Louis B. Gaskin v. State of Florida, 218 So. 3d 399

Louis B. Gaskin was convicted in 1989 of two premeditated first‑degree murders and related offenses; jury recommended death 8–4 for each murder and trial court imposed two death sentences.
This Court affirmed premeditated murder convictions and death sentences on direct appeal in 1991 (Gaskin v. State), vacated duplicative felony‑murder convictions, and the sentences became final in 1993 after the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Gaskin filed successive postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 challenging (1) that the jury’s consideration of now‑vacated felony‑murder convictions amounted to improper doubling of aggravators and (2) entitlement to relief under Hurst v. Florida.
The trial court summarily denied the successive 3.851 motion; the Florida Supreme Court reviews such summary denials de novo and may affirm if the record conclusively shows no entitlement to relief.
The majority held Gaskin’s doubling claim untimely and procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal and his judgment became final in 1993; the majority also held Hurst is not retroactive to cases finalized before Ring.
Two justices (Pariente and Perry) concurred in part and would have applied Hurst retroactively to Gaskin (Pariente would also find the Hurst error not harmless and grant a new penalty phase).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Improper doubling of aggravators (use of premeditated + felony‑murder)	Gaskin: jury relied on both premeditated and felony‑murder convictions when recommending death; vacated felony‑murder convictions tainted sentencing	State: claim could and should have been raised on direct appeal; now untimely and procedurally barred	Denied — claim untimely and procedurally barred (could have been raised on direct appeal)
Timeliness of successive 3.851 motion	Gaskin: judgment became final when corrected judgment issued in 2014, so claim timely	State: judgment became final in 1993 when certiorari denied; 1‑year rule applies; motion is untimely	Denied — judgment final in 1993; motion filed long after rule deadline
Retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida	Gaskin: entitled to Hurst relief because Florida’s sentencing scheme violated jury‑trial rights; counsel preserved challenges at trial/appeal	State/Majority: Hurst not retroactive to cases final before Ring; Gaskin’s sentence was final in 1993	Denied — Hurst not applied retroactively to Gaskin (final before Ring)
Harmlessness of Hurst error	Gaskin: (if Hurst applied) error not harmless given 8–4 jury recommendation and possible reliance on vacated felony‑murder aggravators	State: (if Hurst applied) would bear burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt error harmless	Not reached by majority; concurrence (Pariente) would find error not harmless and grant new penalty phase

Gaskin v. State, 591 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1991) (direct‑appeal disposition of convictions and sentences)
Gaskin v. State, 510 U.S. 925 (1993) (U.S. Supreme Court denial of certiorari; finality of sentence)
Reed v. State, 116 So.3d 260 (Fla. 2013) (standard for summary denial of successive 3.851 motions)
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (holding Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment)
Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court’s remedial and harmless‑error framework for Hurst errors)
Asay v. State, 210 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2016) (holding Hurst not retroactive to cases final before Ring)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that a jury, not a judge, must find facts necessary to impose the death penalty)
Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680 (Fla. 2012) (procedural‑bar principles where claims should have been raised on direct appeal)
State v. Johnson, 122 So.3d 856 (Fla. 2013) (finality occurs when U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari)
DiGuilio v. State, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (rigorous harmless‑error standard for constitutional sentencing errors)