Ass‘n, Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., at 109–11 (1965) (emphasis added).
It is apparent to us that the Maryland State Bar Association fully contemplated that the Court of Special Appeals would have the final authority to deny an application for leave to appeal in a postconviction proceeding. This—taken together with the fact that the General Assembly passed enabling legislation expressly precluding appeals to this Court on the basis of an intermediate court‘s denial of applications for leave to appeal in postconviction proceedings on the same day as it passed the referendum language—provides ample evidence that our earlier plain language analysis is correct. The term “intermediate” in
Therefore, in light of both the plain language and history of the adoption of
CONCLUSION
In summary, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that
APPEAL DISMISSED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Notes
In turn, the State contends that the Court of Special Appeals soundly exercised its discretion in denying Mr. Mahai‘s application for leave to appeal. The State argues that Mr. Mahai‘s appellate counsel did not properly supply the requisite record to the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Mahai did not properly allege prejudice, and Mr. Mahai did not properly challenge the postconviction court‘s finding of fact that his trial counsel was unaware of his desire to file post-trial sentencing motions. We decline to delineate these arguments further because we hold that
(b) (1) The application for leave to appeal shall be in the form set by the Maryland Rules.
(2) If the Attorney General or a State‘s Attorney states an intention to file an application for an appeal under this section, the court may:
(i) stay the order; and
(ii) set bail for the petitioner.
(3) If the application for leave to appeal is granted:
(i) the procedure for the appeal shall meet the requirements of the Maryland Rules; and
(ii) the Court of Special Appeals may:
1. affirm, reverse, or modify the order appealed from; or
2. remand the case for further proceedings.
(4) If the application for leave to appeal is denied, the order sought to be reviewed becomes final.
Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.),
Except as provided in
§ 12-202 of this subtitle, in any case or proceeding pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals upon appeal from a circuit court or an orphans’ court or the Maryland Tax Court, any party, including the State, may file in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to review the case or proceeding. The petition may be filed either before or after the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a decision, but not later than the time prescribed by the Maryland Rules. In a case or proceeding described in this section, the Court of Appeals also may issue the writ of certiorari on its own motion.
Md. Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.),
During the Revolutionary War period, the State of Maryland provided in its Constitution for an intermediate appellate court called the General Court. Md. Const. of 1776, art. 56. The court was organized into two branches: the General Court of the Western Shore, which sat in Annapolis and the General Court of the Eastern Shore, which sat in Easton. See Howard, 397 Md. at 360 n.8. In 1806, the General Court was abolished, “leaving the Court of Appeals as the State‘s only appellate court until the Court of Special Appeals” was established in 1966. Id.; see also 1804 Md. laws, ch. 55.