16 Haw. 351 | Haw. | 1904
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
This is a writ of error to the circuit court of the fourth circuit. The plaintiff in error was convicted at the November term, 1903, of the circuit court of the fourth judicial circuit of' an assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to commit murder upon one Anama. Three assignments of error are here relied upon. As stated in the brief of the plaintiff in error they are as follows: Eirst, no intent to commit murder was shown by the evidence. Second, mistakes in interpretation from Chinese to English were allowed to go to the jury uncorrected over-defendant’s objections. Third, evidence tending to prove the defendant was near the place where the offense was committed was introduced by the prosecution on rebuttal over the defendant’s objections. The testimony shows that Anama was sitting-in his kitchen talking with his wife on the evening of the third day of October, 1903; that about six o’clock or later the plaintiff, in error suddenly entered the kitchen, swiftly approached Anama, seized him by the shoulder, held a pistol near his head and discharged it and then rapidly left the apartment. It was shown that criminal relations had existed between the accused and the wife of Anama; that she had recently put an end to these relations and had forbidden the accused to approach her. The defense was an alibi. In rebuttal of the alibi the prosecu
The first assignment of error relied upon is that no intent to commit murder was shown by the evidence. A preliminary objection is made on behalf of the defendant in error that the errors assigned cannot be raised for the first time in this court,, no exception having been taken at the trial. This was not necessary. This point was settled in Cummings v. Iaukea, 10 Haw. 1. The question presented by this assignment is whether any evidence appears in the record which would support the conviction. We are prohibited from considering the weight of the evidence or any question depending upon the credibility of witnesses. C. L., Sec. 1447. Whether there was any evidence at all, however, is a question of law. Cox v. Drake, 46 N. J. L. 167. The intent to 'commit murder, as is contended by the plaintiff in error, was an essential ingredient of the offense charged and to support the conviction must have been found by the jury as a fact. It is well settled, however, that the intent need not have been shown by direct proof. What is passing in the human mind is rarely to be proved by direct evidence. The law does not require impossibilities. Even if declarations are made by the accused at the time of the commission of an offense, they do not furnish infallible proof of the intent. The intent of a defendant, when it is essential to be shown, is better proved by evidence of his acts than of his declarations. Henderson v. People, 124 Ill. 607. Nor need the intent be shown by direct and positive testimony, as it may be inferred from circumstances. Com. v. People, 116 Ill. 458. “Specific proof of intent is not essential, but the intent may be proved by evidence of the attending facts and circumstances. * * * The jury were justified in taking into consideration the character and manner of the assault; that it was made deliberately with a weapon capable of producing death.” Weaver v. People, 132 Ill. 536. The intent may be inferred from the nature of the weapon. Doolittle v. State, 93 Ind. 272. “The intent with which the act was done is a question of fact either to be shown by the declarations of the
The second assignment of error as above quoted is as the same is stated in the brief of the plaintiff in error. In the assignment of errors the error is stated as follows: “V. That the trial court erred in ruling as follows during the cross-examination of Fong Ting, (p. 49 of evidence). Mr. Smith: Now if the court please, I have listened to what has been given by the interpreter for some time and two parties have come to me and- said there were misinterpretations. I suppose they are misinterpretations. T came from supper at half past five.’ The interpreter put it to the jury, "I came from Avork at half past five.’ If it were an immaterial matter I Avould not make any objection, but as it is material I must object to the interpretations that have been giAren. Argument by counsel. The court, questions the interpreter. The court: Proceed.” This presents-no question of law. The assignment shoivs merely an objection by counsel. No exception appears to haA^e been taken to the-ruling of .the court, nor was any effort made to show by testimony that the interpretation was wrong. As the mutter stood the question of the competency of the interpreter Avas a question of fact. The finding, even if a proper foundation Avere laid, could not be revieAved on error. Competency of a juror, even, cannot be examined onia writ of error on the ground that the question is one of fact only. In re Buchanan, 158 U. S. 31. As to the oath of the interpreter, no sufficient showing has been made to OA^ercome the presumption that he was sAvorn before entering upon the discharge of his duty. Com. v. Kane, 108 Mass. 423; Nofire v. U. S., 164 U. S. 657.
The third ground of error relied upon arises on the sixth, seventh and eighth assignments. The plaintiff in error con
We find no error in the record. The writ of error is dismissed.