MICHAEL ALLEN LUTTRELL v. SAMANTHA MARY JO CUCCO
Record No. 150770
Supreme Court of Virginia
April 28, 2016
OPINION BY JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS
PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, and Kelsey, JJ., and
In this appeal, we consider whether same-sex couples can “cohabit[] . . . in a relationship analogous to a marriage” for purposes of
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Michael Luttrell (“Luttrell“) and Samantha Cucco (“Cucco“) were married on January 6, 1992. They later separated, and Cucco filed for divorce on October 5, 2007. Subsequently, they executed a “Property, Custody, and Support Settlement Agreement” (the “PSA“). The PSA was affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into the final decree of divorce granted by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County on November 6, 2008.
Pursuant to the PSA, the divorce decree ordered Luttrell to pay monthly spousal support to Cucco for a term of eight years. However, the PSA provided further that the payments would terminate upon
the death of either party, the remarriage of the wife, or as a result of action by the Court taken pursuant to
§ 20-109 of 1950 Code of Virginia , as amended, relative to cohabitation.
Also relevant to this appeal, the PSA contained a cost-shifting provision in the event of an enforcement action by one of the parties. That provision states:
The parties agree that any reasonable expenses incurred by a party in the successful enforcement of any of the provisions of [the PSA], or in taking action as a result of the breach of [the PSA] by the other party, whether through litigation or other action necessary to compel compliance herewith, or to cure such breach, shall be borne by the defaulting party. Any such expenses incurred by a party in the successful defense to any such action shall be borne by the party seeking to enforce compliance. “Reasonable Expenses” as referenced herein shall include, but not be limited to, counsel fees, court costs, and expenses of travel.
On July 10, 2014, Luttrell filed a motion for adjustment of spousal support in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. In his motion, Luttrell alleged that Cucco was “engaged to be married” and had been “cohabiting continuously” with her fiancée for at least a year. Pursuant to the PSA, Luttrell sought a court order terminating his spousal support obligation on the basis of Cucco‘s alleged cohabitation. Luttrell also requested an order directing Cucco to refund “the equivalent of at least one year of Spousal Support payments.”
The circuit court reasoned that the right to marry was distinct from the question of its authority to terminate spousal support pursuant to
Luttrell appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in an unpublished opinion. Luttrell v. Cucco, Record No. 1768-14-4, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 135 (Apr. 21, 2015). As relevant to this appeal, the court began its analysis by looking to the history of
The Court of Appeals interpreted this provision in light of two cases decided five years prior to its enactment. First, the court identified a statement from this Court‘s opinion in Schweider v. Schweider, 243 Va. 245, 248, 415 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1992), which noted that previous case law had defined “cohabit” to mean “liv[ing] together in the same house as married persons live together, or in the manner of husband and wife.” The court also cited Frey v. Frey, 14 Va. App. 270, 275, 416 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1992), which had construed a property settlement agreement providing for the termination of spousal support upon the former wife‘s “cohabitation, analogous to marriage, with another man.” In that context, the court held that the phrase “cohabitation, analogous to marriage” meant “a status in which a man and woman live together continuously, or with some permanency, mutually assuming duties and obligations normally attendant with a marital relationship.” Id.
Reasoning that the General Assembly was aware of these cases when it amended
II. ANALYSIS
A. Code § 20-109(A)
Under the terms of the PSA, Luttrell cannot terminate his spousal support obligation on grounds of “cohabitation” until a court takes action pursuant to
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys., 283 Va. 190, 194, 721 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2012). “The purpose for which a statute is enacted is of primary importance in its interpretation or construction.” Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Board of Cnty. Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 388, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.” Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (collecting cases).
When interpreting a statute, “[t]he general rule . . . is that the words of a statute should receive their ordinary acceptation and significance, where such construction is consonant, and not at variance, with the purpose of the statute.” Rountree Corp. v. Richmond, 188 Va. 701, 712, 51 S.E.2d 256, 260-61 (1949). We adhere to this rule because “[l]egislative words derive vitality from the obvious purposes for which the statutes are enacted.” Id. at 711, 51 S.E.2d at 260. Thus, we favor a permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the statute‘s purpose. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 226 Va. at 388, 309 S.E.2d 311; Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 364, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952) (“The statute should have a rational construction consistent with its manifest purpose, and not one which will substantially defeat its object.“).
We begin our analysis by observing that the language of
We next examine the relevant case law. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the 1997 amendments to
In Frey, the Court of Appeals interpreted a property settlement agreement, which provided that the husband‘s spousal support obligation would terminate upon the wife‘s “cohabitation, analogous to a marriage, with another man.” 14 Va. App. at 271, 416 S.E.2d at 41. After reviewing case law from other jurisdictions, the court held that the phrase in the parties’ property settlement agreement, “cohabitation, analogous to a marriage,” meant “a status in which a man and woman live together continuously, or with some permanency, mutually assuming duties and obligations normally attendant with a marital relationship.” Id. at 275, 416 S.E.2d at 43. The court explained further that a shared residence, a degree of intimacy, some financial support, and an assumption of duties normally associated with marriage are factors relevant to determining
Subsequent to these two decisions, the General Assembly added the language in
Upon the death, cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex, or remarriage of the spouse receiving support, spousal support shall terminate unless otherwise provided by stipulation or contract.
H.B. 1341, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 1997) (offered Jan. 22, 1996) (new language indicated by italics). However, the House Committee for Courts of Justice proposed an amendment in the nature of a substitute that eliminated the prepositional phrase “of the opposite sex.” Accordingly, proposed subsection (C)3 provided for the termination of spousal support
upon order of the court based on clear and convincing evidence that the spouse receiving support has been habitually cohabiting with another person for a year or more.
H.B. 1341, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 1997) (proposed on Dec. 20, 1996). Subsequently, the Senate Committee for Courts of Justice proposed another amendment in the nature of a substitute that adopted the gender-neutral phrase used by the House Committee, added the prepositional phrase “in a relationship analogous to a marriage,” and reorganized the subsections. H.B. 1341, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 1997) (proposed on Feb. 10, 1997). This version of the bill was enacted as 1997 Acts ch. 241.
By declining to modify the word “person” with the phrase “of the opposite sex,” the General Assembly signaled its intention that “person” would include individuals of either sex. The General Assembly clearly intended to extend the application of
The fact that same-sex marriage was not legal in Virginia in 1997 is not relevant to this statutory analysis. As the Court of Appeals recognized in another case, “[a] relationship ‘analogous to marriage’ does not mean a ‘marriage.‘” See Stroud v. Stroud, 49 Va. App. 359, 378, 641 S.E.2d 142, 151 (2007) (interpreting the phrase “cohabitation with any person . . . in a situation analogous to marriage” in a property settlement agreement). Therefore, regardless of the legal definition of marriage in effect when this provision was enacted, there is no textual basis to interpret “a relationship analogous to marriage” as having precisely the same meaning as “a marriage.” See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 77 (1993) (defining “analogous” as “showing an analogy or a likeness permitting one to draw an analogy: susceptible of comparison either in general or in some specific detail . . . having a similar function but differing in structure or origin). Rather, the analogy between the relationship in question and marriage directs courts to the factors identified in Frey as relevant to “establish[ing] that a relationship between parties is analogous to marriage.” See 14 Va. App. at 275, 416 S.E.2d at 43.
Those factors reflect the purpose of
A contrary interpretation of
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the General Assembly intended the phrase “habitually cohabiting with another person in a relationship analogous to a marriage” to refer only to opposite-sex relationships.
B. Attorney‘s Fees
The circuit court awarded Cucco attorney‘s fees pursuant to the PSA, which states that “[a]ny [reasonable] expenses incurred by a party in the successful defense to any [enforcement] action shall be borne by the party seeking to enforce compliance.” The Court of Appeals affirmed that award because Luttrell had filed a motion to adjust spousal support, which the court found was an attempt to enforce the PSA, and because it concluded that Cucco had prevailed on her defense to the motion. As we conclude that same-sex couples can cohabit for purposes of
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we find that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that same-sex couples cannot “cohabit” for purposes of
Reversed, vacated and remanded.
Notes
Upon order of the court based upon clear and convincing evidence that the spouse receiving support has been habitually cohabiting with another person in a relationship analogous to a marriage for one year or more . . ., the court shall terminate spousal support and maintenance.