M-11 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. Daniel GOMMARD and Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division
No. 1 CA-CV 13-0582
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1
June 12, 2014
330 P.3d 356
166 Ariz. 514, 517, 803 P.2d 925, 928 (App. 1990) (“Although Arizona lien statutes are remedial and are to be liberally construed, their provisions must be strictly followed.“).
¶ 9 We look to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure in determining the meaning of the term “judgment” as used in the judgment lien statutes. Ariz. Farmers Prod. Credit Ass‘n v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, 24 Ariz.App. 5, 7, 535 P.2d 33, 35 (1975) (“In the absence of any other statutory authority, we must conclude that the term Judgment as used in the statutes takes its meaning from the definition set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure.“); see also Focal Point, Inc. v. Court of Appeals of State of Ariz., Div. One, 149 Ariz. 128, 129-30, 717 P.2d 432, 433-34 (1986) (stating that minute entry that satisfied all requirements of Rule 58(a) is a judgment creating a valid judgment lien).
¶ 10 Only a final judgment can create a valid judgment lien. Bryan, 180 Ariz. at 369, 884 P.2d at 255 (“To create a lien under the general judgment lien statute, a judgment ‘must be final and conclusive.’ “), citing McClanahan v. Hawkins, 90 Ariz. 139, 141-42, 367 P.2d 196, 197 (1961); Ariz. Farmers, 24 Ariz.App. at 7, 535 P.2d at 35 (stating that a judgment lien presupposes the existence of a valid judgment). An unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment.
¶ 11 Here, Sysco did not record a signed judgment, or even a signed minute entry. Accordingly, the unsigned minute entry Sysco recorded is not a final judgment creating a valid judgment lien.1 See Willoughby v. King, 21 Ariz.App. 589, 593, 522 P.2d 54, 58 (1974) (stating that there is no lien until a determinative judgment has been entered and recorded in accordance with the judgment lien statutes).
CONCLUSION
¶ 12 For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arizona Attorney General‘s Office By Stephanie A. Lillie, Phoenix, Counsel for Respondent/Appellee ADOT.
Presiding Judge JOHN C. GEMMILL delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge PETER B. SWANN and Judge PATRICIA A. OROZCO joined.
OPINION
GEMMILL, Judge.
¶ 1 M-11 Limited Partnership (“M-11“) appeals the superior court‘s dismissal of M-11‘s appeal of an administrative decision of the Arizona Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division (“ADOT“). Because we conclude the superior court erred in not applying
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In December 2011, ADOT administratively extinguished M-11‘s title to a 1965 mobile home trailer and awarded title to
An action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by filing a notice of appeal within thirty-five days from the date when a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed is served upon the party affected.... Service is complete on personal service or five days after the date that the final administrative decision is mailed to the party‘s last known address.
(Emphasis added). In accordance with
¶ 3 M-11 sought judicial review of ADOTS administrative decision. It signed and dated its complaint for judicial review on July 18, 2012, and certified that it was mailed that day to the clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court and to ADOT. According to the superior court record, the complaint was filed in the superior court clerk‘s office on August 7, 2012, eight days after the July 30 deadline.
¶ 4 ADOT filed a motion to dismiss under
¶ 5 Based on the superior court record showing the complaint for judicial review was filed on August 7, 2012, the superior court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider M-11‘s appeal and therefore granted ADOTS motion and dismissed M-11‘s complaint against ADOT and Gommard. M-11 timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
ANALYSIS
¶ 6 We review de novo a superior courts grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Church of Isaiah 58 Project of Ariz., Inc. v. La Paz County, 233 Ariz. 460, 462, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 806, 808 (App.2013). We also review de novo the interpretation of statutes and rules. Schwab Sales, Inc. v. GN Const. Co., Inc., 196 Ariz. 33, 35-36, ¶ 3, 9, 992 P.2d 1128, 1130-31 (App.1998).
¶ 7 Documents delivered by mail are considered filed as of the date of receipt by the clerk of the court. See Crye v. Edwards, 178 Ariz. 327, 330, 873 P.2d 665, 668 (App.1993) (“The duty to file a paper is discharged when the filer places the paper in the hands of the proper custodian at the proper time and in the proper place.“); see also Filing by Mail, from the website of the Clerk of the Court, Maricopa County Superior Court, http://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/filing-by-mail.asp (last visited June 3, 2014) (“A person may file a document with the Clerk of the Court‘s Office by mail for civil, family, and probate matters.... The date of filing will be the date the documents are received by the Clerk‘s Office“).
¶ 8 In its opposition to ADOTS motion to dismiss, M-11 first contended that the ”
We have long recognized what is best termed a “mail delivery rule” This common law rule has two components: one a presumption, and one a rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence. Under the mail delivery rule, there is a presumption that a “letter properly addressed, stamped and deposited in the United States mail will reach the addressee” That is, proof of the fact of mailing will, absent any contrary evidence, establish that delivery occurred. If, however, the addressee denies receipt, the presumption of delivery disappears, but the fact of mailing still has evidentiary force. The denial of receipt creates an issue of fact that the factfinder must resolve to determine if delivery actually occurred.
218 Ariz. at 237, ¶ 18, 182 P.3d at 1171 (citations omitted). We decline to determine if the mail delivery rule applies to an initial filing in superior court that commences a new action, see Lee, 218 Ariz. at 241-42, ¶¶ 28-34, 182 P.3d at 1175-76 (McGregor, C.J., dissenting), because even if generally applicable, the mail delivery rule addresses the issue of whether a document was received, not the issue of when a document was received by the clerk‘s office. Because the superior court clerk‘s office received M-11‘s complaint for judicial review, the mail delivery rule has no application here.
¶ 9 We conclude, therefore, that the superior court correctly rejected M-11‘s argument based on the mail delivery rule.
Rule 60(a)
¶ 10 In its opposition to ADOTS motion to dismiss, M-11 also sought relief under
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
M-11 contended that the superior court clerk‘s filing date of August 7, 2012, was a clerical error. The evidence, according to M-11, showed that the complaint should be deemed to have been received on July 20, 2012, or a few days thereafter, and therefore in advance of the July 30 deadline for commencing judicial review. M-11 submitted an affidavit and supporting documents attesting to the mailing of the complaint on July 18 to the superior court clerk‘s office and to ADOT, and the receipt by ADOT of its copy on July 20. M-11 also pointed out that Gommards answer was dated and mailed, according to the mailing certificate, on October 22, 2012, but not docketed in as filed by the superior court clerk until December 5, 2012.
¶ 11 The superior court did not agree that Rule 60(a) applied, explaining:
M-11 further contends, if the Complaint was not timely filed, it was because of clerical error in that somebody in the Office of the Clerk of the Court neglected to file the Complaint until August 7, 2012. M-11 thus contends this Court would have the authority under Rule 60(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure to correct that clerical error. [ADOT] notes the Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions provide as follows:
Upon motion for good cause shown or upon stipulation, the superior court may extend any period of time prescribed either by these rules or by title 12, chapter 7, article 6, A.R.S., including the time for filing an answer or the record on review, but it may not extend the time for the filing of a complaint pursuant to
A.R.S. § 12-904 .Rule 2, R.P. Jud. Rev. Admin. Dec. Assuming Rule 60(a) applied to these proceedings, Rule 60(a) would be a general rule, while Rule 2 is a specific rule, thus Rule 2 would prevail over Rule 60(a). Moreover, this Court concludes a court rule may not change a statutory requirement for the filing of a Complaint. Finally, Rule 60(a) applies only after a Superior Court has
obtained jurisdiction; it does not give the Superior Court the authority to grant itself jurisdiction it never obtained in the first place.
¶ 12 We agree that the superior court does not have authority to extend the time for M-11‘s appeal nor to grant itself subject matter jurisdiction when none exists. But the superior court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 118, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Morgan v. Hays, 102 Ariz. 150, 152, 426 P.2d 647, 649 (1967). In accordance with
¶ 13 ADOT points out that the superior court clerk‘s office has an obligation under
CONCLUSION
¶ 14 We vacate the superior court‘s judgment dismissing M-11‘s complaint for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.