C.I.A. PROPERTIES, APPELLANT, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY AUDITOR ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-1326
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted April 12, 2000 — Decided July 26, 2000
89 Ohio St.3d 363 | 2000-Ohio-192
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 94-N-251.
When a complaint filed with a board of revision pursuant to former
{¶ 2} While the 1991 case was pending, the board of education filed a complaint with the board of revision pursuant to
{¶ 3} The Board of Tax Appeals sua sponte dismissed C.I.A.‘s appeal. It reasoned that the 1992 complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it was signed and filed by a non-attorney, and, therefore, the counter-complaint was also invalid.
{¶ 4} The case is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right.
Fred Siegal Co., L.P.A., and Annrita S. Johnson, for appellant.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy J. Kollin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Board of Revision and Auditor.
Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Karrie M. Kalail and David H. Seed, for appellee South Euclid/Lyndhurst City School District Board of Education.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 6} After receiving notice of the complaint, a property owner or board of education may file a counter-complaint in support of, or objecting to the amount of the alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in the previously filed complaint. Id. The county auditor shall then present all complaints to the county board of revision.
{¶ 7} The issue we are asked to determine is whether a counter-complaint filеd with a county board of revision pursuant to
{¶ 8} Pursuant to statute, boards of revision have been given jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints filed with it pursuant to
{¶ 10} In this case, the complaint filed by the South Euclid/Lyndhurst School District Board of Education was signed and filed by a non-attorney. As a result, the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision was without jurisdiction to render a decision on the complaint. The question before us, however, is not whether the board of revision had jurisdiction to render a decision on the original complaint, but whether the board of revision had jurisdiction to render a decision on the counter-complaint once the original complaint was found to be jurisdictionally defective.
{¶ 11} As previously indicated, the power of a board of revision to issue a decision on a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 12} Given that the counter-complaint is a response to a complaint filed pursuant tо
{¶ 13} We conclude that the Board of Tax Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal because it did not have jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits. Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
COOK, J., dissents and would reverse the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 14} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s decision, but concur in the dismissal of C.I.A. Properties‘s complaint.
“Within thirty days after receiving such notice, a board of education [or] a property оwner * * * may file a complaint in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current valuation. Upоn the filing of a complaint under this division, the board of education or the property owner shall be made a party to the action.”
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Furthermore,
{¶ 18} The majority now creates a distinction between a complaint that is filed before March 31 and one that is filed after March 31, although no such distinction exists in the statute. A second complaint filed before March 31 will be judged on its own merits without regard to the validity of the original complaint. However, the majority makes the validity of a second complaint, if filed after March 31, dependent upon the validity of the original complaint. Yet, there is no statutory language that distinguishes between the two comрlaints.
{¶ 20} Similarly, a “countercomplaint” (a word that does not exist in the statute but appears to have been adopted by the majority from a standardized filing form) is an independent right and action. The second complaint may object to the allegations of the previously filed сomplaint and may be “in support of or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to the current valuation.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 21} The majority is simply incorrect in finding that “the sole function of the counter-complaint is to address the issues raised in a complaint filed pursuant to
{¶ 22} One of the purposes of enacting
{¶ 24} The majority‘s position leads to another patently unfair result. By dismissing the second complaint on the basis that the original complaint was jurisdictionally defective, this second сomplainant is foreclosed from filing a complaint for the interim period. In Elkem Metals Co., L.P. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 693 N.E.2d 276, this court held that a complaint is considered filed for purposes of
{¶ 25} According to the majority, the second complaint is dismissed based upon the jurisdictional infirmity of the original complaint despite the fact that the second complaint may be meritorious. Yet the second party is prohibited from refiling for three years and is prejudiced by the errors of an adverse party. What is to prevent an adverse party from intentionally filing a jurisdictionally defective complaint to keep opposing parties from challenging an assessment for an entire interim period?
{¶ 26} Nevertheless, I believe that C.I.A. Properties‘s complaint is jurisdictionally defective for another reason. In this case, C.I.A. Properties had
{¶ 27} Consequently, I would hold that a complaint filed in response to an
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
