LYDIA E. VEGA, Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 19-1926 & 19-1939
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Decided April 7, 2020
Argued January 9, 2020
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:13-cv-451 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
On appeal, the Park District challenges the district court‘s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Vega‘s Title VII claim, several evidentiary rulings, the statutory maximum damages award, and the calculation of equitable remedies. Vega cross-appeals the district court‘s entry of judgment as a matter of law on her
I.
Lydia Vega, a Hispanic woman, began her employment with the Chicago Park District in 1987 and was promoted to the position of park supervisor in 2004—a position that she retained until she was fired in 2012 for allegedly violating the Park District‘s employment Code of Conduct. We recount the story of the Park District‘s investigation and termination of Vega‘s employment in the light most favorable to
In late September 2011, the Park District received an anonymous call, accusing Vega of “theft of time“—clocking in hours that she had not worked. In response to this accusation, an investigator for the Park District began surveilling Vega‘s car. A few days later, another anonymous caller again accused Vega of theft of time. At that point, another investigator began a separate and simultaneous investigation of Vega. Over the course of 56 days, Vega was surveilled over 252 times. On numerous occasions, the investigators interrupted Vega at work in front of her coworkers to ask her questions as a part of the investigation.
In March 2012, the investigators met with Vega and her union representative. The investigators had no interest in hearing Vega‘s side of the story; instead, Vega and her union representative found them to be “pretty dead set” on their conclusion that Vega had violated the Park District‘s Code of Conduct. By this point, the investigative process was causing Vega significant anxiety, and in late March, she took medical leave on the advice of her physician.
Between July and August 2012, Vega received two separate Corrective Action Meeting notices accusing her of the slightly different offense of timesheet falsification—not being present at her assigned location at the assigned time. After sending each notice, Mary Saieva, the Park District‘s Human Resources Manager, met with Vega and her union representative. Saieva, like the investigators, had little use for Vega‘s side of the story. At both meetings, Saieva refused to listen to Vega‘s explanations or review the documents that Vega had brought with her to dispute the allegations. After the meetings, Saieva called Elizabeth Millan, Vega‘s former supervisor, to discuss the discrepancy in Vega‘s timesheets. Millan told Saieva that she might have asked Vega to work from home on at least one of those occasions, which would explain one of the timesheet discrepancies. Saieva, however, disbelieved Millan, who, like Vega, was Hispanic.
Convinced that Vega was guilty, Saieva recommended that Vega‘s employment be terminated. In violation of the Park District‘s commitments under its union agreement, Saieva neither consulted with Vega‘s then-supervisor nor recommended any progressive discipline. Instead, she told Michael Simpkins, the Park District‘s Director of Human Resources, that Vega should be fired.
Simpkins fired Vega after receiving Saieva‘s recommendation and briefly reviewing the investigative report. According to the final termination letter, Vega was not fired for theft of time; rather, she was fired for eleven timesheet falsifications and for being untruthful during her Corrective Action Meetings. In another violation of its union commitments, the Park District did not offer Vega‘s union a pre-disciplinary agreement. Vega appealed the termination decision to the Park District Personnel Board. At that point, an administrative officer held a hearing and subsequently concluded that Vega‘s employment was properly terminated. The Personnel Board adopted that decision.
Vega sued the Park District under Title VII and
The Park District renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law under
The district court then conducted a bench trial on equitable remedies. It awarded Vega back pay ($154,707.50 in salary and $1,200 in lost bonuses) and benefits ($9,255.42 in substitute health insurance premiums). It initially rejected Vega‘s request for a $30,531.27 tax-component award because it found that Vega had not adequately explained the calculation justifying that amount. But, after Vega submitted supplemental briefing on the issue, the district court awarded Vega a tax-component award of $55,924.90 without explaining how it reached that figure. Finally, as an equitable remedy, the district court ordered the Park District to reinstate Vega to her former position as a park supervisor.
The Park District appeals every ruling that it lost except for Vega‘s reinstatement. In her cross-appeal, Vega asks us to reverse the district court‘s judgment as a matter of law on her
A.
The Park District argues that the district court erred by deciding that Vega had presented enough evidence to support her Title VII claim. We review the district court‘s determination de novo, Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 822 (7th Cir. 2016), and because Vega was the nonmoving party on the
In a Title VII case, “the sole question that matters” is “[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have kept h[er] job if [s]he had a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the same.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff can prove discrimination through various types of circumstantial evidence because “[d]irect evidence—an overt admission of discriminatory intent—is rare.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). So, the fact that Vega relied mainly on circumstantial rather than direct evidence is of no moment. What matters is whether she presented enough evidence to allow the jury to find in her favor—and she did.
For instance, Vega introduced evidence that she was an effective employee of the Park District for over 20 years and was promoted multiple times during her employment. The jump straight to termination was not only in tension with Vega‘s long, favorable record, it violated multiple union commitments. That in itself was important evidence because “[s]ignificant, unexplained or systematic deviations from established policies or practices” can be probative of discriminatory intent. Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 2012).
In addition to evidence of pretext, the jury heard testimony that the Park District mistreated other Hispanic employees. Millan, Vega‘s Hispanic former supervisor, testified that she was assigned to “rough” parks on purpose, while Ramirez, another Hispanic employee, told the jury that she retired from her 35-year career at the Park District after a police officer told her that the Park District investigators were watching her and her staff. As we have explained, “‘behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group’ is one type of circumstantial evidence that can support an inference of discrimination.” Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Vega also had evidence that the Park District disciplined Hispanics more harshly than other groups. She introduced data showing that no Caucasian park supervisors were fired between 2005 and 2012, while 17.6% of the Park District‘s Hispanic park supervisors were fired during that same period. She presented evidence that the Park District‘s investigation into her alleged falsification of timesheets was far more aggressive than its investigations of non-Hispanic employees accused of similar misconduct. While Vega was surveilled 252 times over the course of 56 days by two different investigators, a Caucasian park supervisor accused of a similar violation was surveilled only three times. And while Vega was fired, the Caucasian park supervisor was not punished even though the Park District concluded that she had lied on her timesheets. Similarly, Vega pointed to two other Caucasian park supervisors, both accused of going to bars during work hours, who were surveilled only during the mornings, when bars are typically closed. Vega also presented evidence that some African-American employees accused of similar timesheet violations were never disciplined at all. See Boss, 816 F.3d at 916–17 (holding that the plaintiff can show discrimination under Title VII by presenting “evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class received systematically better treatment“); see also Harden, 799 F.3d at 866 (reasoning that “selective enforcement or investigation” can support a discrimination claim (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Park District maintains that this evidence is irrelevant because the employees
The Park District insists that there were two employees who were similarly situated to Vega: two African-American park supervisors who, like Vega, were fired after an investigation into their timesheets. The Park District argues that faced with this evidence, no reasonable jury could have concluded that it treated comparable non-Hispanic employees more favorably than they treated Vega. But a reasonable jury could reject the Park District‘s contention that the two African-American park supervisors were appropriate comparators. One was fired for theft of time—for which Vega was investigated but not dismissed—and the other was fired after the Park District fired Vega. Given these differences, the jury was free to find that the Park District‘s treatment of these two African-American park supervisors shed little light on its treatment of Vega.
The Park District launches one final challenge to Vega‘s Title VII claim: it contends that Vega failed to show a causal link between the discrimination and her termination. Any discrimination, it says, was on the part of the investigators, who were not the decisionmakers. The decisions were made by Simpkins, who fired her, and the Personnel Board, which declined to reverse his decision. Vega introduced no evidence that Simpkins or any other member of the Board personally discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin. To win, therefore, Vega had to show a causal “link between an employment decision made by an unbiased individual and the impermissible bias of a non-decisionmaking co-worker.” Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2011). According to the Park District, Vega failed to do that.
The Park District‘s argument on this score is confusing and underdeveloped. For starters, it is unclear whether we should treat the Board‘s rejection of Vega‘s appeal as the relevant “adverse employment action” for purposes of Vega‘s Title VII claim. The Park District implies that the Board was the final decisionmaker because it had the power to reverse Simpkins‘s decision. But it fails to explain why this is so. Simpkins plainly possessed decisionmaking authority; had Vega not appealed his decision to terminate her, his decision would have been final. This distinguishes Simpkins‘s role from that of the Fire Department Chief in Woods v. City of Berwyn, the case on which the Park District hangs its hat—in Woods, 803 F.3d 865, 870–71 (7th Cir. 2015), the Fire Department chief possessed only the power to recommend termination to a Board that made the final decision. To conclude that Vega‘s appeal rendered the Board the final decisionmaker in her case, we need to know how the appellate process worked.
Did the Board‘s disposition of Vega‘s appeal reflect its view that Simpkins‘s decision should remain final? Or did the Board effectively start from scratch and render
Moreover, regardless of whether Simpkins or the Board was the “final decisionmaker” in the Park District‘s termination process, the dispositive question is whether the discriminatory animus of the investigators and Saieva was a proximate cause of the termination decision. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). As the Court has explained, a “biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor‘s recommendation, entirely justified.” Id. at 421. The Park District does not point us to evidence that would allow us to discern what role the investigative report or Saieva‘s recommendation played in the Board‘s review. And again, it is not our job to comb the record to determine whether it supports the Park District‘s conclusory assertion—really, it is more of an implication—that the Board‘s review was entirely untainted by either the investigative report or Saieva‘s recommendation.
We do know, however, what the record reflects about the role of the investigative report and Saieva‘s recommendation in Simpkins‘s termination decision. Even if Simpkins himself harbored no racial animus, the jury could have easily concluded that his review was too superficial to constitute “a meaningful and independent investigation.” Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634 F.3d at 383. After all, Simpkins simply adopted Saieva‘s recommendation without speaking to anyone else and admitted that he only read the first three pages of the investigative report. A plaintiff has “plenty of room” to convince the jury that a causal link exists, id. at 381, and a jury could reasonably find the necessary causal link here.
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in Vega‘s favor on her Title VII claim.
B.
The Park District also argues that the district court‘s evidentiary errors deprived it of a fair trial, thereby entitling it to a new one. “A new trial is appropriate where the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or the trial was not fair to the moving party.” Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2013). We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and reverse a district court‘s denial of a motion for a new trial only if there is a significant chance that any error “affected the outcome of the trial.” Smith v. Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1137 (7th Cir. 2013). This case does not present such a rare instance.
Although the Park District challenges numerous evidentiary rulings by the district court, only one warrants even a brief discussion: the district court‘s decision to allow the jury to view and listen to dozens of surveillance video clips. The Park District complains that most of these clips were neither authenticated nor admitted into evidence. This challenge is hard to take seriously because it essentially begins and ends with this conclusory statement. Notably, despite its vehement complaints
C.
The Park District maintains that the district court should have remitted Vega‘s damages from the jury‘s original $750,000 grant to less than the statutory maximum of $300,000 under Title VII. We review this decision for abuse of discretion, considering “whether the award is monstrously excessive, whether there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence, and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.” Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deference is particularly appropriate if, as was the case here, “the district court, which had the benefit of witnessing trial, itself remitted the jury‘s award to an amount that it determined was commensurate with the evidence in the present case viewed in light of comparable cases.” Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422 F.3d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 2005).
Vega testified extensively about the emotional, mental, and physical distress that she suffered for the final six months of her employment. She also testified that she was unemployed for a year and constantly worried about her inability to afford necessary medication and to support her mother. The award is rationally related to this testimony and is not monstrously excessive. See Tullis v. Townley Eng‘g & Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff can support an award for nonpecuniary loss by relying solely on her own testimony about her emotional distress).
The award is also sufficiently comparable to those made in similar cases. That is not to say that it is an exact match—but it doesn‘t have to be. We have explained that “[a]wards in other cases provide a reference point that assists the court in assessing reasonableness; they do not establish a range beyond which awards are necessarily excessive. Due to the highly fact-specific nature of Title VII cases, such comparisons are rarely dispositive.” Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And here, the “reference point” of other cases shows this award to be roughly comparable to other awards supported by “first- and third-person testimony regarding ongoing emotional and physical effects of the discrimination.” Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634 F.3d at 390 (collecting cases). For instance, in Farfaras, we upheld the jury‘s decision to award the plaintiff $200,000 for loss of dignity, humiliation, emotional distress, and pain and suffering when that emotional distress was supported by testimony highlighting the fact that the plaintiff “lost self-esteem, gained weight, [and] had problems sleeping” as a result of the discrimination. 433 F.3d at 563; see also Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 621 (concluding that a $175,000 award is comparable to lesser awards granted in other Title VII cases).
While remitting Vega‘s damages to the statutory maximum was undoubtedly generous, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the award.
D.
The Park District also argues that the district court erred when it awarded Vega back pay and benefits in lost salary, lost bonuses, and lost health insurance premiums. Specifically, the Park District argues that the award was erroneous because Vega did not mitigate her damages by searching for comparable employment in her field. In order to prevail on a failure-to-mitigate argument, the defendant must make two showings: (1) that the plaintiff was “not reasonably diligent in seeking other employment,” and (2) that “with the exercise of reasonable diligence there was a reasonable chance that the [plaintiff] might have found comparable employment.” EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1990). This is an affirmative defense, and once the district court determines that the defendant has failed to meet its burden, “[w]e shall not disturb that determination unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. The district court found that the Park District failed both prongs. We agree.
As for the first prong, the Park District argues that Vega did not exercise reasonable diligence in finding a comparable job because she did not apply for jobs in the narrow field of recreation in municipal parks. The district court disagreed. It found that Vega exercised reasonable diligence because she applied for over 100 jobs after she was fired. While not all the jobs she applied for were comparable to her job as a park supervisor, many of them involved working with youth or otherwise engaging with the community. Thus, the district court determined that the Park District failed to meet the first prong. Besides—as the district court correctly noted—the Park District all but ignores the second prong because it provides virtually no evidence that Vega would have been successful in obtaining a sufficiently comparable job in the narrow field of recreation in municipal parks even if she had tried. We affirm the district court‘s award of back pay and benefits.
E.
Finally, the Park District argues that the district court‘s award of a $55,924.90 tax component is flawed because the district court offered no explanation for its calculation. Here, we agree with the Park District—the district court abused its discretion. EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., Inc., 777 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2015).
In Title VII suits, the district court has the authority to grant a tax-component
The district court in this case did not explain how it arrived at the $55,924.90 figure, which was substantially higher than the amount that Vega had originally requested. She initially sought a tax-component award of $30,531.27, but the district court denied that request because it could not determine how Vega calculated that amount. After supplemental briefing on the issue, Vega revised her calculation and proposed this $55,924.90 figure. The district court accepted Vega‘s revised proposal without saying why.
On appeal, Vega attempts to justify the figure by referencing some of her submissions to the district court. But even after reviewing those documents, we are unable to readily discern whether the calculation is accurate. So, because the district court failed to explain its calculation and $55,924.90 is more than nine times the modest award we affirmed in North Star Hospital, we vacate the award and remand for the district court to show its work.
II.
We now turn to Vega‘s cross-appeal. Vega argues that the district court was wrong to grant the Park District‘s
At trial, Vega argued that the Park District was liable under
The district court held that Vega‘s
We need not wade into the “policymaker” question, though, because Vega failed to show that there was a widespread custom of discrimination against Hispanics in the first place. Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of Chi., Inc. v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 312 (7th Cir. 2011) (“It is well established that we may affirm the result below on any basis that appears in the record, even if it was not the district court‘s ground for dismissing the suit.“). Her case that “[t]he offending custom [was] widespread and well settled” relied heavily on uninformative demographic data. See Vigo Cty., 905 F.3d at 1045. For instance, she emphasized that neither the Human Resources Department nor the Investigations Department employed any Hispanics and that several Hispanic employees were replaced by non-Hispanics. But we have previously cautioned against relying on similar statistical evidence because it lacks critical context such as the ratio of qualified Hispanics who actually applied for the relevant positions. Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 829 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “without knowing how many positions became available during the relevant time frame, the number and race of the candidates applying for those positions, and the candidates’ relative qualifications,” statistical evidence about the racial demographic of a workplace is “next to worthless” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, during the trial, Vega relied on a comparison between the data in the 2010 U.S. Census and the ethnic demographic of the Park District to highlight the comparatively low ratio of Hispanic employees at the Park District. But this piece of evidence tells us even less about the Park District‘s hiring practices because the census data encompasses many more people than just the relevant market for Park District employees. EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 299 (7th Cir. 1991) (highlighting the significance of limiting the data to the “relevant labor market” when making similar inferences about an employer‘s hiring practice).
Vega had other evidence that was more helpful, but it still fell short of establishing the kind of “widespread custom” necessary for municipal liability under
It is true that Vega had enough evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor on her Title VII claim for discrimination on the basis of national origin. But the standard of liability is different under
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In sum, we AFFIRM the district court‘s denial of the Park District‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Vega‘s Title VII claim, its decision to remit Vega‘s compensatory award to $300,000, and its award of back pay and benefits. We VACATE the district court‘s tax-component award and REMAND with instructions to the district court to explain its calculation. We AFFIRM the district court‘s judgment as a matter of law on Vega‘s