LOUIS B. GASKIN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
No. SC15-1884
Supreme Court of Florida
January 19, 2017
This сase is before the Court on appeal from an order denying appellant Louis B. Gaskin‘s motion to vacate a judgment for two convictions of first-degree murder and two sentences of death under
The facts of this case were presented in this Court‘s opinion on direct appeal. Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1991). In 1989, Gaskin was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (premeditated and felony murder) for the death of Robert Sturmfels, two counts of first-degree murder (premeditated and felony murder) in the death of Georgette Sturmfels, one count of armed robbery of the Sturmfels’ home, one count of burglary of the Sturmfels’ home, one count of attemptеd first-degree murder of Joseph Rector, one count of armed robbery of Joseph and Mary Rector, and one count of burglary of the Rectors’ home. Id. at 918. In 1990, after the penalty phase, the jury recommended two death sentences for both murders by a vote of eight to four. Id. at 919. The trial court sentenced Gaskin to death. Id. In 1991, this Court affirmed Gаskin‘s premeditated murder convictions and two death sentences, reversed the two felony murder convictions that were duplicative of the premeditated murder convictions, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its decision. Id. at 922. In 1993, Gaskin‘s sentences became final when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Gaskin v. State, 510 U.S. 925 (1993). In 2002, this Court affirmed the lower court‘s denial of Gaskin‘s initial motion for postconviction relief. Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2002). In 2014,
Standard of Review
A successive
Gaskin‘s claim of improper doubling is untimely and procedurally barred because the issue could have and should have been raised on direct appeal.
In general, a postconviction movant must file for relief “within 1 year after [the movant‘s] judgment and sentence become final.”
Additionally, Gaskin‘s claim is procedurally barred because Gaskin had the opportunity to challenge not only his duplicative convictions on direct appeal but to challenge his sentences on the basis that the jury erroneously considered the doubled convictions in recommending two death sentences. See Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 698 (Fla. 2012) (holding that claims were procedurally barred because the movant could have raised them on direct appeal).
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
CANADY, J., concurs in result.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
PERRY, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
LEWIS, J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that Gaskin‘s claim of improper doubling is untimely and procedurally barred, I write separately to express my disagreement with denying Gaskin relief under Hurst v. Florida1 and Hurst.2 As I stated in my concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion in
Short of holding Hurst fully retroactive, I would at least apply Hurst to Gaskin because he, through his attorneys, challenged the constitutionality of Florida‘s capital sentencing statute at trial in 1990 and, again, on direct appeal in 1991. This Court summarily rejected Gaskin‘s claim on direct appeal, stating: “We also reject without discussion Gaskin‘s multiple assertions regarding the constitutionality of the capital-sentencing statute as each of his arguments has previously been decided adversely to his position.” Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1991). Although our opinion did not detail Gaskin‘s constitutionаl challenges, the record on appeal reveals that Gaskin argued that “section 921.141 . . . was unconstitutional on its face” for the reasons espoused by the
[B]efore a sentence of death may be considered by the trial court in Florida, the jury must find the existence of the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances. These same requirements existed in Florida law when Hurst was sentenced in 2012—although they were consigned to the trial judge to make.
We also conclude that, just as elements of a crime must be found unanimously by a Florida jury, all these findings necessary for the jury to essentially convict a defendant of capital murder—thus allowing imposition of the death penalty—are also elements that must be found unanimously by the jury. Thus, we hold that in addition to unanimously finding the existence of any aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may be considered by thе judge.
Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 53-54 (footnotes omitted).
Amid a myriad of arguments as to how Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme violated the fundamental rights of defendants facing the death penalty in Florida, Gaskin specifically argued that the statute “does not require a sentencing recommendation by a unanimous jury or a substantial majority of the jury and thus results in the arbitrary and unreliable application of the death sentence and denies
Where the error concerns sentencing, the error is harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the sentence. See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000). Although the harmless error test applies to both constitutional errors and errors not based on constitutional grounds, “the harmless error test is to be rigorously applied,” [State v.] DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d [1129,] 1137 [Fla. 1986], and the State bears an extremely heavy burden in cases involving constitutional error. Therefore, in the context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the Stаte, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury‘s failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to Hurst‘s death sentence in this case. We reiterate:
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-faсt by simply weighing the evidence. The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139. “The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the [sentence].” Id.
202 So. 3d at 68 (last alteration in original). As applied to the right to a jury trial with regard to the facts necessаry to impose the death penalty, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that
Gaskin‘s sentences became final in 1993. Majority op. at 2. The penalty phase jury voted eight to four to recommend a sentence of death for both murders. Majority op. at 2. So not only are we unable to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury unanimously made the requisite findings to impose death as required by Hurst, but most significantly in Gaskin‘s case, the jury may have relied on invalid aggravating factors to reach its mere eight to four recommendation for death. See majority op. at 2-3. As the majority explained, this Court reversed and vacated Gaskin‘s sentences of felony murder, which the sentencing jury likely considered in its weighing process. Majority op. at 2-3. Thus, fоr the reasons stated above and under the test set forth by this Court in Hurst for determining whether Hurst errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would conclude that any error in Gaskin‘s nonunanimous sentencing recommendation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Gaskin should, therefore, receive a new penalty phase under Hurst.
PERRY, Senior Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority‘s conclusion that Gaskin‘s claim of improper doubling is untimely and procedurally barred. See majority op. at 4. However, I
I dissent because Hurst v. Florida does apply retroactively to Gaskin‘s case. In his present appeal, Gaskin once again challenges the constitutionality of Florida‘s death penalty statute. The majority concluded that Gaskin was not eligible for Hurst v. Florida relief because Gaskin‘s sentences became final in 1993, before the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See majority op. at 5.
For the reasons I dissented in part in Asay, I cannot agree with the majority‘s decision to limit the retroactive effect of Hurst v. Florida to those cases that were not final before Ring. See Asay v. State, No. SC16-223, 2016 WL 7406538 at *13 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Perry, J., dissenting). I would find that Hurst v. Florida applies retroactively regardless of whether a sentence became final before or after the Ring decision.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
Joseph David Walsh, Judge - Case No. 641995CF034327XXXAES
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region, James Lawrence Driscoll, Jr., David Dixon Hendry, and Gregory W. Brown, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Scott Andrew Browne, Senior Assistant Attornеy General, Tampa, Florida,