LYANTIE TOWNSEND, etc., Petitioner, vs. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Respondent.
No. SC15-722
Supreme Court of Florida
June 9, 2016
LEWIS,
LEWIS, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 160 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). In its decision, the district court certified a question of great public importance to this Court. See id. at 575. We have jurisdiction. See
BACKGROUND
After lengthy and protracted litigation, this case is here for a determination of whether R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“R.J. Reynolds“), the Respondent, owes Lyantie Townsend, the Petitioner, $768,205.48 in disputed post-judgment interest. The dispute concerns whether the post-judgment interest rate was 6% or 4.75% for post-judgment interest acсruing during the period after January 1, 2012, in light of an intervening statutory amendment to Florida‘s post-judgment interest statute,
The relevant facts began on April 21, 2010, when a final judgment was entered awarding Townsend $5,508,000 in compensatory damages and $40,800,000 in punitive damages. With regard to post-judgment interest, the judgment provided that the total sum of $46,308,000 “shall bear interest at 6% per annum from April 29, 2010 for which sum let execution issue.” In 2010,
Next, in 2012, following an appeal by R.J. Reynolds and an election of remittitur by Townsend, an amended final judgment was entered awarding Townsend $5,508,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court ordered that the total sum of $25,508,000 would “bear interest as provided by law from April 29, 2010.”
In 2014, R.J. Reynolds then filed a motion in the trial court to determine the rate of interest payable on the amended final judgment. R.J. Reynolds contended that a 2011 amendment to
On appeal from the trial court‘s ruling, a divided panel of the First District reversed the trial court for two reasons. See Townsend, 160 So. 3d at 573. First, the district court held that the 1998 addition of
DOES THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 55.03(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (1998), PROVIDE THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ABANDON THE COMMON LAW RULE THAT POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATES CHANGE ON EXISTING JUDGMENTS WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CHANGES THE RATES SUCH THAT THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 55.03, FLORIDA STATUTES DO NOT APPLY TO A JUDGMENT ENTERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2011?
Id. at 575. We accepted jurisdiction. See Townsend v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 171 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 2015). However, we believe the question is better articulated as:
DOES THE 2011 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 55.03(3), FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO A JUDGMENT ENTERED BETWEEN OCTOBER 1998 AND JUNE 30, 2011?
This review follows.
ANALYSIS
As the facts are not in dispute, this matter turns on a pure question of law and statutory interpretation—which version of
Townsend contends that the 2010 version of
THE TWO STATUTES AT ISSUE
We begin our analysis by reviewing the two versions of
October 1998,
55.03 Judgments; rate of interest, generally.—
(1) On December 1 of each year, the Chief Financial Officer shall set the ratе of interest that shall be payable on judgments or decrees for the year beginning January 1 by averaging the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the preceding year, then adding 500 basis points to the averaged federal discount rate. The Chief Financial Officer shall inform the clerk of the courts and
chief judge for each judicial circuit of the rate that has been established for the upcoming year. The interest rate established by the Chief Financial Officer shall take effect on January 1 of each following year. Judgments obtained on or after January 1, 1995, shall use the previous statutory rate for time periods before January 1, 1995, for which interest is due and shall apply the rate set by the Chief Financial Officer for time periods after January 1, 1995, for which interest is due. Nothing contained herein shall affect a rate of interest established by written contract or obligation.
(2) Any judgment for money damages or order for a judicial sale and any process or writ directed to a sheriff for execution shall bear, on its face, the rate of interest that is payable on the judgment. The rate of interest stated in the judgment accrues on the judgment until it is paid.
(3) The interest rate established at the time a judgment is obtained shall remain the same until the judgment is paid.
(4) A sheriff shall not be required to docket and index or collect on any process, writ, judgment, or decree, described in subsection (2), and entered
after the effective date of this act, unless such process, writ, judgment, or decree indicates the rate of interest. For purposes of this subsection, if the process, writ, judgment, or decree refers to the statutory rate of interest described in subsection (1), such reference shall be deemed to indicate the rate of interest.
Next, effective July 1, 2011, an amended version of
55.03 Judgments; rate of interest, generally.—
(1) On December 1, March 1, June 1, and September 1 of each year, the Chief Financial Officer shall set the rate of interest that shall be payable on judgments or decrees for the calendar quarter beginning January 1 and adjust the rate quarterly on April 1, July 1, and October 1 by averaging the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for the preceding 12 months, then adding 400 basis points to the averaged federal discount rate. The Chief Financial Officer shall inform the clerk of the courts and chief judge for each judicial circuit of the rate that has been established for the upcoming quarter. The interest rate established by the Chief Financial Officer shall take effect on the first day of each following calendar quarter. Judgments obtained on or after January 1, 1995, shall use the previous statutory rate for time periods before January 1, 1995, for which interest is due and shall apply the rate set by the Chief Financial Offiсer for time periods after January 1, 1995, for which interest is due. Nothing contained herein shall affect a rate of interest established by written contract or obligation.
(2) Any judgment for money damages or order for a judicial sale and any process or writ directed to a sheriff for execution shall bear, on its face, the rate of interest that is payable on the judgment. The rate of interest stated in the judgment, as adjusted in subsection (3), accrues on the judgment until it is paid.
(3) The interest rate is established at the time a judgment is obtained and such interеst rate shall be adjusted annually on January 1 of each year in accordance with the interest rate in effect on that date as set by the Chief Financial Officer until the judgment is paid, except for judgments entered by the clerk of the court pursuant to ss. 55.141, 61.14, 938.29, and 938.30, which shall not be adjusted annually.
(4) A sheriff shall not be required to docket and index or collect on any process, writ, judgment, or decree, described in subsection (2), and entered after the effective date of this act, unless such process, writ, judgment, or decree indicates the rate of interest. For purposes of this subsection, if the process, writ, judgment, or decree refers to the statutory rate of interest described in subsection (1), such reference shall be deemed to indicate the rate of interest.
Thus, through the 2011 amendment to
VESTED RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS
To answer the rephrased certified quеstion, we must determine whether the 2010 version of
Article I, section 2, of the Florida Constitution guarantees to all persons the right to acquire, possess, and protect property.Section 9 of article I provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” These constitutionаl due process rights protect individuals from the retroactive application of a substantive law that adversely affects or destroys a vested right; imposes or creates a new obligation or duty in connection with a previous transaction or consideration; or imposes new penalties. For the retroactive application of a law to be constitutionally permissible, the Legislature must express a clear intent that the law apply retroactively, and the law must be procedural or remediаl in nature.Remedial statutes operate to further a remedy or confirm rights that already exist, and a procedural law provides the means and methods for the application and enforcement of existing duties and rights. In contrast, a substantive law prescribes legal duties and rights and, once those rights and duties are vested, due process prevents the Legislature from retroactively abolishing or curtailing them.
127 So. 3d 1258, 1272 (Fla. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Thus, if the 2010 version of
When this Court interprets statutes, we give effect to the Legislature‘s intent and are guided by rules of statutory interpretation. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). We begin this process by looking to the actual language used in the statute. See id. “Where the statute‘s language is clear or unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 3d 433, 439 (Fla. 2013) (citing Fla. Dep‘t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)). Instead, when clear and unambiguous, “the statute‘s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.” Daniels, 898 So. 2d at 64-65 (citing State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004)). Furthermore, when the Legislature has not defined a word, it is entirely appropriate to refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) (“As this Court has held, ‘[w]hen considering the meaning of terms used in a statute, this Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary definitions, . . . definitions [that] may be derived from dictionaries.’ “) (quoting Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 2009))).
We can recall few statutes that are as clear and unambiguous as the 2010 version of
Although it is not necessary to delve into the legislative history of
B. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:
. . . .
4. Would Freeze the Applicable Rate of Interest – CS/HB 935 states that “The interest rate established at the time a judgment is obtained shall remain the same until the judgment is paid.” This provision would reduce the administrative burdens faced by sheriffs, clerks of the circuit courts, and certain financial institutions. Currently, the rate of interest paid on judgments must be recalculated based upon annual adjustments by the comptroller.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Civil Justice & Claims, HB 935 (1997) Staff Analysis (Mar. 28, 1997). This legislative history suggests that the Legislature aimed to reduce the work and costs that would ensue from adjusting cоuntless judgments on a year-to-year basis by providing for an interest rate that would be the same until the judgment was paid.
As we have determined that the 2010 version of
We conclude that the 2010 version of
Next, we turn to whether Townsend‘s substantive right in a fixed rate of interest actually vested. We conclude that it vested at the moment she obtained her judgment.
We need not look any further than the plain language of the statute to reach this conclusion. As discussed above, the language is clear that the judgment bears a fixed interest rate—one thаt remains the same—once the rate is established at the time the judgment is obtained.
R.J. Reynolds relies on Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 2013), to contend that Townsend‘s rights only vested with regard to the interest that accrued prior to the effective date of the 2011 amendment to
R.J. Reynolds misapprehends the right at issue. The substantive right created by the 2010 version of
Furthermore, Scott is entirely distinguishable. Scott concerned the constitutionality of a statute that changed the Florida Retiremеnt System from a noncontributory pension plan to a contributory pension plan and eliminated an annual cost of living adjustment. See id. at 382. The changes applied only to benefits corresponding to future service—work performed after the effective date of the statute. See id. In Scott, we held that the changes were constitutional despite a preservation of rights statute. See id. at 388. Unlike the beneficiaries in Scott whose future benefits depended on how much future work they performed, Townsend secured her right to a fixed rate of interest solely by obtaining a judgment. Thus, unlike the workers in Scott, Townsеnd has completely fulfilled her only obligation under the statute and can do no more. Scott is also distinguishable on the basis that the preservation of rights statute concerned
Having determined that Townsend‘s substantive right to a fixed rate of interest on her judgment vested, we cannot constitutionally apply the 2011 version of
ADDITIONAL CONCERNS
Although we need not reach further discussion, we briefly address two other concerns raised by the majority below and R.J. Reynolds. First, R.J. Reynolds urges that the statute cannot create a vested right to a fixed rate of interest because it would bind the hands of future Legislatures. The very passage of the 2011 amendment to
Second, the majority below held that the common law default rule cases control in this situation despite the plain language of
On the one hand, the common law default rule cases stand for the proposition that the post-judgment interest rate changes on judgments аs the Legislature changes the rates in the statutes. See Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162 (1892); Glades Cty., Fla. v. Kurtz, 101 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir. 1939); Applestein v. Simons, 586 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The common law default rule rejects the notion that statutory interest is of a contractual nature. See generally Morley, 146 U.S. 162; Glades Cty., Fla., 101 F.2d 759; Applestein, 586 So. 2d 441. Instead, as remains true today, statutory post-judgment interest is a matter of legislative grace. See Whitehurst v. Camp, 677 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The common law default rule cases thus interpreted changes in the post-judgment statutory interest rate as permissible exercises of this legislative grace and changing legislative policies.
On the other hand, as discussed above, in 1998, the Legislature enacted
Despite the clear conflict between the 1998 version of
Furthermore, the common law default rule cases involve a distinguishable post-judgment interest rate statutory framework. Not a single decision of the common law default rule cases from other jurisdictions concerns or involves a statute like the one in effect in Florida at the time Townsend obtained the judgment we consider here.2 Specifically, the statute here сontains a specific provision
providing the rate of interest that accrues until the judgment is paid,
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, through its enactment of
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
POLSTON, J., dissenting.
I would approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 160 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), for the reasons Judge Roberts explained in his opinion.
CANADY, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D14-4147
(Alachua County)
Tracy Sue Carlin, Steven L. Brannock, and Celene Harrell Humphries of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, Florida; Gregory David Prysock and Katherine Michelle Massa of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Keith Randolph Mitnik of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles Franklin Bеall, Jr. and Thomas Larry Hill of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, Florida; and Gregory George Katsas and Charles Richard Allan Morse of Jones Day, Washington, District of Columbia,
for Respondent
Courtney Rebecca Brewer and John Stewart Mills of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association
Notes
1. In 1997,
55.03 Judgments; rate of interest, generally.—
(1) On December 1 of each year beginning December 1, 1994, the Comptroller of the State of Florida shall set the rate of interest that shall be payable on judgments or decrees for the year beginning January 1 by averaging the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New Yоrk for the preceding year, then adding 500 basis points to the averaged federal discount rate. The Comptroller shall inform the clerk of the courts and chief judge for each judicial circuit of the rate that has been established for the upcoming year. The initial interest rate established by the Comptroller shall take effect on January 1, 1995, and the interest rate established by the Comptroller in subsequent years shall take effect on January 1 of each following year. Judgments obtained on or after January 1, 1995, shall use the previоus statutory rate for time periods before January 1, 1995, for which interest is due and shall apply the rate set by the Comptroller for time periods after January 1, 1995, for which interest is due. Nothing
contained herein shall affect a rate of interest established by written contract or obligation.
(2) Any process, writ, judgment, or decree which is directed to the sheriffs of the state to be dealt with as execution shall bear, on the face of the process, writ, judgment, or decree, the rate of interest which it shall accrue from the date of the judgment until payment.
2. In a misplaced attempt to sway this Court in terms of majority and minority rules, R.J. Reynolds refers this Court to many cases from other jurisdictions applying the common law default rule to statutes which appear to be silent with regard to whether the interest rate on a judgment is fixed for the life of the judgment. See, e.g., Morley, 146 U.S. at 162 (applying New York law); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Se. Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 303 S.E.2d 860, 861-62 (S.C. 1983); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Kelso Corp., 449 A.2d 406, 410 (Md. Ct. App. 1982); Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Cent. Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law); Associated Developers, Inc. v. City of Brookings, 305 N.W.2d 848, 849 (S.D. 1981); Ind. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Glendale-Glenbrook Assocs., 429 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. 1981); McBride v. Super. Ct., 635 P.2d 178, 179 (Ariz. 1981); Senn v. Commerce-Manchester Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551, 553-54 (Mo. 1980); Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Ky. 1978); Noe v. City of Chicago, 307 N.E.2d 376, 394 (Ill. 1974); Swanson v. Flynn, 31 N.W.2d 320, 323 (N.D. 1948); Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 37 P.2d 407, 412 (Idaho 1934); Stanford v. Coram, 72 P. 655, 655-56 (Mont. 1903); See Read v. Mississippi Cty., 63 S.W. 807 (Ark. 1901); Wyo. Nat‘l Bank of Laramie v. Brown, 53 P. 291 (Wyo. 1898).
3. Although R.J. Reynolds refers this Court to cases applying the common law default rule in Arizona, North Dakota, and Utah, R.J. Reynolds failed to refer this Court to subsequent enactments in those states that provide for an unchanging rate of interest similar to the 2010 version of