Licking Hts. Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)Licking Hts. Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
{¶ 1} This is a real-property-tax case on appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), in which the BTA adopted the property value stated in an appraisal report presented by appellee Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education (“BOE”). On appeal, the property owner, appellant, CK at Broad, L.L.C./CK Property Group, L.L.C. (“CK at Broad”), raises two jurisdictional challenges to the decision below. CK at Broad argues that its withdrawal of the complaint it originally filed for tax year 2011 deprived appellee Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) of jurisdiction to proceed on the BOE’s countercomplaint. In the alternative, CK at Broad argues that the BOR’s jurisdiction was limited to consideration of the land value, because CK at Broad’s original complaint contested the value of the land and not the value of the improvements. We disagree with both arguments, and we therefore affirm the BTA’s decision.
I. Background
{¶ 2} CK at Broad initiated this case by filing, on March 29, 2012, a complaint challenging the 2011 value of the subject property’s land, but not the building constructed thereon. The BOE responded by filing its countercomplaint on May 20, 2012. At the BOR hearing, CK at Broad’s counsel explained that he had filed the complaint challenging only the value of the land based on the mistaken assumption that the Franklin County auditor had assessed more land than was actually part of the parcel.
{¶ 3} In fact, counsel discovered, all the land assessed was part of the parcel as of January 1, 2011. As counsel explained, a property split was performed in November 2011, under which 5.966 acres of land was transferred to neighboring parcels, leaving only 1.154 acres for the parcel at issue, on which the building—a bank—was situated. For that reason, counsel withdrew the complaint in 2014.
{¶ 4} The BOE decided, however, to proceed to seek a value increase through
{¶ 5} The BOE presented the appraisal report and testimony of its appraiser, Thomas Sprout, and CK at Broad defended with the testimony and report of its appraiser, Samuel Koon, as to a land value for 2012. Counsel also placed into the record a 2011 land appraisal by Koon, which had been based on the erroneous understanding of the acreage to be assessed.
{¶ 6} The BOR convened on August 7, 2015, to decide the case. Relying on the premise that “it’s land value that was actually in question,” the BOR adopted Sprout’s land value, $2,625,000, for 2011, while retaining the building value at the auditor’s original valuation of $716,800, for a total value of $3,341,800 (a reduction from the $3,485,000 original total value determined by the auditor). Using a similar premise for 2012, 2013, and 2014, the BOR compared Koon’s 2012 value for the 1.154 acres of land with the auditor’s original land value of $804,300, and retained the auditor’s original land value added to the auditor’s value for the building of $716,800, for a “no change” total value of $1,521,100.
{¶ 7} The BOE appealed to the BTA, which considered the case on the record of the BOR proceedings. Although the BTA agreed with the BOR that there was jurisdiction to hear the case under the countercomplaint alone, the BTA held, contrary to the holding of the BOR, that both land and improvement value was at issue under the countercomplaint. The BTA adopted Sprout’s appraisal values of $4,300,000 for 2011 and $2,700,000 for 2012 and 2013. CK at Broad has appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the BTA to have so ruled.1
II. Analysis
The voluntary dismissal of a complaint filed under R.C. 5715.19(A) does not retroactively invalidate a complaint filed under R.C. 5715.19(B)
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} But although the official complaint form uses the term “countercomplaint,” as does our case law, that word does not appear in the statute itself. Instead, both
{¶ 10} Using this terminology, the sequence of events in this case can be described as follows. First, CK at Broad filed an A complaint for tax year 2011 in March 2012. Next, while the A complaint was still pending, the BOE filed a B complaint for tax year 2011 in May 2012. For a period of time, both the A complaint and the B complaint were pending. Then, CK at Broad decided to dismiss its A complaint, while the BOE decided to seek an increase in value under its B complaint. CK at Broad argues that the voluntary dismissal of its A complaint divested the BOR and the BTA of jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under the B complaint.
{¶ 11} In support of its position, CK at Broad cites C.I.A. Properties v. Cuyahoga Cty. Aud., 89 Ohio St.3d 363, 731 N.E.2d 680 (2000). In that case, a board of education filed an A complaint and a property owner filed a B complaint. But the board of education’s A complaint was submitted on behalf of the board by an officer who was not a lawyer. As a result, the A complaint failed to invoke the board of revision’s jurisdiction. Id. at 365, citing Sharon Village, Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932 (1997). Regarding the board of revision’s jurisdiction over the property owner’s B complaint, we stated:
When a complaint filed with a board of revision pursuant to former
R.C. 5715.19(A) is dismissed because it is jurisdictionally defective, a counter-complaint filed pursuant toR.C. 5715.19(B) must also be dismissed because the counter-complaint does not vest a board of revision with jurisdiction independent of the original complaint.
C.I.A. at syllabus.
{¶ 12} CK at Broad argues that our reasoning in C.I.A. means that even a voluntary dismissal deprives a B complaint of its jurisdictional basis. On the other hand, the BOE contends that C.I.A. turned on the failure of the original complaint to invoke the board of revision’s jurisdiction.
{¶ 13} There is much in the C.I.A. decision to support CK at Broad’s position on this issue. The syllabus states that the B complaint vests a board of revision with no “jurisdiction independent of the original complaint,” and, citing
{¶ 14} That said, the present appeal does address a very different situation from that in C.I.A. Undoubtedly, C.I.A. is controlling authority in a case in which the A complaint is jurisdictionally defective, and we have no trouble concluding that by extension, a voluntary dismissal of an A complaint before the filing of a B complaint would also remove the jurisdictional basis for the filing of the B complaint. In
{¶ 15} Applying C.I.A. to the present situation would require a significant further step that we do not think is justified by the language and purpose of
{¶ 16} In this case, the BOE advanced its own independent objection to the auditor’s original valuation, which it supported with appraisal evidence, and
{¶ 17} We apply the time-of-filing doctrine to this case, and accordingly, we conclude that the voluntary dismissal of the A complaint long after the B complaint had been filed did not deprive the BOR and the BTA of jurisdiction to consider the BOE’s claim, in the B complaint, for an increased value. Unlike the jurisdictional defect in the A complaint in C.I.A., the voluntary dismissal of the A complaint by the owner in this case was not a circumstance in existence at the time the B complaint was filed; as a result, it had no jurisdictional impact on the validity of the B complaint.
The administrative tribunals’ jurisdiction under the BOE’s complaint was not limited to determining land value
{¶ 18} CK at Broad argues that even if the BOR retained jurisdiction over the countercomplaint, its jurisdiction under the B complaint was limited to determining the land value, because the A complaint on its face contested only the land value. We disagree.
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} This approach accords with the broader doctrine that the claim of value set forth in the original complaint does not limit the scope of the tribunal’s determination of property value. The BTA’s statutory duty in an appeal from a board of revision is to determine value.
{¶ 21} The cases CK at Broad relies upon are inapposite. Both Dayton-Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, and Polaris Amphitheatre Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-2454, 889 N.E.2d 103, involve a limitation on this court’s appellate jurisdiction, not a limitation on the jurisdiction of the boards of revision or the BTA, to determine both land and improvement value. The reasoning of those decisions depends upon the peculiarities of former
{¶ 22} For these reasons, we hold that the BOR and the BTA had jurisdiction to consider the BOE’s claim for increased value pursuant to its “B complaint” and that the determination of value under that complaint was not limited to the value of the land.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA.
Decision affirmed.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEGENARO, J.
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting.
{¶ 24} Respectfully, I dissent.
{¶ 25} When a property owner files a
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 26} In March 2012, CK at Broad, L.L.C./CK Property Group, L.L.C., filed a complaint seeking a reduction in the value of certain land in Franklin County for tax year 2011 but not the value of a building on it, and in May 2012, Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education (“BOE”) filed a countercomplaint seeking to retain the auditor’s valuation of both the land and the building.
{¶ 27} In 2014, CK at Broad withdrew its complaint, and thereafter, the BOE maintained it had the right to pursue an increase in the value of the entire property through its complaint. CK at Broad argued that Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the BOE complaint because CK at Broad had withdrawn its complaint and even if the BOR had jurisdiction, it was limited to considering only the value of the land. The BOR concluded it had jurisdiction to determine the value of the land for tax years 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014; it then reduced the auditor’s land valuation for tax year 2011 and retained the auditor’s land valuation for 2012, 2013, and 2014.
{¶ 28} The BOE appealed, and the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) concluded that “the BOR properly exercised jurisdiction over the BOE’s countercomplaint” but “improperly disregarded the appraised values offered for the subject improvements by the BOE.” The BTA increased the value of the property for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013 but determined that the BOR lacked jurisdiction to determine the value for tax year 2014 for reasons unrelated to this appeal.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 29}
{¶ 30} In C.I.A. Properties v. Cuyahoga Cty. Aud., 89 Ohio St.3d 363, 365, 731 N.E.2d 680 (2000), this court considered whether a complaint “filed with a county board of revision pursuant to
When a complaint filed with a board of revision pursuant to * * *
R.C. 5715.19(A) is dismissed because it is jurisdictionally defective, a counter-complaint filed pursuant toR.C. 5715.19(B) must also be dismissed because the counter-complaint does not vest a board of revision with jurisdiction independent of the original complaint.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 31} Although the majority acknowledges that “[t]here is much in the C.I.A. decision to support” the position that the withdrawal of a
In a related context, we have held that jurisdiction over a valuation complaint should be determined in light of the facts and circumstances as of the point in time that the complaint is filed, with the result that later events will not be given the effect of retroactively invaliding the complaint. Soyko Kulchystsky, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 141 Ohio St.3d 43, 2014-Ohio-4511, 21 N.E.3d 297, ¶ 29-30.
(Emphasis sic.) Majority opinion at ¶ 16. And the majority concludes that C.I.A. does not apply because “[u]nlike the jurisdictional defect in the A complaint in C.I.A., the voluntary dismissal of the A complaint by the owner in this case was not a circumstance in existence at the time the B complaint was filed * * * .” Majority opinion at ¶ 17.
{¶ 32} However, the timing of the dismissal of the A complaint does not alter the fact that pursuant to C.I.A., a B complaint does not vest the board of revision with any jurisdiction independent of the A complaint. This case is controlled by our decision in C.I.A.
{¶ 33} Moreover, the facts and the holding of Soyko Kulchystsky are distinguishable. That case involved
{¶ 34} Here, CK at Broad filed a complaint pursuant to
{¶ 35} Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the BTA and reinstate the auditor’s valuations for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
DEGENARO, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, and Kimberly G. Allison, for appellee Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education.
Sleggs, Danziger & Gill, Co., L.P.A., and Todd W. Sleggs, for appellant.