LONDON CITY COUNCIL; ANTHONY ORTEGA; DONNA GAIL WILSON HOUSE; JAMES BAKER; JUDD WEAVER; JUSTIN YOUNG; KELLY SMITH GREENE; MAYOR TRACIE HANDLEY; AND THE CITY OF LONDON, KENTUCKY v. RANDALL WEDDLE
NO. 2025-CA-1269-MR
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
JULY 10, 2026
RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT, HONORABLE DAVID WILLIAMS, SPECIAL JUDGE, ACTION NO. 25-CI-00864
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: This appeal challenges the Laurel Circuit Court‘s overturning the London City Council‘s removal of Randall Weddle (“Weddle“) as mayor and the court‘s reinstatement of Weddle to office. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the circuit court‘s judgment and remand with directions to
FACTS
Weddle was elected Mayor of London, Kentucky in November 2022.
In early July 2025, Weddle presided over a regular meeting of the London City Council (“the city council“). During this meeting, Chris Robinson (“Robinson“) of the City of London Tourism and Convention Commission (“the tourism commission“) spoke to the city council about efforts to rebuild structures at the local fairgrounds following a recent tornado.
Robinson indicated some insurance claims were still pending and mentioned plans to take out a loan for five million dollars for rebuilding the fairgrounds. He also stated that the mayor would sign loan documents because city property would be affected. Council members asked some questions about the loan, including asking if loan documents were available for review. Robinson replied he did not have the documents with him. Robinson‘s presentation ended without any motion being made оr vote taken by the city council.
The day after this early July city council meeting, Weddle signed documents to mortgage city property, including the Levi Jackson Wilderness Road Park (“the park“), to secure a loan of five million dollars. These documents included a Loan Agreement between the tourism commission as borrower, the City
In August 2025, the city council issued resolutions charging Weddle with misconduct. (The charges issued were civil in nature and did not initiate criminal prosecution.)
A public hearing on the misconduct charges occurred on September 5, 2025. At the end of this hearing, the city council voted unanimously to remove Weddle from office on three bases, including Weddle‘s execution of the lоan documents and mortgage on city property without first obtaining city council approval.1
On September 11, 2025, Weddle filed an appeal from his removal with the circuit court. He named as opposing parties the City of London, the city council, acting mayor Tracie Handley (“Handley“), and individual city council
On September 17, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for a temporary injunction. On September 24, 2025, the court entered an order granting the motion for an expedited briefing schedule and denying the motion for a temporary injunction.
Also, on September 24, 2025, the London parties filed a partial motion to dismiss and an answer. These filings asserted, inter alia, that Handley and the City of London were not properly served notice of the action and/or were not properly served with process because they were served by the acting chief of police instead of the sheriff.
On September 29, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Weddle‘s appeal. On this same date, the court also entered a terse written order concluding that the city council fаiled to present sufficient grounds for removing Weddle from office and immediately reinstating Weddle as mayor.2
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in determining the city council failed to present sufficient grounds for Weddle‘s removal. So, Appellants essentially challenge the circuit court‘s resolution of questions of law including the sufficiency of the stated grounds for removal in light of applicable legal authority. Thus, since purely or primarily legal issues are involved, we review the circuit court‘s conclusion that sufficient grounds for Weddle‘s removal did not exist de novo—meaning without deference. See, e.g., Seeger v. Lanham, 542 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Ky. 2018) (questions of law, such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo); Wheeler v. City of Pioneer Village, 723 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Ky. 2025) (statutory interpretation is a question of law to be reviewed de novo).3
Except in cities of the first class,6 any elected officer, in case of misconduct, incapacity, or willful neglect in thе performance of the duties of his or her office, may be removed from office by a unanimous vote of the members of the legislative body exclusive of any member to be removed, who shall not vote in the deliberation of his or her removal. No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing. The officer, if removed, shall have the right to appeal to the Circuit Court of the county and the appeal shall be on the record. No officer so removed
shall be eligible to fill the office vacated before the expiration of the term to which originally elected.
Appellants contend Weddle was properly removed for misconduct or willful neglect. They argue Weddle‘s signing the mortgage pledging city property as collateral and other loan-related documents without prior city council approval violates various statutory or constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
The city council charged Weddle with misconduct for signing loan documents, including a mortgage on city property, without first obtaining the city council‘s approval. The city council emphasizes on appeal that no motion was made, and no vote was taken following Robinson‘s discussion of loan and mortgage-related matters at the July 7, 2025, meeting. Weddle asserts, however, that he was fully transparent about the loan transaction. He also suggests the city council effectively approved the loan transaction and mortgage by not raising objections after Robinson‘s discussion of the loan.10
Having reviewed the recording of the city council meeting held on July 7 of 2025, Robinson did speak briefly about the loan and said that the mayor would need to sign documents because city property was affected. However, as previously noted, a city council member asked whether the loan documents were available for review, and Robinson said he had not brought the documents with him. (The Appellants emphasize the mortgage and loan documents were not provided to them in their initial brief.) Moreover, we note there was no mention during Robinson‘s presentation to the city council at the July 7 meeting that the
In any event, whether full disclosure was provided or not, the city council did not vote to approve the mortgage/loan transaction.
City Council Did Not Vote to Approve the Mortgage/Loan Transaction
Weddle emphasizes attorneys for both the city council and the City of London were present at the July 7 meeting and that the bank prepared the documents about the loan. He suggests the attorneys assented to the deal, although he does not dispute that no motiоn was made, or vote taken by the city council. Weddle also contends that if the city council wanted to express disagreement, they should have voiced an objection or called for a vote. He suggests the city council acted unfairly by simply waiting until after he signed the documents to charge him with misconduct and seek to remove him.
Notwithstanding Weddle‘s contentions, we reject any assertion that the loan transaction was approved by the city council. The minutes of the July 7, 2025, regular city council meeting clearly state that no motion was made, and no vote was taken following Robinson‘s presentation to the сity council. (Moreover,
A city council acts only through its formal records which “constitute the only legal evidence of all that was done аnd that nothing more was done.” Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. General Distillers Corp. of Kentucky, 257 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Ky. 1953). Thus, it cannot be bound by an implied promise.
Moreover, Weddle‘s perception that the attorneys present assented to the deal is irrelevant. See Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 209 (“Regardless of Snowden‘s inferences or beliefs, Gullette‘s words, as City Attorney, could not bind the City to take particular action[.]“).
In short, the city council did not approve the mortgage/loan transaction before Weddle signed the documents at issue on July 8, 2025. Now we address the parties’ arguments about whether the city council‘s approval was required by law before Weddle signed the documents. We conсlude it was.
Appellants assert that a debt was created by Weddle‘s executing the loan agreement and the mortgage placed on city property to secure such a debt. They argue to the extent that such a debt is authorized by Kentucky law, it would be as a bond of the city which must be enacted by ordinance to permit such a debt. See
Appellants also suggest that incurring debt is an inherently legislative function. By analogy, they point out that incurring debt for the Commonwealth is a legislative matter under the Constitution of Kentucky. See
In the mayor-city council form of municipal government (as in London), the mayor is the executive authority, and the city council is the legislative authority.
The city council has the right to investigate city government activities.
Moreover, Weddle‘s actions in signing the mortgage and loan documents affected city resources, including the park. See
Weddle, on the other hand, argues that the city council‘s approval was not specifically required by state law. He contends Appellants fail to cite any authority which specifically required that he obtain the city council‘s approval before he executed the documents at issue.
Weddle asserts he did not bind the city to pay any amount of money because the tourism commission agreed to make the loan payments, although he admits the mortgage was secured by city property. See
Weddle also points out the tourism commission is a special purpose government entity with separate policy-making authority and independent authority to generate public funds, and which may receive and expend public funds. See
However, local tourism commissions are established by local governing bodies, receive funding from such local governing bodies, and must be included in the local governing bodies’ annual budgets.
In addition to contending that the tourism commission (not the city) was responsible for making loan payments, Weddle asserts that, despite the mortgaging of city property, it is unlikely that the city would incur any liability from the loan/mortgage transaction. For example, he argues it is unlikely the city would lose the park in the event the tourism commission defaults on its payment obligation13 because of a clause in the park‘s deed of conveyance to the city providing that the property will revert to the Commonwealth if the property is no longer used as a рublic park.
However, even if the tourism commission makes all loan payments and even if it is unlikely that the city would ever lose the park in foreclosure, we agree with Appellants that the mortgage/loan transaction was still a debt impacting the city for which the city council‘s approval was required before execution of the mortgage and associated loan documents.
Here, however, there was not simply a lien on revenues from the property for which funds were sought for improvement (the fairgrounds)—instead, the transaction at issue involved mortgaging separate valuable real property owned by the city (the park).15
City property, including the park, was pledged as collateral to secure a loan for five million dollars to refurbish the fairgrounds. This clearly imposed a risk that valuable city property could be forfeited, or that the city might incur
We reject Weddle‘s assertion that there was simply a disagreement about whether the city council‘s approval was necessary—an insufficient basis for removal in his estimаtion.18 Kentucky law clearly required the city council‘s approval before Weddle executed the mortgage and loan agreement.
Next, we address the parties’ arguments about whether Weddle‘s execution of the documents without the required approval of the city council was sufficient to support a finding of misconduct or willful neglect pursuant to
Weddle‘s Signing the Mortgage and Loan Documents Without Obtaining Prior City Council Approval was Sufficient to Support the Finding of Misconduct or Willful Negleсt
Appellants point out that Weddle admitted in his testimony that: “generally, when signing any documents with the banks, we have to have minutes of the meeting or resolution. I had neither in my hand, but I proceeded on at that point.” (Transcript of 9/5/2025 public meeting, page 91.)
Appellants contend Weddle knew approval was required but declined to ask for a vote because he feared the city council would oppose the loan transaction. They also point out that the loan agreement, mortgage, and assignment of rents and leases19 signed by Weddle all contained warranties and/or representations about the transaction being duly authorized. (The loan agreement
Appellants assert Weddle engaged in misconduct by committing fraud against the bank as well as violating statutes in executing the documents without obtaining the city council‘s approval of the mortgage/loan transaction.
They admit the term misconduct is not defined in
On the other hand, Weddle submits that perhaps the mortgage/loan transaction was void due to his failure to obtain city council approval before signing the documents. See generally Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 206-07. But he argues that his executing documents in a void transaction does not harm the city and should not be considered misconduct or willful neglect on his part.
However, as Appellants point out, longstanding precedent holds that misconduct relating to financial irregularities may be properly found to support
Even if perhaps some minor violations of statutes or minor departures from best financial management practices might not always amount to sufficient misconduct or willful neglect to support removal, Weddle‘s undisputably executing documents mortgaging city property to secure a long-term multi-million-dollar loan without obtaining city council approval beforehand supports the city council‘s finding of misconduct or willful neglect. This unauthorized action created a risk that valuаble city property, enjoyed by the citizens of London and the general public, would be forfeited or that significant taxpayer-funded resources must be utilized to defend against any such forfeiture for a period of approximately thirty years. This was not a de minimis failure to observe procedural niceties nor an insignificant commitment of city resources.
The circuit court erred in determining there were no sufficient grounds to remove the mayor from office and therefore erred in overturning the removal and reinstating Weddle.
Moreover, Weddle‘s execution of the mortgage, assignment, and loan document without obtaining рrior city council approval was, by itself, sufficient grounds for removal for misconduct and/or willful neglect. Thus, we decline to discuss or opine upon the other bases for removal found by the city council.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the circuit court‘s judgment, VACATE Weddle‘s reinstatement, and REMAND with directions to enter an order affirming the city council‘s removal of Weddle from office.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
Christopher Wiest
Theodore Roberts
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Carmine G. Iaccarino
Lexington, Kentucky
Notes
See also generally Arnett v. City of Stanton, No. 2007-CA-000266-MR, 2008 WL 4091014, at *3 (Ky. App. Sep. 5, 2008) (unpublished) (appeal from circuit court order affirming city council‘s decision to remove mayor, and stating the issues raised by the mayor—alleged lack of due process and the city council‘s allegedly acting from improper political motives and failing to comply with Open Meetings laws—were questions of law subject to de novo standard of review).
This unpublished opinion is not binding authоrity pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP“) 40(D) and RAP 41(A), but we may consider it as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company v. Badall, 707 S.W.3d 10, 17 n.4 (Ky. App. 2025).
Another subsection of
Weddle argued to the circuit court that
Long-standing precedent generally indicates that when a court reviews a city officer‘s removal for misconduct, the removal must not be arbitrary or capricious, but instead must be supported by substantial evidence and legally sufficient cause to be upheld in court. See generally Rawlings, 121 S.W.2d at 15-16 (1938). No one has specifically disputed that this principle should apply here despite Rawlings being distinguishable from this case in certain respects.
Rawlings involved the removal of a city manager (not a mayor) pursuant to a then-applicable “City Manager Act” which called for public removal hearings, but which did not
explicitly provide for an appeal in court. Id. at 13-15. Moreover, in conformity with this City Manager Act, Rawlings had not been elected in a citywide election but was instead “elected” by the mayor and two of the four members of the board of commissioners. Id. at 12-13. CompareSee Kirby, 295 S.W. at 1007, discussing the reasoning of out-of-state precedent:
the mortgagee was given the right to foreclose its mortgage against property belonging to the city, and because of that fact it was held that the city might be compelled to pay the debt by surrendering property which belonged to it, and for that reason it was the debt of the city, as much so as if there might have been a remedy by cоmpelling the city to pay the debt with money collected by taxation. Indeed there could be no great difference. In one case the city would be compelled to pay with its property and in the other it would be compelled to pay with the money obtained through taxation. If the property which would have to be used to pay the debt had previously been obtained by taxation, it would be a payment of the debt by the municipality. Such an indebtedness is an indebtedness of the municipality within the meaning of constitutional provisions prohibiting indebtedness beyond a certain sum.