C.I.A. PROPERTIES, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY AUDITOR ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-1326
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted April 12, 2000 — Decided July 26, 2000
89 Ohio St.3d 363 | 2000-Ohio-192
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 94-N-251.
Tаxation—Real property valuation—When complaint filed with board of revision pursuant to former
When a complaint filed with a board of revision pursuant to former
{¶ 1} In December 1991, appellant, C.I.A. Properties, filed a complaint pursuаnt to
{¶ 2} While the 1991 case was pending, the board of education filed a complaint with the board of revision pursuant to
{¶ 3} The Board of Tax Appeals sua sponte dismissed C.I.A.‘s appeal. It reasoned that the 1992 complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it was signed and filed by a non-attorney, and, therefore, the counter-complaint was also invalid.
{¶ 4} The case is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy J. Kollin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Board of Revision and Auditor.
Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Karrie M. Kalail and David H. Seed, for appellee South Euclid/Lyndhurst City School District Board of Education.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 5} Former
{¶ 6} After receiving notice of the complaint, a property owner or board of education may file a counter-complaint in support of, or objecting to the amount of the alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation,
{¶ 7} The issue we are asked to determine is whether a cоunter-complaint filed with a county board of revision pursuant to
{¶ 8} Pursuant to statute, boards of revision have been given jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints filed with it pursuant to
{¶ 9} We have stated that to be jurisdictionally valid, a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 10} In this case, the complaint filed by the South Euclid/Lyndhurst School District Board of Education was signed and filed by a non-attorney. As a result, the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision was without jurisdiction to render a decision on the complaint. The question before us, however, is not whether the board of revision had jurisdiction to render a decision on the original complaint, but whether the board of revision had jurisdiction to render a decision on the counter-complaint once the original complaint was found to be jurisdictionally defective.
{¶ 11} As previously indicated, the power of a board of revision to issue a decision on a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 12} Given that the counter-complaint is a response tо a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 13} We conclude that the Board of Tax Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal because it did not have jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits. Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
COOK, J., dissents and would reverse the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 14} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s decision, but concur in the dismissal of C.I.A. Properties‘s complaint.
{¶ 15} I believe that a plain, common sense reading of
“Within thirty days after receiving such notice, a board of eduсation [or] a property owner * * * may file a complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation,
or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objeсting to the current valuation. Upon the filing of a complaint under this division, the board of education or the property owner shall be made a party to the action.”
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Furthermore,
{¶ 18} The majority now creates a distinction between a complaint that is filed before March 31 and one that is filed after March 31, although no such distinction exists in the statute. A second complaint filed before March 31 will be judged on its own merits without regard to the validity of the original complaint. However, the majority makes the validity of a second complaint, if filed after March 31, dependent upon the validity of the original complaint. Yet, there is no statutory language thаt distinguishes between the two complaints.
{¶ 19} I do not believe that the second complaint serves merely as an answer, but rather, is synonymous with a counterclaim in a civil action. A counterclaim is independent and stands on its own. Dismissal of the initial claim does not dispose of a counterclaim. Civ.R. 41. It must be considered on its own merits.
{¶ 20} Similarly, a “countercomplaint” (a word that does not exist in the statute but appears to have been adopted by the majority from a standardized filing form) is an independent right and action. The second complaint may object to the allеgations of the previously filed complaint and may be “in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current valuation.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 21} The majority is simply incorrect in finding that “the sole function of the counter-complaint is to address the issues raised in a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 22} One of the purposes of enacting
{¶ 23} In the absence of statutory language that distinguishes a second complaint filed before March 31 and one filed after March 31, the majority has now created two separate species of second complaints. A second complaint filed before March 31 has super immunity; it is immune from the invalidity of the original complaint. A second complaint filed after March 31 has only limited immunity; the immunity of the second complaint filed after March 31 is dependent upon the validity of the original complaint. The statute makes no such differentiation, and I do not believe the General Assembly intended such a distinction.
{¶ 24} The majority‘s position leads to another patently unfair result. By dismissing the second complaint on the basis that the original complaint was jurisdictiоnally defective, this second complainant is foreclosed from filing a complaint for the interim period. In Elkem Metals Co., L.P. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 693 N.E.2d 276, this court held that a complaint is considered filed for purposes of
{¶ 25} According to the majority, the second complaint is dismissed based upon the jurisdictional infirmity of the original complaint despite the fact that the second complaint may be meritorious. Yet the second party is prohibited from refiling for three years and is prejudiced by the errors of an adverse party. What is to prevent an adverse party from intentionally filing a jurisdictionally defective complaint to keep opposing parties from challenging an assessment for an entire interim period?
{¶ 26} Nevertheless, I believe that C.I.A. Properties‘s complaint is jurisdictionally defective for another reason. In this case, C.I.A. Properties had filed a cоmplaint challenging the property valuation in 1991. It should not be permitted to file another complaint in 1992 within the interim triennial period. Because
{¶ 27} Consequently, I would hold that a complaint filed in response to an
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.