PATRICK D. MacPHEE, Claimant-Appellant, v. R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.
05-7089
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
August 15, 2006
Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and RADER, Circuit Judge.
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr.
Thomas B. Fatouros, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, and Bryant G. Sneе, Assistant Director. Of counsel were Kathryn A. Bleecker, Assistant Director, David B. Stinson and Michael D. Austin, Trial Attorneys. Of counsel on the brief were Richard J. Hipolit, Assistant General Counsel, and Y. Ken Lee, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.
DECIDED: August 15, 2006
ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Patrick MacPhee (“MacPhee“) appeаls the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ (“Veterans Court“) affirmance of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (“Board“) determination that MacPhee‘s 1988 medical records did not constitute an informal claim for increased disability benefits. MacPhee v. Principi, No. 01-918 (Vet. App. Oct. 22, 2004). Because the condition disclosed in MacPhee‘s medical records had not previously been claimed, or determined to be service connected, such records do not satisfy the regulatory requirements of an informal claim. See
Background
MacPhee served on active duty from June 1969 to January 1972. On November 9, 1982, the Regional Office (“RO“) of thе Veterans Administration (“VA“)1 awarded MacPhee service connection for post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD“) and assigned a 30% disability rating, effective July 19, 1982. Subsequently, the VA reduced MacPhee‘s disability rating for PTSD to 10%, effective February 1, 1986.
In August of 1988, MacPhee was hospitalized in a VA medical center due to excessive drinking and anxiety. Treatment records from that period of hospitalization reflect a clinical psychologist‘s opinion that “[t]he most likely diagnosis appear[ed] to be [PTSD], secondary to Vietnam,” and that MacPhee had “severe problems related to [his PTSD].” The psychologist opined that “it [did] not appear likely . . . that [MacPhee would] be able to maintain sobriety unless he [was] able to deal with the symptoms of [PTSD] that he [was] experiencing.” According to his discharge summary, dated in September 1988, MacPhee had been diagnosed as having PTSD and “[a]lcohol [d]ependence, [c]оntinuous.”
In October 1997, MacPhee contended to the VA that, among other things, he was entitled to a decision “based upon the unadjudicated informal claim raised by the [1988 VA medical records] for . . . entitlement to alcohol [dependence] as secondary to [his] service[-]connected [PTSD].”2 The RO denied MacPhee‘s claim, and he appealed to the Board. The Board similarly denied MacPhee‘s claim and noted that “there was neither a prior allowance nor a disallowance for the condition [of alcohol dependence] at the time of the completion of the 1988 medical recоrds” and that the records thus could not “constitute an informal claim under [
MacPhee appealed this decision to the Veterans Court, which affirmed the Board‘s decision. Relevant to this appeal, the Veterans Court explained that “because MacPhee had not previously filed a claim for service connection for [his alcohol dependence], medical records could not constitute an informal claim under
MacPhee challenges these determinations. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Discussion
We must “hold unlawful and set aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof . . . relied upon in the decision of the Court of Appeals for Vetеrans Claims [that is] (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or in violation of a statutory right; or (4) without observance of procedure required by law.”
At issue in this case is whether the Veterans Court correctly interpreted regulations relating to the filing of informal claims, specifically
MacPhee argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted
The Veterans Court concluded that the medical reports at issue were not sufficient to state an original informal claim under
MacPhee‘s argument that the Veteran‘s Court misinterpreted
An informal claim under
(b) Claim. Once a formal claim for pension or compensation has been allowed or a formal claim for compensation disallowed for the reason that the service-connected disability is not compensable in degree, receipt of one of the following will be accepted as an informal claim for increased benefits or an informal claim to reopen. In addition, receipt of one of the fоllowing will be accepted as an informal claim in the case of a retired member of a uniformed service whose formal claim for pension or compensation has been disallowed because of receipt of retirement pay. The evidence listed will also be accepted as
an informal claim for pension previously denied for the reason the disability was not permanently and totally disabling. (1) Report of examination or hospitalization by VA or uniformed services. The date of outpatient or hospital examination or date of admission to a VA or unifоrmed services hospital will be accepted as the date of receipt of a claim. The date of a uniformed service examination which is the basis for granting severance pay to a former member of the Armed Forces on the temporary disability retired list will be acceptеd as the date of receipt of claim. The date of admission to a non-VA hospital where a veteran was maintained at VA expense will be accepted as the date of receipt of a claim, if VA maintenance was previously authorized; but if VA maintenance was authorized subsеquent to admission, the date VA received notice of admission will be accepted. The provisions of this paragraph apply only when such reports relate to examination or treatment of a disability for which service-connection has previously been established or when a claim specifying the benefit sought is received within one year from the date of such examination, treatment or hospital admission.
At the time of his hospitalization in 1988, MacPhee had never filed a claim for service connection for alcohol dependence; nor had a pension or compensation otherwise beеn allowed or disallowed based on MacPhee‘s alcohol dependence being service connected. Similarly, there had been no claim or allowance or disallowance for alcohol dependency as a condition secondary to MacPhee‘s PTSD. Thus, we cannot say that the Veterans Court improperly interpreted
MacPhee also appears to argue in this appeal that
Similarly, MacPhee‘s assertion that the VA must give a sympathetic reading to a veteran‘s claim by determining all potential claims raised by the evidence is unhelpful to his cause. Even if the medical reports are read as suggesting that MacPhee‘s alcohol dependence was caused by
Finally, as to MacPhee‘s assertion that the Veterans Court misinterpreted Rules 10 and 11 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure, we discern no reversible error in the court‘s decision.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Veterans Court is AFFIRMED.
Notes
Any communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits under the laws administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs, from a claimant, his or her duly authorized representative, a Member of Congress, or some person acting as next friend of a claimant who is not sui juris may be considered an informal claim. Such informal claim must identify the benefit sought. Upon receipt of an informal claim, if a formal claim has not been filed, an application form will be forwarded to the claimant for execution. If received within 1 year frоm the date it was sent to the claimant, it will be considered filed as of the date of receipt of the informal claim.
[d]isability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. When service connection is thus established for a secondary condition, the secondary condition shall be considered a part of the original condition.
