Loch View, LLC v. WindhamLoch View, LLC v. Windham
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court‘s denial of its motion to open the judgment dismissing its 2019 action against the defendant town regarding a municipal tax dispute, claiming that the court failed to exercise its discretion in ruling on that motion or, in the alternative, that it abused its discretion. The court had dismissed the 2019 action pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, on the basis that the plaintiff had filed a previous action in 2016 against the defendant which had not been resolved and the two actions were virtually alike, both actions having been brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights and factual claims. Thereafter, the trial court in the 2016 action denied the plaintiff‘s request for leave to amend its complaint to add a count alleging the constitutional violations that it had asserted in the 2019 action, and the court in the 2019 action denied the plaintiff‘s motion to open the judgment. Held that the trial court exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff‘s motion to open, as it considered and rejected the change in circumstances identified by the plaintiff in its motion, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the court‘s denial of the plaintiff‘s request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action did not require that the judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action be opened; moreover, the plaintiff could still fully and fairly litigate its constitutional claims in the 2016 action, as the plaintiff raised an identical constitutional argument as a special defense to the defendant‘s counterclaim in the 2016 action and the fact that the plaintiff was forced to make its constitutional claim defensively instead of affirmatively did not affect the plaintiff‘s ability to litigate those arguments; furthermore, the court properly considered the interests of judicial economy and efficiency and the need to avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting results in denying the plaintiff‘s motion to open.
BRIGHT, C. J. In this action that arose out of a municipal tax dispute, the plaintiff, Loch View, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to open, modify, and vacate the judgment dismissing the its action against the defendant, the town of Windham.1 Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court either failed to exercise its discretion or abused its discretion in denying its motion to open.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as summаrized in the court‘s memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. ‘‘On July 2, 2009, [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] entered into a written tax fixing agreement [agreement] whereby [the defendant] agreed to set municipal taxes on two parcels of property on Main Street in Windham at a discounted rate in exchange for [the plaintiff] taking over the properties and investing a certain amount of money into the redevеlopment of those properties. To ensure that [the plaintiff was] meeting its obligations under the tax fixing agreement, the agreement require[d] [the plaintiff] to provide periodic reports and documentary evidence to [the defendant] demonstrating that [the plaintiff was] in fact making the required investments in the properties. The [agreement] provide[d] [the defendant] with the right to cancel the [agreement] and recoup any tax benefits provided to [the plaintiff] should [thе defendant] determine that [the plaintiff was] not living up to its investment commitments. In 2016, [the defendant] determined that [the plaintiff] was not living up to its obligations under the [agreement] and therefore [the defendant] sought to exercise what [it] viewed as its right to retroactively reassess the relevant properties in order to recoup the tax benefits provided to [the plaintiff] under the agreement.‘’
Thereafter, in Loch View, LLC v. Windham, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6149827-S, the plаintiff commenced an action challenging the defendant‘s termination of the agreement and its attempt to retroactively assess the relevant parcels and charge the plaintiff back taxes (2016 action). The plaintiff specifically alleged that (1) the defendant‘s tax assessments were ‘‘manifestly excessive,‘’ (2) the defendant failed to ‘‘apply uniform percentages to the present true and actual valuation of the properties,‘’ in violation of
The plaintiff subsequently requested and was granted leave to amend its complaint five times in the 2016 action to add additional counts arising out of the defendant‘s retroactive adjustment of taxes with respect to
On April 30, 2019, the defendant filed a counterclaim in the 2016 action, alleging that the plaintiff had breached the agreement and that the defendant was therefore ‘‘entitled to recapture a sum equal to the financial benefit the plaintiff received as a result of reduced tax levies . . . .‘’ The defendant specifically alleged that the plaintiff had failed (1) to meet the financial requirements of the agreement, (2) to pay recaptured taxes pursuant to the agreement, (3) to accurately account for the cost of work done on the parcels, and (4) to provide the town with thorough and semiannual reports pursuant to the agreement. Thereafter, on October 21, 2021, the plaintiff filed an answer to the defendant‘s counterclaim and asserted eight special defenses, including a special defense thаt the defendant‘s actions in terminating the agreement deprived the plaintiff of its constitutional right to challenge the tax assessment and violated its procedural and substantive due process rights.
In 2019, while the 2016 action was pending,4 the plaintiff filed the action underlying this appeal, alleging in a single count that it had been deprived of its constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities (2019 action). The 2019 action specifically alleged that the defendant‘s cancellation of the tax fixing agreement was ‘‘improper, illegаl, arbitrary, and capricious,‘’ that it violated the plaintiff‘s state and federal due process rights, and that it constituted a taking under the United States and Connecticut constitutions. Given that the complaint alleged several federal law claims, the defendant removed the case to federal court. Shortly after its removal, however, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in state court that alleged only state law causes of action, and the case was rеmanded back to state court. The defendant then moved to dismiss the 2019 action in its entirety, pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, arguing that the plaintiff‘s claims in the 2019 action were duplicative of those in the pending 2016 action.
Thereafter, the court, Budzik, J., issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the defendant‘s motion to dismiss. In so ruling, the court concluded that ‘‘both cases require resolution of the same underlying rights and factual claims, specifically, whether [the defendant] properly exercised its rights under the
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend its complaint in the 2016 action, so that it could add the constitutional count that it had asserted in the recently dismissed 2019 action. The court, Cordani, J., denied that request as untimely. The рlaintiff then filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action, alleging that the denial of its request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action constituted a good and compelling reason to open the judgment in the 2019 action. The court denied the plaintiff‘s motion to open, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth below as necessary.
We first set forth our standard of review and the applicable law. ‘‘The principles that govern motions to open . . . a civil judgment are well established. Within four months of the date of the original judgment, Practice Book [§ 17-4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation. . . . The exercise of equitable authority is vested in the discretion of the trial court . . . to grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Newtown v. Ostrosky, 191 Conn. App. 450, 468, 215 A.3d 1212, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 925, 218 A.3d 68 (2019). If a court fails to exerсise its discretion in ruling on a motion to open, that failure to do so is error. See Higgins v. Karp, 243 Conn. 495, 504, 706 A.2d 1 (1998); see also State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 73–74, 640 A.2d 553 (1994) (‘‘[i]n the discretionary realm, it is improper for the trial court to fail to exercise its discretion‘‘).
When a court exercises its discretion in ruling on a motion to open, we review the court‘s decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Dimmock v. Allstate Ins. Co., 84 Conn. App. 236, 241, 853 A.2d 543, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 923, 859 A.2d 577 (2004). ‘‘In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Travis R., 80 Conn. App. 777, 782, 838 A.2d 1000, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 904, 845 A.2d 409 (2004); see also Hall v. Hall, 335 Conn. 377, 396, 238 A.3d 687 (2020) (trial courts enjoy ‘‘broad discretion‘’ in determining whether to grant motion to open).
‘‘The prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dismiss a second case that raises issues currently pending before the court. The pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the same parties, brought to obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be any reason or necessity for bringing the second [action], and, therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious. This is a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in the same jurisdiction.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 247 Conn. 196, 216, 719 A.2d 465 (1998). Under the prior pending action doctrine, the court must determine ‘‘whether the two actions are: (1) exаctly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction; (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine‘s application. . . . If the two actions are exactly alike or lacking in sufficient similarities, the trial court has no discretion. In the former case, the court must dismiss the second action, and in the latter instance, the court must allow both cases to proceed unabated. Where the actions are virtually, but not exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify dismissal of the second action.‘’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 397–98, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009); see also id., 403–404 (holding that, when actions are virtually alike, it is proper to dismiss later action if nonmoving party will not be prejudiced, nonmoving party will have opportunity to litigate claims in prior action, prior action provides remedy for claims, and dismissal of later action serves policy interests behind prior pending action doctrine).
On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the court erred when it denied the plaintiff‘s motion to open because the court failed to exercise its discretion when it ruled on the motion. We disagree.
On the basis of this order, we conclude that, contrary to the plaintiff‘s claim, the court‘s ruling reflects that it exеrcised its discretion when it denied the plaintiff‘s motion. By stating that the plaintiff‘s inability to amend its complaint in the 2016 action did not change the court‘s analysis with regard to its judgment dismissing the 2019 action, the court was essentially saying that it had considered the change in circumstances identified by the plaintiff but that it did not conclude as a matter of law that the change provided a sufficient basis for the court to open the judgment. Thus, because the court considered, and rejected, the changе in circumstances identified by the plaintiff in its motion, the court exercised its discretion in denying that motion.
The plaintiff next claims that, in the event that the court exercised its discretion when ruling on the plaintiff‘s motion, it abused that discretion when it denied the motion. We are not persuaded.
Initially, we observe that the court was not required to consider how the plaintiff chose to prosecute the 2016 action or the rulings made by the court in that case when deciding the plaintiff‘s motion to open. It is undisputed that both actions arose out of the same facts. For whatever reason, when the plaintiff filed its 2016 action it did not allege the constitutional claim that it later asserted in the 2019 action. It also did not seek to amend its complaint in the 2016 action to assert that claim before bringing the 2019 action. The litigation strategy the plaintiff pursued came with attendant risks, and the court in the 2019 action was not required to grant the plaintiff‘s motion to open to save the plаintiff from the consequences of those risks. Furthermore, the court in the present case was not required to effectively undo the denial of the motion to amend by the court in the 2016 action that was found to be untimely and prejudicial to the defendant.5 Parties are not entitled to subvert the decisions of one court by going to a separate court for relief from those decisions, as would have been the case here had the court granted the plaintiff‘s motion to open. Finally, to the extent the plaintiff does not prevail in the 2016 action and believes that the court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend, it can seek appropriate relief on appeal in that action.
We do not think that the fact that the plaintiff must make its constitutional claim defensively, instead of affirmatively, affects the plaintiff‘s ability to litigate its constitutional arguments in the 2016 action. Indeed, regardless of whether its constitutional argument is made as a defense or as an affirmative сlaim, the plaintiff will need to prove the same things to prevail. Additionally, the remedy sought—the nonpayment of the back taxes—is the same regardless of how, procedurally, the plaintiff‘s constitutional argument is raised. In fact, at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff was unable to explain how the affirmative claim that it sought to raise in the 2019 action was substantively different from the constitutional defense that it has alleged in the 2016 action.8 Thus, because the plaintiff still can fully аnd fairly litigate its constitutional arguments in the 2016 action, we disagree with the plaintiff‘s contention that the court in the present case left it without a forum in which to make those arguments. Accordingly, there cannot be an abuse of discretion on that basis.
Finally, the policy concerns that the court considered when dismissing the 2019 action—including the interests in judicial economy and efficiency and the need to avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting results—all remained relevant considerations when it considered the motion to open. Thus, the continued relevance of these policy concerns further supports our conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the court‘s denial of the plaintiff‘s request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action did not require that the court open thе judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.